Monday, March 30, 2009
Worldview
You can catch me with Jerome McDonald on Worldview discussing the Obama announcement on "Af-Pak" aka "Western Pakistan".
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Sunday, March 22, 2009
On Khamenei’s Response to Obama
Farideh Farhi
Juan Cole already has a run down of some of the things Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei said in response to President Obama’s message on the occasion of Iranian New Year and the press coverage of it. I think Juan’s point about the speech not being a rebuff is on the money, but I do take issue with his characterization of the speech being more like a “grumpy old man response to Obama's call for engagement.”
I say this because I think the translations of the bits and pieces of the speech in the news (even the Persian language Farsnews upon which Juan relies) do not do justice to this carefully crafted response intended to set the parameters of US-Iran talks if they are to happen.
For those who can understand Persian, I recommend that you check Khamenei’s website. The Persian language section of the website - the site has translations in 12 other languages – has both the video of his speech as well as the whole text. The English section also has an abbreviated English translation which is decent but still does not relay the feel you get by watching the whole speech.
The speech was quite long, first dealing with domestic affairs and focusing mostly on the need to curb the consumption of resources. But it gets interesting around minute 40 when he explains why his public support for President Ahmadinejad should not be construed as support for him as a candidate in the next presidential election. This is of course a big issue for Iran’s domestic politics and the fact that the leader himself had to address it was significant since Ahmadinejad supporters are working very hard to give the impression that he is his candidate
The move to the subject of US-Iran talks is abrupt and Khamenei makes clear that this is the only external issue with which he will deal, spending more than 20 minutes on it. It is a powerful speech, calmly delivered, and mostly devoid of usual jargon. He does talk about US policies that have harmed Iran and continue to harm it, including sanctions, freezing of assets, support for opposition and secessionist groups, and Baluchi insurgents - communications of whom with US operatives he says the Iranian government has intercepted.
But he mentions these as reasons why mere conciliatory speeches cannot be considered real change in American policy. More significantly, he mentions them in order to explain why the continuation of these hostile policies has to make Iran wonder whether President Obama’s gestures are of any value: “They say they have extended their hands towards Iran. If the extended hand has a velvet glove but under it is an iron cast hand, then this does not have a good meaning.”
This leads to the point: “They say come and talk, come and establish relations, they change slogans. Well, where is this change? Clarify this for us; what has changed? Have you unfrozen the assets of the Iranian people; have you lifted the oppressive sanctions…? We do not have any experience with the new American government and president; we will look and judge. You change, and we will also change our behavior too.”
He also makes a clever play on the usual way the American policy community talks about Iran, turning it against US and saying “I don’t know who really makes policy in the US – the president, Congress or behind the scene players.” But no matter who makes decisions in the US, Iran makes decision "rationally and not based on emotions." The bottom line is: “Our nation dislikes it when you again proclaim ‘talks with pressure’; we talk to Iran while we pressure them as well – threat and inducement. You cannot talk to our nation this way."
Juan Cole interpret complains about US foreign policy as “Iran’s initial bargaining position which include everything but the kitchen sink.” I don’t.
Khamenei’s speech actually shows how attuned he is to debates in Washington. He makes no calls for U.S. apology for past actions. His focus is today. No doubt he wants sanctions to be lifted, assets unfrozen, and attempts to undermine the Iranian government ended at some point as a result of talks with the U.S.
But his concern now is the argument forwarded by powerful circles in Washington that negotiations with Iran should be combined with increased pressure to make sure that Iran will give in at the end. It is this type of what he calls “condescending language, arrogant approach, and patronizing moves” that he rejects.
Clearly from his view, engagement in talks must be accompanied with some concrete steps that show Iran that the United States is interested in a process and give and take and not a process based on “either deception or intimidation.” Deception because the objective remains the same while the softer language is a mere tactical change. Intimidation because talks are combined with further squeeze of Iran.
He leaves no doubt that further squeezing of Iran leading up to talks and during the talks will be seen as a sign that President Obama’s rhetoric of change is a farce. As such the speech should really be seen as a carefully calibrated attempt to shape the debate in Washington on how to go about talking to Iran.
Read more on this article...
Juan Cole already has a run down of some of the things Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei said in response to President Obama’s message on the occasion of Iranian New Year and the press coverage of it. I think Juan’s point about the speech not being a rebuff is on the money, but I do take issue with his characterization of the speech being more like a “grumpy old man response to Obama's call for engagement.”
I say this because I think the translations of the bits and pieces of the speech in the news (even the Persian language Farsnews upon which Juan relies) do not do justice to this carefully crafted response intended to set the parameters of US-Iran talks if they are to happen.
For those who can understand Persian, I recommend that you check Khamenei’s website. The Persian language section of the website - the site has translations in 12 other languages – has both the video of his speech as well as the whole text. The English section also has an abbreviated English translation which is decent but still does not relay the feel you get by watching the whole speech.
The speech was quite long, first dealing with domestic affairs and focusing mostly on the need to curb the consumption of resources. But it gets interesting around minute 40 when he explains why his public support for President Ahmadinejad should not be construed as support for him as a candidate in the next presidential election. This is of course a big issue for Iran’s domestic politics and the fact that the leader himself had to address it was significant since Ahmadinejad supporters are working very hard to give the impression that he is his candidate
The move to the subject of US-Iran talks is abrupt and Khamenei makes clear that this is the only external issue with which he will deal, spending more than 20 minutes on it. It is a powerful speech, calmly delivered, and mostly devoid of usual jargon. He does talk about US policies that have harmed Iran and continue to harm it, including sanctions, freezing of assets, support for opposition and secessionist groups, and Baluchi insurgents - communications of whom with US operatives he says the Iranian government has intercepted.
But he mentions these as reasons why mere conciliatory speeches cannot be considered real change in American policy. More significantly, he mentions them in order to explain why the continuation of these hostile policies has to make Iran wonder whether President Obama’s gestures are of any value: “They say they have extended their hands towards Iran. If the extended hand has a velvet glove but under it is an iron cast hand, then this does not have a good meaning.”
This leads to the point: “They say come and talk, come and establish relations, they change slogans. Well, where is this change? Clarify this for us; what has changed? Have you unfrozen the assets of the Iranian people; have you lifted the oppressive sanctions…? We do not have any experience with the new American government and president; we will look and judge. You change, and we will also change our behavior too.”
He also makes a clever play on the usual way the American policy community talks about Iran, turning it against US and saying “I don’t know who really makes policy in the US – the president, Congress or behind the scene players.” But no matter who makes decisions in the US, Iran makes decision "rationally and not based on emotions." The bottom line is: “Our nation dislikes it when you again proclaim ‘talks with pressure’; we talk to Iran while we pressure them as well – threat and inducement. You cannot talk to our nation this way."
Juan Cole interpret complains about US foreign policy as “Iran’s initial bargaining position which include everything but the kitchen sink.” I don’t.
Khamenei’s speech actually shows how attuned he is to debates in Washington. He makes no calls for U.S. apology for past actions. His focus is today. No doubt he wants sanctions to be lifted, assets unfrozen, and attempts to undermine the Iranian government ended at some point as a result of talks with the U.S.
But his concern now is the argument forwarded by powerful circles in Washington that negotiations with Iran should be combined with increased pressure to make sure that Iran will give in at the end. It is this type of what he calls “condescending language, arrogant approach, and patronizing moves” that he rejects.
Clearly from his view, engagement in talks must be accompanied with some concrete steps that show Iran that the United States is interested in a process and give and take and not a process based on “either deception or intimidation.” Deception because the objective remains the same while the softer language is a mere tactical change. Intimidation because talks are combined with further squeeze of Iran.
He leaves no doubt that further squeezing of Iran leading up to talks and during the talks will be seen as a sign that President Obama’s rhetoric of change is a farce. As such the speech should really be seen as a carefully calibrated attempt to shape the debate in Washington on how to go about talking to Iran.
Read more on this article...
Saturday, March 21, 2009
THE BELLS OF TIANANMEN
by Philip J Cunningham
The June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the exact statistics about which remain ambiguous, was unambiguously a tragedy for China, all the more painful because it was self-inflicted. From crushed bystander to lynched soldiers, from fearless young firebrands in the streets to frightened old men in the watchtower, the ill-conceived crackdown wounded the country as a whole.
Yet when people ask how many people died at Tiananmen, or want to learn more about the victims, it almost goes without saying that the question is about the people the Western media regards as having been “on our side.” PLA soldiers don’t really figure into the equation, they’re the anonymous “bad guys,” at best pawns in the background.
But last week, the silence from the other side was dramatically broken. Zhang Shijun, a former PLA soldier who was involved in the bloody June 4, 1989 crackdown at Tiananmen Square has courageously stepped forward to demand a government inquiry into a pivotal event that remains all but taboo in China even 20 years on.
Mr. Zhang’s bold open letter to China President Hu Jintao is likely to make life difficult for him –he was reportedly arrested shortly after talking to reporters-- but if it doesn’t, it may help start a dialogue that can rectify that imbalance and round out our understanding.
It's hard to think of a grouping with more right to righteous anger than the Tiananmen Mothers, and their dedication to their lost sons and daughters is powerful and inspiring. But there are other grieving parents; families broken by June 4, 1989 that rarely get mention when the anniversary of the epic battle for “democracy” gets trumped up and trumpeted in the West.
Scores of PLA soldiers died too, mostly young men similar in age to the protesters they were ordered to quell. The hapless provincial soldiers, even if made of "lesser steel" in socioeconomic terms, even if denied the opportunity of university education and the privilege of residence in the capital, were kids with parents and grandparents too.
While the desire to take sides is understandable, and the need for closure –even outright denial-- is emotionally compelling, the complex truth of the tragedy has been too long obscured by speculative reporting and heated partisanship on the “democracy” side, countered by government secretiveness and a chilling silence on the other.
In political terms we might be tempted to dismiss Zhang Shijun and other soldiers as having been tools of an authoritarian state, at least partly culpable, to the extent that they were reckless and cruel in the way they carried out orders, and given the long view, we might even be tempted to write them off as being on the wrong side of history. But Zhang’s bid to be part of the conversation changes all that. Were the soldiers not fellow citizens, brought into the world with hopes and dreams of their own?
Given the mutually exclusive sympathies characteristic of violent events, acknowledging the view, let alone the hurt of the “other side,” especially if it is the “wrong side,” is in itself strangely controversial.
This was evident in sharply contrasting reports on the violence in Tibet last year. Beijing government claims, while fairly well documented, focused on Han victims, while Tibetan exiles made difficult to verify claims about violence against ethnic Tibetans, while downplaying Han casualties of the street riots.
The Orwellian state of affairs at present is that Tibet is now in lockdown and the information flow curtailed. Who’s to say what is or isn’t happening?
