Sunday, July 22, 2007

Three Moroccans held in Italy, amid mosque terror camp claim

Italian authorities announced Saturday that they had uncovered a terrorist training cell with links to Usama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Police found manuals on how to fly a passenger jet and others on handling poisons and explosives. Police arrested three men of Moroccan heritage and are searching for a fourth man.

Police found indications that some of those trained by the cell may have gone abroad, including to Iraq.

Video follows:

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Palestinian prisoners freed

The Israeli release of 250 Palestinian activists this weekend was designed as a gift of good publicity to Palestinian Mahmoud Abbas. Most of those released were from the Fatah group that he heads, and none were from Hamas, which now controls Gaza. Fatah fighters have announced a cease fire with Israel.

Jonathan Alterman is skeptical about the impact of the gesture:
' "It changes the subject for a while but it doesn't address the fundamental strategic challenges Abbas has," said Jon Alterman, the director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a national-security research center. "I don't see how this does any more than begin to set him in the right direction."


Video from Aljazeera English follows:

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Saturday, July 21, 2007

Turkey's Upcoming Elections

Turkey's elections on Sunday have polarized the country, with about a third of the population fearing that a victory by the AK Party will spell an end to Kemalist secularism and endanger the rights of women. Polls show that the slightly Islamically tinged AK will do very well.

Riz Khan's interviews on the elections from Aljazeera English:

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Friday, July 20, 2007

Justice's Turn

The Supreme Court of Pakistan, finally realizing that the political landscape has shifted away from Musharraf, reinstated CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and nullified the reference filed against him by Musharraf.

This is perhaps one of the pivotal rulings in the turbulent history of this nation. Pakistan, since 1947, has underwent long duration of military rule. From the first military commander of the nation Ayub Khan [1958 - 1969] to Zia ul Haq [1977 - 1988] to Pervez Musharraf [1999 - ], these warrior-kings have all made one fundamental claim to their public: that their particular act of suspension of democracy in Pakistan was ultimately constitutional and, hence, for the benefit of the nation. And, in making this claim, they have always had the support of Pakistan's Supreme Court - a support which was crucial in providing them the necessary legitimation for power. This rejection of Musharraf is all the more dramatic since it comes after a long history of judiciary's involvement in the dismissal of democratic institutions. I had posted earlier about framing the Lal Masjid crisis in somewhat broader context. In a similar vein, here are some things that should be kept in mind as we try to predict how the dice will roll for our embattled General.

It took nine years after independence, in 1956, for the Constitutional Assembly to come up with the first constitution for Pakistan. That document survived a mere two years - as General Ayub Khan set it aside for Martial Law in 1958. He shaped another constitution in 1962 - with the President having absolute authority over every thing, of course. That constitution was, again, suspended in 1969. The secession of East Pakistan and the election of the populist Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1971 was cause enough to take yet another stab at writing a constitution. The result, unveiled in 1973, was accepted by all the political parties and remains in effect to this day. That is, if you consider the following checkered list to mean 'in effect': suspended 5 July 1977, restored with amendments 30 December 1985; suspended 15 October 1999, restored in stages in 2002; amended 31 December 2003. Throughout the 34 years of existence, this Constitution has often become the doodle-pad for the military ruler - Zia ul Haq issued a dozen or so Presidential Ordinances which were grafted as amendments to the constitution in 1985 and stamped by the Supreme Court. One of the most pernicious of these Presidential Ordinances cemented the power of the Executive to dismantle the legislative branch within the Constitution. The civilian goverments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif became painful hostages to that Ordinance.

In this history, the role of the Supreme Court is a particularly sordid one. In 1954, when Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the first Constituent Assembly, an appeal was made to the Supreme Court, asking it to rule on the legitimacy of such an action. The Chief Justice of Supreme Court at the time, Mohammad Munir, sided with the Governor General in his ruling calling it "the doctrine of necessity". Four years later, in October 1958, when President Iskander Mirza killed off the 1956 Constitution and declared Martial Law with General Ayub Khan as the Martial Law Administrator, the Assembly again appealed to the Supreme Court. Once again, the case of State vs Dosso, legitimized the coup. General Ayub Khan's very next step was to exile the President and the template was fixed for futures to come.

