New York Times on ISI; Serena Hotel Attack (Plus Update Connecting the Two and Historical Background)

David Rohde and Carlotta Gall deserve huge credit for an outstanding investigative article today on Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. This article makes sense out of all the contradictory indications about the ISI's links to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as well as other armed militant groups. It also covers the ISI's role in domestic politics, including election rigging. It is clear from the article that a military regime cannot (and some will not) control the militants it created and that the military will also not permit civilians to take control of the state. But at least President Bush is hard at work building the broadest possible global alliance against Iranian speedboats and Filipino radio pranksters. Bush reportedly does not believe his own intelligence agencies' report on Iran, as it failed to coincide with what he knows to be true. (More on this from Scott Horton....)

The attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul is a shock for all of us foreigners who have gone there for tea. conferences, or brunch, even if we never stayed there. Like most people who go in and out of the Kabul expatriate community, I imagine, I knew a couple of people who were there -- in my case including some Norwegian diplomats.

News reports mention that this was Afghanistan's only "five-star" hotel. They don't mention that nearly all Afghans live in "zero-star" conditions, including the thousands of people who pass that traffic circle every day and see inaccessible luxury behind thick walls. The rioters attacked the Serena in May 2006, apparently believing that alcohol is served there, though it is not.

I am sure that the people of Kabul don't want more violence in their city. They were badly frightened by the riots in 2006. But there is huge resentment and anger building up at the overbearing foreign presence. The May 2006 riots were sparked by an accident where US military vehicles killed a pedestrian. Afghans see and often do not distinguish among the "Chinese restaurant" brothels and the glittering restaurants (by Afghan standards, not ours) serving luxuries, including alcohol, to foreigners, some of whom are being highly paid to destroy Afghanistan's opium livelihood, which Afghan Islamic figures say is no worse than the alcohol they drink at night after destroying farmers' poppy crops.

Many Afghans think that money that is supposed to be used to help them is instead being used to pay for the good life for foreigners in the Serena hotel. Alas, it is true. When aid donors boast of how much technical assistance they are giving Afghanistan, they provide data on the size of the contracts they have given to consultants. I have spent some of the grant and contract money that pay for my salary and travel expenses on meals and tea at the Serena Hotel. These expenses are counted as someone's assistance to Afghanistan.

This is a new kind of target for the Taliban. Foreigners going to restaurants in Kabul (including some where, unlike the Serena, alcohol is in fact served), sometimes joke that they feel like targets. Up to now, however, they have not been. The Taliban have mostly attacked the international forces and Afghan army, police, and officials, as well as other "collaborators," such as employees on reconstruction projects or public figures who support the government. Sometimes they kill civilians indiscriminately when they attack government buildings (including cases when they killed students in schools). But as far as I know, this is the first attack targeted at the foreign assistance community and the "corrupt" lifestyle it has brought to Afghanistan. I imagine it will not be the last.

Update: AP quotes Amrullah Saleh, head of the National Security Directorate of Afghanistan, as saying that the attack was planned by the network headed by Siraj Haqqani, a native of Khost currently based in the North Waziristan Tribal Agency of Pakistan. So it seems the two posts above might be connected. In case this hypothesis proves true, here is some background.

Haqqani's father, Mawlawi Jalaluddin, was a highly praised mujahidin commander in the 1980s. He was called "Haqqani" because he attended the Deobandi madrasa Haqqaniyya in Akhora Khattak on the Grand Trunk Road between Peshawar and Islamabad, headed by Senator Sami-ul-Haq of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. This madrasa trained many Taliban leaders.

Haqqani was one of the CIA's favorites because of his penchant for "killing Russians" and executing Afghan "communist" prisoners after trial for apostasy. He was one of ten commanders known as "unilaterals" who got aid directly from the CIA, not filtered through the ISI. His huge base (later occupied by al-Qaida) was built by a Pakistani construction company connected to the military and paid for by private Saudi donations (not sure whose, but it could easily have been Bin Laden).

Though not a member of the Taliban core group in southern Afghanistan (he is from the Zadran/Jadran tribe in Khost, in the east), he became an important minister and commander of the Taliban, leading offensives in the Shamali plain north of Kabul in cooperation with al-Qaida.

During the Coalition operation against the Taliban in the fall of 2001, the ISI brought Haqqani to Islamabad several times, offering him to the U.S. as a "moderate Taliban" replacement for Mullah Umar, but Haqqani did not cooperate or at least he didn't deliver. In December 2001 Mawlawi Jalaluddin announced that despite his opposition to the U.S. invasion, now was the time for peace in Afghanistan, and he sent a delegation from the Jadran tribe to attend the inauguration of Hamid Karzai. Someone (reportedly Mawlawi Jaluluddin's rival, Pacha Khan Zadran, though there are other suspects as well) warned the U.S. that Taliban were approaching Kabul, and a U.S. bombing raid killed over 60 elders of the tribe who were on their way to Kabul for reconciliation.

Since that time, Mawlawi Jalaluddin (who may have died -- reports are unclear) and his son Sirajuddin have built up a powerful front based in North Waziristan. The Jadrans remain factionalized and their loyalties have vacillated -- today many are serving in pro-government militias, and cross-border attacks from Waziristan are said to have decreased.

The Haqqanis are considered by the U.S. military to constitute almost a separate operation from (though nominally affiliated with) the Taliban under Mullah Umar. They are one of the pivotal points of cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, as the Haqqanis have close relations with Baitullah Mahsud, Amir of the Pakistani Taliban and commander in South Waziristan.

If anyone believes that the ISI does not know where the Haqqanis are, there is a bridge not far from my office in lower Manhattan I would like to show you.

Historical Note: In May 2002 in Kabul I attended a meeting at the home of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, where he received a delegation from the Jaji tribe in Paktia, neighbors (and at times rivals) of the Jadrans. The Jaji elders reminded Zahir Shah that their fathers and grandfathers had helped his father, Nadir Shah, overthrow a usurper in Kabul, Amir Habibullah Kalakani, known as Bacha-i Saqaw (son of the water carrier) and Khadim-i Din-i Rasul Allah (servant of the religion of the Messenger of God). Habibullah came from the Tajik village of Kalakan north of Kabul, which briefly became a "Maoist" bastion in the early 1980s.

The elders offered to help Zahir Shah evict the Northern Alliance from Kabul, as they had helped his father before him. Zahir Shah said he wanted to work for peace and asked them to participate in the Emergency Loya Jirga scheduled for the following month.

By the way, when Nadir Shah (then Nadir Khan) mobilized the Jajis, Jadrans, Ahmadzais, and Tanis against Amir Habibullah, he was sitting in Waziristan, receiving aid from the British through the political agents in the Tribal Agencies. . . . Read more on this article...

Bush and Palestinian-Israeli Peace Efforts

Bush and Palestinian-Israeli Peace Efforts.
Charles D. Smith
Any doubts as to the president’s sincerity in committing himself to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process were increased, not dispelled, by his performance once he left Israel for Abu Dhabi. There he delivered a speech portrayed by his aides as the “centerpiece” of his Middle East trip. It focused on Iran as the threat to peace and attempted to reassert his commitment to democratic trends in the region. No mention was made of Israel or the Palestinians, a serious disconnect from the reality perceived by his hosts who consider the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli issue, not Iran, as a far greater threat to regional stability and their own security against popular unrest.

Were there any good signs from Bush’s visit to Israel and the West Bank? Upon arriving at Ben-Gurion airport he immediately lambasted Hamas for undermining the Gazan economy, spurring CNN correspondent Ben Wedeman to post a story on babies dying in Gaza hospitals because of the American-backed Israeli blockade of most goods in and out of the area; no similar story appeared in the mainstream media. But Bush’s Israeli hosts were concerned. Prime Minister Olmert’s airport welcome was so effusive that many winced. Olmert had himself given an interview a week before where he had said that many “painful decisions” would be necessary regarding withdrawal from West Bank settlements. The question remains whether the pain Olmert forsees for Israelis by confronting settlers will be sufficient to meet minimum Palestinian expectations regarding the borders of a viable Palestinian state.

To his credit, Bush did speak openly of the need for Israel to end its “occupation” of Arab land. Israelis bristled at the word “occupation.” He referred to a “viable, contiguous, and sovereign” state, indicating that the Israeli right of oversight of Palestinian movements would be curtailed. He also called for the end of settlement building and removal of unauthorized outposts. But much of this can be reinterpreted to mean something quite different than what one might expect.