In the case of Beijing in 1989, civilian deaths, documented in the hundreds before information controls went into effect, were horrendous, all the more so because the introduction of war weapons into the mix was so incendiary, so unnecessary.
Bad policy had deadly consequences, some of it resulting in the “horrific scenes,” mostly involving unarmed civilians, that ex-soldier Zhang alludes to. But scores of soldiers were also killed on June 4, ripped to pieces, burned and bodily defiled, when a badly cornered crowd erupted in uncontrollable anger, as Tiananmen Square was retaken by force.
The image of a man standing in front of a tank eventually became a worldwide icon of defiance, but actions far more defiant, far more insane and far more brave and craven happened the day and night before that famous photo which was snapped. Leading up to that photographic moment of equipoise, tanks were trapped and thousands of vehicles torched and soldiers beaten to death by an unarmed but inconsolable mob.
The bells of Tiananmen will toll again this year to mark the twentieth anniversary of the tragedy. In China proper, the metaphoric peals will most likely be greeted by the usual deafening silence, a product of state-enforced prohibitions, inadequate information flow and popular indifference. What few commemorations do take place, in liberal Hong Kong and at gatherings overseas, are likely to be partisan in character, excluding the plight of the fallen soldiers.
Today, with dizzying death tolls being played up or played down or spun around in plain sight due to the machinations of propaganda and partisanship, we should remember that the tolling bell that John Donne famously made allusion to; we suffer not just from the loss of the people we identify as being on our side, but from the loss of others, too.
June 4, 1989 produced no winners, but reconciliation is possible with an open airing of the truth. There are political risks to be sure, especially at a time of economic downturn and rising unrest, but the sooner China has the conversation it needs to be at peace with itself, the better for everyone.
The author, who worked for BBC in Beijing during May and June 1989 is a visiting fellow at Cornell University and author of a memoir entitled Tiananmen Moon, to be published this May by Rowman & Littlefield.
Read more on this article...
The June 4, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the exact statistics about which remain ambiguous, was unambiguously a tragedy for China, all the more painful because it was self-inflicted. From crushed bystander to lynched soldiers, from fearless young firebrands in the streets to frightened old men in the watchtower, the ill-conceived crackdown wounded the country as a whole.
Yet when people ask how many people died at Tiananmen, or want to learn more about the victims, it almost goes without saying that the question is about the people the Western media regards as having been “on our side.” PLA soldiers don’t really figure into the equation, they’re the anonymous “bad guys,” at best pawns in the background.
But last week, the silence from the other side was dramatically broken. Zhang Shijun, a former PLA soldier who was involved in the bloody June 4, 1989 crackdown at Tiananmen Square has courageously stepped forward to demand a government inquiry into a pivotal event that remains all but taboo in China even 20 years on.
Mr. Zhang’s bold open letter to China President Hu Jintao is likely to make life difficult for him –he was reportedly arrested shortly after talking to reporters-- but if it doesn’t, it may help start a dialogue that can rectify that imbalance and round out our understanding.
It's hard to think of a grouping with more right to righteous anger than the Tiananmen Mothers, and their dedication to their lost sons and daughters is powerful and inspiring. But there are other grieving parents; families broken by June 4, 1989 that rarely get mention when the anniversary of the epic battle for “democracy” gets trumped up and trumpeted in the West.
Scores of PLA soldiers died too, mostly young men similar in age to the protesters they were ordered to quell. The hapless provincial soldiers, even if made of "lesser steel" in socioeconomic terms, even if denied the opportunity of university education and the privilege of residence in the capital, were kids with parents and grandparents too.
While the desire to take sides is understandable, and the need for closure –even outright denial-- is emotionally compelling, the complex truth of the tragedy has been too long obscured by speculative reporting and heated partisanship on the “democracy” side, countered by government secretiveness and a chilling silence on the other.
In political terms we might be tempted to dismiss Zhang Shijun and other soldiers as having been tools of an authoritarian state, at least partly culpable, to the extent that they were reckless and cruel in the way they carried out orders, and given the long view, we might even be tempted to write them off as being on the wrong side of history. But Zhang’s bid to be part of the conversation changes all that. Were the soldiers not fellow citizens, brought into the world with hopes and dreams of their own?
Given the mutually exclusive sympathies characteristic of violent events, acknowledging the view, let alone the hurt of the “other side,” especially if it is the “wrong side,” is in itself strangely controversial.
This was evident in sharply contrasting reports on the violence in Tibet last year. Beijing government claims, while fairly well documented, focused on Han victims, while Tibetan exiles made difficult to verify claims about violence against ethnic Tibetans, while downplaying Han casualties of the street riots.
The Orwellian state of affairs at present is that Tibet is now in lockdown and the information flow curtailed. Who’s to say what is or isn’t happening?
In the case of Beijing in 1989, civilian deaths, documented in the hundreds before information controls went into effect, were horrendous, all the more so because the introduction of war weapons into the mix was so incendiary, so unnecessary.
Bad policy had deadly consequences, some of it resulting in the “horrific scenes,” mostly involving unarmed civilians, that ex-soldier Zhang alludes to. But scores of soldiers were also killed on June 4, ripped to pieces, burned and bodily defiled, when a badly cornered crowd erupted in uncontrollable anger, as Tiananmen Square was retaken by force.
The image of a man standing in front of a tank eventually became a worldwide icon of defiance, but actions far more defiant, far more insane and far more brave and craven happened the day and night before that famous photo which was snapped. Leading up to that photographic moment of equipoise, tanks were trapped and thousands of vehicles torched and soldiers beaten to death by an unarmed but inconsolable mob.
The bells of Tiananmen will toll again this year to mark the twentieth anniversary of the tragedy. In China proper, the metaphoric peals will most likely be greeted by the usual deafening silence, a product of state-enforced prohibitions, inadequate information flow and popular indifference. What few commemorations do take place, in liberal Hong Kong and at gatherings overseas, are likely to be partisan in character, excluding the plight of the fallen soldiers.
Today, with dizzying death tolls being played up or played down or spun around in plain sight due to the machinations of propaganda and partisanship, we should remember that the tolling bell that John Donne famously made allusion to; we suffer not just from the loss of the people we identify as being on our side, but from the loss of others, too.
June 4, 1989 produced no winners, but reconciliation is possible with an open airing of the truth. There are political risks to be sure, especially at a time of economic downturn and rising unrest, but the sooner China has the conversation it needs to be at peace with itself, the better for everyone.
The author, who worked for BBC in Beijing during May and June 1989 is a visiting fellow at Cornell University and author of a memoir entitled Tiananmen Moon, to be published this May by Rowman & Littlefield.
Read more on this article...
Friday, March 20, 2009
And Happy Nowruz to You Too Mr. Obama!
Farideh Farhi
I must say that I am stunned by the tone and content of President Obama's message to Iran on the occasion of Iranian New Year or Nowruz. I am stunned because the message was great and on matters related to Iran I am not used to hearing what I like from Washington. So here are some quick thoughts.
Asides from being his gracious self, President Obama did several things that are significant. First and foremost was the fact that, unlike his predecessor, he did not attempt to drive a wedge between the people and government of Iran. He spoke explicitly to both the “people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” acknowledging their common history and culture. No more we love the people of Iran but hate their government taunt repeatedly brandished by the Bush Administration.
Second, he did not try to drive a wedge between the leaders of Iran. He addressed them all and in one brilliant move put to rest all the useless chatter about who the Obama administration should talk to. His focus was not on which Iranians the US wishes to talk to ("moderates" or "pragmatists") or should talk to (the ones who “really” wield power) but the fact that the two countries should talk on matters of mutual interest as well as about their differences.
Third, stating his commitment to meaningful diplomacy and avoiding demonizing rhetoric and peremptory demands, he simply stated the basic truth that the two long-time foes now face a chance for “engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect” and addresses concerns of both. The process, he said in no uncertain terms, “will not be advanced by threats.”
This is the closest anyone in the US has come to ruling out the military option regarding Iran. Obama did not ignore “serious differences that have gown over time,” but did not validate "those who insist that we be defined by our differences." His commitment was clearly to “diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues” as well as “constructive ties” between the two countries.
Some Iranians, no doubt, will find fault in the following paragraph, deeming it a bit patronizing if not insulting:
The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.
But the general tenor of the speech was so different from what the Iranians are used to hearing that my bet at this point is that this part will be mostly ignored. The Iranians have been calling for a serious conversation and Mr. Obama has now promised them one. Let’s see if it happens.
Read more on this article...
I must say that I am stunned by the tone and content of President Obama's message to Iran on the occasion of Iranian New Year or Nowruz. I am stunned because the message was great and on matters related to Iran I am not used to hearing what I like from Washington. So here are some quick thoughts.
Asides from being his gracious self, President Obama did several things that are significant. First and foremost was the fact that, unlike his predecessor, he did not attempt to drive a wedge between the people and government of Iran. He spoke explicitly to both the “people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” acknowledging their common history and culture. No more we love the people of Iran but hate their government taunt repeatedly brandished by the Bush Administration.
Second, he did not try to drive a wedge between the leaders of Iran. He addressed them all and in one brilliant move put to rest all the useless chatter about who the Obama administration should talk to. His focus was not on which Iranians the US wishes to talk to ("moderates" or "pragmatists") or should talk to (the ones who “really” wield power) but the fact that the two countries should talk on matters of mutual interest as well as about their differences.
Third, stating his commitment to meaningful diplomacy and avoiding demonizing rhetoric and peremptory demands, he simply stated the basic truth that the two long-time foes now face a chance for “engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect” and addresses concerns of both. The process, he said in no uncertain terms, “will not be advanced by threats.”
This is the closest anyone in the US has come to ruling out the military option regarding Iran. Obama did not ignore “serious differences that have gown over time,” but did not validate "those who insist that we be defined by our differences." His commitment was clearly to “diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues” as well as “constructive ties” between the two countries.
Some Iranians, no doubt, will find fault in the following paragraph, deeming it a bit patronizing if not insulting:
The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.
But the general tenor of the speech was so different from what the Iranians are used to hearing that my bet at this point is that this part will be mostly ignored. The Iranians have been calling for a serious conversation and Mr. Obama has now promised them one. Let’s see if it happens.
Read more on this article...
Thursday, March 12, 2009
The Long March in Pakistan
On March 12, 1930 Gandhi marched to Dandhi - stopping in forty plus villages - and speaking about swaraj and breaking the salt laws to show their inhumanity. Satyagraha is definitely at the heart of the nonviolent demand for the restoration of the Supreme Court deposed on Nov. 3, 2007 by Pervez Musharraf and specifically Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry on March 9, 2007.
Much has happened since then. Benazir Bhutto's return in October 2007 and her assassination in December 2007. The elections in February 2008 brought to power a new coalition of Pakistan People's Party to power with the swashbuckling widow Zardari taking over as President. A basic campaign promise was to solve the judicial crisis and reinstate the Supreme Court of '07.
