Wednesday, July 11, 2007

Abdul Rashid

Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who led the Lal Masjid confrontation perished in a pitched battle with the Pakistan Army. Here are his last words, as reported in Daily Jang, Pakistan's leading Urdu daily [my translation]:
I am about to be martyred, Journalists take note
Speaking on the phone for the last time, after the start of Operation Silence in Jami'a Hafsa, Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi called Naji TV and said: The commandos are near my doorway. I will not be alive much longer. In this matter, some political ulema have not behaved decently and they will answer to God about that. My wish was to give this entire matter into the hands of our religious scholars, so that everything is clear and the journalists can examine everything...how many we are, how much ammunition we have.

We gave them a tough time. We wrote history. Just as they achieved their goal with trickery in Wana, Waziristan, so they did with me here. They said that we have 25 fighters. We only have 11 klashnikovs. I am commanding myself. I want to give the message that we will surely be gone but the people will seek justice from you. Some religious leaders dealt very strangely with this problem and tried to get us killed. They used Tear Gas. The Operation started at the time of the morning prayer. The first bullet was fired just as I had finished talking to them. I had wanted things to be transparent but they don't want that. If truth had come out, it would have been very bad propaganda for them.


Waziristan is the proper context in which we should examine the aftermath of Lal Masjid. Surely, militants will try and strike back in major metro areas but it is the Baluchistan issue that can re-ignite. Musharraf may have walked away a winner if the siege had lifted without Abdul Rashid's death. The arrest - in a burqa - of the elder brother Abdul Aziz was surely the finest piece of political theater anyone could have dreamed up. But, now, the distaste of 70 deaths - including the elderly mother of these brothers - will quickly sweep across any PR gains he had made recently. Read more on this article...

Pakistani Military Mops up At Red Mosque

Dawn reports that the Pakistani military was still fighting at the Red Mosque complex in Islamabad on Wednesday morning. The clerical leader of the militant resistance there, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, was killed along with at least 50 others when they took up arms against approaching troops. The feared massacre of women and children hostages appears not to have taken place.

Islamabad remained under curfew and the federal government determined to monitor the possible radical backlash, especially in the Northwest Frontier Province, where Deobandi seminarians felt a strong kinship with the militants at the Red Mosque.

Read more on this article...

Turkey and Islamic Politics: On The Turn

Turkey's Islamically-oriented Prime Minister, Erdogan , appears to have struck a compromise over the presidency with the center-right Republican Party. Turkey's powerful secularist generals and other secularists had rejected Erdogan and his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, for the position of president.

Australia's Dateline broadcast this report on Turkey on July 4. It is now at at YouTube. The program covers the increasing conflict between Turkish secularists and more Islamically tinged parties such as the AK Party. I thought it well done, and we don't see Turkish politics on Western television very much-- despite its great importance. Click twice on the icon to go to the YouTube showing (or click on the link above) -- this channel does not allow embedding.

Read more on this article...

Monday, July 9, 2007

Iran's Continued Press Woes

July 3 was yet another sad day in Iran. Less than a week after nationwide disturbances over gasoline rationing, Tehran's prosecutor general, Saeed Mortazavi, the person most responsible for the 2000 wholesale reformist and independent press closures in Iran, ordered the re-suspension of the daily Ham-mihan (Compatriot). Ham-mihan is a newspaper whose license holder is Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the former enterprising mayor of Tehran in the late 1980s and most of the 1990s responsible for the building of many public spaces (parks and cultural centers), before he was brought to trial, jailed, and stripped of his ability to be active politically for several years on mostly trumped up embezzling charges.

Ham-miham was introduced into the Iranian press scene in 2000 during the heyday of newspaper and magazine closures by the then judge Mortazavi and was immediately suspended. It took Karbashchi 7 years of court battles to lift its suspension and the paper began publishing in May with a new editorial staff, headed by Mohammad Qouchani, one of Iran’s youngest and more astute editors and political analysts. Unfortunately Mortazavi could handle only 42 issues of Ham-mihan which despite its short life had developed a large pool of readers (see pictures of the young staff of Ham-mihan on the day of closure here).