The Supreme Court, having climbed in bed with the military, had no choice now but to tuck in and get cozy. In 1977, it unanimously upheld Martial Law under General Zia ul Haq. In 1981, when Zia instituted the Provisional Constitutional Order and asked all Justices to re-take their oaths - the majority did. Those who refused were fired. This largely ensured future accommodation of any wishes of the Chief Military Officer of the country. In 1988, the Court rejected all challenges and upheld the 1988 dissolution of the National Assembly by General Zia. In 2000, Musharraf stuck to the playbook by sacking any Supreme Court Judge that refused to take their oaths to his regime.

The basis of this symbiotic relationship between The General and the Court lie in the structure of power and influence in Pakistani society. The tiers in this pyramid are the Military, which is the largest employer, the largest landholder and has had the longest duration in power, the civil bureaucracy, which traces back to the Raj (though much weakened during Musharraf's tenure), and the largely land-owning/industrial elite [who often provide the political players]. Functioning between these tiers are functional classes like the lawyers who have parlayed their unique access to military, civil and landed elite into their necessary role as brokers. The Court is apex of such brokerage. It has relied especially on the hagiography of the Constitution to bolster its power even as it sides with the Generals in almost every instance. The Generals, eager for the legitimation, have filled the Supreme Court with their appointees and trumpeted to the public that the Court is the last bastion of truly apolitical and patriotic actors in Pakistan - who have validated their rule. See how easy is this three card monte?

So, what changed with Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry? By most accounts, the cause for his dismissal was that he had decided to hear petitions into government scandals - especially about citizens missing after their encounters with ISI and other intelligence services. The first response from the State to this alarming development was the circulation of a rather dubious letter accusing Iftikhar Chaudhry of corruption, cronyism, and abuse of public trust. After some heat was generated from the letter, Musharraf stepped in and declared the CJ to be non-functional and removed from office. And, going by the history of the country, there things would have rested. Except they didn't.

Iftikhar Chaudhry became a public hero. Hundreds of thousands of citizens thronged the streets of Lahore and Islamabad to see him and hear him. The call for Democracy went from being mere abstraction to a full-throated roar in the streets. The middle class that had traditionally sided with Musharraf broke away.

I find it hard to imagine how The General will survive all this. CJ Chaudhry back at the bench will surely pick up where he left off - hearing cases about the disappeared. Musharraf has lost all credibility and legitimacy since Feb/March. The Lal Masjid operation provided only temporary relief.

In the meanwhile, human bombs continue to blast away. Read more on this article...

Afghan warlord Hekmatyar announces ceasefire

There are reports that Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is seeking a truce with the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. Hekmatyar had been a primary ally of the Reagan administration against the Soviets and his militia may have received $1 billion from the US in the 1980s. When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001-2002, Hekmatyar sided with the Taliban and has been leading a guerrilla war against his old allies ever since.

The report that he is laying down arms is preliminary and has not been verified. But if it is true, it could be an important development. Hekmatyar is a mass murderer, but he does have some authority with some Afghans.

Video:

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Thursday, July 19, 2007

Lal Masjid - Pakistan in Aftermath

Car bombings and attacks have thrown northern Pakistan into instability and taken dozens of lives in the aftermath of the storming of the Red Mosque militant stronghold by Pakistani troops.

Video follows:

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Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Iran's Intelligence Ministry Goes Back to Its Old Tricks

Yesterday one of the channels the Iranian national television (IRTV) showed a trailer for an upcoming program to be shown on Wednesday and Thursday nights called “In the Name of Democracy.” In the trailer two Iranian-American scholars, Haleh Esfandiari and Kian Tajbakhsh, are shown discussing things. The reason I cannot be more specific about the content is because the clips are so obviously doctored and shown out of context that the reference points are not at all clear. But the clear intent of the trailer is to relay the message that both Haleh and Kian are admitting that they were involved in efforts to create "cleavage between the government and people” (Kian’s words) and that their activities were merely “in the name of dialogue, in the name of empowering women, in the name of democracy” (Haleh’s words).

I am not surprised at what is being shown on IRTV. It is an old trick that used to be extensively practiced by the Intelligence Ministry in the pre-Khatami era that has now made a comeback during Ahmadinejad’s security-oriented environment. Both Haleh and Kian are filmed in a non-prison environment, probably in one of the many nicely set-up apartments that are owned by the Intelligence Ministry in the city of Tehran. My bet (and I have to acknowledge that my bet is an educated one because I spent a few days in the Evin prison last summer and then went through a series of lengthy “interviews” outside of prison for a couple of months) is that they don’t know that they are being filmed and in all likelihood they are not even talking to their interrogators! They are probably talking to someone, introduced to them as a professor or researcher in some Iranian university, about the Bush Administration’s Iran policy and its objectives.