None of the promises have been kept. Instead, the PPP regime has used the Dogar Supreme Court (cronies put in place by Musharraf) to throw out the opponent political party PML-N out of power in Punjab and restrict Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif from electoral politics.
The Long March of March 12, 2009, leading up to a sit-in at the capital on March 16th, is the only way that the people of Pakistan can produce pressure on the civilian and military regime to pay attention to justice, to accountability and to democracy.
What shouldn't escape anyone's attention is that _THIS_ is what democratic, nonviolent, resistance looks like. This is fine. This is normal. This is what we should expect in a society where the government and the people are out of step. This is not a coup, nor the '79 revolution.
The Zardari regime has reacted as all cornered governments do: mass arrests, police violence on crowds, implementation of laws against critical speech etc.
The best place to follow developments is on Twitter. You should also follow the liveblog on Teeth Maestro. You should also look over this excellent background piece by Madiha Tahir at APP. You should read Sahar Shafqat's op-ed.
[x-posted on CM] Read more on this article...
Much has happened since then. Benazir Bhutto's return in October 2007 and her assassination in December 2007. The elections in February 2008 brought to power a new coalition of Pakistan People's Party to power with the swashbuckling widow Zardari taking over as President. A basic campaign promise was to solve the judicial crisis and reinstate the Supreme Court of '07.
None of the promises have been kept. Instead, the PPP regime has used the Dogar Supreme Court (cronies put in place by Musharraf) to throw out the opponent political party PML-N out of power in Punjab and restrict Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif from electoral politics.
The Long March of March 12, 2009, leading up to a sit-in at the capital on March 16th, is the only way that the people of Pakistan can produce pressure on the civilian and military regime to pay attention to justice, to accountability and to democracy.
What shouldn't escape anyone's attention is that _THIS_ is what democratic, nonviolent, resistance looks like. This is fine. This is normal. This is what we should expect in a society where the government and the people are out of step. This is not a coup, nor the '79 revolution.
The Zardari regime has reacted as all cornered governments do: mass arrests, police violence on crowds, implementation of laws against critical speech etc.
The best place to follow developments is on Twitter. You should also follow the liveblog on Teeth Maestro. You should also look over this excellent background piece by Madiha Tahir at APP. You should read Sahar Shafqat's op-ed.
[x-posted on CM] Read more on this article...
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Iran’s Majles Strikes a Blow to Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plans
Farideh Farhi
While most of the recent Iran news has focused on the prospect of an Iran-US rapprochement, the country's domestic scene has been consumed with a major fight over economic policy. This week the fight came to a head as the whole Majles began deliberating on the country’s budget for the next fiscal year as well Ahmadinejad’s attempt to reform the country’s bloated subsidy system.
The best evidence for how contentious economic policy has become is the fact that only about 10 days left before the Iranian New Year – after which the whole country literally comes into a stand still for a couple of weeks – the details of the budget for the upcoming fiscal year beginning on March 21 are yet to be approved.
The set up for a confrontation began when Ahmadinejad introduced his budget bill to Majles rather late and he did so along with his very ambitious targeted subsidies bill which calls for the suspension of all energy subsidies, their replacement with direct cash subsidies to the lowest 7 income brackets, and sharp prices increases particularly for gasoline and diesel fuel.
Majles deputies, particularly those with a long history of expertise on economic issues, not only found the budget numbers unrealistic, at times even fabricated, but also worried about the connection between the proposed budget and presumed savings generated from ending subsidies and the inflationary impact of the government’s proposed hikes in energy prices.
Economists have been even more critical of government numbers. Mohammad Sattarifar, the former head of the Planning and Budget Organization, went as far as to say that the budget was not even worth analyzing because the administration will be forced to come back to Majles with many amendments and changes. He pointed out that the projected revenues from increasing energy prices does not even take into account the amount of energy consumption by the largest consumer of energy in Iran which is the government itself!
The proposed budget assumes revenues of about $34bn from price hike and subsidy cuts and a distribution of about ¼ of that amount as cash deposited directly to people’s bank accounts immediately after the June election. This time frame was promised to allay the fear that cash subsidies were intended to buy votes.
The large combined Majles committee created to examine the two bills considered government assessment of revenues as exaggerated but, after Ahmadinejad threatened to pull out his targeted subsidies bill in its entirety, agreed to lower the amount of expected revenues while still allocating the government the amount it said it needed to implement the cash subsidies program.
However, by the time the budget bill came to the floor of the whole Majles, prominent economists as well as the Majles Research Center had already voiced concern about the inflationary shock the drastic increase in energy prices would entail. The general outline of the budget was approved in a short session despite significant opposition but today the targeted subsidies component of the budget bill was rejected in its entirety in a 132-102 vote.
It must be considered truly ironic that a president elected on a social justice platform is now being accused by a coalition of prominent conservatives and reformists as the promoter of “shock therapy” that will harm the poor and middle class in significant ways (note the picture on top of this post reproduced from Alef website which is run by Ahmad Tavakoli, a prominent conservative deputy and head of Majles Research Center. It uses a hand to show the need to stop “shock therapy” written in Persian).
Left hanging is the fate of the budget which still needs to be approved in a more detailed fashion. As mentioned, Ahmadinejad's budget numbers are very much linked to subsidy cuts. His administration also took a “take it as is” attitude and refused to address Majles’ concerns about the inflationary impact of sudden price hikes. Now it is not clear how Majles' rejection will affect the budget and whether, as threatened, Ahmadinejad will abandon any attempt to make energy prices more realistic or begin working with Majles to reach a compromise on gradual price increases.
Timing is also a factor because the Guardian Council also needs to approve the budget by the end of the year. Its task is to make sure that - as demanded by the Constitution - all sources of spending are clearly specified. The Council’s spokesperson, Abbas-ali Kadkhodai, has already voiced his concern about the timing, stating that if the budget is not approved by the end of the year, by law the government cannot have any expenses on the first day of the upcoming year unless some sort of temporary appropriation is agreed upon on a monthly basis for necessary current expenses.
It is worth noting that the budget process in Iran is usually messy, quite raucous, and a source of open conflict between Iran’s legislative and executive branches. Even Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, without a doubt post-revolutionary Iran’s most powerful president, was often stunted in his budget plans by Majles. But the lateness and chaos that has characterized this year’s budget process – occurring in the midst of drastic drop in oil prices and global economic crisis - has taken the conflict to another level.
It has also highlighted the difficulty even conservatives have in accepting some of Ahmadinejad’s ideas and his rather aggressive style in dealing with people who worry about the impact of his policies.
Majles’ decisive rejection is a major setback for Ahmadinejad. The manner in which Ahmadinejad manages to work himself back into Majles’ good graces will be important in convincing key conservative players to back his candidacy for presidency. It is hard to believe that the events of this week have made conservative unity behind his candidacy more likely.
Read more on this article...
Monday, March 2, 2009
Bhasin: Pakistan- the Matryoshka Doll of terrorism
Madhavi Bhasi writes
Matryoshka Doll commonly referred to as Russian nested doll is a set of dolls of decreasing size placed one inside the other. Matryoshka is derived from the Latin root ‘mater’ meaning mother. As a breeding ground for terrorists and exhibiting different forms of terrorism, Pakistan can undoubtedly be likened to a matryoshka doll of terrorism.
Several national, regional and global developments presented Pakistan with grave challenges as a nation-state. The country was thrown into a state of political pandemonium with martial law, military coups, political assassinations and absence of democratic elections in the first decade. Religious scholars like Sayyid Suleman Nadvi and Prof. Hamidullah were invited to advise the Government on Constitution making, resulting in emergence of the Objectives Resolution 1949. The Resolution provided that future Constitutions of Pakistan would be modeled on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam. Hassan Abbas and Jessica (FRW) Stern in their book Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, detail how the influence of Pakistan’s clergy shaped the country’s politics. Pakistan’s ‘religious identity’ came to dominate her foreign policy through the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). India’s charge of “sponsored terrorism” in J&K was refuted by Pakistan as diplomatic, political and moral support to the movement for Kashmiri freedom. Robert G. Wirsing in Kashmir in the Shadow of War, highlights how Pakistan’s fixation on Kashmir was viewed by many as a pan-Islamic geostrategic enterprise.
Extremism in terms of inspiration and manifestation graduated to a new level in Pakistan during the 1980s. Influx of jihadi ideology during the Soviet-Afghanistan war had tremendous fallout on Pakistan. External developments coincided with General Zia ul-Haq’s policies of embedding the Islamic ideology in Pakistan’s polity and society. The defeat of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan made a large mass of the jihadist element available for action in Kashmir. India has been drawing international attention to Pakistan’s terrorist activities in J&K since the late 1980s.
Pakistan’s association with terrorism was re-defined after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. In the global war against terrorism Pakistan emerged as frontline state and pledged to sever ties with the Taliban, while supporting the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. It was expected that as an ally in the global counter-terrorism effort, Pakistan would convincingly clamp down on terrorists operating from its territory. Pakistan sought to demonstrate its willingness in combating terrorism through a variety military offensives ranging from the Lal Masjid action to Operation ‘Zalzala’. But involvement in the global war against terrorism was a phase of ecdysis and terrorism continued to flourish in Pakistan.
In the past few months the nested doll of terrorism has sprung another surprise for the global community. Since the process of revelation is still underway, detailed features of the new form of terrorism are yet to be discerned. Nevertheless, the outlines are perceptible. The extremist elements harboring anti-Pakistan sentiments will be segregated from those combating American forces in Afghanistan and will be treated differently. In short, Pakistan reverts to the policy of co-existing with terrorist forces as long as the latter renounces the use of force against the Pakistani establishment. Indications of such a trend and its rationalizations are reflected in the recent policy choices by the Pakistani Government.
President Zardari’s Government has intensified attempts at making peace deals with militant outfits in the country. In April 2008, the Government secured the release of Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin after finalizing a peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban. The deal also included provision for withdrawal of Pakistani Army from areas of South Waziristan in return of commitment by the militants that government and security forces will not be targeted. While agreeing to make peace with Pakistan, Mehsud emphasized that jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan would continue unabated. This peace deal was preceded by an agreement with TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi ) leading to the release of Sufi Mohammad, arrested in 2001 for sending volunteers to attack U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The TNSM was allowed to peacefully campaign for the implementation of the Sharia on the condition that government establishment will not be attacked.