What does the word “contiguous” signify? Ariel Sharon referred to “transportational contiguity” for Palestinians on the West Bank. He meant that Israeli settlements and bypass roads would remain, some such as Maale Adumim virtually cutting the West Bank in half. Palestinians could connect between the northern and southern areas by means of tunnels under the Israeli bypass roads, overseen by Israeli troops on the roads above. That’s not exactly what contiguity usually means. Olmert himself has referred to contiguity with the idea that Gaza and the West Bank must be connected to form one Palestinian state; no mention of West Bank contiguity that could only be assured by removal of Malae Adumim. Olmert is adamant that that settlement will remain part of Israel.

Indeed, Israel officials can rely on Bush’s April 2004 letter, written with the aid of Elliott Abrams of the NSC, assuring Sharon that the “facts on the ground,” major population areas in the West Bank, could remain part of Israel. But where some might think that referred only to the Etzion and similar blocs close to Jerusalem, Israeli officials appear to have other towns in mind, including Ariel, an town that thrusts well into the northern West Bank and around which the security barrier is being extended. Once Bush had left, Israeli officials said with assurance that major settlement expansion would continue.

In such circumstances, we should not expect that any Palestinian leader, however conciliatory he might wish to be, could accept such a process where the “painful concessions” amounted to very little from a Palestinian perspective. Olmert may fear his settler constituency and civil war if required to abandon many settlements, but Abbas’s position depends on achieving nearly the maximum possible with respect to Israeli-occupied land across the 1967 Green Line.

Interestingly, Secretary of State Condalezza Rice appears more determined to confront the issues than President Bush. She has been cited in the Israeli press as saying that Israeli treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank reminds her of her childhood as a black woman in the American south. Strong stuff. But if Olmert feels he can bypass her and rely on Abrams to get to Bush, he may not feel too threatened.

Under the circumstances, with Bush far more focused on Iran than the Palestinians, we should not expect too much for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Bush has strong emotional ties to Israel, fueled by his helicopter survey of the West Bank with Ariel Sharon in 1998. As the Washington Post reported, Bush viewed the ten-mile width of Israel within its 1967 borders and quipped that there were driveways in Texas longer than that. What the Post did not note was that Bush made that remark at the AIPAC convention in spring 2000 as he appealed for Jewish support in the election campaign.

As Olmert noted in his Jerusalem Post interview, Israel faced the quandary of either withdrawing from much of the West Bank, to ensure a Jewish state, or retaining hold and taking on governance of the Palestinian population, denying the possibility of a Jewish state. Recognizing the dilemma and doing something about it are two different things. It is more likely that Olmert may hope that Palestinian rejection of a supposedly generous offer -recall the fictional narrative of what happened at Camp David 2000- will enable him to evade confrontation with the settlers. But such evasion threatens rather than ensures Israel’s security in the long term. Mahmud Abbas, on his part, must demand almost full Israeli withdrawal or be forced out of office. In such circumstances, what Olmert views as necessary for his political survival, which includes escaping assassination by settlers, will likely be what Abbas cannot accept if he himself wishes to survive.

Serious discussions of these matters may await a new administration. If Democratic, it will likely include Dennis Ross overseeing the supposed peace process. That is not encouraging. Ross essentially falsified the information he gave the American public on the Oslo process and Camp David. He willingly acknowledged to a European audience in Charles Enderlin’s Shattered Dreams [now in English] that Israel was as responsible for the failure of the peace process as the Palestinians. He specifically mentioned Israeli settlement building from 1993 onward to 2000. In his memoir for Americans, The Missing Peace, he never mentions Israeli settlements after the year 1993, thus evading the 1993-2000 period he mentions in Enderlin.

Such an example of bias does not inspire confidence for what might happen beyond the end of this year. We may have to hope for more boldness from Israelis and Palestinians than concrete initiatives from Washington, especially in a presidential election year. Read more on this article...

Let Them Eat Cake

Of course, one needs flour to make cake. Pervez Musharraf recently opined that the flour crisis is not real and that the cost of flour in Pakistan is, in fact, cheaper than neighboring countries. Let it be noted that the price of flour in Pakistan is 3 or 4 times the normal rate and that is only if you can find any. [The BBC Urdu article notes that the price of flour in India is three times lower.] The things are so dire that army troops are guarding wheat shipments. I wonder if our informed commentator, Fareed Zakaria, was served cake while having tea with Musharraf.

It is not hard to imagine what the lack of basic foodstuff, and basic security, can mean for this nation in crisis. Read more on this article...

Fareed Zakaria: Musharraf's Last Stand

Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek has just returned from a trip to Pakistan, where he met with, among others, President Musharraf. The result is one of the best analyses to appear in the media: Musharraf's Last Stand. A few excerpts:

In the past year Pakistan has suffered its worst violence since the riots that followed its founding in 1947. And in the past six months it has careered from one political and constitutional crisis to another, none of which has been resolved, or is likely to be resolved by parliamentary elections scheduled for Feb. 18. . . . In fact, Pakistan is facing two crises—one political and the other security-related. . . .

There is a solution to Pakistan's political crisis, one that will allow Musharraf to leave on a high note. First, he must hold free and fair elections. . . . Musharraf should recognize that he has become far too controversial to be able to lead his nation and should instead recede from power.

That still leaves Pakistan's other, more dangerous, crisis—the new jihad. . . . The most troubling aspect of this wave of terror is that no one in Pakistan seems to understand why it's happening. . . . Theories abound. The Pakistani military was never fully committed to battling jihadists. Having spent decades training fighters for Kashmir and Afghanistan, the Army withdrew support but would not kill or arrest its former charges.

Washington itself bears a significant part of the blame. The Taliban were never really defeated after the fall of Kabul. They simply went into hiding and regrouped, and yet the American Army declared victory and left. . . . The American debate has been, as is often the case, largely removed from reality.

The real question we face in Pakistan is what to do about the upcoming elections to ensure that they are free and fair. We need to walk Musharraf back from a power struggle in which he is pitted against an independent judiciary and democratically elected politicians. And above all we must find a way to work with the Pakistani people and not a handful of generals. Otherwise the intense anti-Americanism in Pakistan—fast rising because of our support for Musharraf—will produce a new wave of jihadists, born in the mountains of the frontier, tested in battle against the Pakistani Army and thirsting to fight the ultimate enemy, thousands of miles away.

Read more on this article...

Erroneous Talking Points on Opium Poppy Crop Eradication in Afghanistan

The major donors and troop contributors to Afghanistan will meet in Tokyo on February 6, 2008, to review progress in Afghanistan. One major theme of the meeting will be counter-narcotics, as opium production increased last year. The U.S. position, as stated in its official counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan, demands forced eradication of a significantly larger portion of the crop, especially in areas under Taliban control. In the absence of aerial eradication, which the Afghan government has rejected, this requires forced eradication, using troops and police to protect manual eradicators and possibly fighting in order to obtain access to areas for eradication. Though there is agreement on many other areas of counter-narcotics policy, many in Afghanistan believe that such forced eradication is likely to backfire and strengthen the insurgency.

I have concluded from my discussions with US officials that they believe that the expansion of the opium economy in southern Afghanistan, and especially in Helmand province, has strengthened the Taliban and that crop eradication would therefore weaken the Taliban by depriving them of funds. I believe that this argument is wrong and that forced eradication in hostile areas will not defund the Taliban or increase security. It will weaken the government and strengthen the insurgency. Eradication is part of a balanced counter-narcotics policy, but gaining control of territory and providing security and starting development come first.

It is wrong to imply, as some US officials do, that the Taliban have become so powerful in Helmand because the GoA failed to implement its CN policy. The Taliban became powerful in Helmand because until 2006 the US put only 150 Special Forces there to catch terrorists and did little to provide security or development to the population. Consequently the government of Afghanistan and aid organizations could not work there. Furthermore, the U.S. ignored warnings about the development of Taliban leadership and infrastructure in Quetta, Pakistan, right across the border, and took at face value the statements of the Government of Pakistan, which, according to Pakistan's Daily Times, are believed by no one in Pakistan itself.

So when the British arrived to lead the NATO deployment to Helmand in 2006, they found that Taliban controlled most of the province, poppy cultivation was expanding because of the lack of government control, and the Taliban were safely ensconced right across the border in Baluchistan. Meanwhile, the U.S. government was focused on Iraq.

