Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Turkey's Local Elections: A Preview

In about a month’s time, on 29 March, local elections will be held throughout Turkey. Let me give you a brief preview: the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, will win and win handily.

Even was this not shown by every major public opinion poll, there are three good reasons to believe this will be the case. First, despite the sharp costs of the global economic downturn for Turkey, the AKP’s record for effective governance remains largely intact. Second, Tayyip Erdogan’s recent performance at the Davos World Economic Forum, in which he sharply criticized Israeli President Shimon Peres before walking of the stage in a huff, won him accolades across the political spectrum in Turkey. Turks, after all, were appalled by the carnage of the Israeli incursion into Gaza, and, in any case, have a taste for tough, “larger-than-life” political leadership. Erdogan’s actions at Davos allowed him to stand tall on the world stage in a way that few Turkish leaders have been able to. This is important in Turkey, which has long seen itself as deserving a greater role in world affairs. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the main political opposition parties are absurdly weak, bereft of ideas and out of energy.

The opposition looks hopeless. The party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, is now led by the charismaless Deniz Baykal and flays about with a mixture of economic nationalism and Republican nostalgia which seems out of touch with the dynamism of contemporary Turkey. That the CHP remains an important party at all can be attributed to residual loyalty to the party of Ataturk and the feeling among many secular voters that, for all its flaws, the CHP remains the best vanguard against creeping religiosity in public life. The other major opposition party, the quasi-fascist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has diminished as well, particularly as the AKP adopted a more nationalist tone and cut into the MHP’s base. Quite simply, even if the economic downturn has made support for the AKP softer, the political opposition is too weak to constitute a real threat.

The real questions for the local elections will be in the details. Will the AKP’s victory be more or less definitive than the 46.6% of the vote that it won in the 2007 General Elections (current poll data suggests that it will do somewhat better)? If the AKP does, in fact, do better, despite the economic downturn, it will have won a significant mandate for further reform and a powerful mandate that will give opposition in both the Parliament and the military pause. If, on the other hand, its cannot match this level of support, the door will be opened for more aggressive resistance to AKP reform efforts in the Parliament and, more importantly, within the bureaucracy, courts, and military.

Finally there is the question of the Kurds. One of the strengths of the AKP has been its ability to win Kurdish votes in the Southeast. It has done so both by its sympathy for religious observance in the public sphere and by its relatively greater comfort with Kurdish cultural expression. However, this policy has been followed fitfully as the AKP has attempted to simultaneously reach an accord with a restive military establishment. Its success in balancing a more nuanced approach to the Kurds with its relations with the generals will be tested in these elections.

The AKP is going to win the upcoming elections. What is less clear is how strong its mandate is going to be. Even more important, is the question of whether, in the long term, Turkish democracy can survive without a vibrant and viable political opposition.

Howard Eissenstat is a post-doctoral fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University.



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Wednesday, October 24, 2007

The Kurdish Front against Iran

Kudos to Richard A. Oppel, Jr. of the New York Times for bringing attention to the conflict between the Kurdish guerrillas and Iran during the time attention is on the Turkish- Kurdish imbroglio and the possible US connection.

There has already been some good reporting on the conflict. Seymour Hersh referred to PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan) and the US support for it in a New Yorker piece in November 2006. Juan Cole talked about it here. And independent journalist Reese Erlich has done much work trying to see if PJAK is receiving support from the United States as well as Israel. But a front page story with pictures and interviews with guerrilla leaders brings the right amount of attention.

The conflict between Iran and PJAK which is the Iranian affiliate of PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), has been going on for a while, involving Iranian incursions and repeated shelling of the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan.

But Oppel’s story is significant for reasons that go beyond front-page attention to a largley neglected issue by the mainstream media. First, the story sheds light on the extent of the operation, involving relatively large numbers of Iranian casualties (the claim is 150 since August) as well as some captured (one even interviewed by Oppel).

Second, the story does not beat around the bush and rightly states that PJAK is essentially the same as PKK (“they share leadership, logistics, and allegiance to Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader imprisoned in Turkey”). This is an important point because PKK is on US’s list of terrorist groups and precisely for this reason the United States would like to avoid any hint of association with the group, particularly now that Turkey is demanding the US to bring pressure on the Kurdish Regional Government to clamp down on the activities of PKK.