His justification for the suspension was “faults in the legal proceedings” presumably not followed in the trial that led to the lifting of the suspension. Mortazavi’s reasoning was immediately rejected publicly by the presiding judge that had lifted the suspension. And Ham-mihan’s lawyers have already turned in their legal petition to reverse the decision.

The questioning of Mortazavi’s order by a well-established judge suggests that unlike 2000 when the ban on over 100 reformist papers was implemented, today there is no consensus within the judiciary about the wisdom of such moves (and the broader security oriented environment which I have argued elsewhere is being created), particularly since almost all of the newspapers that currently publish do so with quite a bit of self-censorship based on the guidelines of “sensitive” topics that are issued by the Supreme National Security Council. These directives include bans on the analysis of nuclear-related issues as well as on some sensitive time-bound topics such as gasoline riots.

Still, unlike the prerevolutionary period, when there was a censor physically present in every newspaper, checking topics and contents line by line, contemporary journalism in Iran does not have to contend with prior censorship. Rather, it (and the license holder for the newspaper who the current press laws consider responsible for whatever goes in the paper) pays the cost when it crosses a line that someone powerful deems to be a red line. It is this dynamic and the constant testing of what is permissible that prevents Iranian journalism from dying. But it is also what makes it so hard to swallow the news, which comes almost like a kick in the stomach to the staff as well as readers, when as a good a paper as Ham-mihan is closed.

There are still other newspapers such as E'temad-e Melli, E’temad, Shargh (which like Ham-mihan recently came out of suspension), Sarmayeh, and Donya-e Eqtesad that continue to publish critical commentary about government policies and variety of issues that plague the society. But the re-suspension of Ham-mihan, along with the permanent banning of the suspended Mosharekat, the official party newspaper of the reformist Islamic Iran’s Participation Front and the changing of the head of ILNA (Iranian Labor News Agency which is affiliated the House of Labor, an organization with reformist tendencies which regularly reports on labor unrests) despite evident resistance within the judiciary and only a couple of months after several papers came out of suspension, has led to real confusion about the fate of the press.

This confusion is beginning to turn into fear with a warning by Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, about a “creeping coup”; not a “planned in a military barrack” but one that is essentially designed and organized by reformist and independent press and “moving within a framework of an action to overthrow” the system. Mimicking Saffar and often prodding him is a chorus of hardline newspapers and websites, supportive of Ahmadinejad, who are “naming names” and pointing to individual commentators or publishers who are moving “in line with the enemy.”

So if all this happening, why still wonder about the direction the press is taking in Iran? Should one take this as evidence of a real “creeping coup” by the government with the intent of complete closure of the political space and stifling of independent or critical journalism which was feared with Ahmadinejad’s presidency and the hardliners control of all levers of government? After all, the closure of the political space that came to Iran after the 1953 coup did not come overnight either.

The answer to this question, I think, is still negative. The complete closure of the public space is unlikely essentially because of the reality of intense elite competition and conflict. So long as there are rich patrons of reformist, centrist or even conservative newspapers, some sort of critical press (in the sense of being critical of the opposing camps, their policies or their proposed policies) will continue to exist. This economic aspect is usually forgotten in the analysis of the Iranian press. The starting and running of a newspaper, especially of the quality of Ham-mihan, is very expensive and can only be made possible if there are motivated and wealthy investors/sponsors or a collection of them.

To be sure, the constant closures and re-openings, only to be faced with re-closures, can be considered an attempt to demoralize precisely the sponsors/investors that make contending newspapers possible. In the past few months, a few other newspapers and magazines have had their suspension lifted. But with what has happened to Ham-mihan, their investors are bound to think twice before embarking on the major cost of re-starting a newspaper. At the same time, it is a reality of Iranian politics that even the wholesale closure of newspapers in 2000 and continued harassment and forced unemployment of hundreds of journalists have not prevented substantial criticism of the government and members of the parliament.

In fact, inside Iran, the openly discussed issue is whether the reasons for this most recent attack against the press is to be found in the desires of a nervous administration, criticized on a daily basis in the Iranian papers for incompetence and inability to fulfill economic promises, to control the amount of negative press it is receiving. The nervousness of Ahmadinejad's government is amply revealed in its lashing out even against the reportage that comes out of the state-controlled television and radio regarding people’s daily economic struggles with inflation, a long-standing problem which has worsened because of its expansionary economic policies. This is why I think that the most likely outcome of this latest attack is more of the same: journalism will continue to be a very hazardous and yet still attractive profession in Iran! Read more on this article...

