Rubin: The Fantastic Obsessions of Tim Russert

Posts knocking Tim Russert for his performance as a moderator in the Clinton-Obama debate last night are all over the blogs today. I was personally most struck by the postings by my fellow Jews, like Polk-Award Winner Josh Marshall at TPM and a diarist at DailyKos, taking offense at Russert's McCarthyite attempt to tie Barack Obama to anti-Semitic remarks made by Louis Farrakhan through some contorted series of associations that sound like the perceptions of paranoids that I hear about from my wife, a psychotherapist. (Josh Marshall does the complete pilpul on that parasha). Hillary Clinton's attempt to get Jewish votes by somehow implying that Obama is soft on anti-Semitism did not inspire confidence over her ability to craft a successful policy toward Israel and the Palestinians either.

Russert's questions on foreign policy in general indicate that he should try reading past the second paragraph of front-page articles and maybe look at a map. His questions were more like plot scenarios for 24 than reality-based queries. On Iraq he first invented the following screenplay:

You both have pledged a withdrawal of troops from Iraq. You both have said you'd keep a residual force there to protect our embassy, to seek out Al Qaida, to neutralize Iran. If the Iraqi government said, President Clinton or President Obama, you're pulling out your troops this quickly? You're going to be gone in a year? But you're going to leave a residual force behind? No. Get out! Get out now! If you don't want to stay and protect us, we're a sovereign nation, go home now. Will you leave?

Both candidates made the obvious point that the U.S. cannot stay in Iraq against the wishes of the elected Iraqi government. I suppose it would not have been presidential to point out that actual foreign policy decisions and actions consist of long chains of inter-related discussions with many actors before a decision is announced, rather than like a montage of video clips from a Fox docudrama. I would imagine that President Clinton or Obama would have some private discussions with Iraqi counterparts before announcing a specific decision on withdrawal. Obama put it reasonably well:

We will be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in. We will give ample time for them to stand up to negotiate the kinds of agreements that will arrive at the political accommodations that are needed. We will provide them continued support.

Unsatisfied, Russert pressed on:

RUSSERT: I want to ask both of you this question, then. If this scenario plays out and the Americans get out in totality, and Al Qaida resurges and Iraq goes to hell, do you hold the right in your mind as American president to reinvade, to go back into Iraq to stabilize it?

The number of misconceptions contained in this question is mind-boggling. Just to mention two: First, the most likely negative consequence of a careless withdrawal from Iraq is not a resurgence of al-Qaida, which would not exist in Iraq without the US invasion, but a resumption of sectarian and factional warfare that could increasingly involve Iraq's neighbors. (Hence the need to coordinate a withdrawal with a diplomatic initiative involving all neighbors, including Syria and Iran.)

Second, a reinvasion by the US would not stabilize Iraq!!! What planet is he living on? Does he think the candy and flowers will come out of their underground bunkers this time? How are you supposed to answer a question like that? I was disappointed that neither candidate pointed to the imbecility of the question, but Hillary Clinton did at least refuse to answer such a flawed question:

CLINTON: You know, Tim, you ask a lot of hypotheticals. And I believe that...

RUSSERT: But this is reality.

CLINTON: No, well, it isn't reality. You're making lots of different hypothetical assessments.

Then we move on to Russia. I suspect that Russert forgot that the USSR doesn't exist any more. He really should look at a contemporary map. Otherwise, I can't think of how to explain this question:

And if he [future Russian President Dmitri Medvedev] says to the Russian troops, you know what, why don't you go help Serbia retake Kosovo, what does President Obama do?

Obama gave a pretty good answer about relying on multilateral security arrangements. I wish he had noted that in order to get to Serbia Russian troops would first have to invade Ukraine and then cross Romania or Hungary, both of which are now members of NATO.

I'm not an expert on this subject, but I occasionally see press articles about the Russian Army, which appears to have its hands quite full trying to regain control of the territory of Russia. A casual google search of the subject turned up this recent AFP survey of experts on the subject:

But analysts say Moscow's bark is worse than its bite.

Putin warns of a new arms race and promises a military renaissance, but Russia's military budget is less than one twentieth that in the United States and most of its weaponry is relatively outdated.

"Russia is trying to flex its muscles and trying to be a player on the world stage," Bob Ayers, at the Chatham House think-tank in London, told AFP. But "in a military sense they are not a major player now ... It's just PR."

Russian military analyst Alexander Goltz said that both Moscow and Western political circles were responsible for hyping routine military exercises by Russia's forces.

In the West "certain intellectual circles are searching for confirmation of the Russian leadership's militaristic tendencies," he said. "They exaggerate any military activity."

Meanwhile, Russia's propaganda machine also presents "the most run of the mill exercises as some kind of Russian military comeback."

Maria Lipman, analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center, said Putin wants to exorcise Russia's "past humiliations," but that the country's main strategic goal is to build an economic powerhouse based on energy exports.

