Showing posts with label elections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label elections. Show all posts

Thursday, February 14, 2008

RUBIN: Human Rights Watch -- Audio Recording Shows Pakistan AG Discussing Election "Massive Rigging"

This just in from Human Rights Watch:

Pakistan: Attorney General Aware of ‘Massive’ Election-Rigging Plans

Audio Recording Calls Into Question Government’s Commitment to Fair Elections

(New York, February 15, 2008) – In an audio recording obtained by Human Rights Watch (http://hrw.org/audio/2008/urdu/pakistan0208.htm), Pakistan’s Attorney General Malik Qayyum stated that upcoming parliamentary elections will be “massively rigged,” Human Rights Watch said today.

In the recording, Qayyum appears to be advising an unidentified person on what political party the person should approach to become a candidate in the upcoming parliamentary election, now scheduled for February 18, 2008.

Human Rights Watch said that the recording was made during a phone interview with a member of the media on November 21, 2007. Qayyum, while still on the phone interview, took a call on another telephone and his side of that conversation was recorded. The recording was made the day after Pakistan’s Election Commission announced the schedule for polls. The election was originally planned for January 8 but was postponed after the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, returned to Pakistan on November 25. An English translation of the recording, which is in Urdu and Punjabi, follows:

“Leave Nawaz Sharif (PAUSE).... I think Nawaz Sharif will not take part in the election (PAUSE).... If he does take part, he will be in trouble. If Benazir takes part she too will be in trouble (PAUSE).... They will massively rig to get their own people to win. If you can get a ticket from these guys, take it (PAUSE).... If Nawaz Sharif does not return himself, then Nawaz Sharif has some advantage. If he comes himself, even if after the elections rather than before (PAUSE)…. Yes….”

Repeated attempts by Human Rights Watch to contact Qayyum by phone were unsuccessful.

Fears of rigging have been a major issue in the current election campaign. Human Rights Watch said that since the official election period commenced in November 2007, there have been numerous allegations of irregularities, including arrests and harassment of opposition candidates and party members. There are also allegations that state resources, administration and state machinery are being used to the advantage of candidates backed by President Pervez Musharraf. Human Rights Watch expressed concern that the Election Commission, which is monitoring the polls, was not acting impartially (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/02/11/pakist18034.htm).

Background

Malik Qayyum is a former judge who resigned from the bench in 2001 amid charges of misconduct. On April 15, 1999, a two-judge panel of the Lahore High Court headed by Qayyum convicted Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari in a corruption case. They were sentenced to five years in prison, fined US$8.6 million dollars each, disqualified as members of parliament for five years, and forced to forfeit their property. The impending verdict led Bhutto to go into exile in March 1999.

In February 2001, the Sunday Times, a British newspaper, published a report based on transcripts of 32 audio tapes, which revealed that Qayyum convicted Bhutto and Zardari for political reasons. The transcripts of the recordings reproduced by the newspaper showed that Qayyum asked then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s anti-corruption chief, Saifur Rehman, for advice on the sentence: “Now you tell me how much punishment do you want me to give her?”

In April 2001, on the basis of this evidence, a seven-member bench of Pakistan’s Supreme Court upheld an appeal by the couple, overturning the conviction. In its ruling, the Supreme Court contended that Qayyum had been politically motivated in handing down the sentence. Faced with a trial for professional misconduct before Pakistan’s Supreme Judicial Council, the constitutional body authorized to impeach senior judges, Qayyum opted to resign his post in June 2001.

A close associate of Musharraf, Qayyum was appointed as the lead counsel on behalf of Pakistan’s federal government in the presidential reference against Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, instituted after Chaudhry was first illegally deposed by Musharraf on March 9, 2007. A full bench of Pakistan’s Supreme Court reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhry on July 20, 2007.

Qayyum was appointed attorney general of Pakistan by Musharraf in August 2007.

To download the audio recording of Pakistan’s Attorney General Malik Qayyum discussing election rigging (in Urdu with English transcript), please visit:

http://hrw.org/audio/2008/urdu/pakistan0208.htm

For more of Human Rights Watch’s work on Pakistan, please visit:

http://hrw.org/pakistan

For more information, please contact:

In London, Brad Adams (English): +44-20-7713-2767; or +44-790-872-8333 (mobile)

In Washington, DC, Tom Malinowski (English): +1-202-612-4358; or +1-202-309-3551 (mobile) Read more on this article...

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

AHMED RASHID IN NAUDERO, AT THE GRAVESIDE OF BENAZIR BHUTTO.

A shorter version of this article appeared today in the Daily Telegraph.

AHMED RASHID IN NAUDERO, AT THE GRAVESIDE OF BENAZIR BHUTTO.

Nearly two weeks after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, people are still coming in their tens of thousands to condole with her husband Asif Ali Zardari and weep and rage at her graveside.
They come on camels and tractor trolleys, luxury cars and private planes. Like an endless stream the lines of vehicles clog this small village sending up showers of dust that settle on the lush fields of sugar cane. Some have walked the 300 kilometers from Karachi like monks doing penance.

There are Sindhis with their embroidered caps, Punjabis with enormous turbans and fierce looking Pashtun and Baloch tribesmen, as well as Kashmiris and Afghans with their winter caps and Mongols who live close to the Chinese border. In death no other politician in Pakistan has the capacity to assemble the entire nation in such a way – a nation usually divided by ethnic and sectarian hatreds.

In the feudal family farm house of Bhutto at Naudero, Zardari sits in the middle of a warren of rooms and courtyards jam packed with mourners. He moves from room to room hugging friends and raising his hands in frequent prayer. The rooms are windowless, built over the years to accommodate the maximum number of supplicants as Bhutto herself was a feudal land lord. Now the walls are covered with pictures of her and her children and people bust into tears looking at them. We are now in the tenth day of the 40 day mourning period prescribed by Islam and the crowds should be thinning out, but there is no sign of that as yet.

As we wait to see Zardari, sitting next to me are one of the country’s top industrialists, senior lawyers and Pakistan’s leading landscape painter. Also an elderly woman who bursts into tears every few minutes and wails, ‘’Oh God could you not have taken me instead of her.’’ Outside in the courtyard thousands of peasants mill around, dazed and confused waiting to touch the hem of Zardari’s clothes, if not his hands.

Since Bhutto’s death the Western media has revived Zardari’s nickname ‘Mr. Ten Percent’, accrued from the commissions he allegedly made in deals when Bhutto was Prime Minister twice in the 1990s. At one point he was immensely disliked in the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) but now the same leaders say he is a changed man, more mature, responsible and more humble.
For starters he spent eight years in jail under Musharraf but was never found guilty of any of the charges against him. For many in the PPP he has paid his dues with his excessively long jail term. Not a single Pakistani newspaper has used the nickname since Bhutto’s death and the media now hang on Zardari’s every word. In the light of his wife’s murder, he has been forgiven his sins – for the time being at least.

He has said he will guide the PPP up to the elections on February 18 and then take a back seat. The permanent leader of the party is his son Bilawal Bhutto, aged 19 and now in his first year at Oxford University. Zardari will not contest a seat in parliament and he has appointed another PPP leader, fellow Sindhi landlord Amin Fahim as the party candidate to be Prime Minister.

Again much criticism has come from the Western media about the dynastic succession and the lack of democracy in the party – but in rural Sindh people would accept nothing less than a Bhutto to lead them. Benazir was first and foremost a Sindhi and even if Bilawal is underage, unimpressive and raw he is a Bhutto. Politics across South Asia is littered with political dynasties and there is nothing anyone can do about it for the time being.

Zardari escapes with a small group of journalists into his hideaway, a tiny soundproof room which can only seat five people. In a private conservation he unburdens his thoughts and fears for the future. < style=""> them for the first time. Bhutto dictated her orders to them, Zardari says all decisions are being made collectively and through consensus. He says nobody can replace Benazir with her knowledge and experience –‘’we need all the brains we can muster to take the right decisions,’’ he says. In every sentence in invokes her name and her memory.

Zardari along with every other Sindhi and perhaps the majority of Pakistanis is convinced that the government, the army and the intelligence services were involved in Benazir’s murder. Despite the heated government denials, the bumbling mistakes made by the regime since her death and the total lack of remorse shown by Musharraf and his political partners have only further convinced the public of a conspiracy. Zardari and the PPP insist that nobody had the capacity to carry out such a murder except the state, the so called establishment.

Zardari and the PPP also fear that Musharraf and the military will never allow general elections to take place on 18 February because there will be a landslide sympathy vote for the PPP. All the indications are that he is right.

The ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is in a panic, their leaders dare not come out of their house for fear of crowds beating them up or blaming them for Bhutto’s death. Some PML politicians are trying to whip up Punjabi-Sindhi ethnic tensions – a sure fire way to get the polls postponed. Nobody rules out more political assassinations either.