Other erroneous talking points on this subject:

1. The US and UNODC claim that poppy cultivation is not related to poverty because southern provinces where poppy is grown are richer than northern provinces where it has been reduced. Wrong. First they are using average income to measure poverty, which is highly inaccurate and not the preferred measure. Even using this flawed measurement, official statistics show that the northern provinces of Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, and Baghlan are all “richer” than the southern province of Qandahar. All seven northern provinces are richer than the southern provinces of Zabul and Uruzgan. The average income in Helmand is indeed estimated to be greater than in Balkh, amounting to $1 per person per day rather than $0.70 per person per day. A dollar a day, the average income in "rich" Helmand, is the internationally accepted definition of destitution. And within each province, the poorest people are the most dependent on poppy cultivation. In any case, the argument against eradication is not bleeding-heart liberal (or Christian) sympathy for the poor. It is analysis that the net result of forced eradication will be greater insecurity and a stronger insurgency with no negative effect on Taliban operations or financing.
2. The US and UNODC claim that the fact that poppy cultivation is concentrated in the south, where the insurgency is, proves that the insurgency grows because of the drug trade. Wrong. Poppy cultivation follows insecurity. Since the Taliban control so much of Helmand,where natural conditions favor poppy cultivation, poppy is grown there. Natural conditions also favor poppy cultivation in Badakhshan and Nangarhar, but because the insurgency is weaker in these provinces, security is better and communities have more alternatives to the drug economy.
   
3. Crop eradication will deprive the Taliban of funds. Wrong. Did the Taliban lack money in 2000-2001, when they decreased opium poppy cultivation by 95%? They continued to tax trafficking of existing stocks. If the government with NATO back-up manages to eradicate in Helmand this year, the first year or two trafficking will continue from stocks. After that, either poppy will be grown elsewhere and trafficked through Helmand, at a higher price, or the government will lose control of Helmand and poppy will come back. Crop eradication does not defund the Taliban.
4. The successful capture of Musa Qala district from the Taliban in northern Helmand shows that eradication will defund the Taliban, because the area had been turned into a heroin production center to fund the Taliban. U.S. Ambassador Wood stated that "in Musa Qala Afghan and international forces found a reported $500 million in street value of drugs warehoused in the district." The use of "street value," (i.e. price to the final consumer in Europe) exaggerates the local value of the drugs by a factor of at least 20. In fact the seized narcotics in Musa Qala show that forced eradication is not necessary for tackling the link between insurgency and narcotics. There was no eradication in Musa Qala. A successful political-military operation (negotiation with Taliban leader Abdul Salaam, who came over to the government side, plus the military operation) enabled the government to get control of the area, seize drugs, and destroy heroin labs. This is interdiction, not eradication. If the government had forcibly eradicated the crop, would Mullah Abdul Salaam have come over to the government side? Would the operation have succeeded? Now the government and international agencies can start programs to help people in Musa Qala and ask them to refrain from planting poppy.
5. Helmand has received so much money in US aid that if it were a country it would be one of the leading aid recipients. This is the kind of argument that sounds good in Washington and rings false in Afghanistan. What is true is that the U.S. has appropriated and partly spent that amount of money for projects in Helmand. The largest project in Helmand is the Kajaki dam hydro-electric project, which I think is the single biggest project in Afghanistan. Much of the money for Helmand has been spent on equipment and operations for the Kajaki Dam, which is not yet operational, largely because the Taliban managed to entrench themselves around it, thanks to the Bush administration's neglect of Afghanistan. No one in Helmand has yet “received” any benefit from these expenditures, so it is deceptive to claim that they are "recipients" of this amount of aid. The implication that Helmandis are greedily enriching themselves off of US aid and then enriching themselves further with poppy (and then asking the Taliban to come and protect them!) is false. It also inflames regional and ethnic conflict in Afghanistan, which is not helpful.

The turning of a major Taliban commander to the government side in Helmand, the successful seizure of large quantities of heroin, and the destruction of about 60 heroin refineries in Musa Qala are successes. Forced crop eradication before the government can provide security and economic opportunity will reverse these successes. Read more on this article...

Half of Pakistanis believe Bhutto Killed by Government: Gallup Pakistan

Husain Haqqani of Boston University, a foreign affairs adviser to the late Benazir Bhutto, writes:

Below please find the first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup, since the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Several things stand out:

• First, that BB’s death has caused across-the-board grief that was not found after the deaths of her father and General Ziaul Haq.
• Second, that a majority of Pakistanis (53%) think the PPP’s decision to select Bilawal Bhutto Zardari as the party Co-Chairperson was correct.
• Third, that 48% of Pakistanis blame either government agencies or politicians linked to the government as responsible for the murder.
  

On most points the conventional wisdom of educated, elite Pakistanis that form the backbone of the US foreign policy community’s interaction with Pakistanis appears to be quite different from widely held public perceptions in Pakistan –a fact borne out by polling data in the past as well. Perhaps one of the many aspects of healing Pakistan is the need to bridge this divide between educated, professional, managerial, urban, well off Pakistan and the rest of the nation.

According to Gallup, “Nearly half of the sample suspected Government agencies (23%) and Government allied politicians (25%). Al-Qaeda or Taliban were suspected by 17%, while 16% suspected other external forces, principally the United States (12%) and India (4%). 19 % said they would not know.” If so many people mistrust their own government, how can that government be an effective US partner in fighting terrorism and winning hearts and minds against Jihadists?

Read Gallup Press Release here. Read more on this article...

“If Americans Are Wise They Would Not Meddle in Iran's Affairs

Calling for the American use of wisdom was Gholamali Haddad Adel, the conservative speaker of the parliament, as he was registering as a candidate for the upcoming March 14 parliamentary elections. “Last time Bush also advised people not to participate in the elections. His suggestions this time will also have the same fate as his last suggestion. If Americans are wise they would not meddle in Iran's Affairs.”

The issue of "U.S support for some groups" in Iran’s elections was also brought up is a January 8 speech given by Ayatollah Khamenei. He said, “The sensitivity of the leadership regarding elections is due to the concern that some individuals find their way to the parliament who have tendencies towards being dominated, weak in front of powers, and passive when facing international agitations.”

Two days later, reacting angrily to the call for the international observation of Iranian elections by the opposition group, Freedom Movement, Ayatollah Khamenei was even more explicit:

“American support for anyone in Iran is a disgrace. Both people and the group for which the president of America has declared his support should think why America wants to support that group and that group had what deficiency that made America to come to its support… We must be careful so that the elections do not become a plaything in the hands of foreigners and political groups and individuals should define their boundaries with the enemy because if these boundaries lose their color or are erased, there is the possibility of the enemy crossing these boundaries or some individuals carelessly falling into the lap of the enemy…Political groups and individuals, along with delineating their boundary with the enemy, must also define their boundary with the hired hands, servants, and individuals who are in the service of the enemy.”

Taking cue, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the current deputy speaker, decided to talk about the “hatred” of the people for groups that are “petrified of” and are supported by foreigners. “The experience of a colored coup in Iran has been defeated and the groups connected to foreigners cannot go up the ladder of elections through agitation and making noise and surrender the country to foreigners.”

All this accusatory and threatening thunder occurred in a week in which candidates for the March 14th parliamentary elections are registering (registration period was extended for a day and will end on Saturday). So the question is what the conservatives, with the protection and cue from Ayatollah Khamenei, are up to. I can think of two objectives; one having to do with transforming the general atmosphere that has characterized recent elections in Iran and second essentially revolving around the conservatives’ campaign strategy.

Regarding the transformation of the atmosphere, I should make clear that Iranian elections (and amazingly this will be the 28th election since the 1979 revolution, counting the first three elections regarding the founding of the Islamic Republic, election of the Constitutional Assembly, and ratification of the constitution) are always raucous with lots of accusations flying around from all sides. But the periods leading to elections, particularly in the past few elections, are usually periods when a conversational space opens and many issues regarding the manner elections are held, the vetting process, handicapping of many political players, constraints imposed to prevent a truly competitive process, and impediments to a truly democratic process are aired. The clear and unambiguous references to the “enemy hands” and domestic groups and individuals wanting to “surrender to the enemy” are intended to close that conversational space and in all likelihood will be successful at tightening it.

