Cunningham: Burma More or Less Needs Help

BURMA MORE OR LESS NEEDS HELP

BY PHILIP J CUNNINGHAM
SEPTEMBER 30, 2007

At first glance, the unfolding crisis in Burma ("Myanmar") offers America a golden opportunity—after four years of bad news from Iraq and Afghanistan, suddenly a popular uprising in a land hungry for the ostensibly American values of freedom, democracy and perhaps even capitalist development.

Problem is, US President George Bush has almost single-handedly frittered away US prestige and credibility to the point where just hearing him mention the word freedom is enough to send the smart, and in some cases shell-shocked, running for cover. Under his watch, an immigrant country that had a not entirely unearned reputation for caring about human rights and humanitarian causes has become a global laughingstock, if not bogeyman.

Bush has dug himself into a diplomatic hole so deep it is beginning to resemble a black hole. That a man at the end of his tether might be desperate for a bit of high ground, something to cling to, something to show he isn't an entirely spent force is understandable, but a Bush intervention in Burma would be an unmitigated disaster.

Anything Bush or his minions have to say is colored by the actions of an arrogant administration that has shamelessly promoted torture, eavesdropping and kidnapping, not to mention a self-serving and totally manipulative war on terror. Bush invaded Iraq for all the wrong reasons, a family vendetta being central among them, and he has continued to shamefacedly lie about it. Unfortunately for the people of Burma in their hour of need, Bush has shot the wad of US credibility, and anything he touches is likely to be contaminated, if not broken and crumbled to bits, by know-nothing neo-con greed.

Had Bush not invaded the wrong country, or had he faced up to his mistakes with at least an ounce of accountability, the US government, as the representative of the American people, might not be hamstrung in its ability to help. Had Bush and the cosseted "chickenhawk" architects of the war in Iraq, the most abjectly craven of whom are now pressing for a war with Iran, shown even a glimmer of humility to atone for setting Iraq on the road to disaster which has cost a million-plus souls, perhaps Uncle Sam could offer a lending hand without scaring the very people he seeks to help. But Bush remains unrepentant and imperious, making the prospect of a ham-fisted US-led intervention in Burma too frightening to contemplate.

Burma needs help, desperately, but with a "friend" like Bush trying to capitalize on his "freedom" agenda, they might do well to look elsewhere.

ASEAN is a good place to start, Burma is a member country and informal personal, cultural and trade links provide intelligence and potential leverage. Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN's new Secretary General is a veteran diplomat who as foreign minister under Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, chose not lend support to the dictators of Burma, in sharp contrast to the devil-may-care profiteering in Rangoon and elsewhere on the part of the successor government led by Thaksin Shinawatra.

And Japan, the largest aid donor and home to a community of Burmese exiles has a modest role to play.

But the real wild card in the Burma conundrum, with immense leverage for better or worse, is China.

Just as it might be prudent at this checkered moment in US history for the US to tame its impulse to intervene, China conversely, needs to discard its traditional policy of radical non-intervention, the product of a time when China was poor and powerless, to a more responsible global role commensurate to its rising power.

China President Hu Jintao and his foreign minister Yang Jiechi have inherited a seemingly idealistic and lofty model of diplomacy that was only truly lofty in proportion to China's poverty and inability to project power. Even during the heyday of non-intervention under the guidance of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, China engaged in significant, albeit largely clandestine, meddling in Southeast Asia and provided some significant development assistance in Africa.

Times have changed and China is neither altogether poor nor powerless, indeed it is a lopsided power in which the supremacy of economic considerations is running havoc with environmental and humanitarian concerns at home and abroad.

For China to now claim fealty to political non-intervention at a time when it is economically active, if not rapacious, as it secures and consumes natural resources across the globe from Burma to Zimbabwe at an unprecedented rate is disingenuous. It's like trumpeting economic reform in the absence of political reform, it's awkward, ungainly and ultimately off-pitch.