But association with PJAK is exactly what the United States is accused of by the government of Iran. This association (direct and indirect) is also not denied by the interviewed members of PJAK whose leader, Rahman Haj-Ahmadi, visited Washington last summer.

Oppel does not inquire how a leader of a terrorist organization received a visa to the United States. I assume the answer would be that PJAK as a separate organization from PKK is not on the terrorist list (which is true) and Oppel seems satisfied with the diplomatic answer that Haj-Ahmadi did not meet with US officials while in Washington and does not probe further.

This answer makes the United States seem only slightly less hypocritical in its support of PJAK than the support it gives to Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), an Iranian opposition organization group based in Iraq which is on US’ list of terrorist groups. But this begs the further question of why is PJAK not on the list.

But I am digressing here from the third and most important aspect of Oppel’s piece which is a quote from Cmdr. Scott Rye of the Navy identified as “an American military spokesman in Baghdad. Rye says, “The consensus is that US forces are not working with or advising the PJAK.”

This is a strange statement (the consensus is?!) and nothing in it precludes the possibility of American hardware and financial support for the organization. Oppel unfortunately does not offer further clarifications. It is possible that as in the case of PKK, PJAK is also supported by Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish regional government. But if the implication of the quote above are correct and indeed financial and hardware support for PJAK does come from the United States, then all sorts of questions are raised regarding US policy.

Does the US not mind that part of its support for PJAK may be transferred to and used by PKK against Turkey? What does Turkey think about all this? (okay, this one is a rhetorical question!)Does the fact that the US is knowingly supporting PJAK explain the American silence in the face of Iranian raids into Iraqi Kurdistan? Doesn’t it sound pretty suspicious that in the light of all the hoopla about the Islamic Revolution's Guard Corps' (IRGC) meddling in Iraq, the American government has remained silent regarding actual Iranian incursions into and shelling of Iraqi territory or even the existence of uniformed captured IRGC members? Is this because the US does not want any probing of the association or because of the embarrassingly contradictory position it has to take regarding the similar actions taken by Turkey and Iran against Kurdish guerrillas? Isn’t this an incredibly stupid way of solidifying Turkish-Iranian relations at the time when the stated policy of the United States is to isolate Iran in the region?

I don’t know the answers to all these questions but I hope someone is asking further questions and putting the administration on the spot. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

The 2007 Turkish Elections: An Islamist Victory?
Guest Op-Ed by Howard Eissenstat

It is hard to understate the high drama of the Turkish elections that took place on July 22nd. One leading candidate, Devlet Bahçeli, of the neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) took to tossing a hangman’s noose to his audience to demonstrate his tough “anti-terror” stance. Another candidate was murdered shortly before the election, though unpaid debts and ties to organized crime are more likely than politics as the cause of his assassination.

But the most important aspect to these elections was that they represented an important face-off between the elected government of Turkey and that country’s powerful military and bureaucratic elite. For many in the bureaucracy and, particularly, with the military, the government is nothing more than an Islamist wolf in democratic sheep’s clothing. In the Spring, a combination of massive (and well financed) protests, half-veiled threats from the powerful Turkish military, and legislative high jinks effectively stymied the ability of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to choose its candidate for the Presidency. At a legislative impasse, the Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, called for elections, promising to win an even more decisive victory than he had in the 2002 elections. He was as good as his word and the AKP, won better than 45% of the popular vote, an improvement of more than 12% over the 2002 results and more than enough to ensure that the AKP can again form a government without reliance on coalition partners.

There are a number of reasons to be pleased with the results of the election. The poor showing of the MHP suggests that even in the militantly nationalist atmosphere of contemporary Turkey, the attractions of fascism are limited. On the other hand, a significant number of Kurdish candidates, who risked disenfranchisement through the arcane rules of Turkey’s electoral system (written under the watchful eye of the Turkish military), effectively overcame this hurdle by running as independent candidates. Twenty-seven independent candidates will participate in the new parliament, most of them representing Kurdish interests. Perhaps the most important outcome of these elections, however, has been the failure of the old military and bureaucratic elites to either cow or overturn the popularly elected government.

That being said, do the 2007 elections really, as so many commentators have suggested, represent the “triumph of Political Islam” in Turkey? In a word, no.