As a logical progression to the 2008 agreement with TNSM, the government of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) signed the Swat Peace Deal on February 16, 2009. The Swat Accord allows TNSM to implement the Sharia in the valley while ensuring that Maulana Qazi Fazlullah’s faction would renounce the use of force against the Pakistani Government. After the Swat Deal, Pakistan’s Parliamentary Committee on National Security declared that this model would be replicated in other tribal areas if successful. A week later on February 23, the Taliban in Bajaur declared a unilateral ceasefire and the Government has responded by halting its operation for four days. It’s yet to be seen if this cessation of hostilities leads to another peace deal. Faqir Mohammad, a Taliban leader, explained that the ceasefire was ordered because it was in the ‘interest of Pakistan and the region.’ Meanwhile, three factions of the Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, Hfiz Gul Bahadur Group and Mullah Nazir Group, declared the formation an alliance in Waziristan tribal area on February 21. The alliance could be an attempt to enhance the bargaining power of the Taliban in the future peace offers by the Pakistani government. Such developments point the emergence of a new form of terrorism in Pakistan; terrorism which is constrained in its scope and does not victimize its guardian.
This new form of terrorism has emerged from the intersection of two distinct developments. The first development is inspired by the unnoticed yet compelling suggestions on how the U.S. should deal with the extremist elements in Afghanistan. In October 2008, U.S. Army General David Petraeus stated that negotiations could be held with some sections of the Taliban as a strategy to check growing violence in Afghanistan. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed the same approach when he suggested that Washington could reconcile with sections of the Taliban if the Karzai government was willing. Secretary Gates however, categorically ruled out any possibility of negotiations with Al Qaeda. Developments on the ground appeared to follow the suggestions of General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. In late 2008 Afghan officials, including President Karzai’s brother, held talks with the Taliban in a dialogue brokered by Saudi Arabia. Though the negotiations did not yield any positive outcome it set the stage for future dialogue. Abdul Salaam, a former Taliban fighter has been appointed as the District Chief of Musa Qala in January this year. His appointment comes as a reward for defecting from Taliban and assisting the British forces to wrestle Musa Qala from Taliban control. Leaders of the Taliban are thus being rewarding for making peace with NATO forces in Afghanistan. This suggests that the U.S. favors a policy of negotiating with certain elements of Taliban in lieu of peace and stability. The Government of Pakistan is simply implementing a customized version of the U.S. strategy at a faster pace.
The second development contributing to the emergence of a new form of terrorism is the gradual distancing of the Taliban from the al Qaeda. Though rarely realized the Al Qaeda and Taliban are historically and ideologically distinct. The Al Qaeda is inspired by the more extremist Wahabi School of Islam and does not recognize national boundaries. The mission of the Al Qaeda is to establish the rule of pure Islam across the globe. The Taliban are ideologically linked to the Sufi and Deoband Schools of Islam and largely comprise of local fighters from tribal Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban also favor spreading the message of pure Islam but their operational sphere is limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nationalism is a strong sentiment among the Taliban which distinguishes them from the Al Qaeda.
This difference in ideology has become prominent in the past year. In February 2008 there was a statement by Taliban leader Mullah Omar that his movement wanted to maintain positive and legitimate relations with Afghanistan and its neighbors. Mullah Omar’s contention is the stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and not the existence of Afghanistan under non-Taliban rule. In the words of Mullah Salam Zaief, Taliban’s Former Ambassador to Pakistan, “The conflict in Afghanistan doesn’t mean [the Taliban] has to confront the world…Taliban doesn’t want to rule the world.” As early as 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri had pointed out that the Taliban members had retreated to their tribes and villages after the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and showed little attachment to the global Islamist struggle. In making peace deals with the Pakistani Government, the Taliban are attempting to regain local orientation and avoid entanglement in a never-ending global jihad.
The Government of Pakistan and the Taliban have thus come under the influence of two distinct developments which has got them to the negotiating table. Both sides are working out means of mutual accommodation. This however, complicates the task for the U.S. Anti-U.S. attacks in Afghanistan will continue to inspire the Taliban even if they stop subscribing to the ideology of global jihad. This new form of terrorism emerging out of Pakistan will not threaten the U.S. homeland but will continue to challenge the American forces in Afghanistan. Since peace and stability in Afghanistan is a critical objective of the global war on terrorism, Pakistan’s peace with Taliban implies mere alteration rather than elimination of the terrorist threat challenging the U.S. The latest form of the matryoshka doll is no less menacing.
Madhavi Bhasin
Senior Research Fellow at Jadavpur University
Read more on this article...
Matryoshka Doll commonly referred to as Russian nested doll is a set of dolls of decreasing size placed one inside the other. Matryoshka is derived from the Latin root ‘mater’ meaning mother. As a breeding ground for terrorists and exhibiting different forms of terrorism, Pakistan can undoubtedly be likened to a matryoshka doll of terrorism.
Several national, regional and global developments presented Pakistan with grave challenges as a nation-state. The country was thrown into a state of political pandemonium with martial law, military coups, political assassinations and absence of democratic elections in the first decade. Religious scholars like Sayyid Suleman Nadvi and Prof. Hamidullah were invited to advise the Government on Constitution making, resulting in emergence of the Objectives Resolution 1949. The Resolution provided that future Constitutions of Pakistan would be modeled on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam. Hassan Abbas and Jessica (FRW) Stern in their book Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, detail how the influence of Pakistan’s clergy shaped the country’s politics. Pakistan’s ‘religious identity’ came to dominate her foreign policy through the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). India’s charge of “sponsored terrorism” in J&K was refuted by Pakistan as diplomatic, political and moral support to the movement for Kashmiri freedom. Robert G. Wirsing in Kashmir in the Shadow of War, highlights how Pakistan’s fixation on Kashmir was viewed by many as a pan-Islamic geostrategic enterprise.
Extremism in terms of inspiration and manifestation graduated to a new level in Pakistan during the 1980s. Influx of jihadi ideology during the Soviet-Afghanistan war had tremendous fallout on Pakistan. External developments coincided with General Zia ul-Haq’s policies of embedding the Islamic ideology in Pakistan’s polity and society. The defeat of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan made a large mass of the jihadist element available for action in Kashmir. India has been drawing international attention to Pakistan’s terrorist activities in J&K since the late 1980s.
Pakistan’s association with terrorism was re-defined after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. In the global war against terrorism Pakistan emerged as frontline state and pledged to sever ties with the Taliban, while supporting the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. It was expected that as an ally in the global counter-terrorism effort, Pakistan would convincingly clamp down on terrorists operating from its territory. Pakistan sought to demonstrate its willingness in combating terrorism through a variety military offensives ranging from the Lal Masjid action to Operation ‘Zalzala’. But involvement in the global war against terrorism was a phase of ecdysis and terrorism continued to flourish in Pakistan.
In the past few months the nested doll of terrorism has sprung another surprise for the global community. Since the process of revelation is still underway, detailed features of the new form of terrorism are yet to be discerned. Nevertheless, the outlines are perceptible. The extremist elements harboring anti-Pakistan sentiments will be segregated from those combating American forces in Afghanistan and will be treated differently. In short, Pakistan reverts to the policy of co-existing with terrorist forces as long as the latter renounces the use of force against the Pakistani establishment. Indications of such a trend and its rationalizations are reflected in the recent policy choices by the Pakistani Government.
President Zardari’s Government has intensified attempts at making peace deals with militant outfits in the country. In April 2008, the Government secured the release of Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin after finalizing a peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban. The deal also included provision for withdrawal of Pakistani Army from areas of South Waziristan in return of commitment by the militants that government and security forces will not be targeted. While agreeing to make peace with Pakistan, Mehsud emphasized that jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan would continue unabated. This peace deal was preceded by an agreement with TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi ) leading to the release of Sufi Mohammad, arrested in 2001 for sending volunteers to attack U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The TNSM was allowed to peacefully campaign for the implementation of the Sharia on the condition that government establishment will not be attacked.
As a logical progression to the 2008 agreement with TNSM, the government of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) signed the Swat Peace Deal on February 16, 2009. The Swat Accord allows TNSM to implement the Sharia in the valley while ensuring that Maulana Qazi Fazlullah’s faction would renounce the use of force against the Pakistani Government. After the Swat Deal, Pakistan’s Parliamentary Committee on National Security declared that this model would be replicated in other tribal areas if successful. A week later on February 23, the Taliban in Bajaur declared a unilateral ceasefire and the Government has responded by halting its operation for four days. It’s yet to be seen if this cessation of hostilities leads to another peace deal. Faqir Mohammad, a Taliban leader, explained that the ceasefire was ordered because it was in the ‘interest of Pakistan and the region.’ Meanwhile, three factions of the Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, Hfiz Gul Bahadur Group and Mullah Nazir Group, declared the formation an alliance in Waziristan tribal area on February 21. The alliance could be an attempt to enhance the bargaining power of the Taliban in the future peace offers by the Pakistani government. Such developments point the emergence of a new form of terrorism in Pakistan; terrorism which is constrained in its scope and does not victimize its guardian.
This new form of terrorism has emerged from the intersection of two distinct developments. The first development is inspired by the unnoticed yet compelling suggestions on how the U.S. should deal with the extremist elements in Afghanistan. In October 2008, U.S. Army General David Petraeus stated that negotiations could be held with some sections of the Taliban as a strategy to check growing violence in Afghanistan. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed the same approach when he suggested that Washington could reconcile with sections of the Taliban if the Karzai government was willing. Secretary Gates however, categorically ruled out any possibility of negotiations with Al Qaeda. Developments on the ground appeared to follow the suggestions of General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. In late 2008 Afghan officials, including President Karzai’s brother, held talks with the Taliban in a dialogue brokered by Saudi Arabia. Though the negotiations did not yield any positive outcome it set the stage for future dialogue. Abdul Salaam, a former Taliban fighter has been appointed as the District Chief of Musa Qala in January this year. His appointment comes as a reward for defecting from Taliban and assisting the British forces to wrestle Musa Qala from Taliban control. Leaders of the Taliban are thus being rewarding for making peace with NATO forces in Afghanistan. This suggests that the U.S. favors a policy of negotiating with certain elements of Taliban in lieu of peace and stability. The Government of Pakistan is simply implementing a customized version of the U.S. strategy at a faster pace.
The second development contributing to the emergence of a new form of terrorism is the gradual distancing of the Taliban from the al Qaeda. Though rarely realized the Al Qaeda and Taliban are historically and ideologically distinct. The Al Qaeda is inspired by the more extremist Wahabi School of Islam and does not recognize national boundaries. The mission of the Al Qaeda is to establish the rule of pure Islam across the globe. The Taliban are ideologically linked to the Sufi and Deoband Schools of Islam and largely comprise of local fighters from tribal Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban also favor spreading the message of pure Islam but their operational sphere is limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nationalism is a strong sentiment among the Taliban which distinguishes them from the Al Qaeda.