What Hu Jintao's foreign policy needs is what pre-Bush America once claimed to possess in spades, a willingness to engage in humanitarian intervention not because it can be commercially profitable or even politically advantageous but simply because it is the right thing to do. China's deaf ear to people crying out for help is the mirror image of the US telling people what they need to do; both extremes overlook the genuine possibility of outreach to the downtrodden, the bullied and disenfranchised.

In recent months, China has made modest adjustments to its Africa policy, recognizing that being "neutral" with respect to cruel and tottering regimes in Zimbabwe and Sudan is not only a public relations failure in the run-up to the Olympics, but endangers long-term stability and interests in the region.

Similarly Beijing, which has enjoyed profitable if not entirely cordial relations with Burma's military dictators, is said to be cultivating some support among opponents of the current regime. In addition to solid trade and military ties, China additionally boasts perhaps a million of its own citizens eking out a living in Burma as a petty bourgeois Peace Corps of sorts, providing an unusual degree of leverage and exposure in both formal and informal terms.

For China's foreign policy to meet the needs of Burma's downtrodden calls for deft, timely intervention, a prudent policy guided by something more than laissez faire trade-at-any-cost and something less than the bombs-and-bullets of military intervention of the sort currently favored by the Bush administration.

A more nuanced and humanitarian thrust from China, effectively unmooring itself from the darkest forces in Burmese society, while putting economic considerations on hold, could prevent things from spiraling out of control and provide a bridge of interregnum stability until a new government can coalesce. The risk of continuing to put one's weight behind the despicable Than Shwe is that China will be a tarnished if not unwelcome player in the inevitable post-Than Shwe Burma that is certain to emerge from the ashes of the current crisis.

The courage of journalists covering the courageous mass demonstrations allows the world to peer into Burma's closed society with compassion and concern. And clearly help is needed. But for now, US governmental help would be as unhelpful as China's unwillingness to engage in truly humanitarian intervention. Read more on this article...

Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan IV: Beyond Interdiction

This is the fourth of a series of posts in which I present analyses of the main aspects of counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan, in response to the recently published U.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan and the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007.

The previous installments were: Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan (First Installment): Defining the Problem; Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan II: The Value Chain, The Corruption Chain; and Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan III: The False Promise of Crop Eradication. I also presented a general memorandum on counter-narcotics strategy: Points on Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan: A Critique and a Proposal.

As argued in the previous installments, the U.S. (which funds most counter-narcotics activity in Afghanistan) has invested a disproportionate amount of resources in the eradication of the opium poppy crop, which contributes only 20 percent of the value of the opiate industry in Afghanistan. The result has been the migration of cultivation, its concentration in insecure areas, an increase in the value of the opium economy, and closer links among farmers, traffickers, corrupt officials, and the Taliban. In the new U.S. Counter Narcotics Strategy, of the five immediate priorities, three are for eradication: make eradication a counter narcotics priority; encourage (i.e. pressure) the Afghan government to set eradication goals, and; encourage (i.e. pressure) the government of Afghanistan to use non–negotiated eradication (mechanical eradication and spraying). The two other goals are improving the fund for rewarding provinces that are “good performers” (with cultivation being the only measure of performance) and an improved public information strategy, an area where this administration has proved itself uniquely inept. While the report contains sections on alternative livelihoods and interdiction, neither is listed among the immediate priorities.