Zardari asks, that when Musharraf has done everything possible in the past nine months to stop the PPP juggernaut – declared an emergency, suspended the constitution, imprisoned thousands of people, curbed the media and sacked Supreme Court judges – how can he now allow free and fair elections.

Equally the military could try and rig the elections but that is more difficult now than it was on the original election date of January 8. Now there is greater public vigilance and much greater hatred for the regime. Zardari does not doubt that the Interservices Intelligence (ISI) will use the next eight weeks to try and break the PPP.

Either way Zardari and the PPP have to find answers and a strategy to deflect all these possibilities. The distraught mourners also expect answers. Beyond the gates of Naudero the stream of people head to the massive mock Moghul tomb three miles away.

Here Benazir is buried next to her beloved father, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was hanged by the military in 1979. Just four weeks ago she had come to lay a wreath at her father’s grave and is if full of premonitions, had marked out exactly where she wanted to be buried, telling attendants to fence off the area.

There are moving displays of public grief at her graveside, but even more there is boiling public anger. The noise is deafening as men and women walk in together chanting not prayers, but slogans against Musharraf. Two black banners hanging above her grave, say it all. One whispers ‘’Benazir – the unblemished and innocent,’’ the other cries out, ‘’we will take revenge on her killers.’’

Her grave is covered in a mountain of rose petals – outside flower vendors say her death has sucked up all the roses of Pakistan like a giant vacuum cleaner. Some people pick a rose petal of her grave, carefully smell its fragrance and then pocket it. The memory of her and the manner of her death will haunt Pakistan for years to come. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Do Taliban Represent Pashtun Identity? A Letter from Kurram

But before I get to that, a couple other items: The word from Pakistan (via telephone) is now that there may be no elections. Free and fair elections would produce an angry, empowered, PPP-led government,perhaps allied with Nawaz Sharif, that would be likely to confront the military. If the PPP, PML-N, and their allies controlled 75% of the seats, they could impeach the president. Rigged elections would not be accepted in the current mood and could lead to confrontations in the street. The solution: Postpone the elections for a year, while replacing the caretaker government with a government of national unity including the PPP, PML-N, and other major parties, with a significant role for the Islamist MMA alliance. The army would act as the guarantor of this agreement and therefore would continue to exercise hegemony.

Rasul Bakhsh Rais has sent his excellent article, "Pakistan's Elections: Troubled Legacy."

Also: excellent article on Benazir Bhutto by Mahnaz Ispahani in Slate.
Delayed elections are the latest effort by the Musharraf government to limit the power of civilian political parties in Pakistan. In this context, the lessons of Benazir Bhutto's life and her ghastly death must be a wake-up call to the Bush administration and certainly to its successor: Accepting a garrison state, however disguised, over a legitimately elected civilian government, is an acknowledgment of terror's emerging triumph in Pakistan. It has always been a short-term, tactical, and doomed solution to the long-term, incendiary problem of security of governance in a nuclear-armed state. The lesson of Benazir Bhutto is that without a long-term and significant investment in civilian political institutions, especially political parties, Pakistan, and with it the "global war on terror," will be lost. The task is frustrating, requires a significant financial commitment, and is not without risks, but the potential rewards are far greater than a continuing alliance with President Pervez Musharraf.
Finish it here.

To the main theme:

This week I received a query from someone writing an article for a magazine:
To what extent should popular support of the Taliban/militants in the FATA and NWFP be understood simply as an expression of Pathan solidarity? And to the extent that that's the case, do the locals perceive the Pakistani army operations as a Punjabi assault on their territory?
The idea that Taliban are Pashtuns fighting against foreign invaders is a common one. It is the official position of the Government of Pakistan. When I was in Pakistan in November, one of my Pashtun nationalist friends asked, "If Taliban are Pashtuns fighting against foreigners, who are the foreigners in Swat?"

This week I received a copy of a letter dated December 29, 2007, written by Dr. Abid Ali Shah, a Pashtun from Kurram Agency, to Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai, a Pashtun ex-general also from Kurram Agency, who was at that time Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province. Since that time Governor Orakzai has resigned. Orakzai originated the policy of seeking negotiated truces with the Pakistan Taliban in the tribal agencies and reportedly opposed plans for the use of force there in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's assassination.

Here is what Dr. Shah had to say (facsimile of letter here):

Your Excellency,

With due respect I just remind that today is the 44th day of clashes and unrest in Kurram Agency. . . . Your Excellency knows the number of killed, injured, suffered, and displaced. The over all views is misery, blood shed and anarchy.

There are sick, elder, women and innocent children in need of immediate attention. There are families starving and if you look from top of Parachinar till lower end at Chappary gate, each house or family has suffered in one or other way. Every body is not fighting but in fact the whole zone is under the anarchy of known wanted militants.

Your Excellency just imagines, the respectable commander Kurram militia was requested to intervene but he proudly answered that, I do not want my jawans [soldiers] to be killed. I ask your Excellency, if the national security is under threat, is the soldier has right to say that I don’t want to be killed? Who is then responsible to implement Govt writ?

Your Excellency, this is very interesting that security forces have vacated their positions for militants and each person is fighting for his own sect. If this becomes the trend, then what will be the end result and who will do justice?

Your Excellency, this is undeniable fact that all wanted militants from Waziristan, Uzbeks and outlawed Lashkar e jahangwi are encamped in lower Kurram and fighting so called jehad. Why they have such free and easy access and no one is in position to tackle them?

I hope and request your Excellency to act immediately to implement Govt writ and restore Peace in the beautiful valley.

While the populations of Upper and Lower Kurram are Pashtun, the Aurakzai tribe of lower Kurram is Sunni, while the Turi tribe of upper Kurram is Shi'a, as presumably is Dr. Abid Ali Shah. Dr. Shah claims that the militants in Lower Kurram are Pashtun (from Waziristan), Uzbeks (from Uzbekistan), and Punjabis (from Jhang, home of the Deobandi extremist group Lashkar-i Jhangvi). He does not see them as expressions of his ethnic identity. Instead he asks the Governor (also a Pashtun) to restore the authority of the Government.

As a result of these clashes, according to UNHCR, about 6,000 Pakistani Pashtuns, mostly women and children from Kurram Agency have fled to Afghanistan in the past week. Pashtuns are fleeing the Pakistani Taliban to seek refuge in the most insecure parts of Afghanistan.

Perhaps this is an exception, since these Pashtuns are Shi'a, unlike the majority. But elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies:
Gunmen in Pakistan have shot dead eight pro-government tribal leaders in the troubled South Waziristan region on Afghanistan's border, officials say. . . .
Officials say they suspect the attackers to be Uzbek militants, who are opposed to Mullah Nazir. Although a Taleban commander, Mullah Nazir recently fought foreign militants with the backing of Pakistani government troops.
That is the official story: Uzbek militants affiliated with al-Qaida killed former Taliban Pashtun elders who sided with the government. Another story circulating is that the pro-government elders were assassinated by the Pakistani Taliban themselves, who then blamed Uzbeks. In neither case is Islamic militancy an expression of Pashtun identity.

Taliban are not an expression of Pashtun identity or Pashtun or Afghan nationalism, though some people are fighting the foreign troops in Afghanistan with such motives. The Taliban make effective use of Pashtun tribalism and cross-border ties. Al-Qaida has even exploited the tribal code by portraying Bin Laden and his companions as persecuted Muslims seeking refuge (nanawati in Pashto), who must be protected. But the Pakistani government and the British Indian government before them also used Pashtun tribalism for political purposes. The Taliban use transnational commerce or ethnic ties as they serve their goals; but those goals are not ethnic or nationalist. Pashtun nationalists see the Taliban as a threat to, not an expression of, Pashtun identity. Read more on this article...

Monday, January 7, 2008

Pakistan: The Art of Rigging (Updated with Description of New Security Measures)

Update: I previously summarized how post-poll election rigging has taken place in past elections in Pakistan and how, therefore, it might occur again. After my last post, based on an article in The Friday Times, I asked Staffan Darnolf, a Swedish electoral expert working with the Electoral Commission of Pakistan, to respond. He argues that new safeguards introduced for this election make the previous type of post-poll rigging impossible:
The one thing the people trying to rig the elections at the Assistant Commissioner offices have to overcome this time around is the uniquely numbered plastic security seal that prevents the new translucent ballot boxes’ slot from being opened without detection. Party agents, international observers and the 20,000 FAFEN [Free and Fair Election Network, a Pakistani election monitoring organization] observers have all been trained to record the unique serial numbers of the seals used on the ballot boxes in the polling stations, so they have to be prevented from entering the polling stations throughout the Election Day, which would defeat the alleged clandestine stealth-rigging at a select number of polling stations. Also, the party agents and observers at the Returning Officer office have been trained to record these serial numbers and will compare the numbers with the once recorded by their colleagues at the polling station level.