To be sure, there will be numerous complaints about the tightening of this conversational space in reformist and opposition blogs and websites but newspapers connected to various political groups which are contesting the conservative control of the parliament will have to stay away from complaints about the rules of the game lest they’ll be accused of having sold their souls to George Bush. In Iran, like in other contested political environments, the charge of weakness against the enemy, or using the enemy’s talking points, is usually a pretty good conversation killer.

It is the desire to close this conversational space about the unfairness of the rules of the game that made the supreme leader to talk disdainfully - in a not so disguised reference to the reformist deputies who engaged in a 2004 parliamentary sit-in when they found out that they were barred from standing in the next election through disqualifications - about “those who intended to suspend the elections four years ago with a show and a game.” This open expression of disdain is of course also a cue from the leader that the wholesale disqualification of the reformists of the type who won in the sixth parliamentary elections is not only fine but expected.

The tightening of the conversational space is only one aspect of what is going on. For the conservative candidates like Haddad Adel and Bahonar, the focus on foreign enemies and their domestic servants is also intended to serve the much more mundane purpose of helping them win in an election which they worry conservatives might lose to more centrist candidates.

By pointing the accusatory finger towards the reformists, they hope to change the conversation and deflect attention from the criticism - coming even from the centrist candidates and parties with a good chance of doing well in the election - that the conservatives controlling the executive and legislative branches have been both reckless and incompetent in their running of the economy.

Instead, the "successes" the conservatives have had in defending Iran’s “national sovereignty” and standing tall on the nuclear issue will be touted with a constant reference to those who were ready to give in on the question of enrichment out of fear. This attempted change of conversation is also important for the maintenance of some sort of unity among the conservative ranks which are deeply divided over economic issues and policies pursued by President Ahmadinejad

The upcoming election will still be highly contested and choices have to be made. According to the Ministry of Interior, which is in charge of running the elections, already close to 4200 candidates have so far signed up for the 290-seat parliament (including some big names such as the conservative Ali Larijani who was pushed out of his job as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator by Ahmadinejad). But the acrimonious nature of US-Iran relations is being used as an excuse to narrow the choices the electorate has. So the conservative Haddad Adel is probably secretly hoping that the Americans do keep meddling, of course only with their words and not in their deeds. Read more on this article...

WHO/Iraqi study of civilian deaths (UPDATED)

(Also posted on my own blog.)

The new study, which includes more extensive sampling than the earlier one published in Lancet in 2006, estimates that 151,000 Iraqis died violent deaths in the first three years (2003-6) following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. There is still a likelihood of undercounting, but this is likely to be right order of magnitude. This is a sobering finding and it helps to emphasize the horrors through which Iraqis have lived. (Previous comment here.)

The new study will appear in the New England Journal of Medicine, January 31, 2008. Catherine and John Brownstein's "perspective" on the study will also appear in the January 31 issue, but an advance copy is available here.

New Estimate of Violent Deaths Among Iraqis Is Lower
Read more on this article...

The US and Iran after the NIE

I have written a piece about the implications of the National Intelligence Estimate for US-Iran relations for the MIT Center for International Studies. In it I conclude:

Today, Tehran is possibly stirring a return of strategic thinking to American foreign policy, even if the lethargic Bush administration is unlikely to take up the challenge. But the reduction of the Iran question to “the bomb” and “chaos” misses the basic question that is implicit in the NIE report and Bush’s successor has to face regarding Iran: If the regionally ascendant Islamic Iran, with or without an actual bomb, is here to stay, would U.S. interests in the region be better served through a friendlier, even if not trouble free, relationship with it, or further antagonism that pushes Iran to act as a spoiler in the region and look for tactical and strategic alliances to the East to counter to American belligerence?

You can read the whole thing here. Read more on this article...

AHMED RASHID IN NAUDERO, AT THE GRAVESIDE OF BENAZIR BHUTTO.

A shorter version of this article appeared today in the Daily Telegraph.

AHMED RASHID IN NAUDERO, AT THE GRAVESIDE OF BENAZIR BHUTTO.

Nearly two weeks after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, people are still coming in their tens of thousands to condole with her husband Asif Ali Zardari and weep and rage at her graveside.
They come on camels and tractor trolleys, luxury cars and private planes. Like an endless stream the lines of vehicles clog this small village sending up showers of dust that settle on the lush fields of sugar cane. Some have walked the 300 kilometers from Karachi like monks doing penance.

There are Sindhis with their embroidered caps, Punjabis with enormous turbans and fierce looking Pashtun and Baloch tribesmen, as well as Kashmiris and Afghans with their winter caps and Mongols who live close to the Chinese border. In death no other politician in Pakistan has the capacity to assemble the entire nation in such a way – a nation usually divided by ethnic and sectarian hatreds.

In the feudal family farm house of Bhutto at Naudero, Zardari sits in the middle of a warren of rooms and courtyards jam packed with mourners. He moves from room to room hugging friends and raising his hands in frequent prayer. The rooms are windowless, built over the years to accommodate the maximum number of supplicants as Bhutto herself was a feudal land lord. Now the walls are covered with pictures of her and her children and people bust into tears looking at them. We are now in the tenth day of the 40 day mourning period prescribed by Islam and the crowds should be thinning out, but there is no sign of that as yet.

As we wait to see Zardari, sitting next to me are one of the country’s top industrialists, senior lawyers and Pakistan’s leading landscape painter. Also an elderly woman who bursts into tears every few minutes and wails, ‘’Oh God could you not have taken me instead of her.’’ Outside in the courtyard thousands of peasants mill around, dazed and confused waiting to touch the hem of Zardari’s clothes, if not his hands.

Since Bhutto’s death the Western media has revived Zardari’s nickname ‘Mr. Ten Percent’, accrued from the commissions he allegedly made in deals when Bhutto was Prime Minister twice in the 1990s. At one point he was immensely disliked in the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) but now the same leaders say he is a changed man, more mature, responsible and more humble.
For starters he spent eight years in jail under Musharraf but was never found guilty of any of the charges against him. For many in the PPP he has paid his dues with his excessively long jail term. Not a single Pakistani newspaper has used the nickname since Bhutto’s death and the media now hang on Zardari’s every word. In the light of his wife’s murder, he has been forgiven his sins – for the time being at least.

He has said he will guide the PPP up to the elections on February 18 and then take a back seat. The permanent leader of the party is his son Bilawal Bhutto, aged 19 and now in his first year at Oxford University. Zardari will not contest a seat in parliament and he has appointed another PPP leader, fellow Sindhi landlord Amin Fahim as the party candidate to be Prime Minister.

Again much criticism has come from the Western media about the dynastic succession and the lack of democracy in the party – but in rural Sindh people would accept nothing less than a Bhutto to lead them. Benazir was first and foremost a Sindhi and even if Bilawal is underage, unimpressive and raw he is a Bhutto. Politics across South Asia is littered with political dynasties and there is nothing anyone can do about it for the time being.

Zardari escapes with a small group of journalists into his hideaway, a tiny soundproof room which can only seat five people. In a private conservation he unburdens his thoughts and fears for the future. < style=""> them for the first time. Bhutto dictated her orders to them, Zardari says all decisions are being made collectively and through consensus. He says nobody can replace Benazir with her knowledge and experience –‘’we need all the brains we can muster to take the right decisions,’’ he says. In every sentence in invokes her name and her memory.

Zardari along with every other Sindhi and perhaps the majority of Pakistanis is convinced that the government, the army and the intelligence services were involved in Benazir’s murder. Despite the heated government denials, the bumbling mistakes made by the regime since her death and the total lack of remorse shown by Musharraf and his political partners have only further convinced the public of a conspiracy. Zardari and the PPP insist that nobody had the capacity to carry out such a murder except the state, the so called establishment.

Zardari and the PPP also fear that Musharraf and the military will never allow general elections to take place on 18 February because there will be a landslide sympathy vote for the PPP. All the indications are that he is right.

The ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is in a panic, their leaders dare not come out of their house for fear of crowds beating them up or blaming them for Bhutto’s death. Some PML politicians are trying to whip up Punjabi-Sindhi ethnic tensions – a sure fire way to get the polls postponed. Nobody rules out more political assassinations either.

Zardari asks, that when Musharraf has done everything possible in the past nine months to stop the PPP juggernaut – declared an emergency, suspended the constitution, imprisoned thousands of people, curbed the media and sacked Supreme Court judges – how can he now allow free and fair elections.