Pakistan considers freeing Mosque hostages by force

Pakistani clerics are making a final effort to resolve the stand-off between Pakistani troops and militant Deobandis at the Red Mosque in Islamabad. It seems likely that if the radicals do not surrender, the military will eventually make a frontal assault on them. Hundreds of women and children on the seminary grounds are in danger of being caught in the crossfire.

See Manan Ahmed's analysis below for the background of the dispute and its wider meaning in Pakistani society. See also Manan's own blog, "Chapati Mystery."

Read more on this article...

The Pessoptimist

My title comes from Emile Habiby's novel, The Secret Life of Saeed, the Pessoptimist. I turned to this book (which intentionally or not proves that Jews and Palestinians are secret twins) for help in answering one of the most puzzling questions people ask me: "Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Afghanistan?" In future posts I will also explore whether the glass is half full or half empty.

Far from helping me find an answer to this question, however, I found that the hero of this picaresque science fiction tale suffered if anything more intensely from the same doubts as I. As he explains, he inherited his anxiety from a long line of Pessoptimists:

That's the way our family is and why we bear the name Pessoptimist. For this word combines two qualities, pessimism and optimism, that have been blended perfectly in the character of all members of our family since our first divorced mother, the Cypriot. It is said that the first to so name us was Tamerlane, following the second massacre of Baghdad. This was when it was reported to him that my first ancestor, Abjar son of Abjar, mounted on his horse outside the city walls, had stared back at the tongues of flame and shouted, "After me, the deluge!"

Take me, for example. I don't differentiate between optimism and pessimism and am quite at a loss to which of the two characterizes me. When I awake each morning I thank the Lord he did not take my soul during the night. If harm befalls me during the day, I thank Him it was no worse. So which am I, a pessimist or an optimist?


But Saeed was lucky compared to me (as he would be the first to admit). He asked himself this question in the privacy of his own home.... Actually Saeed had neither privacy nor a home. But he did have a self, whose attitude toward the future he found difficult to define.

I, however, must answer this question at cocktail parties, on lecture stages, at conferences and seminars, not only in private (or, as we say, in "off-the-record" briefings) but to members of the press with cameras and microphones: "Professor Rubin, Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Afghanistan?"

First of all, I am not a professor. My job title is "senior research scientist." There are some doubts in the NYU Politics Department as to whether I am qualified to instruct PhD students. I understand these doubts as well as my unfortunate cousin Saeed would have. I do not profess anything. But I do try to be worthy of the title "senior research scientist."

I am as prone as anyone to make judgments based on superficial impressions, wishful thinking, or a bad mood. But I sought training as a social scientist to help overcome my mood swings, not use them as a guide to public life. As a result, I try to rely on information (limited as it is), data (faulty as they are), research results (contradictory and subject to revision as they may be) and unceasing questioning. I know that there is a Romantic school of thought that disdains such "reality-based" thinking (you know who I mean). But I remain a fallen classicist.

There are a few things we know about Afghanistan with a great deal of certainty, and there are a few pretty robust research results. We know that Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world outside of sub-Saharan Africa and that it has been at war for almost 30 years. We know that the great and also some rather mediocre powers have spent billions and billions of dollars sending weapons to anyone in the country who asked for them -- and some others as well. Actually, the value of these weapons has exceeded several multiples of Afghanistan's economy. Perhaps that's why some people are optimistic about Afghanistan -- it has attracted a lot of attention.

I say, "we know" these things, but I feel a Saeedian puzzlement. Who are "we?" Apparently many people - even people wielding history's most deadly weapons and budgets of billions of dollars -- have not bothered to acquaint themselves with these facts. Recently I attended an off-the-record meeting outside of Washington. At this meeting officials from many parts of the US government (but not the Department of Agriculture) met to discuss counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan. I learned many things. I learned that Afghan farmers are too secure and are making too much money. That is why it is necessary to eradicate their crops. But no one at this meeting mentioned that 40 percent of the families in rural Afghanistan do not have enough food to eat, though they can easily find someone with an automatic weapon to "protect" them. I suggested that maybe Afghan farmers needed more rather than less security, but no one wants to reward bad behavior like growing opium poppies.