We have ordered 6.5 million seals to the ECP and every single seal has a unique number. The Presiding Officers have no way of knowing which seals will be used in their particular polling station until election day. So, unless each and every AC office has access to 6.5 million identical seals on their premises and can go through every single box and find these unique 30 seals it cannot be done. Also, logistically, someone need to order 1,768,000 million seals on the international market, have it shipped to Pakistan, and then park a couple of sea containers on each premise of the AC just to store the 6.5 million seals. In addition, you probably need to have a couple of hundred workers in each location to find those seals. All this without anyone spilling the beans. I find this non-plausible.

The original post follows:

Pakistani journalist Raheel Asghar Ginai published a complete guide to the "Art of Rigging" in The Friday Times (behind subscription firewall) on December 28, the day after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The method described is exactly the one I was discussing in previous posts, but the account is more detailed. The description is accompanied with an arithmetical illustration from the 1990 election, where I first encountered this system.

Ginai shows that the overall results can be decisively changed by rigging only a few well chosen polling places in a few key constituencies and that the visible part of the polling and vote counting can be done in a completely legal and transparent fashion. Here is the system:
Methodology of Rigging on Election Day

The technique followed on the day of elections is very simple, but foolproof, and comprises the following steps:

l Political parties to be defeated and to be elected are identified

l Seats that are sure to be won by opposition candidates with clear margins are not touched. Fair elections are held in their constituencies

l Similarly, seats in which opposition candidates lose elections with large differences are also not chosen for rigging

l Only those constituencies are chosen where a close fight is expected and the difference of a few thousand votes can swing the results

l A normal constituency consists of about 250 polling stations. Out of about 250 polling stations, hardly 25 to 30 polling stations are chosen for rigging. The remaining polling stations are not touched at all. Fair elections are held in these polling stations as well

l No interference is carried out during polling at any station. Even at the twenty to thirty polling stations designated for rigging, nothing is done till polling is over. As a result, voters observe no rigging anywhere.

l The presiding officers of the chosen 20 to 30 polling stations are appointed by the approval of the intelligence services. They are trustworthy and ‘reliable’.

l Police personnel posted at all polling stations are instructed to obtain a copy of the result from the presiding officers at the end of counting of votes. These results are compiled unofficially at secretly established offices (mostly offices of Assistant Commissioners) to determine how many votes are required to make a defeated candidate win the elections.

l The selected presiding officers now play their pivotal role. They do not pass on a copy of the result to the polling agents of contesting candidates who are threatened by the police to leave the polling stations and disappear without contacting their candidate till the announcement of the result for that particular constituency. Tactics like threats of involving them in murder cases, drug trafficking etc. are used against the polling agents.

l The presiding officers of the chosen polling stations, instead of going to the returning officers at the end of polling, take their record to the secret offices mentioned above. Assistant Commissioners, who have the statistics of the results obtained by the police, cast the required number of votes in favour of the government candidate to make him win.

l The presiding officers then take the modified record of their polling stations to the returning officers, who declare the results according to the figures presented to them by the presiding officers.

l Obviously, the results of such polling stations reach the returning officers with delay, and perhaps are the last to be received. Before arrival of their results, the counting by the returning officers show opposition candidates in the lead. Their supporters start celebrating victory. But the tables are turned by the rigged results of the chosen polling stations towards the end of counting.

l To avoid detection of rigging, polling station–wise progressive results are not released to the media during counting of votes step by step as they are received. Only the final result of the constituency is announced. Only in the 1971 elections, polling station-wise progressive results were made public during counting, because the government did not intend to rig those elections.

With this methodology, voters and observers alike observe no rigging at all throughout the polling day. Changing results by a very small percentage at a very few places produces the desired results against the will of the people and an unpopular government is placed in power ....
Using figures from the 1990 elections, Ginai shows how rigging only 2.84% of the votes could account for the shift of 47 seats from the PPP to the Islami Jamhuri Ittihad, which he characterized as "a creation of the intelligence agencies." This shift made the difference between a PPP government and an IJI government. Today the PML-Q plays the role that the IJI did in 1990.

Ginai offers useful advice for poll watchers and election observers on election day:
Political parties, contesting candidates, the media, and international observers and the voters have to be made aware of this methodology of rigging. The movement of each presiding officer will have to be monitored on the evening of Election Day, till the result of his polling station is released to the media, and the presiding officer reaches the office of the returning officer. Polling station-wise results must be released to the public and private TV and radio channels progressively. Inquiries must be made into results of polling stations that arrive with abnormal delay to the returning officers. Candidates should make attendance of all of their polling agents of all polling stations compulsory at a prescribed point in the evening of the polling day. Any missing polling agent must be traced and questioned in privacy.

Normally, the media and international observers try to observe the polling process at various polling stations. But as rigging is not done during the day, it remains undetected. At the most they will point out some instances of pre-poll rigging, which is rampant these days. People at large form their opinion about the fairness of elections by observing order and discipline at the polling stations. They will, thus, be satisfied, as nothing untoward will be observed at any polling station, and it will never come to light how the will of the people was robbed with the secret casting of just four fake votes per thousand by the district administrations.
Note on Asif Zardari's sarcastic name for PML-Q. I have seen several reports that Asif Ali Zardari has called the PML-Q a "killer" party. This is an untranslatable play on words. PML-Q stands for Pakistan Muslim League -- Quaid-i-Azam. This distinguishes it from the PML-- Nawaz, the offshoot (or original) headed by Nawaz Sharif. Quaid-i-Azam is the quaint olde transliteration of Qa'id-i-A'zam, or Great Leader, the title bestowed on Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and President of the original Muslim League. (Qa'id is the same Arabic word that entered Spanish as "El Cid," or "alcalde," the Spanish word for "mayor.")

The word for "killer" used by Zardari is "qatil," which starts with the same Arabic letter, qaf, as qa'id. So what he is saying is that the PML-Q is actually the PML-Qatil. Read more on this article...

Sunday, January 6, 2008

"PAKISTAN AFTER THE ASSASSINATION": Interview with Pervez Hoodbhoy

Pervez Hoodbhoy, professor of nuclear and high-energy physics, and chairman of the department of physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, has been interviewed by Stefania Maurizi for Il Venerdi (Friday supplement) of La Repubblica, where the interview will be published in Italian. With permission, I extract a few excerpts of particular relevance to the U.S. and reproduce the entire interview afterwards in the original English, as supplied by Professor Hoodbhoy.

On the immediate future:
Q: Ideally, what do you want to see happen in the next few weeks?

A: I want Musharraf to go - resign or somehow be removed, preferably without bloodshed. I want the independent judiciary restored, a new neutral caretaker government installed for overseeing free and fair elections, and then elections that would decide upon the new parliament and prime minister. This will not immediately solve Pakistan's fundamental problems - army dominance, maldistribution of wealth, religious fanaticism, provincial imbalances - but it would get Pakistan on the track to democracy instead of the self-destruction it is now racing towards.
On U.S. policy:
Q: People in Washington are increasingly frustrated with Musharraf's counterterrorism efforts, however they think there are no alternatives to Musharraf. What do you think about this?

A: The Americans have tunnel vision. They want lackeys like Musharraf who do their bidding, although here too there is deception at work. They know, but choose to forget, that Pakistani military leaders, Musharraf included, are the makers of the jihadist monster. . . .

Musharraf is extremely unpopular now and the Americans will have to dump him at some point. It is hard to find a pro-Musharraf person anywhere in the country except in the top business circles and the top army leadership. Until recently he ran both the army and the government himself, with the connivance of a rubber-stamp Parliament put in place through rigged elections. When the courts were about to rule that he could not legally be president, Musharraf chose to suspend the constitution and impose emergency rule. He dismissed the Supreme Court and arrested the judges, replacing them with judges who obey his every command. He blocked all independent television channels, and punished the news media for disparaging him or the army. His police arrested thousands of lawyers and pro-democracy activists. He ordered that civilians be tried in closed military courts. This was necessary, he said, to save Pakistan from a rapidly growing Islamist insurgency. But he released 25 Islamic extremists on the day that the judges were arrested. In spite of all this, George W. Bush called Musharraf "a democrat at heart". It makes you sick.

The Americans have shot themselves in the foot by supporting the army consistently for decades. They have lost credibility and respect among Pakistanis. Everybody laughs when they hear that America wants democracy for Pakistan. In this situation, even if Musharraf goes and Gen. Kayani (the new army chief) takes over, the best that American can hope for is for the status quo. This is sad, because America is a great country with many virtues. If only they could get over their hangup of wanting to run the world! It's an impossible task anyway.
On al-Qaida and Taliban:
Q: What could be an effective way to fight Al Qaeda and the Taleban in Pakistan?