"Russia, under today's leadership at any rate, is not seeking a Cold War confrontation, a real arms race," Lipman said.

"The rhetoric may get very unpleasant and tough, even aggressive, but I don't think this overshadows the main trend that Russia is interested in commercial profit, in economic success."

It would have been nice for the candidates to mention this. They also both missed an opportunity to make a very important point: President Putin has been able to build his domestic political base and start to rebuild Russia's military for one single reason: the huge increase in oil prices that has taken place during the Bush administration. Neither candidate mentioned that the world's continuing dependence on fossil fuels -- and the Bush administration's obsession with maintaining a military presence in the Persian Gulf -- have strengthened the regimes in Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, not to mention in all the other countries where oil revenues are funding corruption and authoritarianism. Despite the numerous harmful effects of oil dependence, the Bush-Cheney administration's only strategy is to occupy the Persian Gulf and drill in wilderness areas. This should be a much higher priority campaign issue.

On Pakistan I can't blame Tim Russert. Both candidates to their credit emphasized the need for stronger support for democratization and less reliance on Musharraf. Their disagreement consisted of a contest between a misrepresentation and a misconception. Clinton claimed that Obama "basically threatened to bomb Pakistan" (a misrepresentation of his advocacy of targeted strikes against al-Qaida), and Obama answered by defending the need for such strikes, as if missile strikes would be a very useful tool against a transnational insurgency.

So it goes. Read more on this article...

Putin's Trip to Tehran

The most significant aspect of Putin’s trip to Tehran, from the Iranian leadership’s point of view, was that it took place at all, despite Washington’s hope for and, in all likelihood, expectation of last minute cancellation. This is why the trip is being touted as a success for Iranian diplomacy; displaying the fact that Iran is not as isolated as Washington portrays it to be.

And perhaps it was this modicum of success that made George Bush upset enough to raise for the first time in public the specter WW III, saying "If Iran had a nuclear weapon, it would be a dangerous threat to world peace…. So I told people that if you're interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.”

But the reality is that this trip so far has not broken new grounds in helping Iran get out of its nuclear predicament. In general, I think BBC’s Jon Leyne, has it right saying that Putin came to Tehran as “peacemaker… not to forge a new alliance. And the outcome of the meeting is still very much in the balance.”

Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, did acknowledge that in his most important meeting in Tehran with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, Putin “expressed a specific view and outlook that is under review.” But he refused to talk about the content of the message, instead choosing to reveal that the long awaited meeting between him and the European foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, will take place next Tuesday.

So much is yet to be seen and the views expressed by Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a cleric with close ties to former president Khatami, in his blog is probably a good indicator of the assessments, expectations (realistic or not) as well as skepticism found in Iran these days:

Putin’s trip must of course be considered a historical and important trip, a political success for Iran’s diplomacy, and important for Iran and Russia. The minimum Iranian expectation from this trip is for Russia to have committed itself in main discussions to a veto of the third sanctions resolution [against Iran]. But, if Russia like the prior instances ends up voting for sanctions, then by [making it possible for] Russia to be the only messenger of the West to Iran, this trip will only increase the price Russia can exact in its blackmail of the West and in the name of the people of Iran the government of Russia as always will end up being more gratified. What can make this trip appear successful to the people of Iran is the reduction of global pressure against the Iranian nation. In official news, there is nothing about this type of success that benefits the people.

Read more on this article...

Afghanistan: Negotiations with Taliban?

The Guardian's Declan Walsh, Julian Borger, and Sami Yousafzai reported two stories yesterday on trends toward negotiations with the Taliban. Borger and Walsh claim that the UK and the government of Hamid Karzai have agreed on a strategy of offering power-sharing deals to Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan:

The British government has thrown its backing behind an ambitious Afghan strategy to split the Taliban by securing the defection of senior members of the militant group and large numbers of their followers.

The strategy, spearheaded by the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, reflects a significant shift in British policy, and is showing initial signs of success. The Guardian has learned that members of the Taliban's leadership council have used go-betweens to negotiate their defection.

Borger and Walsh's sources claim that the US government is divided on this:

Such a shift has put Britain and the Karzai government at odds with hawks in Washington, who are wary of Whitehall's enthusiasm for talks with what they see as a monolithic terrorist group. But a British official said: "Some Americans are coming around to our way of seeing this."

A senior diplomatic source in Kabul confirmed the contact, but stressed it was one of multiple strands. "This is not shaping up to be a single dialogue with a core Taliban entity," he said. The source said many of the contacts were initiated by Taliban commanders themselves, dispirited by losses at the hands of Nato bombing campaign and worried about the loss of the sanctuary in neighbouring Pakistan.