The following policy instruments address higher parts of the value chain:

• Interdiction of the trade, mainly destruction of the product, including raids on opium bazaars, police seizures of drugs found in vehicles or in storage, and destruction of heroin or morphine laboratories. While these actions are carried out by law enforcement institutions, they require more enforcement than law. Once a banned substance is seized, the government can destroy it without additional legal procedure or referral to a court. Needless to say, this is not what always happens. There is a system, varying by region, for how much traffickers must pay the police to recover a portion of their wares. Instead of destroying the captured substance, police sometimes claim they have to transport it to their superiors for “evidence.” What happens to it afterwards is not always well documented. In part because of such problems, NATO is now considering an enhanced role for ISAF in interdiction.
• Arrest of traffickers. The number of such cases is on the rise according to the US report, but such arrests mainly target small traffickers or smugglers. The incapacity and corruption of the Afghan justice system is such that cases rarely lead to fair trial and conviction. Instead arrests lead to detention and bribery for release. Hence the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is working to compile cases against major traffickers that can be presented for extradition to the U.S. The total number of such cases is 2 or 3 so far and cannot increase quickly enough to make any appreciable impact on the largest sector of the Afghan economy.
• Arrests of corrupt officials: such arrests are rare in the extreme, since the police and courts that are the main object of corruption. I have been told of, without being able to verify, arrests of officials of the National Directorate of Security, the intelligence agency, for accepting bribes from traffickers. Those arrested were reportedly tried through NDS’s internal courts and punished severely. I am not aware of any such prosecutions in the Ministry of the Interior.
• Building institutions for interdiction and law enforcement. Just as foreign donors have supported the formation of the Central Poppy Eradication Force, they have also supported the formation of the Counter-Narcotics Police Force (CNPF) for interdiction and law enforcement, part of the pattern of forming special elite units for tasks of particular importance to foreigners. The US is also supporting the creation of special prosecutors, courts, and prisons for drug offenses. These institutions will be resourced and trained better than the rest of the Afghan justice system.
• Measures against money laundering. These are not mentioned in the public version of the U.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy, but they are reportedly part of the classified version. A World Bank-UNODC study of money laundering for drug trafficking in Afghanistan estimated (very approximately to say the least) that in 2004-2005 actors in the opium economy imported $1.7 billion into Afghanistan using the informal hawala system of money transfer. The author could not estimate the amount of drug profits transferred out of Afghanistan in the same way, but it is certainly of the same order of magnitude.
• Removal from or prevention of the appointment to senior positions of officials suspected of drug-related corruption. All ministers and senior officials of the government serve at the pleasure of the President and may (in principle if not in practice) be removed from office at his discretion. Hence counter-narcotics policy is closely related to the benchmark in the Afghanistan Compact requiring that “A clear and transparent national appointments mechanism will be established . . . for all senior level appointments to the central government and the judiciary, as well as for provincial governors, chiefs of police, district administrators and provincial heads of security.”

The Strategy proposes programs to meet all of these objectives. It is based on a model of law enforcement, with military backup where necessary, plus development (“alternative livelihoods,” which will be the subject of a subsequent post). It also contains measures for strengthening institutions through funding, equipment, and training. Properly designed, implemented, and sequenced, these are needed components of a counter-narcotics policy. But they cannot succeed without building a state to implement the policies and exercise command and control over the strengthened institutions. Recommending law enforcement where the state is so weak is reminiscent of the economist who offered an elegant solution to the problem of being stranded on a desert island with only canned food: assume the existence of a can opener.

At a meeting on counter-narcotics that I helped to organize, the Deputy Minister of defense of Colombia, Sergio Jaramillo, emphasized that aligning policies to strengthen the credibility of the government was essential to counter-narcotics. The state is a political organization enjoying a degree of legitimacy and sovereignty, not just a set of technical bodies, however well trained, equipped, and funded. The state is but one of several contending authorities in most of Afghanistan, and its reach is particularly weak in areas where opium production is concentrated. The state’s weakness does not result solely or even primarily from a lack of technical capacities, but from a lack of resources and consent to a common institutional framework on the part of the country’s key power holders. The divergent views and interests of these power holders regarding the drug economy and their relative strength compared to the state are the main reasons that the drug economy has continued to grow. Given that the yearly export value of opiates produced in Afghanistan equals a quarter to a third of the country’s estimated licit GDP, participation in the drug economy is not a “deviant” activity that can be suppressed with law enforcement and some incentives to cooperate. It will require either the military defeat of or a political agreement with key power holders. Ending or reducing both the insurgency and the drug economy (which are linked, though not exclusively) requires a political settlement on how Afghanistan is to be ruled and developed, not just the implementation of policies by a state that still barely exists.