I said that I am not surprised at what is being shown on IRTV but I am very surprised at the way the American newspapers are covering the trailer. Rather than reporting the exact words of both Haleh and Kian, they are printing the implications that Intelligence Ministry would like to relay through the doctored frames of their words. The implication is of course that these two scholars have "admitted" to things. For instance, the Washington Post story states: “Esfandiari …is quoted as saying her work was ‘in the name of dialogue, in the name of women's rights, in the name of democracy.’ In the trailer, however, Haleh in no way says “her work” was in the name of anything. In fact, as mentioned above, the doctored footage simply says, “in the name of democracy, in the name of women’s empowerment, in name of democracy.” The Los Angeles Times story also states:” “In the video clip shown Monday, she admits to being part of "a velvet revolution in Georgia," the former Soviet republic in the Caucasus region.” Again she says no such thing. Her words were “they were agents of the velvet revolution in Georgia.” The referent “they” is not at all clear and could have easily been any social or political group regularly identified as agent of change. Regarding Kian, the Los Angeles Times report states: “the role of ‘the Soros center after the collapse of communism was to target the Islamic world,’ he says in the promo, adding that he had sought to create ‘a conflict between the government and the people.’ Again he says no such thing. His only words, uttered not in continuity, are: “the Islamic world to be a target,” and “a cleavage be created between government and the people.”

The circumstances of Haleh and Kian are difficult enough to explain anything they end up saying to just get out of Evin prison. But I must admit that the American newspapers' falling so easily for the Intelligence Ministry's tricks took me by surprise. Read more on this article...

Yet another Election Kickoff in Iran

Last week - a week that saw the arrest of several student activists peacefully commemorating the anniversary of 1999 student protests, abduction of labor leader Massour Osanlou by plainclothes men in broad daylight (after a few days he was reported to have appeared in Evin prison’s Ward 209 which is run by the Intelligence Ministry), and the stoning of a man to death for adultery in the Qazvin province despite the attempt by other judicial authorities to stop it (the judge who ordered the stoning is now under investigation) - Iran for all practical purposes also kick started its elections for the Eight Parliament (Majles) to be held on March 15.

The occasion for what I consider a kickoff was the deadline set by new election regulations that came to pass last week for high ranking government employees to resign their posts six months before the election if they wished to run. The deputy interior minister for parliamentary affairs reported that approximately 150 high ranking officials resigned for an election that among Iran's political classes is considered both important and contested. The actual registration and the subsequent Guardian Council vetting process will not begin until late December but election talk and maneuvering for the creation of slates of candidates have already begun.

The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, for variety of reasons, is intimately tied to the exercise of elections and this will be the Islamic Republic’s 25th elections for various offices (added to the 3 elections held in the immediate post-revolution year regarding the change of regime, election for the Constitutional Assembly and the approval of the Islamic constitution) in its 28-year history. Since until last year these elections were never held jointly, there have been elections in Iran almost annually. It was the extensiveness of resources required to mobilize for nationwide elections that led to the decision to hold the December 2006 elections for the Assembly of Experts (every eight years) and municipal councils (every four years) together. Similar attempts were made throughout last year to synchronize presidential and parliamentary elections, both held every four years, but the Guardian Council declared unconstitutional every legislative attempt to either shorten the president’s term or lengthen that of the Majles. Unlike the terms for the Assembly of Experts and municipal councils, the Iranian Constitution is explicit about the four -year duration of the presidential and parliamentary terms, and on this particular technicality the Guardian Council has proven uncharacteristically a stickler to the letter of the law at least so far.

Given the power of non-elective institutions – office of the leader, the Guardian Council, and the Expediency Council – one can and should question the significance of elections in Iran in heralding any measurable change in the political system as a whole. But notwithstanding this fundamental issue, elections in Iran do involve a competition in which the outcome is not pre-determined and as such they are significant political games, involving all the machinations, organizational maneuvering, attempts at coalition building, and voter and vote manipulations that are prevalent in many countries that have competitive political systems. Like elsewhere, they may also entail shifts in policy direction (as it has happened in the shift from Khatami to Ahmadinejad), particularly in the economic and cultural arenas. Moreover, there is the added element of constant attempt to manipulate election rules in order to handicap opponents or those candidates which may challenge the system (this is again not unique to Iran but is currently practiced much more extensively than elsewhere). As such elections also provide an important space for conversation about the rules of the game, and criticism of how elections are conducted and ultimately how the Islamic Republic is run. These criticisms rarely get anywhere but elections are important vehicles for their airing. Whether the recent security-oriented created to confront U.S. pressures and UN Security Council sanctions will prevent the usual opening of the public space during elections times is yet to be seen