It's pretty clear that very poor countries with a lot of weapons, high unemployment, and insurgents and terrorists based in neighboring countries and remote, mountainous regions have, shall we way, a "high risk" for armed conflict. By the way, I also read a few history books. They disagree about a lot of things. But it does seem that foreign military interventions in Afghanistan have a poor track record.

So am I pessimistic? Look at the facts. What are the chances that Afghanistan will become a stable, prosperous, democratic, gender-sensitive country? But as I sometimes say, being pessimistic about Afghanistan is not an intellectual challenge. I didn't become a "senior research scientist" just to assert the obvious. Perhaps this is why I am no longer a professor.

In the past several years I have become a practicing pessoptimist, not just a theoretician. In October 2001 I stated on television that, even though the US and other countries should help Afghanistan rebuild, there was no chance that the country could become a stable democracy in two years. Then I went to Bonn as part of the UN team, and at the end we produced an agreement saying that Afghanistan should become a stable (and gender-sensitive!) Islamic democracy in.... two and a half years.

I guess the Bonn Agreement has provided a lot of the water to fill up that glass (more on how thirsty Afghanistan is in later posts). I guess I should boast about it like the other things I have been involved in -- the Afghan Constitution, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the Afghanistan Compact.... Of course people call me an "adviser," meaning someone who gives advice. They never call themselves "advisees," meaning someone who takes advice. There is a reason for this, but it is a professional secret. It is known only to other "senior research scientists."

I even did something stranger. I invested my own money in Afghanistan. With some Afghan and French investors I started Gulestan Ltd., to manufacture essential oils for the fragrance and personal care industries. It's easy to register a business with the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, but just try to operate it once you leave the AISA compound! My business is just like opium, but the flowers are different. Also it's legal. And Afghanistan is not really set up for legal businesses. According to the World Bank Investment Climate Survey, Afghanistan is, more or less, the worst place in the world to invest. Maybe I will start a new fund: Pessoptimist Venture Capital.

I know a senior diplomat who says that there should be a time limit for work on Afghanistan, because it warps your mind. But this same person, who supposedly retired several years ago, has just signed up for another year in Kabul. Those of us who have been around for a while get used to the new faces telling us how they will fix everything. Their optimism will soon turn to pessimism, and then they will leave.

Except for a few of us. Just like Saeed, every morning we thank the Lord that he did not destroy Afghanistan during the night. And if harm befalls Afghanistan during the day, we thank the Lord it was not worse.

And then we get to work.

As Saeed's mother used to say, "And why should we not praise God?" Read more on this article...

Saturday, July 7, 2007

The Mosque and the Ballot

Just a few weeks ago, General Pervez Musharraf's regime seemed in severe trouble. Chief Justice Chaudhry had strangely emerged as a popular hero inspiring the country after his summary dismissal by the Musharraf. Lawyers were rioting all across Pakistan's major cities. The state's crackdown on media had backfired. NYT, WaPo, WSJ had all put out editorials questioning Musharraf's rule and US support of it. The extensive electricity outages in Karachi and the lack of federal response to the heavy monsoon rains which caused hundreds of deaths in Sindh and Baluchistan had further deteriorated any remaining support for Musharraf. More and more, this General was resembling that old General Yahya and the end-game seemed in sight.

lal masjid domeHow quickly things change. The Lal Masjid seige/showdown is now front-page news everywhere. The photographs of Army helicopters hovering silently behind the mosque's great white dome surely caused frisson of excitement to those accustomed to the way the War on Terror is being fought across Iraq. After all, those burka-clad shaolin seminarians with their bamboo lathis and the young men with their faces wrapped and their automatics raised are all simple enough signifiers for the Great Islamic Threat ®.burkafighters Soon enough the editorials will change their tone. The White House will stand and acclaim the tough job Musharraf is doing to curtail the Talibanization of Islamabad. Fareed Zakaria will declare some other inanity like "Pakistan is an army with a state in a box containing an angry mullah sitting on a nuke with the evil-but-ok-maybe-not Musharraf trying to hammer the box shut" and the intelligentsia will sigh in relief. The Pakistani TV programs that I watched yesterday were all filled with how this latest showdown is playing out in US and how will it affect policy - the panopticon of American neo-Imperialism is never far from the minds of Pakistani punditry. Even the print press, long critical of Musharraf's overreaches, is willing to forgive Musharraf's sins if he can save the country. As an aside, just let me point out that even this small fact, that the Press is proclaiming a dictator for standing up to radicalization of their society, upends the conventional wisdom that Pakistan teeters forever on the brink of an Islamic Revolution.