Training people in the technical skills required for counter-narcotics (interdiction, prosecution, law enforcement, and development) is necessary, but it is not a substitute for a state whose power holders and decision makers exercise a degree of autonomy from the socially powerful, who in Afghanistan include drug traffickers. As a result, frustrated foreign advisors increasingly press for more control over operations and autonomy from the governmental apparatus, which leaves power-holders the choice of being seen as foreign puppets or of engaging in some form of resistance, whether covert (corruption) or overt (insurgency). Jon Lee Anderson of the New Yorker observed this first-hand while reporting on a U.S.-supported eradication effort in Uruzgan province. When the Afghan force refused to eradicate a field belonging to a local power holder, the DEA agent accompanying them (Douglas Wankel, a determined and dedicated professional) tried to make counter-narcotics more equitable by forcing the reluctant Afghans to eradicate the field. But even if the field is eradicated, such an operation does not strengthen the authority of the state or prevent future poppy cultivation in any sustainable way.

Hence the problem confronted by the policies labeled as interdiction, law enforcement, or anti-corruption are pieces of the same daunting task: consolidating at least a minimal state structure in the face of enormous resources in the hands of unofficial (and sometimes, but not always, criminal) power holders.

For the foreseeable future, the government and its international supporters will be able to accomplish little in Afghanistan without the support of the de facto power holders. These are local leaders who combine functions as politicians, tribal or ethnic leaders, businessmen, landowners, commanders of armed groups of varying degrees of legality, parliamentarians, and government officials. Many were marginalized under the Taliban regime but returned as the allies of the U.S.-led Coalition and the new government.

The mixture of functions varies among members of this group, as does their political orientation. Most have mastered several rhetorical repertoires for different audiences, and they manifest considerable pragmatism in their actions. These leaders have a healthy respect for the effective use of force, money, and rhetoric. Conversely, nothing more incites their contempt than wasteful and ineffective use of force, money, and rhetoric, which, rightly or wrongly, is what most of them see in the actions of the international community in Afghanistan, especially in counter-narcotics.

Many of them derive much of their resources directly or indirectly from the opiate industry, sometimes without ever actually seeing, handling, or even mentioning the substance in question. An Afghan official once pointed out to me that all Afghan politicians had brothers who were businessmen. Afghan leaders also have half-brothers, stepbrothers, cousins, uncles, and nephews, and so do their (possibly several) wives. During the Taliban period one Afghan leader asked for political asylum for himself and his “family.” When asked how large his family was, he said, “About fifty households.” An average Afghan household has about six members, and those of the wealthy and powerful have more. These extensive, dense, and opaque family networks enable some of the powerful to denounce or oppose the drug economy while simultaneously (and invisibly) benefiting from it.

These leaders, however, are even less committed to narcotics than they are to other allegiances they have made from time to time. They often agree that drugs are harmful and that profiting from the trafficking is not praiseworthy, but they see no alternative way to raise the funds they need to keep up their social and political standing. In several cases, however, members of this group have decided that their interests are served best by banning or preventing poppy growing, and virtually all “successes” in counter-narcotics have been due to their efforts, rather than to the international community’s counter-narcotics programs, which often failed to provide the support that success would have required.