Equally the military could try and rig the elections but that is more difficult now than it was on the original election date of January 8. Now there is greater public vigilance and much greater hatred for the regime. Zardari does not doubt that the Interservices Intelligence (ISI) will use the next eight weeks to try and break the PPP.

Either way Zardari and the PPP have to find answers and a strategy to deflect all these possibilities. The distraught mourners also expect answers. Beyond the gates of Naudero the stream of people head to the massive mock Moghul tomb three miles away.

Here Benazir is buried next to her beloved father, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was hanged by the military in 1979. Just four weeks ago she had come to lay a wreath at her father’s grave and is if full of premonitions, had marked out exactly where she wanted to be buried, telling attendants to fence off the area.

There are moving displays of public grief at her graveside, but even more there is boiling public anger. The noise is deafening as men and women walk in together chanting not prayers, but slogans against Musharraf. Two black banners hanging above her grave, say it all. One whispers ‘’Benazir – the unblemished and innocent,’’ the other cries out, ‘’we will take revenge on her killers.’’

Her grave is covered in a mountain of rose petals – outside flower vendors say her death has sucked up all the roses of Pakistan like a giant vacuum cleaner. Some people pick a rose petal of her grave, carefully smell its fragrance and then pocket it. The memory of her and the manner of her death will haunt Pakistan for years to come. Read more on this article...

Do Taliban Represent Pashtun Identity? A Letter from Kurram

But before I get to that, a couple other items: The word from Pakistan (via telephone) is now that there may be no elections. Free and fair elections would produce an angry, empowered, PPP-led government,perhaps allied with Nawaz Sharif, that would be likely to confront the military. If the PPP, PML-N, and their allies controlled 75% of the seats, they could impeach the president. Rigged elections would not be accepted in the current mood and could lead to confrontations in the street. The solution: Postpone the elections for a year, while replacing the caretaker government with a government of national unity including the PPP, PML-N, and other major parties, with a significant role for the Islamist MMA alliance. The army would act as the guarantor of this agreement and therefore would continue to exercise hegemony.

Rasul Bakhsh Rais has sent his excellent article, "Pakistan's Elections: Troubled Legacy."

Also: excellent article on Benazir Bhutto by Mahnaz Ispahani in Slate.

Delayed elections are the latest effort by the Musharraf government to limit the power of civilian political parties in Pakistan. In this context, the lessons of Benazir Bhutto's life and her ghastly death must be a wake-up call to the Bush administration and certainly to its successor: Accepting a garrison state, however disguised, over a legitimately elected civilian government, is an acknowledgment of terror's emerging triumph in Pakistan. It has always been a short-term, tactical, and doomed solution to the long-term, incendiary problem of security of governance in a nuclear-armed state. The lesson of Benazir Bhutto is that without a long-term and significant investment in civilian political institutions, especially political parties, Pakistan, and with it the "global war on terror," will be lost. The task is frustrating, requires a significant financial commitment, and is not without risks, but the potential rewards are far greater than a continuing alliance with President Pervez Musharraf.

Finish it here.

To the main theme:

This week I received a query from someone writing an article for a magazine:

To what extent should popular support of the Taliban/militants in the FATA and NWFP be understood simply as an expression of Pathan solidarity? And to the extent that that's the case, do the locals perceive the Pakistani army operations as a Punjabi assault on their territory?

The idea that Taliban are Pashtuns fighting against foreign invaders is a common one. It is the official position of the Government of Pakistan. When I was in Pakistan in November, one of my Pashtun nationalist friends asked, "If Taliban are Pashtuns fighting against foreigners, who are the foreigners in Swat?"

This week I received a copy of a letter dated December 29, 2007, written by Dr. Abid Ali Shah, a Pashtun from Kurram Agency, to Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai, a Pashtun ex-general also from Kurram Agency, who was at that time Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province. Since that time Governor Orakzai has resigned. Orakzai originated the policy of seeking negotiated truces with the Pakistan Taliban in the tribal agencies and reportedly opposed plans for the use of force there in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's assassination.

Here is what Dr. Shah had to say (facsimile of letter here):

Your Excellency,

With due respect I just remind that today is the 44^th day of clashes and unrest in Kurram Agency. . . . Your Excellency knows the number of killed, injured, suffered, and displaced. The over all views is misery, blood shed and anarchy.

There are sick, elder, women and innocent children in need of immediate attention. There are families starving and if you look from top of Parachinar till lower end at Chappary gate, each house or family has suffered in one or other way. Every body is not fighting but in fact the whole zone is under the anarchy of known wanted militants.

Your Excellency just imagines, the respectable commander Kurram militia was requested to intervene but he proudly answered that, I do not want my jawans [soldiers] to be killed. I ask your Excellency, if the national security is under threat, is the soldier has right to say that I don’t want to be killed? Who is then responsible to implement Govt writ?

Your Excellency, this is very interesting that security forces have vacated their positions for militants and each person is fighting for his own sect. If this becomes the trend, then what will be the end result and who will do justice?

Your Excellency, this is undeniable fact that all wanted militants from Waziristan, Uzbeks and outlawed Lashkar e jahangwi are encamped in lower Kurram and fighting so called jehad. Why they have such free and easy access and no one is in position to tackle them?

I hope and request your Excellency to act immediately to implement Govt writ and restore Peace in the beautiful valley.

While the populations of Upper and Lower Kurram are Pashtun, the Aurakzai tribe of lower Kurram is Sunni, while the Turi tribe of upper Kurram is Shi'a, as presumably is Dr. Abid Ali Shah. Dr. Shah claims that the militants in Lower Kurram are Pashtun (from Waziristan), Uzbeks (from Uzbekistan), and Punjabis (from Jhang, home of the Deobandi extremist group Lashkar-i Jhangvi). He does not see them as expressions of his ethnic identity. Instead he asks the Governor (also a Pashtun) to restore the authority of the Government.

As a result of these clashes, according to UNHCR, about 6,000 Pakistani Pashtuns, mostly women and children from Kurram Agency have fled to Afghanistan in the past week. Pashtuns are fleeing the Pakistani Taliban to seek refuge in the most insecure parts of Afghanistan.

Perhaps this is an exception, since these Pashtuns are Shi'a, unlike the majority. But elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies:

Gunmen in Pakistan have shot dead eight pro-government tribal leaders in the troubled South Waziristan region on Afghanistan's border, officials say. . . .
Officials say they suspect the attackers to be Uzbek militants, who are opposed to Mullah Nazir. Although a Taleban commander, Mullah Nazir recently fought foreign militants with the backing of Pakistani government troops.

That is the official story: Uzbek militants affiliated with al-Qaida killed former Taliban Pashtun elders who sided with the government. Another story circulating is that the pro-government elders were assassinated by the Pakistani Taliban themselves, who then blamed Uzbeks. In neither case is Islamic militancy an expression of Pashtun identity.

Taliban are not an expression of Pashtun identity or Pashtun or Afghan nationalism, though some people are fighting the foreign troops in Afghanistan with such motives. The Taliban make effective use of Pashtun tribalism and cross-border ties. Al-Qaida has even exploited the tribal code by portraying Bin Laden and his companions as persecuted Muslims seeking refuge (nanawati in Pashto), who must be protected. But the Pakistani government and the British Indian government before them also used Pashtun tribalism for political purposes. The Taliban use transnational commerce or ethnic ties as they serve their goals; but those goals are not ethnic or nationalist. Pashtun nationalists see the Taliban as a threat to, not an expression of, Pashtun identity. Read more on this article...

Pakistan: The Art of Rigging (Updated with Description of New Security Measures)

Update: I previously summarized how post-poll election rigging has taken place in past elections in Pakistan and how, therefore, it might occur again. After my last post, based on an article in The Friday Times, I asked Staffan Darnolf, a Swedish electoral expert working with the Electoral Commission of Pakistan, to respond. He argues that new safeguards introduced for this election make the previous type of post-poll rigging impossible:

The one thing the people trying to rig the elections at the Assistant Commissioner offices have to overcome this time around is the uniquely numbered plastic security seal that prevents the new translucent ballot boxes’ slot from being opened without detection. Party agents, international observers and the 20,000 FAFEN [Free and Fair Election Network, a Pakistani election monitoring organization] observers have all been trained to record the unique serial numbers of the seals used on the ballot boxes in the polling stations, so they have to be prevented from entering the polling stations throughout the Election Day, which would defeat the alleged clandestine stealth-rigging at a select number of polling stations. Also, the party agents and observers at the Returning Officer office have been trained to record these serial numbers and will compare the numbers with the once recorded by their colleagues at the polling station level.