Those parts of the Taliban leadership closer to al-Qaida including Amir Mullah Muhammad 'Umar, have reportedly rejected such talks. But Walsh and Yousafzai report that a coalition of ten commanders in Helmand have forwarded demands for power sharing to the government of President Karzai. Of course, as opponents of negotiation always point out, these demands far exceed any possible agreement. In my experience of negotiations among parties to a conflict, however, it is relatively rare for one party to make public its final position as an opening gambit. That would be surrender, not negotiation.

The Guardian confirms , as I previously argued here:

Nato and Taliban officials said a turning point in talks came after the Korean hostage crisis this summer in which two aid workers were killed but 21 were freed unharmed.

After that, a Nato official said, "both sides had faith that talking could actually work".

Curiously, both right-wing and left-wing critics of U.S. policy are now speaking out against these talks, in the apparent hope that Afghans will continue to die fighting in an endless war to solve the whole world's problems. On the right, Ann Marlowe (whose relentlessly optimistic view of Afghanistan I previously compared with reality) writes in Rupert Murdoch's New York Post that President Karzai is "asking, indeed begging, the Taliban to negotiate with him." Apparently this is mainly the fault (surprise) of the US's weak-kneed allies, who negotiate with hostage takers.

Meanwhile, on the left:

"It is a complete misunderstanding of the local situation to believe that negotiating with violent extremists will result in peace," said Joanna Nathan of the International Crisis Group. "This will simply add more fuel to the conflict, not quell it."

There are indeed dangers in these negotiations, but I wonder what scenario for ending the conflict the critics of negotiations have in mind? The Afghan insurgency, loosely affiliated to the Taliban, is not a marginal extremist organization that can be destroyed by force. It is a social movement (though not representing the majority) in the Pashtun areas of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It actually has more support in Pakistan. The Taliban's origin had nothing to do with al-Qaida, and, indeed, they were initially hostile to them. The Taliban-dominated Islamic Court of Qandahar issued a fatwa in 1988 stating that Wahhabis were not Muslims, placing takfir on the takfiris! I don't recommend this tactic to my Muslim friends, but it indicates that there were differences.

Today's Taliban are subjected to conflicting pressures. On the one hand, their Pakistan-based leadership has reaffirmed its ties to Al-Qaida. On the other hand, while the Taliban have continued to use extremely brutal tactics (including the hanging of a fifteen-year old for posessing US dollars), they have also adopted more to the modern world, recognizing Afghans' demands for education and lightening their past restrictions on media. Like the mujahidin field commanders of the 1980s, the Taliban field commanders are not fully obedient to their leadership in Pakistan. Furthermore, that leadership is finally coming under significant if still insufficient pressure, unlike the exiled mujahidin leadership of the 1980s.

One great danger is that the longer this conflict goes on, the more it becomes dominated by a new generation of young, radicalized, pro-Qaida Taliban. These new fighters belong to neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan: they are products of refugee camps and militarized madrasas in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They have never experienced benefits of citizenship in any country, and they have never participated in any "traditional" society based on agricultural production, pastoralism, kinship relations, and state patronage. The longer the war goes on, the more the transnational milieu that creates this group becomes more deeply rooted in the region.

The relationship with al-Qaida deserves more attention. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, much of the Taliban showed solidarity with their Arab brothers and believed that they were falsely accused of an atrocity engineered by others. Former senior Taliban officials, however, have told me that since that time, as they have watched Bin Laden repeatedly claim credit for these attacks, they have concluded that he was in fact guilty, and that he had sacrificed the Taliban's Afghan goals for his global agenda. Some have chosen to embrace that global agenda, but others are seeking a way back to a national Islamic agenda. They recognize, so these former officials claim, that the US and the international community have legitimate demands that Afghanistan's territory not be used to attack them. This recognition, if it can be confirmed, can create space for negotiation.

The real dangers of negotiation are not those pointed out by its critics. Negotiation with insurgents could help bring stability and peace to Afghanistan if it brings former armed groups into the political system. But it will merely change the nature of instability if it is part of a realignment rather than a peace process.

This is the threat seen by the Northern Alliance, many other non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, and India. They suspect that this effort is not part of a plan to bring peace to a more inclusive Afghanistan, but part of a plan to return Afghanistan to the hegemony of Pakistan and pro-Pakistan Pashtuns (if such exist, which I personally doubt), exclude northern ethnic groups from power, encircle Iran, and create a corridor of US-aligned states from South Asia through Central Asia. They see what appears to be a similar process in Iraq, where the US has turned against the Iranian-supported Shi'a groups it helped to power and aligned itself with militias of Saddam Hussain's Sunni supporters.

As long as these groups suspect that the negotiations have such goals, non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan will feel obliged to seek the protection of the Northern Alliance, the Northern Alliance will feel the need to seek the protection of Iran and Russia, and Iran and Russia will seek to assure that these negotiations do not succeed. The escalating rhetoric of conflict over Iran intensifies these dangers. Read more on this article...