For those of us, who have long argued that Pakistan must immediately hold elections, that Musharraf cannot retain US support and that the only way to teach Democracy is to practice Democracy, these new developments are quite disheartening. The populist uprising against Musharraf may or may not survive now that the PR advantage is finally squarely with the General. One can even argue that this confrontation with Lal Masjid was deliberately provoked by the State for expressly changing the political landscape. But, before one can argue that, we need to cast a wider glance behind this Waco-abad.

Following, I will offer a brief overview of the history of Lal Masjid, a small timeline of the events leading up to the recent crisis and offer a few mitigating factors that can help contextualize Lal Masjid.

I hate to begin all stories with the Islamization policy of the last military dictator of Pakistan Zia ul Haq but, at least in this case, it is justified. One significant aspect of Zia's efforts was a reaction to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran and his fear that it will lead to Iranian aggression inside Pakistan. The building of close ideological and material ties to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the support of Jama'at-i Islami and its radical agenda of jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the creation of counter-Sunni groups like Sipah-e Suhaba, the construction of madrasas across Pakistan [from 200-odd seminaries in 1947 to nearly 3000 by 1988] and the Majlis Ahl-e Shur'a were some of the steps implemented by Zia from 1978 to 1988. A significant part was also his material support for anti-Shi'a, pro-jihad firebrands like a certain Maulana Abdullah - the man in charge of one of Islamabad's central mosque, the Markazi Jamia Masjid (Lal Masjid) founded in 1966.

A Baluchi by birth, Abdullah was a devout adherent of the Deobandi school. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Zia's proclamations of impending Shari'ah across Pakistan were enough incentives for Maulana Abdullah to swing his support firmly for Zia and the Afghani cause. Lal Masjid received significant land grants from Zia in Islamabad and the mosque solidified with a large membership of civil society, military brass and state functionaries saying their obligated five prayers - including the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia ul Haq. It also incorporated an extensive pedagogic and civic relief agenda. Jami'a Faridia - a seminary for young men was present since the inception of the mosque. In 1984, it moved to the exclusive E-7 sector of Islamabad after a generous land grant by Zia ul Haq. Jami'a Hafsa was established for the girls in 1992. The curriculum for these seminaries was fairly traditional and modeled after Jami'a Ashrafiya in Lahore with Qur'an Studies, Hadi'th, Arabic, Law and, basic Sciences [I.T. was started in the late 90s]. There are currently about 6000 students in both the seminaries - no one is charged a fee for attendance. These students not only live and participate in seminary activities but are also responsible for the extensive food kitchens run by Lal Masjid and perform other civic duties across the region.

Throughout the 80s and 90s Lal Masjid and Maulana Abdullah remained on the fore-front of Afghani Jihad and, later, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Their support include supplying fighters from the seminary, teaching Afghan students and maintaining funds for the jihad effort. All of which did not detract Maulana Abdullah from his anti-Shi'a rhetoric. A consequence of which was that, in 1998, he was gunned down by unknown assailants - thought to be from rival Shi'a groups.

abdul rashidHis death put his sons, Abdul Aziz and the younger Abdul Rashid, in charge of Lal Masjid and the two seminaries associated with it. Abdul Rashid Ghazi was a veteran of the Afghani front - as attested by his honorific of 'Ghazi' - and made clear his support for Talibans and Osama b. Laden. In September 2001, he led the efforts to prohibit Musharraf from siding with the US efforts in Afghanistan and send fighters against the US forces. Even as Musharraf sallied forth with his support, Lal Masjid attempted to sway the public opinion against him - largely to no avail, as the religious right never had a clear channel into Pakistani society. All this would have stood as it was - in that limbo necessary for the continuation of civil society - but things were no longer the same, anywhere.