We have ordered 6.5 million seals to the ECP and every single seal has a unique number. The Presiding Officers have no way of knowing which seals will be used in their particular polling station until election day. So, unless each and every AC office has access to 6.5 million identical seals on their premises and can go through every single box and find these unique 30 seals it cannot be done. Also, logistically, someone need to order 1,768,000 million seals on the international market, have it shipped to Pakistan, and then park a couple of sea containers on each premise of the AC just to store the 6.5 million seals. In addition, you probably need to have a couple of hundred workers in each location to find those seals. All this without anyone spilling the beans. I find this non-plausible.

The original post follows:

Pakistani journalist Raheel Asghar Ginai published a complete guide to the "Art of Rigging" in The Friday Times (behind subscription firewall) on December 28, the day after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The method described is exactly the one I was discussing in previous posts, but the account is more detailed. The description is accompanied with an arithmetical illustration from the 1990 election, where I first encountered this system.

Ginai shows that the overall results can be decisively changed by rigging only a few well chosen polling places in a few key constituencies and that the visible part of the polling and vote counting can be done in a completely legal and transparent fashion. Here is the system:

Methodology of Rigging on Election Day

The technique followed on the day of elections is very simple, but foolproof, and comprises the following steps:

l Political parties to be defeated and to be elected are identified

l Seats that are sure to be won by opposition candidates with clear margins are not touched. Fair elections are held in their constituencies

l Similarly, seats in which opposition candidates lose elections with large differences are also not chosen for rigging

l Only those constituencies are chosen where a close fight is expected and the difference of a few thousand votes can swing the results

l A normal constituency consists of about 250 polling stations. Out of about 250 polling stations, hardly 25 to 30 polling stations are chosen for rigging. The remaining polling stations are not touched at all. Fair elections are held in these polling stations as well

l No interference is carried out during polling at any station. Even at the twenty to thirty polling stations designated for rigging, nothing is done till polling is over. As a result, voters observe no rigging anywhere.

l The presiding officers of the chosen 20 to 30 polling stations are appointed by the approval of the intelligence services. They are trustworthy and ‘reliable’.

l Police personnel posted at all polling stations are instructed to obtain a copy of the result from the presiding officers at the end of counting of votes. These results are compiled unofficially at secretly established offices (mostly offices of Assistant Commissioners) to determine how many votes are required to make a defeated candidate win the elections.

l The selected presiding officers now play their pivotal role. They do not pass on a copy of the result to the polling agents of contesting candidates who are threatened by the police to leave the polling stations and disappear without contacting their candidate till the announcement of the result for that particular constituency. Tactics like threats of involving them in murder cases, drug trafficking etc. are used against the polling agents.

l The presiding officers of the chosen polling stations, instead of going to the returning officers at the end of polling, take their record to the secret offices mentioned above. Assistant Commissioners, who have the statistics of the results obtained by the police, cast the required number of votes in favour of the government candidate to make him win.

l The presiding officers then take the modified record of their polling stations to the returning officers, who declare the results according to the figures presented to them by the presiding officers.

l Obviously, the results of such polling stations reach the returning officers with delay, and perhaps are the last to be received. Before arrival of their results, the counting by the returning officers show opposition candidates in the lead. Their supporters start celebrating victory. But the tables are turned by the rigged results of the chosen polling stations towards the end of counting.

l To avoid detection of rigging, polling station–wise progressive results are not released to the media during counting of votes step by step as they are received. Only the final result of the constituency is announced. Only in the 1971 elections, polling station-wise progressive results were made public during counting, because the government did not intend to rig those elections.

With this methodology, voters and observers alike observe no rigging at all throughout the polling day. Changing results by a very small percentage at a very few places produces the desired results against the will of the people and an unpopular government is placed in power ....

Using figures from the 1990 elections, Ginai shows how rigging only 2.84% of the votes could account for the shift of 47 seats from the PPP to the Islami Jamhuri Ittihad, which he characterized as "a creation of the intelligence agencies." This shift made the difference between a PPP government and an IJI government. Today the PML-Q plays the role that the IJI did in 1990.

Ginai offers useful advice for poll watchers and election observers on election day:

Political parties, contesting candidates, the media, and international observers and the voters have to be made aware of this methodology of rigging. The movement of each presiding officer will have to be monitored on the evening of Election Day, till the result of his polling station is released to the media, and the presiding officer reaches the office of the returning officer. Polling station-wise results must be released to the public and private TV and radio channels progressively. Inquiries must be made into results of polling stations that arrive with abnormal delay to the returning officers. Candidates should make attendance of all of their polling agents of all polling stations compulsory at a prescribed point in the evening of the polling day. Any missing polling agent must be traced and questioned in privacy.

Normally, the media and international observers try to observe the polling process at various polling stations. But as rigging is not done during the day, it remains undetected. At the most they will point out some instances of pre-poll rigging, which is rampant these days. People at large form their opinion about the fairness of elections by observing order and discipline at the polling stations. They will, thus, be satisfied, as nothing untoward will be observed at any polling station, and it will never come to light how the will of the people was robbed with the secret casting of just four fake votes per thousand by the district administrations.

Note on Asif Zardari's sarcastic name for PML-Q. I have seen several reports that Asif Ali Zardari has called the PML-Q a "killer" party. This is an untranslatable play on words. PML-Q stands for Pakistan Muslim League -- Quaid-i-Azam. This distinguishes it from the PML-- Nawaz, the offshoot (or original) headed by Nawaz Sharif. Quaid-i-Azam is the quaint olde transliteration of Qa'id-i-A'zam, or Great Leader, the title bestowed on Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and President of the original Muslim League. (Qa'id is the same Arabic word that entered Spanish as "El Cid," or "alcalde," the Spanish word for "mayor.")

The word for "killer" used by Zardari is "qatil," which starts with the same Arabic letter, qaf, as qa'id. So what he is saying is that the PML-Q is actually the PML-Qatil. Read more on this article...

Iran’s “Unduly Provocative Act” Against the US Navy?

"Unduly provocative" is the characterization used by Navy Vice Adm. Kevin J. Cosgriff, who also commands U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, to term the incident that just took place between the Islamic Revolution’s Guard Corps and the US Navy. But I am still not sure if I understand what exactly happened. Clearly there are different versions.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman portrayed the incidence as a routine interaction which passed as the Americans identified themselves while Fars News is quoting an unidentified source from IRGC’s Navy as saying that the three American ships were contacted by Iranian vessels “as usual” to identify themselves and, after they did, continued their path.

The American versions of the event, however, include not only getting close (which according to an anonymous military official is usual) but something more. According to Pentagon spokesman, Bryan Whitman, “three U.S. ships had been in international waters passing through the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday when they were approached by five fast boats, at least some of which were visibly armed.” Iranian vessels apparently made “some aggressive maneuvers against our vessels and indicated some hostile intent." According to Whitman “the speed of the Iranian boats and their distance from the U.S. Navy vessels demonstrated potentially hostile intent. Bridge-to-bridge radio communications between the Iranian vessels and the U.S. Navy ships reinforced this impression.”

On record, Pentagon initially stayed mum about the content of the communication but an anonymous official told CNN the U.S. Navy received a radio transmission that "officials believe came from the Iranian boats." The transmission said, "I am coming at you. You will explode in a couple of minutes," CNN further reported that when the U.S. ships heard that radio transmission, they took up their gun positions and officers were "in the process" of giving the order to fire when the Iranians abruptly turned away. CNN goes on to say, “After the radio transmission, one of the Iranian boats dropped white boxes into the water in front of the U.S. ships.”

A variation of the sequence of events was relayed by Vice Admiral Cosgriff who said that after five boats approached the U.S. formation and "maneuvered aggressively in the direction of the U.S. ships, "U.S. captains called on the radio and sounded the ships’ horns to warn the Iranians off. It was apparently after this initial contact that “the (U.S.) ships received a radio call that was threatening to our ships to the effect that they were closing our ships and that the U.S. ships would explode.” So it seems to me that there needs to be some clarification about who called who first and when the verbal threat was voiced. There also needs to be a bit more clarity about exactly what words were used and whether there was a possibility of miscommunication.