As to the manipulation of the rules, the world mostly knows about the vetting of the candidates by the Guardian Council - a body consisting of 6 clerics appointed by the supreme leader and 6 non-clerics nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majles - and how this very effective mechanism has been used since the early 1990s by the conservatives who control the Guardian Council to handicap their opponents. But this process has also received quite a bit of domestic and international criticism and for the upcoming elections new tactics are being tried by the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of conducting elections and since Ahmadinejad’s election has also been controlled by hard-line conservatives.

For instance, the new election regulations require those who occupy a significant number of government positions to resign from their positions six months before elections (hence the last weeks deadline). This rule is a clear disadvantage to those with higher chances of being vetted by the Guardian Council, i.e., the reformists/centrists. Since election registration and vetting do not begin until two months prior to the election, the very real possibility that a person may be disqualified and be out of a lucrative government job is likely to act as a significant barrier to candidacy. In recent years, the way to get around the vetting process, at least partially, has been by flooding the election market with candidates. This particular rule is intended to counteract that tactic. But ironically, given the fact that the conservatives now also control the executive branch, this may hurt them more by the mere fact that they now have more people in positions of power who are by law forbidden to run for the parliament unless they resign their positions. This is why the reformist and centrist political parties are claiming that they will have less difficulty in fielding sufficient number of candidates.

The second changed rule, an increase in the education requirement of candidates to a Masters degree (or a Bachelors degree and five years of managerial experience in the private or private sector) is likely to reduce the traditionally unwieldy number of candidates without little partisan impact over the long run. But in the short run the mere fact of the conservative controlled Interior Ministry becoming an arbiter of whether a candidate has enough combined education and experience adds another layer of vetting, hidden by the veneer of educational requirements. As such, it politicizes an already highly politicized electoral process even further. Finally, the decision to count each four-year stint as a member of the parliament as equivalent to one educational degree is undoubtedly intended to help the incumbent (mostly conservative) deputies retain their seats.

Despite all the rule manipulations, the process of forming slates of candidates for large cities is already in full gear. The past few elections have revealed a “hyper-fractionalization” of the political forces to the point that without some sort of concerted effort to form pre-election coalitions, organizations or political parties identified as either conservative or reformist will not have be able to declare any kind of victory in the upcoming Majles election. But in forming coalitions, the reformist/centrist and conservatives forces face different problems.

For the reformists/centrists the issue is registering enough candidates, particularly for the 30 seats of the city of Tehran, so that after disqualifications they would still have appealing slates in large cities (by appealing I mean that the top tiers of the slates are sufficiently well-known to attract the voters to come and vote and, when they do, vote for the whole slate). They also need to struggle against the urge among some reformists to boycott the elections if the vetting process becomes too extensive. Vetting clearly disadvantages the reformists/centrists but low voter turnout, likely in case of boycott by some reformists, assures a victory for conservatives (as it did in the 2003 municipal and 2004 Majles election) who can always rely on a solid base of supporters to show up on Election Day.

Even more important for the reformists/centrists is the need to overcome political divisions that have cost them several elections by offering slates that despite some variations essentially share a core of candidates that are acceptable to all the reformist and centrist forces. This strategy was tried during the 2006 municipal elections and led to significant gains in large cities. In the city of Tehran, for instance, the reformist/centrist council members now constitute a significant minority and because of this they were able to prevent the attempt on the part of hard-line conservative to dislodge the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who today is considered more moderate (and a more capable executive) than Ahmadinejad and the most likely person to successfully challenge him in the next presidential election of 2009.

The conservatives’ problem with political divisions is probably worse. Being in power and not facing the kinds of adverse moves that the reformists/centrists have faced in the past few years against their political survival, they will have a more difficult time overcoming their ideological and political differences, particularly over the running of the economy. They could of course make a marriage of convenience for the sake of maintaining power (something they were unable to do during the 2006 municipal elections). But given past experience, they know that this marriage will fall apart immediately after the election as it has during the current conservative Majles. In fact, several prominent deputies have already announced the formation of a group of independent conservatives, with the intent of offering its own separate slate for the city of Tehran.