Baluchistan erupted. The brothers belong to the Mazari tribe from Baluchistan and a large contingent of students in the two seminaries come from the region. It should come as no surprise then, that Abdul Aziz was at the forefront of protesting Musharraf's actions in Waziristan. In 2004, he issued a fatwa declaring non-Muslim burials for Pakistan Army members killed in Baluchistan and Waziristan. It was this action that put Musharraf and Lal Masjid on a collision course. This caused not only a split with the military but also within the religious elite in Pakistan - with Abdul Aziz breaking relationships with many leading ulemas - not surprisingly, another major beneficiary of Zia's largesse, Jama'at-i Islami remained steadfast with Lal Masjid.

In early 2007, a number of mosques were demolished around Islamabad by the CDA. The official rational was that these mosques were illegal settlements - often on prime development real estate - and had to be cleared out [even though this action was against religious law]. Jami'a Hafsa was institution involved in this illegal land grab - though the details are too convoluted even for me. In retaliation, the Shaolin Burqas of Jamia Hafsa occupied a Children's Library on Feb 22, 2007. As a response, the State agreed to re-construct one of the seven mosques. On March 27th, female seminarians kidnapped (and released after repentance) Auntie Shamim - a madame to some luminaries in Pakistan's political scene. Things escalated from this point. The seminarians kidnapped policemen in order to facilitate a prisoner exchange with the state. On March 31st, Abdul Aziz gave a deadline to impose Sharia in Pakistan. By early April, the government had shut down the website of Lal Masjid [www.lalmasjid.org and www.faridia.org] and revoked their radio broadcast license [Jami'a Hafsa still has an operational off-site].

The rest is all recent news.

The strengthening of miltant forces in Pakistan - and their inward gaze - has not come from any radicalization of Pakistani society but from the incomplete operation of US forces in Afghanistan. The war in Iraq drained away any plan for a viable and functioning Afghanistan. The defeated troops carried their tribal allegiances back across the border into the Northern and Western regions of Pakistan - and turned their attention onto Pakistani state. Musharraf, busy consolidating the military's dominion had no viable way of combating these tribes - he has no legitimacy. I could be writing an alternative version of this recent past, if democratic tendencies had actually been allowed to develop in Pakistan since 2001. You may call it 'paradoxical' but the only solution to de-Islamization of Pakistan is democracy - not the support of dictatorships.

Lal Masjid was an ally (and a pawn) in Zia's strategy in Afghanistan [and by that relationship, an ally of then United States foreign policy]. Soviets may have lost and that war may have ended for the United States but it continued on for the Pakistanis and the Afghanis. The immense influx of refugees and fighters into Pakistan during the 90s helped only strengthen the political and material basis for institutions such as Lal Masjid. While many western observers praise Musharraf's brave decision to side with the United States, the truth is that it was a no-brainer for him. The majority of Pakistan's population has long maintained a healthy distaste for the involvement of religious leaders into statecraft - taking perhaps as axiomatic Bulleh Shah's old verse: Mulla tay mashaalchi dohaan ikko chiz / Loukan karday chananan, aap anhairae vich [The Cleric and the Light Bearer are both the same / Trying to illuminate others, but in darkness themselves]. The outpouring of support for the Chief Justice is just one indication that the country is hungry for relief - note, please note, that Chaudhry Iftikhar is not some bearded mullah with any agenda for Shari'ah implementation in Pakistan. And yet, that old canard is forever being bandied about that if given democracy, the insane mullahs will control Pakistan. The choice has never been between Musharraf and the Mullah or the Mosque and the Ballot. The truth is that there never has been any choice. And the Pakistani public demand a choice. And they can be trusted to make the right decision just as much as any other citizen in any other democracy in any nation of this world [cf. 2000 and 2004, United States of America.] Read more on this article...

Thousands of Palestinians Rally at Funeral for 11 Slain by Israel


Thousands of Palestinians marched on Friday at funerals
for 11 Palestinians killed by Israeli troops in a cross-border raid into the territory on Thursday. Among the dead was a Palestinian journalist. Nine of those killed were Hamas activists. The Israelis said that the incursion was intended to stop Palestinian rocket attacks on Sderot and to search for munitions.