I ask these questions because if such a verbal threat did actually occur, this is a big deal that cannot, as Juan Cole suggests, simply be attributed to “some gung-ho local IRGC commander who'd been at sea way too long.” As far as I am concerned, if there was indeed such a threatening communication to which the US Navy reacted, we are either talking about a case of miscommunication (a genuine mistake/misunderstanding on the part of US Navy) or an outright provocation on the Iranian part, the order for which must have come from the top perhaps to make a point prior to George Bush’s visit to the Middle East that Iran can make trouble for the US forces if it wishes to.

While I cannot rule out the possibility of this provocation, neither can I rule out the possibility voiced by some in the Iranian media that, given the big hoopla made about the incidence in the US as well as Arab media, that the Bush Administration is essentially trying to heighten the Iranian threat right before George Bush’s trip to the region which according to most observers has as one of its objectives the cementing of a coalition against Iran.

By the way, in the process of checking the reaction in the Iranian press, I stumbled on a denunciation in the hard-line Rajanews of the “unprecedented and provocative act” by the website belonging to the US Naval Forces Central Command identifying the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf. Iranians of all ilks are rather testy about this so I checked the command’s website and sure enough the first news item identifies the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf.

I have to admit that I am not very up to date about the controversy over the usage of the term and do not know if this is something new but a quick check of the command’s website suggests that it must not be as the command’s mission statement and map of the region also identify the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf. I had heard that in recent years various branches of the US armed forces had issued directives to their members to use the "Arabian Gulf" when operating in the area, presumably due to increased cooperation with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Apparently all multinational naval forces (including Australia, the US and UK) use "Arabian Gulf" during operations, and their naval charts reflect this. But my understanding was that since the United States officially accepts the Persian Gulf as the proper name (see for instance the CIA Fact book map of Iran) that the name was still used in official publications and websites of the military branches. I guess I was wrong. Learning something new everyday… Read more on this article...

"PAKISTAN AFTER THE ASSASSINATION": Interview with Pervez Hoodbhoy

Pervez Hoodbhoy, professor of nuclear and high-energy physics, and chairman of the department of physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, has been interviewed by Stefania Maurizi for Il Venerdi (Friday supplement) of La Repubblica, where the interview will be published in Italian. With permission, I extract a few excerpts of particular relevance to the U.S. and reproduce the entire interview afterwards in the original English, as supplied by Professor Hoodbhoy.

On the immediate future:

Q: Ideally, what do you want to see happen in the next few weeks?

A: I want Musharraf to go - resign or somehow be removed, preferably without bloodshed. I want the independent judiciary restored, a new neutral caretaker government installed for overseeing free and fair elections, and then elections that would decide upon the new parliament and prime minister. This will not immediately solve Pakistan's fundamental problems - army dominance, maldistribution of wealth, religious fanaticism, provincial imbalances - but it would get Pakistan on the track to democracy instead of the self-destruction it is now racing towards.

On U.S. policy:

Q: People in Washington are increasingly frustrated with Musharraf's counterterrorism efforts, however they think there are no alternatives to Musharraf. What do you think about this?

A: The Americans have tunnel vision. They want lackeys like Musharraf who do their bidding, although here too there is deception at work. They know, but choose to forget, that Pakistani military leaders, Musharraf included, are the makers of the jihadist monster. . . .

Musharraf is extremely unpopular now and the Americans will have to dump him at some point. It is hard to find a pro-Musharraf person anywhere in the country except in the top business circles and the top army leadership. Until recently he ran both the army and the government himself, with the connivance of a rubber-stamp Parliament put in place through rigged elections. When the courts were about to rule that he could not legally be president, Musharraf chose to suspend the constitution and impose emergency rule. He dismissed the Supreme Court and arrested the judges, replacing them with judges who obey his every command. He blocked all independent television channels, and punished the news media for disparaging him or the army. His police arrested thousands of lawyers and pro-democracy activists. He ordered that civilians be tried in closed military courts. This was necessary, he said, to save Pakistan from a rapidly growing Islamist insurgency. But he released 25 Islamic extremists on the day that the judges were arrested. In spite of all this, George W. Bush called Musharraf "a democrat at heart". It makes you sick.

The Americans have shot themselves in the foot by supporting the army consistently for decades. They have lost credibility and respect among Pakistanis. Everybody laughs when they hear that America wants democracy for Pakistan. In this situation, even if Musharraf goes and Gen. Kayani (the new army chief) takes over, the best that American can hope for is for the status quo. This is sad, because America is a great country with many virtues. If only they could get over their hangup of wanting to run the world! It's an impossible task anyway.

On al-Qaida and Taliban:

Q: What could be an effective way to fight Al Qaeda and the Taleban in Pakistan?

A: To fight and win this war, Pakistan will need to mobilize both its people and the state. The notion of a power-sharing agreement between the state and Taliban is a non-starter; the spectacular failures of earlier agreements should be a lesson. Instead the government should help create public consensus through open forum discussions, proceed faster on infrastructure development in the tribal areas, and make judicious use of military force - troops only, no air power. This should become every Pakistani's war, not just the army's, and it will have to be fought even if America packs up and goes away. But, as long as Musharraf is president, it will be impossible to get popular support for the war. If presented with a choice between Musharraf and the Taliban, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis would want the latter - although I am sure they would regret it later.

Here is the full text of the interview:

Q: Let's start with the tragedy of Bhutto assassination. Today, international media remind us she was the first woman to become the PM of an Islamic country, she was a democratic leader, etc. Nonetheless, she was the scion of a feudal family, which was primarily responsible for making Pakistan an atomic power and she was known for the authoritarian control of her party. Looking back, how do you judge Benazir Bhutto?

A: Having first known Benazir Bhutto from high school in Karachi, and then later in Cambridge (Massachusetts), I am deeply saddened by her murder. But, although the international media paint her as someone who could have led Pakistan into the modern age, the truth is very different. Her two tenures as prime minister were a nightmare of autocratic government and mis-governance. Billions disappeared from foreign aid. A Swiss court found her guilty of money laundering in 2003. Ms. Bhutto owned mansions and palaces across the world. She even tried to steal land from my (public) university to feed the rapacious appetite of her party members.

Even during school days, Benazir thought she had been born to rule. More importantly, she made not the slightest effort to change the feudal character of Pakistani politics and society. The Bhuttos own vast tracts of agricultural land in Sindh that is worked upon by serfs. Although she promised to bring democracy to Pakistan, after returning to Pakistan, Ms. Bhutto made clear that for a few table scraps she would be happy to team up with General Musharraf under the hopelessly absurd US plan to give our military government a civilian face. Her party, the Pakistan Peoples Party was her fiefdom. She appointed herself as "chairperson for life". Reflecting the mindset of a feudal princess, she even named her successors to be male members from her family: her 19-year son, who is a student at Oxford and knows nothing about Pakistani culture, as well as her phenomenally corrupt husband, initially known as Mr Ten Percent and later as Mr. Thirty Percent.

Q: Was Ms. Bhutto a model for Pakistani women?

A: She was courageous and single-minded. And she showed that a woman could be the head of a conservative Islamic state. Nevertheless, it is hard to see what she wanted beyond personal power. Although she said that she was fighting for grand causes, I'm still trying to figure out what they were. She certainly did nothing for Pakistani women during her two stints in power and left untouched the horrific Hudood laws, according to which a rape victim needs to produce 4 witnesses to the act of penetration (else she could be punished for fornication). Nor did she try to overturn the Pakistani blasphemy law that prescribes death as the minimum penalty for those convicted of insulting the prophet of Islam or his companions. As for democracy: she had been desperate to do a deal with Musharraf who dangled over her head the many corruption cases that she was charged with. But he proved too clever for her and she was forced into the opposition.

In foreign policy, she played footsie with the army. It could do whatever it liked, including making nuclear weapons, sending Islamic militants into Kashmir, and organizing the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. In 2002 she regretted having signed the document authorizing funds for the Taliban forces poised to capture Kandahar. But Ms. Bhutto makes an excellent martyr. In her death she will doubtlessly play a more positive role than when alive.

Q: Al Qaeda was immediately blamed for Bhutto assassination. However, many people hated her: Musharraf, the Army, and the infamous ISI, which in 1990 removed Bhutto from power after she had replaced General Hameed Gul, the man who invented the Taliban [While Professor Hoodbhoy did not distract the interviewer from the subject, it should be noted that Hameed Gul was not involved in the origin of the Taliban. The principal general involved in 1994 was General Naseerullah Babar, principal advisor on Afghanistan to both Zulfiqar Ali and Benazir Bhutto. -- BRR] . Do you believe that Al Qaeda was really responsible for killing Benazir Bhutto? Who is going to gain from Bhutto's death?