This difference in ideology has become prominent in the past year. In February 2008 there was a statement by Taliban leader Mullah Omar that his movement wanted to maintain positive and legitimate relations with Afghanistan and its neighbors. Mullah Omar’s contention is the stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and not the existence of Afghanistan under non-Taliban rule. In the words of Mullah Salam Zaief, Taliban’s Former Ambassador to Pakistan, “The conflict in Afghanistan doesn’t mean [the Taliban] has to confront the world…Taliban doesn’t want to rule the world.” As early as 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri had pointed out that the Taliban members had retreated to their tribes and villages after the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and showed little attachment to the global Islamist struggle. In making peace deals with the Pakistani Government, the Taliban are attempting to regain local orientation and avoid entanglement in a never-ending global jihad.
The Government of Pakistan and the Taliban have thus come under the influence of two distinct developments which has got them to the negotiating table. Both sides are working out means of mutual accommodation. This however, complicates the task for the U.S. Anti-U.S. attacks in Afghanistan will continue to inspire the Taliban even if they stop subscribing to the ideology of global jihad. This new form of terrorism emerging out of Pakistan will not threaten the U.S. homeland but will continue to challenge the American forces in Afghanistan. Since peace and stability in Afghanistan is a critical objective of the global war on terrorism, Pakistan’s peace with Taliban implies mere alteration rather than elimination of the terrorist threat challenging the U.S. The latest form of the matryoshka doll is no less menacing.
Madhavi Bhasin
Senior Research Fellow at Jadavpur University
Read more on this article...
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Turkey's Local Elections: A Preview
In about a month’s time, on 29 March, local elections will be held throughout Turkey
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Even was this not shown by every major public opinion poll, there are three good reasons to believe this will be the case. First, despite the sharp costs of the global economic downturn for
The opposition looks hopeless. The party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, is now led by the charismaless Deniz Baykal and flays about with a mixture of economic nationalism and Republican nostalgia which seems out of touch with the dynamism of contemporary
The real questions for the local elections will be in the details. Will the AKP’s victory be more or less definitive than the 46.6% of the vote that it won in the 2007 General Elections (current poll data suggests that it will do somewhat better)? If the AKP does, in fact, do better, despite the economic downturn, it will have won a significant mandate for further reform and a powerful mandate that will give opposition in both the Parliament and the military pause. If, on the other hand, its cannot match this level of support, the door will be opened for more aggressive resistance to AKP reform efforts in the Parliament and, more importantly, within the bureaucracy, courts, and military.
Finally there is the question of the Kurds. One of the strengths of the AKP has been its ability to win Kurdish votes in the Southeast. It has done so both by its sympathy for religious observance in the public sphere and by its relatively greater comfort with Kurdish cultural expression. However, this policy has been followed fitfully as the AKP has attempted to simultaneously reach an accord with a restive military establishment. Its success in balancing a more nuanced approach to the Kurds with its relations with the generals will be tested in these elections.
The AKP is going to win the upcoming elections. What is less clear is how strong its mandate is going to be. Even more important, is the question of whether, in the long term, Turkish democracy can survive without a vibrant and viable political opposition.
Howard Eissenstat is a post-doctoral fellow at the
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Saturday, February 21, 2009
Reading Swat
Increasingly, I am convinced that the discourse on Pakistan within the United States needs some major intervention. My fear, or maybe paranoia, is that Pakistan is en-route to be declared "mentally incapacitated" by United States aka "failed state". The impact of such a declaration (whether stated or not) would be that US will need to put a "care-taker" in charge of the mess. The rising frequency of the drone attacks, the extension of missile strikes, the troop "surge" in Afghanistan read as concrete steps towards a radically intrusive strategy towards Pakistan. I will have more to say on this. But I wanted, for the moment to simply bring to your attention some recent writings on Swat.
1. Jackie Northam, "Pakistan Deal With Taliban Draws Criticis", All Things Considered, Feb 17, 2009.
Perhaps the worst of all recent pieces - NPR could only find 1. CIA Station Chief, 1. State Department Official and 1. NSC Official to declare that the Swat deal basically meant that Afghanistani Taliban have basically invaded and taken over Swat and that this means the Pakistani army is ridiculously weak. Between the lines, you should understand that the nukes are about to fall into the Taliban hands. Also al-Qaeda. Thank you, NPR.
2. The New York Times managed to get their reporters to Pakistan. Their write up, Pakistan Makes a Taliban Truce, Creating a Haven at least took the time to point out:
Leaving aside what "strict Islamic law" even means (and how it compares to the California "Three Strikes" law), I was relieved that Jane Perlez sought to give some sense of the history of the region. Though this whole "prince" bit could have been used to provide a quick word on Swat's constitutional relationship to Pakistan. The nice thing about the piece was that it actually quoted experts in Pakistan (such as Shuja Nawaz) even though the generic spin remained the same ("Theeeeere Here!")
Read more on this article...
1. Jackie Northam, "Pakistan Deal With Taliban Draws Criticis", All Things Considered, Feb 17, 2009.
Perhaps the worst of all recent pieces - NPR could only find 1. CIA Station Chief, 1. State Department Official and 1. NSC Official to declare that the Swat deal basically meant that Afghanistani Taliban have basically invaded and taken over Swat and that this means the Pakistani army is ridiculously weak. Between the lines, you should understand that the nukes are about to fall into the Taliban hands. Also al-Qaeda. Thank you, NPR.
2. The New York Times managed to get their reporters to Pakistan. Their write up, Pakistan Makes a Taliban Truce, Creating a Haven at least took the time to point out:
Many of the poor who have stayed in Swat, which until the late 1960s was ruled by a prince, were calling for the Shariah courts as a way of achieving quick justice and dispensing with the long delays and corruption of the civil courts. The authorities in the North-West Frontier Province, which includes Swat, argued that the Shariah courts were not the same as strict Islamic law. The new laws, for instance, would not ban education of females or impose other strict tenets espoused by the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Leaving aside what "strict Islamic law" even means (and how it compares to the California "Three Strikes" law), I was relieved that Jane Perlez sought to give some sense of the history of the region. Though this whole "prince" bit could have been used to provide a quick word on Swat's constitutional relationship to Pakistan. The nice thing about the piece was that it actually quoted experts in Pakistan (such as Shuja Nawaz) even though the generic spin remained the same ("Theeeeere Here!")
Read more on this article...
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Erdogan and Davos
Howard Eissenstat writes:
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Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's outburst at The World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, in which he called Israeli President Shimon Peres a baby killer and much besides before stomping off the stage in a huff has served as a sort of Rorschach inkblot test for many observers, with supporters of Israel being roundly critical of the Turkish Prime Minister and critics of Israel being broadly supportive of his actions.
Perhaps more interesting has been the various ways in which Erdogan's Davos theatrics have served as a prism for understanding both transformations in Turkey under the AKP and their repercussions for both Turkish Jewry and for Turkey's relations with Israel.
The first thing to note regarding Erdogan's outburst is that it is very much in keeping with his public persona. Erdogan's famous temper is both a remarkable tool for cowing political opponents and journalists and a fundamental aspect of his charisma, which borrows much from his urban, working class roots. Regardless of whether his outburst was planned or not, it played extremely well in Turkey, where support for Palestinian rights runs across the political spectrum and where public outrage at the violence in Gaza was universal. A public defense of both Palestinian rights and Turkish honor could only serve Erdogan well in the upcoming local elections on March 29.
Many observers have seen in the Davos spat, signs of a larger shift in Turkish – Israeli relations and, indeed, continued public sniping in the wake of the Davos conference points to outstanding tensions. Nonetheless, it needs to be underlined that the Turkish – Israeli alliance is, from the Turkish perspective at least, very much a marriage of convenience and not of love. Thus it has been since its inception and thus it will be for the foreseeable future. It is, however, also true that successive Turkish governments have had to negotiate this relationship under greater public scrutiny. While there was always a certain sympathy for the Palestinian cause, Turkish public interest and concern for the issue of Palestinian rights has grown dramatically since the first Intifada. It was after all, the intensely secular Bulent Ecevit (then Prime Minister) who, in 2002, described Israeli actions in Jenin as "a genocide." While it is certainly true that Islamists have tried to make political hay out of the Israeli – Turkish alliance, they have done so precisely because the alliance is unpopular. That being said, the marriage has proven remarkably durable and the AKP has, for all of its efforts to expand relations with its Arab neighbors and Iran, not taken any significant steps to diminish its economic and security ties with Israel. Under the AKP, trade and tourism have both increased and Turkish – Israeli military relations remain, despite recent grousing over Gaza, remarkably strong. If the AKP has been publicly critical of Israel, it has been so without taking any concrete actions to change the status quo. And in this, at least, it is maintaining a longstanding aspect of Turkish – Israeli relations.
For some observers, the AKP's increased ties with Iran and its Arab neighbors are part of a zero-sum game that means Turkey's alliance with Israel is crumbling and, more broadly, that it is pulling away from its western allies. There is, I think, something particularly weird and perhaps a little disingenuous about this portrayal, which attempts to frame the AKP as "anti-Western" in character. The AKP has shown a remarkable willingness to overturn long-held foreign policy taboos and has gone further than any previous Turkish government in addressing the outstanding problems of Cyprus and relations with the Republic of Armenia. For all the many failings of its political liberalization efforts, the AKP has moved further towards meeting EU criteria than any previous government and has done so under withering criticism from both the political opposition and the Turkish military. To be sure, the AKP has also been aggressive in building its ties with the wider Middle East and taken an increasingly active role in the region. For some this, in and of itself, is suspect. But if the AKP has been aggressive in reaching out to its neighbors, it is also continuing a process that began more than a decade ago and, from my perspective, stems from the collapse of the Cold War system in the Middle East. I have seen many op-eds arguing that this is "scary." I do not believe I have yet to read one that has argued it is disadvantageous to Turkey's security or economic interests.
Finally, I think it worth while to consider the question of what Erdogan's outburst at Davos says about anti-Semitism in Turkey. A number of writers have argued that the AKP has nurtured anti-Semitism in Turkey. While Erdogan has made public statements against anti-Semitism in the past, calling it a "crime against humanity," his own words at Davos, in which he quoted the sixth commandment and Gilad Atzmon (identified, not as an Israeli, but as "a Jew"), demonstrate a not particularly unusual conflation of Jewish and Israeli identity. If this conflation is hardly limited to anti-Semites, it is also one that gives the Jewish community of Turkey little reason for comfort. There is no question that the recent crisis in Gaza has left Turkey's twenty-thousand or so Jewish citizens feeling even more targeted than normal.
That being said, the trope of "Turkish tolerance" is more myth than historical reality and the question of anti-Semitism is not limited to the religious right. Research by Corry Guttstadt has largely deflated the image of Turkey protecting European Jews during the Holocaust, while work by Rifat Bali and others have shown the extent to which Jews were actively pushed out of public life. European anti-Semitism was already part and parcel of Turkish nationalism at the founding of the Republic and – more importantly - was woven into the fabric of a nationalism that defined Muslim identity as a prerequisite to membership in the nation even as it rejected outward religiosity. In this sense, the key issue for Turkey domestically is less anti-Semitism per se, than a general sense that non-Muslims are "native foreigners."