The USG Open Source Center translates an article from the Bethlehem Ma`an News Agency giving the Palestinian account of the Thursday attack:



Palestinians Say IDF Raids Anew Northern Gaza Strip; PIJ Fires Rocket at Sederot
"Israeli Occupation Forces Invade Northern Gaza Strip; Resistance Responds" -- Ma'an headline
Ma'an News Agency WWW-Text
Friday, July 6, 2007

Gaza, 6 Jul (Ma'an) -- The Israeli occupation forces today invaded Bayt Hanun and Bayt Lahiyah in the northern Gaza Strip. Eyewitnesses said a number of tanks and vehicles moved this morning toward the northern sector of Bayt Hanun and are now deployed in the Al-Kaff area at the southern entrance to the township, which is adjacent to Bayt Lahiyah.

The eyewitnesses said that special Israeli forces are taking part in the incursion and that they captured a number of houses in the southern and eastern sectors of Bayt Hanun and turned their rooftops into a platform for shooting at Palestinians.

This fresh incursion comes a few hours after the occupation forces withdrew from the eastern parts of Al-Mughazi and Al-Burayj refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip which they invaded at dawn yesterday. Eleven Palestinians were martyred and about 29 were injured in this incursion. In addition, the infrastructure and farming lands that were leveled were greatly damaged.

Israeli sources noted that these incursions are aimed at the establishment of a buffer zone between the Strip and Israel, which will be more than 1 kilometer wide and Palestinians will not be allowed to enter it.

In another development, the Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, announced that one of its groups clashed with a special force and that exchange of fire is under way between the resistance men and the occupation.

The Al-Quds Brigades announced that it fired a Quds-3 rocket at Sederot at 1835 (1535 GMT) tonight. The brigades said the operation is an initial response to the assassination of a key Al-Quds Brigades commander in the Gaza Strip.

(Description of Source: Bethlehem Ma'an News Agency WWW-Text in Arabic -- Independent, leading news agency; funded by the Dutch and Danish Foreign Ministries; URL: http://www.maannews.net/)


Read more on this article...

Women in Afghanistan

Avi Lewis of Canada's "On the Map" interviews Ann Jones on the actual status of women in Afghanistan. "Liberating" Afghan women was frequently invoked by the Bush administration as a rationale for the Afghanistan War. Now, the issue has disappeared from the air waves. Ann Jones, who has lived in Afghanistan, still cares.

Read more on this article...

Friday, July 6, 2007

10 Police Killed at Spin Boldak; Canada debates Troop Commitment

A suicide bomber killed 10 Afghan police near Spin Boldak on Thursday. Nearly 3,000 persons have died in political violence in that country so far this year.

The deaths come after a roadside bomb killed 6 Canadian troops on Wednesday near Qandahar in the Pushtun southwest.



The loss of so many troops in one day has provoked a vigorous political debate in Canada about the wisdom of keeping Canadian forces in Qandahar past early 2009. A lot of the troops deployed are French Canadians, and the Harper government risks losing support there if it stays the current course.

Germany faces a similar dilemma, even though its forces in Afghanistan are largely peacekeepers. Read more on this article...

Thursday, July 5, 2007

David Miliband on Palestine

British Foreign Minister David Miliband lays out his positions on Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinians, and the future of any peace process.

Miliband has been getting a lot of advice on foreign policy. He is known for having privately opposed the Iraq War, and was the only cabinet minister to call openly for an immediate ceasefire last summer when Israel attacked Lebanon.

Here, he calls on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to find mechanisms to represent the whole Palestinian people. At the moment, Abbas controls only Fatah and the West Bank, while Gaza is in the hands of Hamas, his bitter rival.

Hamas won the January 2006 elections, but Abbas has essentially made a coup against it, with US and Israeli backing. Hamas declines to recognize Israel and has been implicated in ongoing terrorist operations against Israel.

Read more on this article...

Wednesday, July 4, 2007

BBC's Alan Johnston released

BBC journalist Alan Johnston has been released. He had been held by a tiny radical fundamentalist group, but was released through pressure from Hamas, the Islamic party that runs Gaza now.

Some commentators on the Arabic satellite stations are suggesting that this release is evidence that Hamas can achieve law and order in Gaza, and isn't just a terror organization, itself.

Read more on this article...