A: To fight and win this war, Pakistan will need to mobilize both its people and the state. The notion of a power-sharing agreement between the state and Taliban is a non-starter; the spectacular failures of earlier agreements should be a lesson. Instead the government should help create public consensus through open forum discussions, proceed faster on infrastructure development in the tribal areas, and make judicious use of military force - troops only, no air power. This should become every Pakistani's war, not just the army's, and it will have to be fought even if America packs up and goes away. But, as long as Musharraf is president, it will be impossible to get popular support for the war. If presented with a choice between Musharraf and the Taliban, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis would want the latter - although I am sure they would regret it later.
Here is the full text of the interview:

Q: Let's start with the tragedy of Bhutto assassination. Today, international media remind us she was the first woman to become the PM of an Islamic country, she was a democratic leader, etc. Nonetheless, she was the scion of a feudal family, which was primarily responsible for making Pakistan an atomic power and she was known for the authoritarian control of her party. Looking back, how do you judge Benazir Bhutto?

A: Having first known Benazir Bhutto from high school in Karachi, and then later in Cambridge (Massachusetts), I am deeply saddened by her murder. But, although the international media paint her as someone who could have led Pakistan into the modern age, the truth is very different. Her two tenures as prime minister were a nightmare of autocratic government and mis-governance. Billions disappeared from foreign aid. A Swiss court found her guilty of money laundering in 2003. Ms. Bhutto owned mansions and palaces across the world. She even tried to steal land from my (public) university to feed the rapacious appetite of her party members.

Even during school days, Benazir thought she had been born to rule. More importantly, she made not the slightest effort to change the feudal character of Pakistani politics and society. The Bhuttos own vast tracts of agricultural land in Sindh that is worked upon by serfs. Although she promised to bring democracy to Pakistan, after returning to Pakistan, Ms. Bhutto made clear that for a few table scraps she would be happy to team up with General Musharraf under the hopelessly absurd US plan to give our military government a civilian face. Her party, the Pakistan Peoples Party was her fiefdom. She appointed herself as "chairperson for life". Reflecting the mindset of a feudal princess, she even named her successors to be male members from her family: her 19-year son, who is a student at Oxford and knows nothing about Pakistani culture, as well as her phenomenally corrupt husband, initially known as Mr Ten Percent and later as Mr. Thirty Percent.

Q: Was Ms. Bhutto a model for Pakistani women?

A: She was courageous and single-minded. And she showed that a woman could be the head of a conservative Islamic state. Nevertheless, it is hard to see what she wanted beyond personal power. Although she said that she was fighting for grand causes, I'm still trying to figure out what they were. She certainly did nothing for Pakistani women during her two stints in power and left untouched the horrific Hudood laws, according to which a rape victim needs to produce 4 witnesses to the act of penetration (else she could be punished for fornication). Nor did she try to overturn the Pakistani blasphemy law that prescribes death as the minimum penalty for those convicted of insulting the prophet of Islam or his companions. As for democracy: she had been desperate to do a deal with Musharraf who dangled over her head the many corruption cases that she was charged with. But he proved too clever for her and she was forced into the opposition.

In foreign policy, she played footsie with the army. It could do whatever it liked, including making nuclear weapons, sending Islamic militants into Kashmir, and organizing the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. In 2002 she regretted having signed the document authorizing funds for the Taliban forces poised to capture Kandahar. But Ms. Bhutto makes an excellent martyr. In her death she will doubtlessly play a more positive role than when alive.

Q: Al Qaeda was immediately blamed for Bhutto assassination. However, many people hated her: Musharraf, the Army, and the infamous ISI, which in 1990 removed Bhutto from power after she had replaced General Hameed Gul, the man who invented the Taliban [While Professor Hoodbhoy did not distract the interviewer from the subject, it should be noted that Hameed Gul was not involved in the origin of the Taliban. The principal general involved in 1994 was General Naseerullah Babar, principal advisor on Afghanistan to both Zulfiqar Ali and Benazir Bhutto. -- BRR] . Do you believe that Al Qaeda was really responsible for killing Benazir Bhutto? Who is going to gain from Bhutto's death?

A: There are different possibilities and much confusion. But some facts are certain. There definitely were gunshots, and this was followed by a suicide blast. Now, I do not think that suicide bombers can be bought with any number of rupees. Only a religious fanatic lured by heavenly rewards would blow himself up. Therefore Al-Qaida, the Taliban, or other Islamic jihadist groups are strong possibilities. They always hated Bhutto, but even more after she announced in Washington that, if elected prime minister, she would fight them even more vigorously than Musharraf. Of course, rogue elements of Pakistan's intelligence agencies, who are also strong Islamists, and who lie deeply hidden within the establishment, could also have done it. They have a stock of suicide bombers available to them, as evidenced by the success they have had in organizing suicide attacks upon army commandos as well as their own colleagues.

So did Islamists of one or the other flavour do it? Maybe, but the waters have been muddied by the government. First, publicly available photographs and videos show a modern-looking gunman accompanying the suicide bomber. He fired three shots, heard by all present, at least one of which hit Bhutto. Some say that there was a second sharpshooter in a building too. On the other hand, the government initially insisted she died from concussion and not a bullet wound - an obvious lie immediately refuted by those in the same car as Bhutto. Second, in just an hour after the assassination, the police washed away all the bloody evidence with water hoses. So, it is quite possible that non-Islamists in the government have somehow used brainwashed suicide bombers, trained in mosques and madrassas, to do their dirty job. But, as in the JFK murder, the truth will never be known.

As for the gainers and losers: Islamist groups saw Bhutto as a tool of America that would be used against them, and a leader who could secularize Pakistan. Plus, she was a woman and popular. But Musharraf and his political party, the PML(Q), have also gained because a political rival has been eliminated. The losers are those Pakistanis who wish for a secular, modern Pakistan and not one that is run by mullahs. Although she never delivered on her promises, her followers never lost faith.

Q: There is a lot of concern about the future of Pakistan. How real is the threat of an Islamic takeover, in your opinion?

A: It has already been taken over! Twenty five years ago the Pakistani state began pushing Islam on to its people as a matter of policy. Prayers in government departments were deemed compulsory, punishments were meted out to those who did not fast in Ramadan, selection for academic posts required that the candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islamic teachings, and jihad was propagated through schoolbooks. Today government intervention is no longer needed because of a spontaneous groundswell of Islamic zeal. But now the state is realizing that it shot itself in the foot. The fanatical jihadists it created have turned against it. It is supreme irony that the Pakistan Army - whose men were recruited under the banner of jihad and which saw itself as the fighting arm of Islam - is now frequently targeted by suicide bombers who are fighting a jihad to bring even stricter Islam. It has lost a thousand or more men fighting Al-Qaida and the Taliban.

The pace of radicalization has quickened. There are almost daily suicide attacks. This phenomenon was almost unknown in Pakistan before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Now it is common in major cities as well as tribal areas. The targets have been the Pakistan army, police, incumbent and retired government leaders, and rival Islamic sects. But this is just the tip of the iceberg; we'll see much more in years ahead.

Q: Ideally, what do you want to see happen in the next few weeks?

A: I want Musharraf to go - resign or somehow be removed, preferably without bloodshed. I want the independent judiciary restored, a new neutral caretaker government installed for overseeing free and fair elections, and then elections that would decide upon the new parliament and prime minister. This will not immediately solve Pakistan's fundamental problems - army dominance, maldistribution of wealth, religious fanaticism, provincial imbalances - but it would get Pakistan on the track to democracy instead of the self-destruction it is now racing towards.

Q: People in Washington are increasingly frustrated with Musharraf's counterterrorism efforts, however they think there are no alternatives to Musharraf. What do you think about this?

A: The Americans have tunnel vision. They want lackeys like Musharraf who do their bidding, although here too there is deception at work. They know, but choose to forget, that Pakistani military leaders, Musharraf included, are the makers of the jihadist monster. In 1999, after Musharraf launched the secret Kargil operation in Kashmir, the United Jihad Council celebrated him as a true fighter for Islam. After 911 such praises disappeared, but under his leadership the army still covertly supported jihadist groups and the Taliban in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
Musharraf is extremely unpopular now and the Americans will have to dump him at some point. It is hard to find a pro-Musharraf person anywhere in the country except in the top business circles and the top army leadership. Until recently he ran both the army and the government himself, with the connivance of a rubber-stamp Parliament put in place through rigged elections. When the courts were about to rule that he could not legally be president, Musharraf chose to suspend the constitution and impose emergency rule. He dismissed the Supreme Court and arrested the judges, replacing them with judges who obey his every command. He blocked all independent television channels, and punished the news media for disparaging him or the army. His police arrested thousands of lawyers and pro-democracy activists. He ordered that civilians be tried in closed military courts. This was necessary, he said, to save Pakistan from a rapidly growing Islamist insurgency. But he released 25 Islamic extremists on the day that the judges were arrested. In spite of all this, George W. Bush called Musharraf "a democrat at heart". It makes you sick.