This has, I think, become more pronounced in recent years but the blame lies as much with militant secularists as it does with Islamists. Militant Kemalists, particularly, have used denial of the Armenian genocide as a means of demonstrating that they are better defenders of the national honor than the AKP. Accusations that political opponents are "secret Jews or Armenians," long a staple of the Islamist fringe are now used against AKP politicians as well. Observers who point to a growing culture of intolerance in Turkey are certainly correct. Suggesting that this is simply the outcome of a secret Islamist agenda on the part of the AKP is, however, deeply misleading.
Howard Eissenstat is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandies University.
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Monday, February 16, 2009
Swat, Now
Yesterday's announcement that Zardari has made a deal with the TNSM and installed "Islamic government" in Swat is all over the news. I talked, briefly, with Jerome McDonald of Worldview today. My main point was that there exists a history - 1994, 1999, 2007 - of efforts to install a Shari-Nizam-e-Adl (Islamic Order of Justice) in Swat region. You can check my previous post on Swat to get a sense of this history, Akond of Swat.
More importantly, an absolutely must-read is historian Sultan-i-Rome's paper, Swat: A Critical Analysis [pdf], IPCS Research Paper, January 2009. The paper provides a succinct historical and political overview and also introduces some of the key players. Must read.
Sultan-i-Rome is one of the major, if not the, historian of Swat valley. His monograph, Swat State, 1915-1969: From Genesis to Merger: An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-Political, and Economic Development is key to building a historical overview of the crisis facing the state of Pakistan. I had thought of writing a proper review of the latter, but time slipped away. I will try and do it.
[x-posted from CM] Read more on this article...
More importantly, an absolutely must-read is historian Sultan-i-Rome's paper, Swat: A Critical Analysis [pdf], IPCS Research Paper, January 2009. The paper provides a succinct historical and political overview and also introduces some of the key players. Must read.
Sultan-i-Rome is one of the major, if not the, historian of Swat valley. His monograph, Swat State, 1915-1969: From Genesis to Merger: An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-Political, and Economic Development is key to building a historical overview of the crisis facing the state of Pakistan. I had thought of writing a proper review of the latter, but time slipped away. I will try and do it.
[x-posted from CM] Read more on this article...
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Nudging towards Peace
by Ian S. Lustick and Gershon Shafir
In the early 1990s, the United States carefully nudged Israel toward appreciating the long-term costs of continued occupation and settlement of the West Bank. It did so before the Israeli elections. New elections will take place in about a week Israel. What would be an equally effective American approach to prod forward the moribund peace process?
At the beginning of 1992, Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister from the Likud, made it plain that he would divert the growing wave of Soviet Jewish immigration to the West Bank. He intended to finance the project with a $10 billion American loan guarantee. But President George H. W. Bush threatened to veto any loan guarantees that did not include a freeze on all new settlements. The hard-line Shamir demurred and expressed his willingness to forgo the guarantees, but the American move had its effect nonetheless. One result of American policy was the shift of a few tens of thousands of votes in the 1992 Israeli elections in favor of "changing Israel’s priorities," thereby contributing decisively to the victory of Yitzhak Rabin. Under his premiership, Israel engaged in secret talks with the PLO, and on September 13, 1993 signed the Oslo accord with the PLO in President Clinton’s eighth month in office.
The Oslo process ultimately failed, for multiple reasons of omission and commission on all sides. But that is not surprising. It was the first time core issues of the conflict were put on the table. The real lesson of Oslo, and of the tantalizingly successful negotiations at Taba that followed on the failure at Camp David, is that another try is not only the only possible path to peace, but actually might have a chance to succeed. It is therefore worth considering closely just how little the U.S. had to do to trigger robust Israeli moves toward peace and yet how crucial its actions were.
Of great significance is that the Bush administration did not directly pressure Israel. Oslo was not a process imposed on Israelis. Of equal significance is the proof offered by this episode of —just how closely Israelis attend to U.S. words and deeds. The dramatic reversal of Israeli government policy on the key issue of settlements and negotiations with the PLO also show that Israel’s commitment to settlements and continued rule of the West Bank is relatively weak. Deep down Israelis know their governments have been over-reaching in efforts to absorb the Palestinian territories. But it is only when the smothering blanket of assured U.S. support on every issue is removed, that Israeli democracy has a chance to display its fundamental wisdom.
To be sure, after the signing of the Oslo accord, U.S. vigilance faltered and Rabin allowed the resumption of settlements in the West Bank, a fatal thorn in the side of the Oslo accord. As the recent war in Gaza demonstrated, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is entering a new and dangerous phase, in which neither side imagines violence as an unpleasant but necessary route to peace, but only as a desperate and furious reaction to the perceived evil of the other. If this pattern is to end, and only an end to this pattern can save both the Jewish state and the Palestinians, the Obama administration will have to act with at least the tact, subtlety and effectiveness of the Bush-Baker team.
One advantage the Obama-Clinton-Mitchell team have, that Bush and Baker did not, is the Arab League Peace Plan. In return for full Israeli withdrawal and a "just solution" to the Palestinian refugee problem it offers to "establish normal relations with Israel in the context of [a] comprehensive peace" and "consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended." In the past year Arab leaders have urged a revival of the plan and Israeli cabinet members have spoken of it approvingly. Both Hamas and Fatah have considered adopting a version of it. The terms of the accord will need to be negotiated, but the involvement of the moderate Arab states in resolving the conflict would add the regional dimension that has been missing since the Madrid talks in the early 1990's. If an accord is reached on this basis, it would be difficult for Hamas to resume rocketing Israel and it would find itself, within the context of a Palestinian plebiscite, under great pressure to find a way to sign up to the agreement and adopt the profile of a "loyal Islamic opposition" in a real and thriving Palestinian state.
To enable this vision to be achieved, unprecedented steps on settlements, prisoners, uses of violence, and rhetorical indulgences, will be needed, not to build confidence, but to drain cynicism. Past experience shows that Israeli settlements can either expand or shrink; they never remain frozen. Consequently, one important measure would have to be the removal of all "illegal" settlements, a promise repeatedly given and invariably violated by Israeli governments. A key Israeli step will be the freeing of Marwan Barghuti. Barghuti, a leader of Fatah's young guard, justifies resistance to occupation but condemns attacks on Israeli civilians, thus clearly distinguishing himself from Hamas. He is the fresh and popular face Fatah is lacking. His release would also demonstrate an Israeli future willingness to reconsider the fate of Palestinian prisoners, a particularly painful dimension of the conflict. Once the reality of this opportunity is established, Palestinian public pressure on Hamas and other extremists to end rocket attacks on Israel will become as strong as they can ever be. Then, finally, and perhaps for the last possible time, a serious and comprehensive effort to scale the mountain of peace can be well and truly launched.
To open this opportunity, President Obama needs to nudge the Israeli electorate. He should make U.S. support in the Security Council contingent on Israeli government negotiations based on the Arab League Plan for a real two state solution. Alternatively, the next Israeli government will face an international community, joined by the United States, determined to break the siege of Gaza and build a framework of negotiations, including Hamas if it agrees to the terms of the same Arab League Plan.
Ian S. Lustick is the Bess W. Heyman Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Gershon Shafir is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego.
Read more on this article...
In the early 1990s, the United States carefully nudged Israel toward appreciating the long-term costs of continued occupation and settlement of the West Bank. It did so before the Israeli elections. New elections will take place in about a week Israel. What would be an equally effective American approach to prod forward the moribund peace process?
At the beginning of 1992, Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister from the Likud, made it plain that he would divert the growing wave of Soviet Jewish immigration to the West Bank. He intended to finance the project with a $10 billion American loan guarantee. But President George H. W. Bush threatened to veto any loan guarantees that did not include a freeze on all new settlements. The hard-line Shamir demurred and expressed his willingness to forgo the guarantees, but the American move had its effect nonetheless. One result of American policy was the shift of a few tens of thousands of votes in the 1992 Israeli elections in favor of "changing Israel’s priorities," thereby contributing decisively to the victory of Yitzhak Rabin. Under his premiership, Israel engaged in secret talks with the PLO, and on September 13, 1993 signed the Oslo accord with the PLO in President Clinton’s eighth month in office.
The Oslo process ultimately failed, for multiple reasons of omission and commission on all sides. But that is not surprising. It was the first time core issues of the conflict were put on the table. The real lesson of Oslo, and of the tantalizingly successful negotiations at Taba that followed on the failure at Camp David, is that another try is not only the only possible path to peace, but actually might have a chance to succeed. It is therefore worth considering closely just how little the U.S. had to do to trigger robust Israeli moves toward peace and yet how crucial its actions were.
Of great significance is that the Bush administration did not directly pressure Israel. Oslo was not a process imposed on Israelis. Of equal significance is the proof offered by this episode of —just how closely Israelis attend to U.S. words and deeds. The dramatic reversal of Israeli government policy on the key issue of settlements and negotiations with the PLO also show that Israel’s commitment to settlements and continued rule of the West Bank is relatively weak. Deep down Israelis know their governments have been over-reaching in efforts to absorb the Palestinian territories. But it is only when the smothering blanket of assured U.S. support on every issue is removed, that Israeli democracy has a chance to display its fundamental wisdom.
To be sure, after the signing of the Oslo accord, U.S. vigilance faltered and Rabin allowed the resumption of settlements in the West Bank, a fatal thorn in the side of the Oslo accord. As the recent war in Gaza demonstrated, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is entering a new and dangerous phase, in which neither side imagines violence as an unpleasant but necessary route to peace, but only as a desperate and furious reaction to the perceived evil of the other. If this pattern is to end, and only an end to this pattern can save both the Jewish state and the Palestinians, the Obama administration will have to act with at least the tact, subtlety and effectiveness of the Bush-Baker team.
One advantage the Obama-Clinton-Mitchell team have, that Bush and Baker did not, is the Arab League Peace Plan. In return for full Israeli withdrawal and a "just solution" to the Palestinian refugee problem it offers to "establish normal relations with Israel in the context of [a] comprehensive peace" and "consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended." In the past year Arab leaders have urged a revival of the plan and Israeli cabinet members have spoken of it approvingly. Both Hamas and Fatah have considered adopting a version of it. The terms of the accord will need to be negotiated, but the involvement of the moderate Arab states in resolving the conflict would add the regional dimension that has been missing since the Madrid talks in the early 1990's. If an accord is reached on this basis, it would be difficult for Hamas to resume rocketing Israel and it would find itself, within the context of a Palestinian plebiscite, under great pressure to find a way to sign up to the agreement and adopt the profile of a "loyal Islamic opposition" in a real and thriving Palestinian state.