Tuesday, July 3, 2007

Suicide bomber kills tourists in Yemen

The Yemeni government has implemented security precautions in the wake of a deadly car bombing in the province of Marib that killed 7 Spanish tourists. Yemen has long had an al-Qaeda problem, though the secular, Arab nationalist government has acted against the group vigorously in recent years.

Read more on this article...

Bergen and Lieven on Pakistan's Stability



A recent briefing at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC, by Anatole Lieven and Peter Bergen on their recent trip to Pakistan and their views of that country's current situation. Lieven thinks Pakistan is more stable than headlines suggest, and that it is far more important to Anglo-American security than Afghanistan. Read more on this article...

Monday, July 2, 2007

Time to Take the Bull by the Horns

Guest Editorial by Rajeev Pillay



The US is in danger of digging a deeper hole in Iraq. Just when you thought that this Administration’s policy in Iraq could not possibly get more screwed up than it already is, first it announces the building of walls around select neighbourhoods in Baghdad and then it begins to arm Sunni insurgents to fight Al Qaeda! All this comes on the heels of all the other bad decisions of monumental proportions: disbanding the army; purging all civil servants who were members of the Ba’ath party; redefining the new democratic institutions along sectarian lines; eliminating tariffs at the border; underestimating troop requirements, etc. etc. The litany of errors goes on and on.

It goes to show what sort of a bubble the US is operating in. Doesn’t General Petraeus with his much touted strategic expertise realise that together these policies confirm all of the very worst suspicions held by the average Iraqi? The average Iraqi looks at the concrete walls and says, “Where have I seen these before? Why, in Israel and the West Bank of course!!” So, he concludes, the US is trying to do to us what the Israelis are doing to the Palestinians. Sure enough, far from protecting residents hemmed in by the walls, these concrete barriers both make them sitting ducks for sectarian cleansing and hampers their access to schools, shops, hospitals and the requirements of daily life. In the minds of the hemmed in Iraqis, the wall is there to target them and control them and not to protect them.

Arming the Ba’athists may in the very short term help against the relatively small percentage of insurgents with Al Qaeda affiliation, but in the long term is bound to fuel the conflict between the Sunnis and Shi’a. No doubt among the Shi’a community, this move is a sign that the US now favours the Sunnis. Bombing of the Askariya shrine will surely be seen in this light and viewed in a country prone to conspiracy theories, as a sign that the US and the Sunnis are in cahoots. Already prominent Shi’a leaders are saying that the US, and not the Iraqi Government, was responsible for security around the Shrine, and are making it very clear that from their point of view failure to protect it is very difficult to understand.

As each day goes by, we are digging a deeper hole in the Middle East. The war in Iraq has already begun to spawn instability in the wider region. Lebanon is becoming a dangerous tinderbox. Turkey is slipping toward military involvement in “Kurdistan”, and the West Bank and Gaza are close to total anarchy. Insurgent technologies, battle tested in Iraq, are now showing up in other countries such as Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, which never had a foothold in Iraq under Saddam Hussein is now definitely ideologically influential in that country if not actually present. Worse still, Iraq is viewed as a symbol of Western oppression and is gaining sympathizers in Europe, sympathizers who have already taken action with disastrous consequences. Far from spreading democracy, the fanciful “reverse domino theory’ rescued and dusted off from the Cold War playbook and espoused by Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz is spreading instability, alienation and radicalization.

It really is time to pull out and reassess. The Republicans keep saying that you cannot pull out without having a solution. Well, when a bull goes into a China shop, there is no graceful solution. There is not much that can be done but to get the bull out. The shop owner is is going to have to be left to pick up the pieces and move on. It is not going to endear the US to the Iraqis, nor indeed to the rest of the world, but the damage is already done and frankly, there is no other solution.

Attention now needs to shift to holding back the forces unleashed in Iraq from spreading more widely. US credibility is now very limited in the region. We need to think in multilateral terms. We need to think in political and not military terms. We need to launch a political initiative along with the European Union in support of a political process led by the moderate countries of the region to do the necessary to halt the spreading cancer and to stabilise Iraq.


Rajeev Pillay is a founding partner of Abacus International Management L.L.C., a consulting firm that works on governance and democratization.
Mr. Pillay has been extensively involved in the development of reforms and the management of change at UNDP and the United Nations. Read more on this article...