The Americans have shot themselves in the foot by supporting the army consistently for decades. They have lost credibility and respect among Pakistanis. Everybody laughs when they hear that America wants democracy for Pakistan. In this situation, even if Musharraf goes and Gen. Kayani (the new army chief) takes over, the best that American can hope for is for the status quo. This is sad, because America is a great country with many virtues. If only they could get over their hangup of wanting to run the world! It's an impossible task anyway.
Q: In Pakistan what is the man on the street thinking?

A: Almost everyone holds the government responsible for the assassination. Tragically, suicide bombings are not condemned with any particular vigor. There is no strong reaction against the mullahs, madrassas, and jihadis. Perhaps people are afraid to criticize them because this might be seen as a criticism of Islam. Interestingly, in all the street demonstrations I have gone to after the Bhutto assassinations, there was no call for cracking down on extremists. Yesterday I met the lone taxi driver who thought the Islamists did it. I tipped him well.

Q: What could be an effective way to fight Al Qaeda and the Taleban in Pakistan?

A: To fight and win this war, Pakistan will need to mobilize both its people and the state. The notion of a power-sharing agreement between the state and Taliban is a non-starter; the spectacular failures of earlier agreements should be a lesson. Instead the government should help create public consensus through open forum discussions, proceed faster on infrastructure development in the tribal areas, and make judicious use of military force - troops only, no air power. This should become every Pakistani's war, not just the army's, and it will have to be fought even if America packs up and goes away. But, as long as Musharraf is president, it will be impossible to get popular support for the war. If presented with a choice between Musharraf and the Taliban, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis would want the latter - although I am sure they would regret it later.

Q: Let's talk about Pakistan's nukes. There a lot of concern about the possibility that nuclear weapons could end up into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Early in December the Washington Post revealed that a small group of U.S. military experts and intelligence analysts convened in Washington for exploring strategies to secure Pakistani nukes if the Pakistani regime falls apart. Their conclusions were very scaring, as, - there are no palatable ways to forcibly ensure the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. What do you think about this?

A: The government says there is absolutely no danger of loose nukes. Pakistan has been sending serving officers of the Strategic Plans Division, which is the agency responsible for handling nuclear weapons, to the United States for training in safety measures (PAL's locking devices, storing procedures, etc). But there's no way of telling if this will be effective. Extremists have already penetrated deep into the army and the intelligence agencies. We now see repeated evidence: for example, last month an unmarked bus carrying employees of the Inter Services Intelligence [Pakistan's secret intelligence], was collecting employees early in the morning. It was boarded by a suicide bomber who blew himself up killing 25. It was an inside job.
And now there are many other such examples, such as that of an army man killing 16 Special Services Group commandos in a suicide attack at Ghazi Barotha. A part of the establishment is clearly at war with another part. There are also scientists, as well as military people, who are radical Islamists. Many questions come to mind: can there be collusion between different field-level commanders, resulting in the hijacking of a nuclear weapon? Could outsider groups develop links with insiders? Given the absence of accurate records of fissile material production, can one be certain that small quantities of highly enriched uranium or weapons grade plutonium have not already been diverted? I do not know the answers. Nobody does. Read more on this article...

Thursday, January 3, 2008

More on Election Rigging in Pakistan

UPDATE: I have posted a scanned copy of the PPP's report on election rigging, Another Stain on the Face of Democracy. According to the sub-title, this report is only about pre-poll rigging. This is apparently the report that Benazir Bhutto was planning to give to a visiting U.S. Congressional delegation the evening that she was murdered. See below.

The summary is as follows:
The Master Plan of Rigging 2008 Elections Unveiled

The administration has planned to rig the Elections in the following manner:
  1. Where an opposing candidate is strong in an area, they have planned to create a conflict at the polling station, even killing people if necessary, to stop polls for at least 3 - 4 hours. The polling stations will be granted extended opening of thirty minutes which will not be made up for the time lost.
  2. Where they collect and secure the ballot box at the end of the polling day, the place will be broken into and ballots will not be stolen but thrown on the floor so they will have solid basis to call for a re-count during which process they will add the votes for their candidates.
  3. 90 percent of the equipment that the USA gave the government of Pakistan to fight terrorism is being used to monitor and to keep a check on their political opponents especially the PPP. All of our communications as well as that of other major leaders in other parties are compromised by them. They listen to our conversations up to a mile away and intercept our communications.
  4. The regime has asked government-sponsored candidates to give names of their security guards and local thugs to enroll them into the police for three days on election duty. These also include ex-Army personnel. They will be used to fire at voter's stations and drive voters away so that ballots can be stuffed.
  5. Election officials are still being changed/transferred.
  6. Military Intelligence sits in the offices of returning officers, police officials and other elections officials.
  7. Election agents with voters' lists are being asked to give tampered lists to presiding officers.
  8. Election being stitched up.
The version I have is only 47 pages long, whereas press reports speak of 160 pages. It appears on quick reading to argue that Military Intelligence, rather than the ISI, is the agency responsible for assuring that the election is rigged. I will post more as I receive it.

Original Post:

From now until February 18, when the general elections in Pakistan are scheduled, we will hear a lot about election rigging. I have written about it here and here and also discussed it with Scott Horton of Harpers. I would now like to present some more material, including my correspondence with Staffan Darnolf, a Swedish electoral specialist who has been working with the Electoral Commission of Pakistan for over a year. I was delayed in posting this, as I was waiting for consent from Darnolf in Islamabad, who just gave his approval, remarking, "Just had our fourth power cut today, so sorry for the late reply."

First, general background: Professor Rasul Bakhsh Rais of Lahore University of Management Sciences has written a paper called "Pakistan Elections: Troubled Legacy," a summary of which appeared in The News (Lahore). I will ask Rasul (whose office was next to mine at Columbia University many years ago) for a full copy of the paper and try to make it available. On December 5, the government filed charges against four professors of LUMS, including Rasul, as well as two students,under the Maintenance of Public Order Act, for some act of protest against Emergency rule and dismissal of the Supreme Court. As far as I know, however, the authorities have not gotten around to actually arresting them, as they are preoccupied with other matters. Here is the core of what Professor Rais has to say:
There is lot of evidence to support the allegations that elections have rarely been free or fair in the history of Pakistan except the 1970 [elections]. No elections ever since have been acclaimed as fair and its outcome accepted without doubts and reservations. However the intensity of the claim, as to how the elections were rigged, to what extent, and to favour whom have varied from elections to elections in Pakistan. The question why the outcome of elections has been contested, leads to the second characteristic of the Pakistani elections, the mistrust of the electoral machinery of the country. The Election Commission of Pakistan.

It is because the Commission has failed to cultivate impartiality and trust the two values that would be necessary to make any electoral exercise as successful. This begs another question; have the regimes in power used the electoral machinery to produce results to suit their interests? The answer to this question leads to the third feature of the Pakistani elections-partiality of the executive branch of the government. Interestingly, seven out of eight general elections since 1970 have been conducted either by a military regime directly or by an interim government that it created under its supervision. Therein lies the real dilemma of Pakistan's electoral politics-the civil military relations in Pakistan. The military in Pakistan has its own vision of good politics, good society, good economy and good democracy. It doesn't trust the politicians, nor does it believe that they are genuine representatives of the people of Pakistan. All the military leaders who captured power have viewed free play of democratic forces as dangerous, anti-development, and pregnant with the potential of degenerating to lawlessness and anarchy. In military-dominated or military-directed political system, the electoral process loses its credibility, as it seen by the public as an exercise to bring into power the most favoured groups and route out those opposed to its interventions. The real value of the electoral process lies in facilitating a representative government, and not in being an instrument of political manipulation. Unfortunately, the later expression is true of the way elections have been conducted in Pakistan. It is widely alleged and believed that through its intelligence agencies the military in the shadows or over the horizon has attempted to change the loyalties of politicians, has funded political campaigns of the favourite groups, and has used the Election Commission to change electoral results selectively, if not wholly. [emphasis added.] With low trust in the electoral process and frequent allegations of defrauding the opposition of its true electoral representation, the voter turn out in Pakistani elections has declined. It is also a reflection of distrust of the political class in Pakistan.
Next, recent events: Both the Guardian and the Times of London have reported that, the evening of her assassination, Benazir Bhutto was to present to visiting U.S. Senators and Congressional representatives a report on preparations being made to rig the elections. Declan Walsh of the Guardian:

Bhutto had obtained details of an Islamabad safe house run by the country's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency from where it intended to manipulate the poll, said Sarfraz Khan Lashari, an official on her party's 10-member election monitoring cell. The ISI-led operation would rig the vote in favour of President Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League-Q party through ballot stuffing in constituencies across Sindh and Punjab provinces, he said. The ISI has a long history of meddling with elections in Pakistan, usually in the interest of the country's military establishment.