A: There are different possibilities and much confusion. But some facts are certain. There definitely were gunshots, and this was followed by a suicide blast. Now, I do not think that suicide bombers can be bought with any number of rupees. Only a religious fanatic lured by heavenly rewards would blow himself up. Therefore Al-Qaida, the Taliban, or other Islamic jihadist groups are strong possibilities. They always hated Bhutto, but even more after she announced in Washington that, if elected prime minister, she would fight them even more vigorously than Musharraf. Of course, rogue elements of Pakistan's intelligence agencies, who are also strong Islamists, and who lie deeply hidden within the establishment, could also have done it. They have a stock of suicide bombers available to them, as evidenced by the success they have had in organizing suicide attacks upon army commandos as well as their own colleagues.

So did Islamists of one or the other flavour do it? Maybe, but the waters have been muddied by the government. First, publicly available photographs and videos show a modern-looking gunman accompanying the suicide bomber. He fired three shots, heard by all present, at least one of which hit Bhutto. Some say that there was a second sharpshooter in a building too. On the other hand, the government initially insisted she died from concussion and not a bullet wound - an obvious lie immediately refuted by those in the same car as Bhutto. Second, in just an hour after the assassination, the police washed away all the bloody evidence with water hoses. So, it is quite possible that non-Islamists in the government have somehow used brainwashed suicide bombers, trained in mosques and madrassas, to do their dirty job. But, as in the JFK murder, the truth will never be known.

As for the gainers and losers: Islamist groups saw Bhutto as a tool of America that would be used against them, and a leader who could secularize Pakistan. Plus, she was a woman and popular. But Musharraf and his political party, the PML(Q), have also gained because a political rival has been eliminated. The losers are those Pakistanis who wish for a secular, modern Pakistan and not one that is run by mullahs. Although she never delivered on her promises, her followers never lost faith.

Q: There is a lot of concern about the future of Pakistan. How real is the threat of an Islamic takeover, in your opinion?

A: It has already been taken over! Twenty five years ago the Pakistani state began pushing Islam on to its people as a matter of policy. Prayers in government departments were deemed compulsory, punishments were meted out to those who did not fast in Ramadan, selection for academic posts required that the candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islamic teachings, and jihad was propagated through schoolbooks. Today government intervention is no longer needed because of a spontaneous groundswell of Islamic zeal. But now the state is realizing that it shot itself in the foot. The fanatical jihadists it created have turned against it. It is supreme irony that the Pakistan Army - whose men were recruited under the banner of jihad and which saw itself as the fighting arm of Islam - is now frequently targeted by suicide bombers who are fighting a jihad to bring even stricter Islam. It has lost a thousand or more men fighting Al-Qaida and the Taliban.

The pace of radicalization has quickened. There are almost daily suicide attacks. This phenomenon was almost unknown in Pakistan before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Now it is common in major cities as well as tribal areas. The targets have been the Pakistan army, police, incumbent and retired government leaders, and rival Islamic sects. But this is just the tip of the iceberg; we'll see much more in years ahead.

Q: Ideally, what do you want to see happen in the next few weeks?

A: I want Musharraf to go - resign or somehow be removed, preferably without bloodshed. I want the independent judiciary restored, a new neutral caretaker government installed for overseeing free and fair elections, and then elections that would decide upon the new parliament and prime minister. This will not immediately solve Pakistan's fundamental problems - army dominance, maldistribution of wealth, religious fanaticism, provincial imbalances - but it would get Pakistan on the track to democracy instead of the self-destruction it is now racing towards.

Q: People in Washington are increasingly frustrated with Musharraf's counterterrorism efforts, however they think there are no alternatives to Musharraf. What do you think about this?

A: The Americans have tunnel vision. They want lackeys like Musharraf who do their bidding, although here too there is deception at work. They know, but choose to forget, that Pakistani military leaders, Musharraf included, are the makers of the jihadist monster. In 1999, after Musharraf launched the secret Kargil operation in Kashmir, the United Jihad Council celebrated him as a true fighter for Islam. After 911 such praises disappeared, but under his leadership the army still covertly supported jihadist groups and the Taliban in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
Musharraf is extremely unpopular now and the Americans will have to dump him at some point. It is hard to find a pro-Musharraf person anywhere in the country except in the top business circles and the top army leadership. Until recently he ran both the army and the government himself, with the connivance of a rubber-stamp Parliament put in place through rigged elections. When the courts were about to rule that he could not legally be president, Musharraf chose to suspend the constitution and impose emergency rule. He dismissed the Supreme Court and arrested the judges, replacing them with judges who obey his every command. He blocked all independent television channels, and punished the news media for disparaging him or the army. His police arrested thousands of lawyers and pro-democracy activists. He ordered that civilians be tried in closed military courts. This was necessary, he said, to save Pakistan from a rapidly growing Islamist insurgency. But he released 25 Islamic extremists on the day that the judges were arrested. In spite of all this, George W. Bush called Musharraf "a democrat at heart". It makes you sick.

The Americans have shot themselves in the foot by supporting the army consistently for decades. They have lost credibility and respect among Pakistanis. Everybody laughs when they hear that America wants democracy for Pakistan. In this situation, even if Musharraf goes and Gen. Kayani (the new army chief) takes over, the best that American can hope for is for the status quo. This is sad, because America is a great country with many virtues. If only they could get over their hangup of wanting to run the world! It's an impossible task anyway.
Q: In Pakistan what is the man on the street thinking?

A: Almost everyone holds the government responsible for the assassination. Tragically, suicide bombings are not condemned with any particular vigor. There is no strong reaction against the mullahs, madrassas, and jihadis. Perhaps people are afraid to criticize them because this might be seen as a criticism of Islam. Interestingly, in all the street demonstrations I have gone to after the Bhutto assassinations, there was no call for cracking down on extremists. Yesterday I met the lone taxi driver who thought the Islamists did it. I tipped him well.

Q: What could be an effective way to fight Al Qaeda and the Taleban in Pakistan?

A: To fight and win this war, Pakistan will need to mobilize both its people and the state. The notion of a power-sharing agreement between the state and Taliban is a non-starter; the spectacular failures of earlier agreements should be a lesson. Instead the government should help create public consensus through open forum discussions, proceed faster on infrastructure development in the tribal areas, and make judicious use of military force - troops only, no air power. This should become every Pakistani's war, not just the army's, and it will have to be fought even if America packs up and goes away. But, as long as Musharraf is president, it will be impossible to get popular support for the war. If presented with a choice between Musharraf and the Taliban, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis would want the latter - although I am sure they would regret it later.

Q: Let's talk about Pakistan's nukes. There a lot of concern about the possibility that nuclear weapons could end up into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Early in December the Washington Post revealed that a small group of U.S. military experts and intelligence analysts convened in Washington for exploring strategies to secure Pakistani nukes if the Pakistani regime falls apart. Their conclusions were very scaring, as, - there are no palatable ways to forcibly ensure the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. What do you think about this?

A: The government says there is absolutely no danger of loose nukes. Pakistan has been sending serving officers of the Strategic Plans Division, which is the agency responsible for handling nuclear weapons, to the United States for training in safety measures (PAL's locking devices, storing procedures, etc). But there's no way of telling if this will be effective. Extremists have already penetrated deep into the army and the intelligence agencies. We now see repeated evidence: for example, last month an unmarked bus carrying employees of the Inter Services Intelligence [Pakistan's secret intelligence], was collecting employees early in the morning. It was boarded by a suicide bomber who blew himself up killing 25. It was an inside job.
And now there are many other such examples, such as that of an army man killing 16 Special Services Group commandos in a suicide attack at Ghazi Barotha. A part of the establishment is clearly at war with another part. There are also scientists, as well as military people, who are radical Islamists. Many questions come to mind: can there be collusion between different field-level commanders, resulting in the hijacking of a nuclear weapon? Could outsider groups develop links with insiders? Given the absence of accurate records of fissile material production, can one be certain that small quantities of highly enriched uranium or weapons grade plutonium have not already been diverted? I do not know the answers. Nobody does. Read more on this article...