Clearly, many in the old Turkish elite and among the millions who protested the AKP this past Spring, believe that the AKP constitutes a danger to the secular nature of the Turkish state. There are reasons to be concerned. Early in the AKP administration, an attempt to criminalize marital infidelity raised eyebrows and threatened a national pastime before it was quietly aborted. More troubling, municipal governments associated with the AKP, have often attempted to use state resources to promote what they see as proper Islamic practice. Finally, the AKP, while far less corrupt than previous Turkish governments, has not shied from indulging in what the Turks call, “kadrolaşma” stuffing government institutions with their supporters both as a means of rewarding loyalty and ensuring that their power continues even if their electoral fortunes one day falter.

Nevertheless, these concerns are overstated. First, the secret to the AKP’s success is that it has reframed debates regarding the role of Islam in Turkey. While there is certainly a determined (and tiny) minority in Turkey which hopes to overthrow the secular basis of the Turkish Republic, this has never been on the AKP’s agenda and indeed would be tremendously unpopular. Instead, they have argued that being religiously observant should not constitute a barrier to access of the public sphere. The AKP has coupled this call for tolerance for religious observance with economic liberalism and a determination to locate Turkey decisively in “the West.” This “center-right” formula has been consistently successful in Turkish politics since the first democratic elections in 1950. It has proven equally successful for the AKP.

Certainly, many devout Sunni Muslims voted for the AKP this past Sunday. But most were voting for the opportunity to practice their religion without interference from the state, not imposition of Islamic law. In addition, much of the AKP’s electoral success is based on its economic policies and the steady growth and relative stability that they have brought. In Turkey, as elsewhere, money matters.

The AKP’s relative liberalism seems to have also gained it the support of many who have been distrustful of state power but have no interest in an Islamist state. As in the past, the AKP did well in Kurdish regions. If newspaper reports are to be believed, it also did well with many of Turkey’s diminishing non-Muslims, who were presumably won over by the AKP’s pro-Europe stance and were fearful of the rabid nationalism espoused by both the MHP and the formerly left-of-center, Republican People’s Party (CHP). Of greater electoral significance, the AKP also did surprisingly well in regions with large Alevi population, a group that has historically voted for left-of-center parties and has been particularly protective of Turkey’s secular traditions. Only serious survey data will indicate how successful the AKP was with the Alevi; at minimum, however, they were able to cut into a significant portion of the Alevi vote. This is particularly significant because the Alevi are a large voting bloc which has historically sided with the secular left as the best defense against Sunni dominance. Even if Turkey’s elites remain unconvinced of the AKP’s long-term ambitions, the party has been able to convince an even more important group: Turkey’s voters.

The AKP won its popularity through careful stewardship of the economy and by progressive liberalization of the political sphere. Its victory is a victory for Turkish democracy, not a call for Sharia.

Howard Eissenstat is an Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern History at Seton Hall University in South Orange, NJ. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, July 24, 2007

First Pro-Kurdish MPs in Ankara for 16 years

Some twenty (some sources say 24) Kurdish MPs were elected to the Turkish parliament, some of them with ties to the violent PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) guerrilla group. For the Kurds to have representation at this level is unprecedented since the early 1990s, and could be a positive development. They will face a lot of hostility from Turkey's far rightwing nationalist party, which also gained seats for the first time in a while.

What this article does not say is that 100 of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) members of parliament are of Kurdish heritage.

Video from Euronews.

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Saturday, July 21, 2007

Turkey's Upcoming Elections

Turkey's elections on Sunday have polarized the country, with about a third of the population fearing that a victory by the AK Party will spell an end to Kemalist secularism and endanger the rights of women. Polls show that the slightly Islamically tinged AK will do very well.

Riz Khan's interviews on the elections from Aljazeera English:

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Wednesday, July 11, 2007

Turkey and Islamic Politics: On The Turn

Turkey's Islamically-oriented Prime Minister, Erdogan , appears to have struck a compromise over the presidency with the center-right Republican Party. Turkey's powerful secularist generals and other secularists had rejected Erdogan and his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, for the position of president.

Australia's Dateline broadcast this report on Turkey on July 4. It is now at at YouTube. The program covers the increasing conflict between Turkish secularists and more Islamically tinged parties such as the AK Party. I thought it well done, and we don't see Turkish politics on Western television very much-- despite its great importance. Click twice on the icon to go to the YouTube showing (or click on the link above) -- this channel does not allow embedding.

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