To enable this vision to be achieved, unprecedented steps on settlements, prisoners, uses of violence, and rhetorical indulgences, will be needed, not to build confidence, but to drain cynicism. Past experience shows that Israeli settlements can either expand or shrink; they never remain frozen. Consequently, one important measure would have to be the removal of all "illegal" settlements, a promise repeatedly given and invariably violated by Israeli governments. A key Israeli step will be the freeing of Marwan Barghuti. Barghuti, a leader of Fatah's young guard, justifies resistance to occupation but condemns attacks on Israeli civilians, thus clearly distinguishing himself from Hamas. He is the fresh and popular face Fatah is lacking. His release would also demonstrate an Israeli future willingness to reconsider the fate of Palestinian prisoners, a particularly painful dimension of the conflict. Once the reality of this opportunity is established, Palestinian public pressure on Hamas and other extremists to end rocket attacks on Israel will become as strong as they can ever be. Then, finally, and perhaps for the last possible time, a serious and comprehensive effort to scale the mountain of peace can be well and truly launched.
To open this opportunity, President Obama needs to nudge the Israeli electorate. He should make U.S. support in the Security Council contingent on Israeli government negotiations based on the Arab League Plan for a real two state solution. Alternatively, the next Israeli government will face an international community, joined by the United States, determined to break the siege of Gaza and build a framework of negotiations, including Hamas if it agrees to the terms of the same Arab League Plan.
Ian S. Lustick is the Bess W. Heyman Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Gershon Shafir is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego.
Read more on this article...
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Iranian Revolution at 30
Today Iran began 10 days of festivities marking the 30th anniversary of its revolution.
The Middle East Institue has produced a volume on the occasion of this anniversary in which 53 contributors, including me, reflect on the significance of the 1979 Revolution and its positive and negative ramifications. Short essays dwell on gender issues, education, media, the environment, energy, foreign policy and so on. There is really nothing like it around. Complementing the essays is an extensive resource section of maps, statistics, a timeline, and selected bibliography. The full document can be found here. Read more on this article...
The Middle East Institue has produced a volume on the occasion of this anniversary in which 53 contributors, including me, reflect on the significance of the 1979 Revolution and its positive and negative ramifications. Short essays dwell on gender issues, education, media, the environment, energy, foreign policy and so on. There is really nothing like it around. Complementing the essays is an extensive resource section of maps, statistics, a timeline, and selected bibliography. The full document can be found here. Read more on this article...
Saturday, January 24, 2009
PROTECTING DISSENTERS AND ECCENTRICS
By: Philip J Cunningham
(published in the Bangkok Post 24/01/2009)
Anyone familiar with the dangers of nationalistic group-think - especially in Japan where a weakness to such thinking once led to a militant rampage across Asia that left 20 million dead on the mainland and eventually took Japan itself as victim - will appreciate that little acts of civil disobedience and the airing of contrary, disrespectful, even insolent, views are signs of a healthy system.
The power of the state is ever in danger of becoming overwrought and corrupted. As such, it needs a panoply of checks and balances, not just those provided by a neutral judiciary, not just the see-saw balance provided by the dynamics of a ruling party wrestling with the opposition, not just the clamour of self-interest from vested interest groups, but on the part of rugged individuals who buck the popular tide, and even outright eccentrics.
In any society it is the rare individual who chooses to sit down when everyone else stands up, or vice versa, because peer pressure is one of the most powerful and ubiquitous social control mechanisms known. Anyone with the temerity to march to their own drummer when everyone else is marching the other way, is apt to be seen as an obstruction to traffic, if not a menace to the glory of mass delusion.
Not all individuals who stake out unpopular positions are politically minded or intellectually savvy; some are gadflies who revel in being different, others seek to bring attention upon themselves, others yet may act for reasons unknowable not only to others but even to themselves.
But society is better off for its dissenters, cranks and eccentrics; most especially when calls for conformity of thinking reach high pitch.
Compassion for - or at least benign tolerance of - non-conformists helps fend off fascistic tendencies and makes society more fully human and humane.
Even when an act of civil disobedience is committed with every intent to challenge a taboo or make a pointedly politically incorrect statement, one does not have to agree with the implied statement to support the right of the individual to such idiosyncratic expression.
Looking through the long lens of history, lone dissenters and gadflies who challenge mainstream thinking have as much a role to play in keeping society balanced, stable and viable in the long run as upholders of the status quo, revered institutions and enforcers of the law.
Consider a headline from Japan this week: "Court rules refusal to rehire teacher who didn't stand for national anthem was illegal."
Mainichi Shimbun reports that a Tokyo teacher who refused to stand when the Kimigayo anthem was played at his school, was awarded over 2 million yen as compensation for the unfair punitive actions of the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education which refused his application for continued employment.
The Saruya Yuji case is a small victory, not so much for free expression, or more specifically in this case, the freedom not to stand - a thorny issue which was not technically addressed - but rather as a slap against the over-reaching hand of the city authorities eager to punish dissenters.
Hundreds of Tokyo teachers have been disciplined since 2003 when arch-nationalist Mayor Ishihara Shintaro made mandatory the previously controversial and sporadically observed flag and national anthem rituals in Tokyo schools. The school teachers who expressed themselves by refusing to stand - many close to retirement, with pensions and post-retirement options at stake - were punished in irregular and ad hoc ways by zealous city bureaucrats who acted in concert with Mayor Ishihara's uncompromising stance.
Deliberately refusing to comply with what might fairly be construed as obligatory state worship, the teachers who refused to stand made themselves stand out all the more. Subject to the national glare, they clung to their convictions as stubborn individuals in the best sense of the word, hardy individualists in a society where following the crowd is the norm.
Nezu Kimiko, a junior high school teacher in Tokyo, told John Spiri in Japan Focus that her refusal to stand was an act of defiance against militarism, imperialism and authoritarian edicts everywhere.
The Rising Sun flag has a complex political pedigree; it adorned Japanese fighting vessels and kamikaze craft during the war and was planted in conquered territory to mark Japanese rule. Likewise, the mournful Kimigayo, which means "In Your Majesty's Reign," was thoroughly associated with Emperor Hirohito, though the simple lyrics are sufficiently ancient and ambiguous to construe other meanings. More to the point, both these national symbols survived World War Two intact, unlike the hated flags and anthems of Nazi Germany.
That might explain the palpable ambivalence of many Japanese citizens who, either out of reticence or hard-learned lessons of the lost war, are rather diffident about their flag.
Still, judicial opinion and public opinion continue to be split on the issue. Previous court challenges in June 2007 and February 2008, one of which ruled in favour of the Tokyo administration's position, are still under appeal.
For what it's worth, the liberal-minded Emperor Akihito himself has indirectly expressed sympathy for the dissenters, not that militant defenders of the Emperor system necessarily care what the real Emperor actually thinks or feels.
Beware of those who punish others in the name of the nation's most revered symbols, for they are often hewing to their own vindictive agendas.
The January 18, 2009 Tokyo court ruling is not the last word on the matter, but it shows the health of Japanese democracy; there remains ample room for dissent against mandatory rituals of allegiance, even regarding the potent and highly-revered symbols of nation and emperor.
Philip J Cunningham is a free-lance writer and political commentator.
Read more on this article...
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Strangers in the Night
Yesterday, at her Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Clinton faced a number of questions about Pakistan and Afghanistan. Her most detailed conversation was with Senator Kerry - who will head the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Kerry spoke about his trip to South Asia, in the immediate aftermath of Mumbai attacks.
It is a profoundly illuminating statement. The interplay of light and dark, day and night. The reference to hamlets and pockets. Insurgency - the lexical contribution of the Iraq War which continues to hold sway. They live there. We don’t. That language of globalization which rules the pages of Wall Street Journal and New York Times is distinctly absent. These are not interconnected communities that stretch across national borders, these are inwardly focused, pre-modern histories. To further explain, Senator Kerry mentioned that he has been doing a lot of reading recently - readings that impressed upon him the importance of “tribalism”, "We honored tribalism when we dealt with the Northern Alliance and initially went in to Afghanistan. We really haven’t adequately since." He recommended that Senator Clinton read Rory Stewart’s travelogue of walking across Afghanistan and Pakistan, The Places in Between. And also Janet Wallach’s biography of Gertrude Bell entitled Desert Queen: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell: Adventurer, Advisor to Kings, Ally of Lawrence of Arabia. Let that title wash all over you. Luxuriate in it.
Senator Clinton responded warmly to Kerry’s literary suggestions.
The historian in me is fascinated by these teleologies at display: Alexander to the British to the Soviets to US. A timelime of invaders and conquerors who, I assume, only abided the day, and not the night. There is the unapologetic emphasis on the romantic and the Orientalist - a vocabulary of time and space that does not mesh, at all, with our own. I do not know if our Senators realized that this is also, explicitly, a teleology of failed imperial enterprises. Not the precedent, I am sure, they'd want to invoke.
But the tribalism espoused by Senator Kerry is also part of this now-defunct mode. It stands for those "others" every colonial power has ever imagined into being. To fight their wars. The burden of tribalism is the burden of violence on colonial subjects – be they the Hindus and Muslims under British colonial rule in the early decades of the twentieth century, or the Sunnis and Shias in Baghdad under the surge. The colonial histories are written in that particular language of violence. These are the violent colonial solutions to political problems, to be exact.
II.
Reading the US Press, Senator Kerry and Clinton, on Pakistan is to know that Pakistan does not exist as a coherent nation-state. It seems to comprise of undifferentiated security actors (Musharraf/Kayani, Karzai, Northern Alliance, Taliban, Pakistan military, ISI) operating in a volatile soup. It is constantly claimed that the state - whether civil or military - does not control its own western and south-western territories. A claim that enables US to conduct drone attacks, as well as military incursions into the country. In the first seven months of 2008, there were five drone strikes inside Pakistan. Since August, there have been over thirty. Some as deep as 25 miles into Pakistani territory and deadly - killing 50 people in four attacks in September, alone.
But Pakistan does have a history as a nation-state, in fact. And it is not the history of Alexander’s arrival to the Indus. Let me give you a brief recount. From 1999 - 2008, we supported the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf - he was the devil we knew and liked. From 2002-2008, the same devil presided as vast swathes of his country converted into a war-zone. In 2005, to suppress the proto-nationalist uprising in Baluchistan, he used the same tactics that were being practiced across the border in Afghanistan: bombing over civilian enclaves, missile assassinations, heavy military foot-print. As he methodically destroyed the claimants for an engaged and equal partnership for Baluchistan in the federal regime, he created the political space for the emergence of new actors - the Mehsud tribe in Waziristan. As a result Pakistan, by the end of 2008, faces several civil wars - in the north-west, it faces the development of self-declared taliban regime which is hoping to enforce Shari’a. In the south-west, it faces the proliferation of both proto-nationalist and terrorist groups. In the city of Karachi, there is the systematic effort to expel Afghan/Pakhtun immigrants by the ethnic party, MQM.