In 1990 the ISI received 140m rupees (£1.1m at current values) to rig national elections, according to supreme court testimony by the then chief of army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg.

There is no ISI spokesman but a government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, denied the claims. "How can you run an election rigging campaign from a safe house? There is a lot of talk about the ISI but not much substance," he said.

The PPP claims to have identified the safe house, the location of which is given in a smaller document "of much greater sensitivity." According to Jeremy Page for the Times:
The second report, which Ms Bhutto did not plan to release to the media, alleged that the ISI was using some of the $10 billion (£5 billion) in US military aid that Pakistan has received since 2001 to run a covert election operation from a safe house in G5, a central district of Islamabad, he said.

“The report was done by some people who we’ve got in the services. They directly dealt with Benazir Bhutto,” [Lashari] continued, adding that Ms Bhutto was planning to share the contents of the report with the British Ambassador as well as the US lawmakers.
Finally, my discussion with Staffan Darnolf. In his first note, Darnolf wrote:
It was with great interest that I read your interview in Harper’s Magazine. Since working on the Afghanistan elections back in 2004 & 2005, I have always tried to read your work and commentaries. For the last 15 months I have now been working with the ECP [Electoral Commission of Pakistan] here in Pakistan.

I am the first to recognize that the electoral process in Pakistan leaves much to be desired. This includes the method for allocating voters to polling stations, ECP's interaction with political parties and the aggregation of results. In order to achieve the necessary improvements I am of the opinion that we must accurately present the problems.

In this article you mentioned that the elections are likely to be rigged with the assistance of ISI and district administration as “[t]hese ballots, already printed, filled out, and prepared, are then added to those transported from polling places for the final count.” Could you elaborate a bit more here, as I simply don’t understand your argument. The reason being that no central counting of ballot papers take place. The ballot boxes are opened at the polling stations and the ballot papers are counted at the individual polling stations.
I responded:
The method of rigging that I described is sometimes called "ghost polling places." Nawaz Sharif was quoted in the NYT today.

[I erred, as the quotation was actually from Nawaz's brother, Shahbaz Sharif, reported by Jane Perlez:
He [Shahbaz Sharif] accused the current chief minister of Punjab, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, of planning to distribute forged ballot papers and to create “ghost” polling places in order to swing the election in favor of Mr. Musharraf’s party. “Ghost” polling places are extra polling places that are often created in Pakistani elections to enhance the vote totals of one side or another.]
I myself witnessed the ballot counting at the polling place in Sukkur in 1990. It was a model of the democratic process! Then the ballots are sealed with the total and sent to the division center or somewhere [the Returns Office for the constituency] for the totaling of all the polling places in the constituency. The polling places are forbidden to release their counts to the public. But they are monitored by the ISI elections cell. The elections cell checks the "real results" and then adds results from "ghost polling places" before the final count is announced in order to achieve the desired outcome. The ballots are prepared in advance for those constituencies where the ISI's pollling indicates it is necessary. (The desired result is not 99% for PML-Q, but the right balance of seats to leave the military firmly in control while making it look like a parliamentary system.) This produces some odd turnout figures unless real turnout is kept down, which is why the latter is important.
Darnolf replied:
The results aggregation process you are describing in your email might have been in place 17 years ago, but is no longer the case. Nowadays the ballots are counted at the polling station immediately following the end of polling. Party agents and observers are given a copy of the results form. The results forms, and other election material, are sent to the Returning Officer in-charge of the constituency in question, for aggregation. However, no physical counting is taking place at the RO-level. The RO will review the results forms and tally the results based on these documents. In accordance with the National Reconciliation Ordinance and ECP procedures, the aggregated results are shared with party agents and observers present at the Returning Officer premises. Unfortunately, observers and party agents have not always focused on this part of the process, or in some cases been refused access to the RO, which is of great concern to me.
In his final note, in response to my request for his permission to publish his views, he added:
What my argument boils down to is that this notion of ghost polling stations is a red herring. Why go through this huge exercise involving thousands of people to try to siphon off ballot papers, get your hands on ballot boxes, security seals, the right stamps, the original forms, prep the ballot papers and then have them sent to the Returning Officers' premises where no counting of the ballots are taking place? Also, how do you produce faked voters list for these ghost polling stations now when the voters lists are computerized and can be easily verified?

To me, this seems as far-fetched as the allegation by some political parties in late November and the first week of December stating that 108 Punjab NA constituencies had been selected for rigging, as the ruling party's representatives had already received 20-30K (the reported number varied) extra ballot papers for stuffing. The problem with this accusation is that candidate nomination only ended on Dec 15. And before that no one knows which parties and candidates will actually run for office. Hence, it is only on December 16th that the final design of the real ballots are known and they can be produced for any of the 849 directly elected constituencies.
I would be grateful for any further contributions to this discussion. Read more on this article...

Wednesday, January 2, 2008

Pakistan Election Rigging: Corrections and Clarifications

In response to my previous post, Pakistan's Power Puzzle, I received a note from a very knowledgeable international official working on electoral matters in Pakistan raising questions about some of my statements. I hope that tomorrow I will be able to publish his views. The official referred to two points I made, rigging elections through "ghost polling places" to obtain the desired result by adding forged ballots to those received by the returning officer, and an allegation that computers supplied by the U.S. to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) were not plugged in.

I erred in stating that the computers in question were supplied by the U.S. My source (below) did not say who funded the computers. This report was circulated by a Pakistani colleague who accompanied it with some critical remarks about U.S. aid to the ECP, which I confused with the report itself. There is no reference to U.S. aid in my source (below). Also, the computers were plugged in but not turned on. My source was a Reuters report from Attock on December 25, 2007. Attock is the historical fortress town on the bend of the Indus River marking the boundary of Punjab and NWFP. At one time it was the frontier of the Mughal Empire with Afghanistan. It is about 80 km (50 miles) from Islamabad on a well-trafficked multi-lane highway:
ATTOCK: The Election Commission’s office in Attock is in a run-down building on the outskirts of town.

Several dusty computers sit on tables, none of them switched on, and the office has no internet connection [high-speed internet connections are widely available in Pakistan], said the only person there on Monday morning, a caretaker with a grey beard. “No one’s here,” said the caretaker, Ghulam Rafiq, when a Reuters reporter stopped by. Transparent plastic ballot boxes were stacked up with piles of election manuals in boxes.

“He comes very rarely,” Rafiq said when asked about the district’s main election officer. “He’s a man of his own will.” Pakistani opposition parties are pinning their hopes for free and fair parliamentary elections on Jan 8 on Election Commission offices like the one in Attock.

But in this town on the Indus River in Punjab province, opposition politicians said the commission was ignoring complaints of unfair electioneering by candidates who support President Pervez Musharraf.

“The election commission seems to be totally paralysed,” said Malik Amin Aslam, a former environment minister running as an independent candidate. “We are providing them information with proof,” he said of his complaints about unfair electioneering by his opponents.

“There’s no doubt there’s a plan to support certain politicians and parties.” Three members of a powerful political family that supports Musharraf are contesting in Attock’s three constituencies.

The father of one of the candidates is the district government chief who is meant to be impartial but on Monday was seen asking voters to support the three. His photograph appears on his daughter’s election posters.

“Voters are being openly threatened and they are changing their loyalties but the election commission is paying no attention. They are part of this rigging plan,” said Sheikh Aftab Ahmed, a candidate for PML-N party. But Attock’s assistant election commissioner, Sardar Mazhar Hussain, tracked down at a town court, said his office had not got any complaints in writing so there was nothing he could do.

“There’s no question of taking action against anybody.” Attock’s chief election commission official, district returning officer Tariq Abbasi, said his office could do much more if it had the resources and workers.
On post-polling rigging, my correspondent argued that some additional safeguards had been introduced. I hope to publish his description tomorrow and seek comments from others.

Meanwhile, I have located online the National Democratic Institute's Report of the International Observer Delegation to the Pakistan Elections in October 1990. Unfortunately the file is posted in a nearly illegible (pre-PDF) format. It includes the report I drafted of my experiences on election day in Sukkur, Sindh, together with my colleague, Senegalese journalist Boubacar Toure. (Toure and I were surprised to find among the disenfranchised PPP supporters in rural Sindh a man of unmistakably African appearance, perhaps a remnant of the Indian Ocean slave trade.) These experiences (only partly reproduced here) have left me with a persistent skepticism about elections in Pakistan:
Around 11:30 that night we went to try to find the DC [Division Commissioner] and see what happened elsewhere. Our car was unavailable, so we went out in the street and more or less stood there until a passing motorist picked us up. He took us to the home of the commissioner of Sukkur division, where we found the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner Kamran Lashari, and a commander of the police rangers.