The conservative inability to reach a compromise in order to maintain their solid control of all elective and non-elective institutions makes the urge to manipulate the electoral process stronger and the pre-election situation very fluid and unpredictable. But such fluidity and unpredictability (and wild electoral swings) have become almost the norm in Iranian politics and in all likelihood a function of a political system that, while endowed with bickering political elite, is lacking in a fully-formed party system based on competing platforms. As such, the next few months in Iran will again be literally consumed with intrigues and maneuvering about who should be on which list, along with accusations and counter-accusations, without much reference to what elections results will mean in terms of the country’s well being. What will matter is first how many people will show up to vote as a reflection of the continued support for the Islamic Republic as a whole (traditionally somewhere between 50 to 60 percent for Majles elections with the exception of 2000 election which resulted in a clear reformist victory when 67% turned out to vote), and second, the extent to which the results can be considered a rejection of the conservative political faction in power. Once the results are in, then it is time to begin bickering and maneuvering for the next election: the presidential election of 2009! Read more on this article...

Monday, July 16, 2007

No One Ever Left the Room

William Dalrymple has a piece on Asma Jahangir and the recent events in Pakistan at the NYer, Days of Rage: Challenges for the nation’s future.

But amidst all the bombast of the Mullah, it heartens me to read that life goes on as usual. This is of no great significance - unless, like me, you believe in the power of words and music - but Mike Del Ferro recently gave a master class in Karachi blending Jazz piano and Sitar. Del Ferro is the Director of Jazz Programming for American Voices.

Do give it a read - esp. the last six paragraphs.

Maybe they can earmark some of that $750 million to similar efforts.

On a more discordant note, is the case of Shaheen Khan. Read more on this article...

Pakistan All Parties Democratic Movement

The USG Open Source Center rounds up Pakistani editorials on the formation of a new political alliance aimed at ending military dictatorship in Pakistan. They note that the Pakistan People`s Party is absent from the coalition. Some in Pakistan are talking about the possibility that Gen. Pervez Musharraf will bring back PPP leader Benazir Bhutto to promote secularism and take the pressure off himself over democratization.

The report:

"Pakistan: Urdu Press Roundup on Formation of All Parties Democratic Movement
Pakistan -- OSC Summary
Monday, July 16, 2007

The following is a roundup of excerpts from editorials on the formation of a new political alliance by over thirty political parties of the country to resist dictatorship and the Pakistan Peoples Party's (PPP) absence from it, published in the 13 July 2007 editions of six Urdu dailies: Jang Editorial Says Political Parties Should Unite for Achievement of Common Goals

Highlighting the absence of one of the main parties, the PPP, from the new alliance and the differences among the political parties at the all parties conference, the editorial states: "The opposition parties need to refrain from thrusting their viewpoints on their colleagues and promote the culture of mutual understanding. They should lay a foundation for collaboration on the points on which they are fully agreed. There is still for the host of the all parties' conference, Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, to start talks with the PPP and other political parties that are expressing their reservations about the new alliance and chalk out a strategy in consultation with them. The alliance of the opposition cannot be considered as stable until some key political parties are included, and it will fail to yield credible results in not so doing." Nawa-e Waqt Editorial Sees Bhutto's Absence Due to Deal Talks

Highlighting that Bhutto's absence from the all parties' conference and her failure to join the new alliance will be detrimental to her political future, the editorial remarks: "The reason given for Bhutto's non-participation in the all parties' conference and her refraining from joining the new alliance is that she cannot sit down with Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA) on any platform. However, the real reason seems to be her bid to make herself acceptable to the United States and President Gen Musharraf in her bid for power, for which the promotion of the US philosophy of secularism and the recognition of the philosophy of enlightened moderation is a prerequisite. Under the thinking of the United States and other anti-Islamic forces, it is also necessary to dub the spirit of jihad among Muslims and their freedom movements as terrorism (to become a ruler in alliance with them)." Jasarat Editorial Says Bhutto not Ready To be Party to Efforts Against Musharraf

Maintaining that Bhutto still hopes that matters will be settled with President Musharraf, due to which she has been hesitant to become part of the active opposition alliance, the editorial says: "Nawaz Sharif is correct in asking when the political parties will make their stance clear if they fail to do so at this time. It is hoped that the PPP will realize the ground realities and join those making a joint struggle; otherwise, it will suffer great loss. It is possibile that the people and the country may also suffer loss due to this behavior. However, Makhdoom Amin Fahim's position that he was not given a mandate to announce PPP's participation in the new alliance cannot be contradicted. It would have been better if consultations had been made beforehand (with the PPP on the formation of the alliance)." Khabrain Editorial Questions Success of New Alliance