Previously, we supported two other decade long military dictatorships, General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988) during whose tenure we fought our hot Cold War in Afghanistan and during whose tenure we excused a rampant policy of Sunnification and militarization. And Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-1969) whose tenure saw the effective killing of democratic institutions and the highlighting of Kashmir as the central issue of Pakistan. We supported all three men. They came to our capital, spoke to the Congress, enjoyed days and nights as our esteemed friends. Overall, in the 61 years of existence, we supported 30 plus years of military rule in Pakistan. Let me restate this: The United States has consistently supported the elimination of any democratic development in Pakistan since 1947. During the civilian administrations, we routinely ignored Pakistan or imposed sanctions. If Pakistan lacks coherence as a nation-state to Senator Kerry and Clinton, they can look to these specific histories for explanation. Alexander the Great cannot help them.
III.
In the aftermath of Mumbai attacks, the world has found yet another reason to doubt the sustainability of Pakistan, doubt the intentions of the people and the State, doubt their commitment to being a peaceful global citizens. These doubts, those proclamations, some of the harsh denouncements of the Indian media were heard loudly and clearly across Pakistan. The bellicosity - apparent even in the flyer for this panel - generated its own predictable response. The military, which had finally lost all credence, is slowly coming back in business. It is the protector. It is the sustainer of the national myths.
The Pakistanis are also attuned to the silences. They note that in the teleology of modern terror - NYC, Madrid, London, and now Mumbai - there is no mention of Lahore and Islamabad. The September 20th blast at the Marriott, Islamabad is a clear precursor to the tragedy at Taj, Mumbai. It, too, was a site where the local elite gathered for daily mingling. It, too, catered to the foreign visitors. It, too, was a sign of Pakistan's growing economy. Yet, while NYC and Mumbai are forever linked, the victims of Islamabad and Lahore find themselves on the other side of history.
The Obama administration will need to stop reading Rudyard Kipling and start reading even the wide-circulation daily Urdu and English press from Pakistan. It is quite easy, they are all online. It will have to know Pakistan’s hopes lie with civilian institutions, civic bodies which protect women and minorities, elementary and secondary education for all, strengthening the judiciary, invoking land reform. It will have to know that the military is the largest land-owning entity, one of the biggest business entity and the greatest consumer of US AID. The Obama administration needs to focus on the people of Pakistan, in the PRESENT and not in some distant past surrounded in unknown terrain, if it hopes to combat escalating extremism in the region. Collectively, there are over 200 million inhabitants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are mega-cities like Karachi with populations over 19 million. We are not dealing with hamlets and pockets. And the global context is certainly clear to the terrorists in Mumbai. In the violence they spread, over three days, and their targets and their statements, they drew upon this language of political violence. Nariman house to Gaza, Kashmir to Taj Hotel are not teleologies of tribalism and we make a grave error if we read them wrongly.
Ironically, 2008 began with one of the greatest moments in the history of this nation. After a year-long civic protest, led by the Lawyers Movement, the people of Pakistan democratically voted out this military dictator. The February elections in Pakistan were a resounding dismissal of a decade of military dominance, as well as the religious parties. Yet, we failed to engage with this flowering of democracy. And we need to engage with the civilian government of Zardari – however flawed that particular person is.
There are no military solutions to a decades old political problem. Because military solutions mandate that the language of political violence be the only language left (be it in Kashmir or Islamabad or Mumbai).
x-posted at Chapati Mystery Read more on this article...
We do not live there. We don’t live in the community, in a hamlet, in a small town, pocket, whatever you want to call it. And so we’re not there often at night. They are. And the night often rules with the insurgencies.
It is a profoundly illuminating statement. The interplay of light and dark, day and night. The reference to hamlets and pockets. Insurgency - the lexical contribution of the Iraq War which continues to hold sway. They live there. We don’t. That language of globalization which rules the pages of Wall Street Journal and New York Times is distinctly absent. These are not interconnected communities that stretch across national borders, these are inwardly focused, pre-modern histories. To further explain, Senator Kerry mentioned that he has been doing a lot of reading recently - readings that impressed upon him the importance of “tribalism”, "We honored tribalism when we dealt with the Northern Alliance and initially went in to Afghanistan. We really haven’t adequately since." He recommended that Senator Clinton read Rory Stewart’s travelogue of walking across Afghanistan and Pakistan, The Places in Between. And also Janet Wallach’s biography of Gertrude Bell entitled Desert Queen: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell: Adventurer, Advisor to Kings, Ally of Lawrence of Arabia. Let that title wash all over you. Luxuriate in it.
Senator Clinton responded warmly to Kerry’s literary suggestions.
Sitting here today, when I think about my trips to Afghanistan, my flying over that terrain, my awareness of the history going back to Alexander the Great and certainly, the imperial British military and Rudyard Kipling’s memorable poems about Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, which put in more troops than we’re thinking about putting in — I mean, it calls for a large doze of humility about what it is we are trying to accomplish.
The historian in me is fascinated by these teleologies at display: Alexander to the British to the Soviets to US. A timelime of invaders and conquerors who, I assume, only abided the day, and not the night. There is the unapologetic emphasis on the romantic and the Orientalist - a vocabulary of time and space that does not mesh, at all, with our own. I do not know if our Senators realized that this is also, explicitly, a teleology of failed imperial enterprises. Not the precedent, I am sure, they'd want to invoke.
But the tribalism espoused by Senator Kerry is also part of this now-defunct mode. It stands for those "others" every colonial power has ever imagined into being. To fight their wars. The burden of tribalism is the burden of violence on colonial subjects – be they the Hindus and Muslims under British colonial rule in the early decades of the twentieth century, or the Sunnis and Shias in Baghdad under the surge. The colonial histories are written in that particular language of violence. These are the violent colonial solutions to political problems, to be exact.
II.
Reading the US Press, Senator Kerry and Clinton, on Pakistan is to know that Pakistan does not exist as a coherent nation-state. It seems to comprise of undifferentiated security actors (Musharraf/Kayani, Karzai, Northern Alliance, Taliban, Pakistan military, ISI) operating in a volatile soup. It is constantly claimed that the state - whether civil or military - does not control its own western and south-western territories. A claim that enables US to conduct drone attacks, as well as military incursions into the country. In the first seven months of 2008, there were five drone strikes inside Pakistan. Since August, there have been over thirty. Some as deep as 25 miles into Pakistani territory and deadly - killing 50 people in four attacks in September, alone.
But Pakistan does have a history as a nation-state, in fact. And it is not the history of Alexander’s arrival to the Indus. Let me give you a brief recount. From 1999 - 2008, we supported the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf - he was the devil we knew and liked. From 2002-2008, the same devil presided as vast swathes of his country converted into a war-zone. In 2005, to suppress the proto-nationalist uprising in Baluchistan, he used the same tactics that were being practiced across the border in Afghanistan: bombing over civilian enclaves, missile assassinations, heavy military foot-print. As he methodically destroyed the claimants for an engaged and equal partnership for Baluchistan in the federal regime, he created the political space for the emergence of new actors - the Mehsud tribe in Waziristan. As a result Pakistan, by the end of 2008, faces several civil wars - in the north-west, it faces the development of self-declared taliban regime which is hoping to enforce Shari’a. In the south-west, it faces the proliferation of both proto-nationalist and terrorist groups. In the city of Karachi, there is the systematic effort to expel Afghan/Pakhtun immigrants by the ethnic party, MQM.
Previously, we supported two other decade long military dictatorships, General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988) during whose tenure we fought our hot Cold War in Afghanistan and during whose tenure we excused a rampant policy of Sunnification and militarization. And Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-1969) whose tenure saw the effective killing of democratic institutions and the highlighting of Kashmir as the central issue of Pakistan. We supported all three men. They came to our capital, spoke to the Congress, enjoyed days and nights as our esteemed friends. Overall, in the 61 years of existence, we supported 30 plus years of military rule in Pakistan. Let me restate this: The United States has consistently supported the elimination of any democratic development in Pakistan since 1947. During the civilian administrations, we routinely ignored Pakistan or imposed sanctions. If Pakistan lacks coherence as a nation-state to Senator Kerry and Clinton, they can look to these specific histories for explanation. Alexander the Great cannot help them.
III.
In the aftermath of Mumbai attacks, the world has found yet another reason to doubt the sustainability of Pakistan, doubt the intentions of the people and the State, doubt their commitment to being a peaceful global citizens. These doubts, those proclamations, some of the harsh denouncements of the Indian media were heard loudly and clearly across Pakistan. The bellicosity - apparent even in the flyer for this panel - generated its own predictable response. The military, which had finally lost all credence, is slowly coming back in business. It is the protector. It is the sustainer of the national myths.
The Pakistanis are also attuned to the silences. They note that in the teleology of modern terror - NYC, Madrid, London, and now Mumbai - there is no mention of Lahore and Islamabad. The September 20th blast at the Marriott, Islamabad is a clear precursor to the tragedy at Taj, Mumbai. It, too, was a site where the local elite gathered for daily mingling. It, too, catered to the foreign visitors. It, too, was a sign of Pakistan's growing economy. Yet, while NYC and Mumbai are forever linked, the victims of Islamabad and Lahore find themselves on the other side of history.
The Obama administration will need to stop reading Rudyard Kipling and start reading even the wide-circulation daily Urdu and English press from Pakistan. It is quite easy, they are all online. It will have to know Pakistan’s hopes lie with civilian institutions, civic bodies which protect women and minorities, elementary and secondary education for all, strengthening the judiciary, invoking land reform. It will have to know that the military is the largest land-owning entity, one of the biggest business entity and the greatest consumer of US AID. The Obama administration needs to focus on the people of Pakistan, in the PRESENT and not in some distant past surrounded in unknown terrain, if it hopes to combat escalating extremism in the region. Collectively, there are over 200 million inhabitants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are mega-cities like Karachi with populations over 19 million. We are not dealing with hamlets and pockets. And the global context is certainly clear to the terrorists in Mumbai. In the violence they spread, over three days, and their targets and their statements, they drew upon this language of political violence. Nariman house to Gaza, Kashmir to Taj Hotel are not teleologies of tribalism and we make a grave error if we read them wrongly.
Ironically, 2008 began with one of the greatest moments in the history of this nation. After a year-long civic protest, led by the Lawyers Movement, the people of Pakistan democratically voted out this military dictator. The February elections in Pakistan were a resounding dismissal of a decade of military dominance, as well as the religious parties. Yet, we failed to engage with this flowering of democracy. And we need to engage with the civilian government of Zardari – however flawed that particular person is.
There are no military solutions to a decades old political problem. Because military solutions mandate that the language of political violence be the only language left (be it in Kashmir or Islamabad or Mumbai).
x-posted at Chapati Mystery Read more on this article...
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