Lashari asked us how our day had gone. We told him what we had seen [several incidents of violence, booth capturing, intimidation] and said he was surprised. He was under the impression that order had been restored in Ghotki, and he did not realize that the polling agents had been kidnapped. We gave him the written Urdu statement to read.

The three officers present were receiving telephone calls giving them information on the law and order situation (which was now generally calm) and on the election returns. They told us what they were hearing. While we unfortunately did not take notes on these results (which we imagined were definitive), we later compared our recollection of these events, and we are in agreement that we remember hearing the following two statements:

1. The PPP had carried all three seats in Sukkur district. This includes NA 153, where the son of Pir Pagara [a large landowner from a Sufi family aligned with the government], Sadruddin Shah, was running against the PPP.

2. Asif Ali Zardari [PPP candidate, husband of Benazir Bhutto] had defeated Murtaza Jatoi [son of caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi] in Nawabshah.

The next day in Karachi we were surprised to read in the newspapers that Murtaza Jatoi had been declared the winner in Nawabshah by the Election Commission in Islamabad. We were also surprised to hear from Jam Sadiq Ali [Chief Minister of Sindh] that the son of Pir Pagara had won in NA 153.
For those not familiar with this cast of characters, Jam Sadiq Ali was thus memorialized by Dawn columnist Ardeshir Cowasjee:
Blackguard, murderer, grand larcenist (he died before he could be convicted). He was a likeable rogue, who never denied the fact that he was a rogue.

Despite all his attributes, he was chosen to be the chief minister of Sindh by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to serve his nefarious purposes. GIK wished to remain in power for eternity. Jam as CM robbed and plundered again - as he had done during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime. But this time around he did not kill. Cancer killed him.

He left a very charming Hindu wife, lots of offspring, and lots and lots of moolah.
The internet includes some helpful descriptions of how Jam Sadiq Ali carried out his job.

This just in: a Report on Pakistan from the International Crisis Group:
Islamabad/Brussels, 2 January 2008: If Pakistan is to be stable in the wake of Benazir Bhutto’'s murder, President Pervez Musharraf must resign and a quick transition follow to a democratically elected civilian government.

After Bhutto’'s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, concludes that Musharraf, who seized power in a 1999 coup, is no longer, if he ever was, a factor for stability. Particularly the U.S. must recognise he is a serious liability, seen as complicit in the death of the popular politician. Unless he steps down, tensions will worsen and the international community could face the nightmare of a nuclear-armed, Muslim country descending into civil war from which extremists would stand to gain.

“Bhutto’s death has drawn the battle lines even more clearly between Musharraf’'s military-backed regime and Pakistan’s moderate majority, which will settle for nothing less than genuine parliamentary democracy”, says Mark Schneider, Crisis Group'’s Senior Vice-President.

Crisis Group agrees with the Election Commission decision to postpone the parliamentary election scheduled for 8 January to 18 February – but only if additional steps are taken so that the delay contributes to the creation of conditions for free and fair elections and the restoration of democracy.

These include, in addition to Musharraf’'s resignation: appointment, in consultation with the political parties, of caretaker governments at federal and provincial levels; full restoration of the constitution; and restoration of judicial independence, including reappointment of the judges Musharraf dismissed because they would not do his bidding in November when he declared martial law. The international community should also support an independent, fixed-deadline investigation into Bhutto’s murder.

“It is time to recognise that democracy, not an artificially propped-up, defrocked, widely despised general – has the best chance to provide stability and turn back extremists’ gains”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director.
Read more on this article...

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

Civilian Rule

Pervez Musharraf became a civilian* today. The elections are scheduled and candidates across the country are filing their candidacy papers - in great numbers, especially in the troubled regions. This despite great debate across the two major political parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz on whether to participate or boycott the elections. Their hesitance is understandable. Pervez Musharraf, as a civilian President will rule under the 1973 Constitution which has the oft-used Eighth Amendment to the Article 58, enacted by the last dictator Zia ul Haq in 1985. The Amendment grants the President the power to "dissolve the National Assembly where, in his opinion,…the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and appeal to the electorate is necessary". The amendment was used first by Zia ul Haq against the civilian government of Muhammad Khan Junejo, then by Ghulam Ishaq Khan against Benazir Bhutto, then by Ghulam Ishaq Khan against Nawaz Sharif and again by Farooq Leghari against Benazir Bhutto. The last Nawaz Sharif government nullified this power of the President by passing the Thirteenth Amendment Act in 1997. In 2002, under the Legal Framework Order, General Musharraf fixed it right back.

Basically even if these elections take place as scheduled, even if all the political parties participate, even if they are fair, open and untampered elections (to whatever extent possible) ... President Pervez Musharraf can, at his will, dismiss the elected government when he pleases. Historians predicting the future need only point to the past.

Nawaz Sharif's touted return (after his touted unceremonious departure) has caught the attention of those who deem it necessary to find hidden links. It is pretty straightforward: Nawaz Sharif is the protogé of Zia ul Haq and a close intimate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He comes here because they cleared the way with Pervez Musharraf. He does not enjoy a broad support - his party has many other rivals for leadership including his brother, Shahbaz Sharif. Although, he is also not touched by the obvious stain of being a US-engineered candidate. So maybe that helps?

*Those curious about his successor to the military throne, General Kiyani should consult this profile. I venture that he is more in the mold of General Aslam Beg than Zia ul Haq or Pervez Musharraf. It would be interesting to see if he continues his support of Musharraf - the civilian. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, October 2, 2007

Horse Trading

Deals are being struck in the aftermath of the Pakistan Supreme Court decision to allow Pervez Musharraf the right to contest in the name-off.

Benazir Bhutto will not be prosecuted for crimes when she returns to Pakistan.

The "elections" are scheduled for October 6th and Musharraf has announced that after his inevitable win (current predictions are that he will get either 99.9% of the vote or 99.87%), he will step down as Chief of Army Staff.

In related news, readers might be interested in a small piece I recently wrote covering Pakistan in Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review. You can download the issue here. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

The Bhutto Complex

I have led an unusual life. I have buried a father killed at age 50 and two brothers killed in the prime of their lives. I raised my children as a single mother when my husband was arrested and held for eight years without a conviction -- a hostage to my political career. I made my choice when the mantle of political leadership was thrust upon my shoulders after my father's murder. I did not shrink from responsibility then, and I will not shrink from it now.
- When I Return to Pakistan, September 20, 2007

Why do you think that the U.S. seems to have a harder time with women at the highest level of power than other countries?

In a country like Pakistan or India, when a charismatic leader dies, people are not sure that the traditions he symbolized will continue—there’s a lot of illiteracy and there isn’t the same access to information. So they tend to transfer allegiance from a male leader to a female descendant, in the hope that his policies will be continued. But in Westernized societies, it’s a little different, because people have greater education and greater access to information—they don’t have the same need to be sure of the message of the leader.
- Nurturer-in-Chief: Advice for Hillary Clinton from the former prime minister of Pakistan, October 1, 2007.


On April 4th, 1979, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the overthrown Prime Minister of Pakistan and the father of Benazir Bhutto, was hanged by the State of Pakistan under the military dictator Zia ul Haq.

Zulfiqar Bhutto was an incredibly charismatic and popular leader [known for his fiery presence at the U.N. as Pakistan's Foreign Minister] but he was filled with contradictions. He was an intellectual who came from landed elite. He was schooled in the best of places and was bourgeoisie yet claimed to speak for the people with socialist convictions. He rose to prominence not from the mass politics but from the inner halls of bureaucratic power under the dictator General Ayub. When he became the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in 1963, he wanted Pakistan on the forefront of Islamic countries and South Asia instead he stoked the fires in Kashmir. He hated the military but all of his best friends were military men. He was the most trusted man Ayub had but, in 1969, his own political ambition led him to create the political party [PPP - Pakistan's People Party] and, subsequently, topple Ayub. He instituted industrial and land reform but the only beneficiaries were landlords and industrialists. He gave speech after speech on the terrors of landholding exploiters of the people but he remained a landholder and courted the landed elite as his base. He promised 18 acres of land to each peasant and they got, well, nothing. From 1972 to 1977, he shaped Pakistan in his fractured image. More than anything, it was his death which came to symbolize the end of civil power in Pakistan.