Discussing the stance of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, that PPP's absence and contrary stance will make no difference, the editorial remarks: "The statement of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto that no new alliance can be formed without the permission of the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) should be given consideration. What is the status of the new alliance, the All Parties Democratic Movement, in the wake of this statement? Even its formation seems to fraught with difficulty. What guarantee can be given for the success of a movement launched from the platform of such an alliance?" Islam Editorial Sees PPP Exposed

Referring to the rumors and conjectures of a deal between Bhutto and President Musharraf and the former's support for the latter for launching the Lal Mosque operation, the editorial comments: "Due to the latest developments, the policy of the PPP and its deepest stance has been exposed before the nation. On this juncture, the leaders of the alliance should maintain their unity at all costs and not sacrifice it for the sake of expediency and the doctrine of necessity. This will help in realizing the objectives that the alliance has set forth. The nation also will get rid of the status quo, and the masses will get their rights." Express Editorial Says PPP To be Isolated if it Stands Firm on its Policy

Exposing the wavering of the PPP in chalking out its future course, the editorial remarks: "Political analysts say that the PPP may not join the new Movement if the MMA remains part of the alliance because it terms itself as a liberal party. Another reason for PPP's staying away from the alliance is that the party may still be nourishing hopes that it will be able to strike a deal with President Gen Pervez Musharraf. However, those monitoring the political situation closely say that if the PPP fails to strike a deal with the president, and it fails to become part of the All Parties Democratic Movement, it will be isolated in the near future. In such a situation, the movement can dominate the political scenario." " Read more on this article...

Sunday, July 15, 2007

Army continues bombardment on Lebanon camp

The crisis between the Lebanese military and Fatah al-Islam militants inside the Nahr al-Barid camp near Tripoli continues. After renewed bombardment in recent days, the Lebanese military has begun entering the camp. Such an incursion is extremely rare. Video follows:

Read more on this article...

Friday, July 13, 2007

Pakistan buries the dead from Red Mosque

Gen. Pervez Musharraf on Thursday said that the Pakistani government had been more than forebearing and that the militants in the Red Mosque and its attached seminaries had forced the government's hand. He pointed especially to their kidnapping of Chinese residents of Islamabad and the embarrassment this action caused as a reason for acting. China is a key ally of Pakistan, which has been locked in decades of conflict with its much bigger and more powerful neighbor, India. Musharraf blamed the militant leader Abdul Rashid Ghazi for constantly inflating his demands and declining to negotiate seriously. Given this situation, Musharraf said, the attack on the mosque was "inevitable."

Al-Qaeda's number 2 man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a videotape menacing the Pakistani government over its attack on the mosque.

Musharraf says he is determined to reform the madrasahs or Islamic seminaries. Past such pledges have gone unfulfilled.

Journalists were given access to the mosque/seminary complex on Thursday (see video, below), and found a scene of horror, including a place where a militant blew himself up in a suicide bombing of approaching troops, and a room where 5 militants committed collective suicide as the Pakistani army closed in on them. At least 76 militants were killed, and 9 Pakistani troops.

Read more on this article...

Thursday, July 12, 2007

Al-Qaeda regaining strength

Al-Qaeda is the strongest it has been since 2001, we are told, and firming up its base in the tribal areas of northern Pakistan.

Could there be a more trenchant critique of George W. Bush's supposed 'war on terror?' Do a calculation of what he has spent on fighting an unnecessary and counter-productive Iraq War, and what he has spent actually trying to bring Bin Laden and the ever more garrulous Ayman al-Zawahiri to justice.

Read more on this article...

The Pessoptimist in Istanbul: Will Bin Laden Win?

Today I am in Istanbul in a hotel overlooking the Sea of Marmora. I am here for -- of all things -- a conference on the Durand Line. Of course it is about much more than the Line itself, demarcated by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand in 1893 as the limit of the dominion of the Amir of Afghanistan.

Today this line through a mountainous, arid, sparsely populated area is regarded by Pakistan, and most of the world, as the international border with Afghanistan, but Afghanistan has never formally recognized it as such. Above all, the people living around the line have never recognized it as a border. They were there before these states. They wonder who gave Durand or anyone in London, Kabul, Delhi, or Islamabad the right to divide them?