Zulfiqar Bhutto was a popular PM. Perhaps, the most popular figure in the history of the nation. After his execution and Zia's long tenure of military dictatorship, Benazir Bhutto emerged as the hope of millions and the spearhead for democracy. The day she returned to Pakistan for the first time in 1986, those millions turned out to welcome her. The cult of personality that had built up around her father, herself, her brothers, her uncles, grew larger and larger but her tenure was just as maddenigly contradictory as her fathers. She courted the Islamists as much as she let the Army dictate her government. She tried to be the voice of feminism and modernity yet failed to do anything substantial for the rights of women and minority in her nation.

Benazir Bhutto is reportedly working on a deal that will bring her to power in Pakistan in companionship with Pervez Musharraf. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Yet another Election Kickoff in Iran

Last week - a week that saw the arrest of several student activists peacefully commemorating the anniversary of 1999 student protests, abduction of labor leader Massour Osanlou by plainclothes men in broad daylight (after a few days he was reported to have appeared in Evin prison’s Ward 209 which is run by the Intelligence Ministry), and the stoning of a man to death for adultery in the Qazvin province despite the attempt by other judicial authorities to stop it (the judge who ordered the stoning is now under investigation) - Iran for all practical purposes also kick started its elections for the Eight Parliament (Majles) to be held on March 15.

The occasion for what I consider a kickoff was the deadline set by new election regulations that came to pass last week for high ranking government employees to resign their posts six months before the election if they wished to run. The deputy interior minister for parliamentary affairs reported that approximately 150 high ranking officials resigned for an election that among Iran's political classes is considered both important and contested. The actual registration and the subsequent Guardian Council vetting process will not begin until late December but election talk and maneuvering for the creation of slates of candidates have already begun.

The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, for variety of reasons, is intimately tied to the exercise of elections and this will be the Islamic Republic’s 25th elections for various offices (added to the 3 elections held in the immediate post-revolution year regarding the change of regime, election for the Constitutional Assembly and the approval of the Islamic constitution) in its 28-year history. Since until last year these elections were never held jointly, there have been elections in Iran almost annually. It was the extensiveness of resources required to mobilize for nationwide elections that led to the decision to hold the December 2006 elections for the Assembly of Experts (every eight years) and municipal councils (every four years) together. Similar attempts were made throughout last year to synchronize presidential and parliamentary elections, both held every four years, but the Guardian Council declared unconstitutional every legislative attempt to either shorten the president’s term or lengthen that of the Majles. Unlike the terms for the Assembly of Experts and municipal councils, the Iranian Constitution is explicit about the four -year duration of the presidential and parliamentary terms, and on this particular technicality the Guardian Council has proven uncharacteristically a stickler to the letter of the law at least so far.

Given the power of non-elective institutions – office of the leader, the Guardian Council, and the Expediency Council – one can and should question the significance of elections in Iran in heralding any measurable change in the political system as a whole. But notwithstanding this fundamental issue, elections in Iran do involve a competition in which the outcome is not pre-determined and as such they are significant political games, involving all the machinations, organizational maneuvering, attempts at coalition building, and voter and vote manipulations that are prevalent in many countries that have competitive political systems. Like elsewhere, they may also entail shifts in policy direction (as it has happened in the shift from Khatami to Ahmadinejad), particularly in the economic and cultural arenas. Moreover, there is the added element of constant attempt to manipulate election rules in order to handicap opponents or those candidates which may challenge the system (this is again not unique to Iran but is currently practiced much more extensively than elsewhere). As such elections also provide an important space for conversation about the rules of the game, and criticism of how elections are conducted and ultimately how the Islamic Republic is run. These criticisms rarely get anywhere but elections are important vehicles for their airing. Whether the recent security-oriented created to confront U.S. pressures and UN Security Council sanctions will prevent the usual opening of the public space during elections times is yet to be seen

As to the manipulation of the rules, the world mostly knows about the vetting of the candidates by the Guardian Council - a body consisting of 6 clerics appointed by the supreme leader and 6 non-clerics nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majles - and how this very effective mechanism has been used since the early 1990s by the conservatives who control the Guardian Council to handicap their opponents. But this process has also received quite a bit of domestic and international criticism and for the upcoming elections new tactics are being tried by the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of conducting elections and since Ahmadinejad’s election has also been controlled by hard-line conservatives.

For instance, the new election regulations require those who occupy a significant number of government positions to resign from their positions six months before elections (hence the last weeks deadline). This rule is a clear disadvantage to those with higher chances of being vetted by the Guardian Council, i.e., the reformists/centrists. Since election registration and vetting do not begin until two months prior to the election, the very real possibility that a person may be disqualified and be out of a lucrative government job is likely to act as a significant barrier to candidacy. In recent years, the way to get around the vetting process, at least partially, has been by flooding the election market with candidates. This particular rule is intended to counteract that tactic. But ironically, given the fact that the conservatives now also control the executive branch, this may hurt them more by the mere fact that they now have more people in positions of power who are by law forbidden to run for the parliament unless they resign their positions. This is why the reformist and centrist political parties are claiming that they will have less difficulty in fielding sufficient number of candidates.

The second changed rule, an increase in the education requirement of candidates to a Masters degree (or a Bachelors degree and five years of managerial experience in the private or private sector) is likely to reduce the traditionally unwieldy number of candidates without little partisan impact over the long run. But in the short run the mere fact of the conservative controlled Interior Ministry becoming an arbiter of whether a candidate has enough combined education and experience adds another layer of vetting, hidden by the veneer of educational requirements. As such, it politicizes an already highly politicized electoral process even further. Finally, the decision to count each four-year stint as a member of the parliament as equivalent to one educational degree is undoubtedly intended to help the incumbent (mostly conservative) deputies retain their seats.

Despite all the rule manipulations, the process of forming slates of candidates for large cities is already in full gear. The past few elections have revealed a “hyper-fractionalization” of the political forces to the point that without some sort of concerted effort to form pre-election coalitions, organizations or political parties identified as either conservative or reformist will not have be able to declare any kind of victory in the upcoming Majles election. But in forming coalitions, the reformist/centrist and conservatives forces face different problems.

For the reformists/centrists the issue is registering enough candidates, particularly for the 30 seats of the city of Tehran, so that after disqualifications they would still have appealing slates in large cities (by appealing I mean that the top tiers of the slates are sufficiently well-known to attract the voters to come and vote and, when they do, vote for the whole slate). They also need to struggle against the urge among some reformists to boycott the elections if the vetting process becomes too extensive. Vetting clearly disadvantages the reformists/centrists but low voter turnout, likely in case of boycott by some reformists, assures a victory for conservatives (as it did in the 2003 municipal and 2004 Majles election) who can always rely on a solid base of supporters to show up on Election Day.

Even more important for the reformists/centrists is the need to overcome political divisions that have cost them several elections by offering slates that despite some variations essentially share a core of candidates that are acceptable to all the reformist and centrist forces. This strategy was tried during the 2006 municipal elections and led to significant gains in large cities. In the city of Tehran, for instance, the reformist/centrist council members now constitute a significant minority and because of this they were able to prevent the attempt on the part of hard-line conservative to dislodge the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who today is considered more moderate (and a more capable executive) than Ahmadinejad and the most likely person to successfully challenge him in the next presidential election of 2009.

The conservatives’ problem with political divisions is probably worse. Being in power and not facing the kinds of adverse moves that the reformists/centrists have faced in the past few years against their political survival, they will have a more difficult time overcoming their ideological and political differences, particularly over the running of the economy. They could of course make a marriage of convenience for the sake of maintaining power (something they were unable to do during the 2006 municipal elections). But given past experience, they know that this marriage will fall apart immediately after the election as it has during the current conservative Majles. In fact, several prominent deputies have already announced the formation of a group of independent conservatives, with the intent of offering its own separate slate for the city of Tehran.

The conservative inability to reach a compromise in order to maintain their solid control of all elective and non-elective institutions makes the urge to manipulate the electoral process stronger and the pre-election situation very fluid and unpredictable. But such fluidity and unpredictability (and wild electoral swings) have become almost the norm in Iranian politics and in all likelihood a function of a political system that, while endowed with bickering political elite, is lacking in a fully-formed party system based on competing platforms. As such, the next few months in Iran will again be literally consumed with intrigues and maneuvering about who should be on which list, along with accusations and counter-accusations, without much reference to what elections results will mean in terms of the country’s well being. What will matter is first how many people will show up to vote as a reflection of the continued support for the Islamic Republic as a whole (traditionally somewhere between 50 to 60 percent for Majles elections with the exception of 2000 election which resulted in a clear reformist victory when 67% turned out to vote), and second, the extent to which the results can be considered a rejection of the conservative political faction in power. Once the results are in, then it is time to begin bickering and maneuvering for the next election: the presidential election of 2009! Read more on this article...