There is nowhere more different from the Durand Line than the Sea of Marmora. This morning I walked along the seafront, by a stone wall that once constituted the fortifications of the entry to the Golden Horn and the Strait of Bosporus. Yesterday from the terrace of my hotel, my colleagues and I saw an enormous container ship traveling from the Black Sea through the Strait and outward to the Mediterranean. Would it then cross the Suez canal and enter the Indian Ocean?
The ship was registered with the Maersk shipping line; I remembered seeing the same containers while driving from Kabul to Jalalabad in the spring of 2005 with Omar Zakhilwal, head of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency. The main road from Kabul to Sarobi was closed for construction, so we had to take the old road, over the Lataband Pass, the same route taken by the Army of the Indus when it retreated under fire from Kabul to Jalalabad in 1841. The Army of the Indus, however, had long since mutated into the Armed Forces of Pakistan, and today most of the traffic was in the other direction. Truck after truck lumbered with full loads of Maersk containers headed for Kabul from the port of Karachi via Peshawar and Jalalabad, carrying, what? -- Ukrainian airplane parts shipped from Odessa (where my great-grandfather was born) through the Strait of Bosporus and on through the Sea of Marmora?

So much for the unchanging Afghan frontier. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, during whose reign (1880-1901) the Durand Line was demarcated, decided against building roads through the country's passes, as the same roads that facilitated trade facilitated conquest as well. Afghanistan's isolation protected both his rule -- and the British Empire in India. Britain, which subsidized the Amir's
government and army to assure that it could control the territory on the frontier, forbade Kabul to welcome any foreign legation but one from Delhi. The Amir depicted his realm as a just Islamic order under his command: But to the British this isolated Afghanistan state with a subsidized army fulfilled the function of a buffer state: keeping Russia far from their Empire. The British and Russian governments demarcated the rest of the country's borders and formalized their agreement in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention on Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

This Treaty was an part of the same process that Usama Bin Laden evoked in his warning to the United States on October 7, 2001. Seated not far from the Durand Line before an outcropping of the mountains of Afghanistan, whose name and history he did not mention, the Amir of al-Qa'ida informed his global audience:


What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years. Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years.

What was he talking about? He was talking about the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), in which "THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, GREECE, ROUMANIA and the SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE, of the one part,and TURKEY,of the other part" agreed to the demarcation of today's Republic of Turkey.
Lausanne followed on the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which separated most of the Ottoman Empire from Anatolia. Together these treaties abolished the Islamic caliphate, which had been claimed for centuries by the Ottoman Sultan and recognized by most Sunni Muslims. The Treaty of Lausanne stipulated:
No power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters shall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish Government or authorities, for any reason whatsoever, over the nationals of a territory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the other Powers signatory of the present Treaty, or over the nationals of a territory detached from Turkey.
It is understood that the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities are in no way infringed.


The division of the Islamic umma, the Muslim community, into nation states by the European colonial powers the better to dominate them and nullify the temporal power of the Islamic caliphate is at the heart of Bin Laden's grievances against the contemporary world order. Destruction of the caliphate based in Istanbul prepared the ground, in his view, for the catastrophe of the Palestinians, sanctions and war against Iraq, and the "occupation of the Land of Muhammad" by "infidel troops."
Though Bin Laden mentioned neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan, al-Qaida respects the border dividing these two states no more than it does the State of Israel or the secular Republic of Turkey. All are equally products of aggression against the Muslims.

It is no coincidence that al-Qaida, though led and conceived by Arabs, was founded in these borderlands. To Westerners it may appear that Bin Laden is now trapped in an isolated region. But this region, never fully integrated into the modern system of states, provides an appropriate seat for this transnational insurgency against that very system.

And as the itinerary of the containers shows, that region is no longer the isolated backwater it remains in the National Geographic mind. While in the days of Abdul Rahman Khan only British India was permitted a legation in Kabul, today the capital of the Mughal Emperor Babur is a major outpost of the UN, NATO, the US Central Command, and the European Union, with enormous embassies of every major country under construction. The people whom Amir Abdul Rahman Khan informed about his rule with an illustrated map are now more likely to have traveled abroad than Americans, if not usually as tourists, and listen to far more international news in several languages.

Their country, which used to rely on subsistence farming, has become a commercial single-crop economy. Opium poppy -- like sugar cane in Cuba, rubber in Liberia, or tea in Sri Lanka -- encroaches further every year on land used for subsistence farming and traditional horticulture. Traffickers and traders from all major markets reserve their share of the Afghan product through futures markets. Every family includes migrants in Karachi, Iran, or the states of the Persian Gulf. The remittances sent by these workers finance many new houses and shops, while the workers, separated for years at a time from family, tribe, and village, seek refuge and meaning in mosques frequented by global preachers. Cash, once rare, reaches the remotest villages through this global trade and the omnipresent hawala system, which links Afghans to global electronic banking networks through mobile phones and itinerant traders.

It is common enough to observe that globalization has transformed sovereignty, transferring functions of states to larger organizations like the European Union and shattering the weak institutions of others. It is less commonly realized that Bin Laden's vision of the caliphate constitutes a revolutionary response to globalization. The states drawn by imperial powers on the territory of the Islamic umma have excluded the Palestinians from nationhood and placed one of Islam's holiest places under Israeli control. The zone from where Bin Laden and his Egyptian deputy, Ayman al-Zawihiri now issue their pronouncements symbolizes how the same process of state making has divided and ill-served the Pashtuns.

The dialectic of terrorism and counter-terrorism has transformed the tribal areas. In 2003, when US pressure to search for the al-Qaida leadership led General Pervez Musharraf to send the Army of Pakistan (a direct descendant of the Army of the Indus) into the Momand Tribal Agency, elders awoke officials in Kabul with midnight calls -- Pakistan had invaded "Afghanistan." For in these elders' minds, while the Afghan state administration ended at the Durand Line, Afghanistan did not.

Islamabad's invocation of US pressure to fence and even mine that border has led elders to tell President Hamid Karzai that if he allows Pashtuns to be divided in this way, his name will be remembered with shame. The Afghan Army has responded by firing on the Pakistan Army, the same Pakistan Army that is fighting al-Qaida. The lives of the people need a soft border, but Washington's counter-terrorism needs a hard one.

In my Istanbul hotel room, as sea traffic traverses the Bosporus outside my window, al-Jazeera English broadcasts the news: the battle of the Red Mosque in Islamabad; demonstrations in Bajaur; the anniversary of the latest war in Lebanon; the ongoing massacres in Iraq and Sudan; more suicide bombers in Afghanistan. And on CNN and Bloomberg I see the growth of the US trade deficit, the fall of the dollar against other currencies, and the unstoppable growth of the US debt, as our government sells securities to China to cover the costs of the war in Iraq.

Amir Abdul Rahman Khan used the British subsidy to build his army; he used his army to build his revenues; he used his revenues to build a justice system; and the justice system enabled his people -- those he had not massacred or exiled -- to till their lands in peace. He died in his bed in 1901 bequeathing to his son both rulership and a surplus of 40 million rupees in the national treasury.

This Circle of Justice, first described in an Islamic text of the eighth century, has for centuries constituted the model of governance for the people of South and West Asia; today the Afghan Government uses it to describe the goals of its Afghanistan National Devleopment Strategy.

But in response to the challenge of Bin Laden, rather than building its army, the US has mobilized thousands of private contractors and exhausted its army in the fatal venture of Iraq. Rather than calling our people to fight and sacrifice, our government cut the taxes of those most able to afford to pay and financed its military ventures with subsidies, not from an imperial hegemon, but from financial markets that are far more arbitrary than Lord Curzon. To retain its monopoly on power in the face of failure, the ruling party has undermined the system of justice. We could have responded more wisely to Bin Laden's challenge, but we have drawn this circle of injustice around ourselves.

In 1919, Abdul Rahman's grandson, Amanullah Khan, made Afghanistan independent and renounced the British subsidy. Less than ten years later, he was overthrown. Amanullah had attempted a grand transformation for which he had no resources. His efforts to raise taxes and strengthen the state provoked a peasant uprising that brought a Tajik commander to power, ending the dynasty of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan. Soon Pashtun tribes from the same areas now hosting Bin Laden and Zawahiri descended on Kabul to loot it and install a new, much weakened king.

Neither Bin Laden nor the neo-Taliban of the tribal zone are Pashtun nationalists -- that ideology serves the interest of a state in Kabul and politicians in Peshawar and Quetta. But the ideology of the caliphate provides another vehicle for the grievances and ambitions of people whom the nation-state system always served poorly.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, the "international community," acting unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally, is trying to shore up, strengthen, and create states to provide peace and stability. Some, even many, people of those areas long to become full citizens of states that protect their rights and provide services. But for many others, it is harder to imagine that they might one day be citizens of an effective accountable nation-state than that they might be joined with their fellow Muslims in a renewed caliphate. Somewhere in the mountains of the land its inhabitants call Pakhtunkhwa, Bin Laden is waiting. Read more on this article...