The Taliban’s Emirate in 2001, Nangarhar in 2005, and Balkh in 2006 provide examples of authorities with significant ties to drug traffickers or their protectors who succeeded in suppressing poppy growing for a period of time. These cases illustrate these leaders’ potential and flexibility, but also the limits to their authority. I discussed the case of the Taliban in a previous post. In Nangarhar, the tribal leadership of the Jabbarkhel clan, under heavy pressure from the US, decided to forbid poppy cultivation in 2005. Governor Hajji Din Muhammad promised major development projects, which he was unable to deliver. Instead USAID paid rural Nangarharis $3 a day to dig ditches they did not need. Hence poppy production has rebounded in Nangarhar, especially in remote areas without access to assets or markets and where security is poor.

In 2006 Governor Atta of Balkh, a former regional commander of Jamiat-i Islami, whom other officials had previously accused of involvement in narcotics trafficking, decided to eliminate poppy cultivation. He succeeded (though one of the principal alternative livelihoods turned out to be cannabis sativa). In none of these cases did the authorities touch the traffickers, whose incomes remained stable or rose. In 2005, in fact, Nangarhar traffickers responded to the ban on cultivation by sending their extension and lending agents to other provinces, so that the reduction in Nangarhar was accompanied by the spread of cultivation to new areas. A close relative of Hajji Din Muhammad was recently arrested driving northward through Kabul with a load of heroin.

These powerholders felt insecure in the new power they enjoyed at the start of 2002, as they did not know if the Americans would tolerate their usual mode of operation. The anxiety created by the US intervention manifested itself in a rapid fall of opium prices after the Coalition operation started, as dealers sold off inventories they feared would be destroyed or confiscated. In any case, they hoped to benefit from the promised aid bonanza. As it turned out, there was no aid bonanza, but at least the Americans did not interfere with the drug trade, and prices soon stabilized. Even when some commanders were captured by US troops with vehicles full of heroin, they were let go with a remonstrance.

So far it has worked well for them. The fact that people Afghans believe to be major protectors of and participants in the drug trade still enjoy the apparent respect and support of the international community has undermined the credibility of counter-narcotics policy, which thus far has appeared to punish poor farmers and reward rich traffickers and their political patrons.

State building requires a combination of co-opting or defeating this elite. Some targeted sanctions (removal from office, arrest, exile) against the most recalcitrant of this group are necessary if the effort is to succeed, but such efforts can at most provide pressure for the core task: co-opting as many as possible of this group into the state building and development process. In the long term, social and political change will create different elites as well as the instruments they need to exercise authority.

Whatever scarce enforcement means can be mustered should be concentrated against narcotics trafficking and protection. Intelligence collection should focus on understanding the power relations among drug traffickers and specific power holders. The international community should use this intelligence (which its representatives now often claim to lack) to press for the exclusion of the patrons of traffickers from high office. They need not be arrested or tried; even removing some from office and sending them far from the country would send a clear message.

NATO troops should be authorized to provide needed support to Afghan operations to interdict convoys carrying drugs across the borders and destroy heroin laboratories, while minimizing loss of civilian life. International narcotics police should be embedded with Afghans at border posts and airports. Major traffickers and their protectors, once identified by reliable intelligence, should be subject to travel bans and seizure of assets under sanctions approved by the Security Council, which in December 2006 voted to extend the anti-terrorist sanctions of Resolution 1376 to drug traffickers as well.

But law enforcement cannot defeat an elite consensus. And the elite consensus in Afghanistan right now is that foreigners have offered no credible alternative to the opium economy. Law enforcement works to suppress and control deviant behavior with the consent of the society as a whole, which is expected to cooperate with the law enforcement apparatus by supplying information, testimony, and funding. An activity that constitutes a quarter to a third of the economy, however, is not socially deviant behavior, whatever international agreements may say. While drug trafficking is not honored, people see it as a result of the demand for narcotics from foreign markets, which the developed countries with all their resources are unable to suppress, and an effect of the annihilation of Afghanistan’s former state and economy by decades of war. Counter-narcotics policy has become another risk to be managed by pseudo-compliance and covert (or overt) resistance, above all by maintaining asymmetries in information, which the Afghan elite finds relatively easy to do. The only way to defeat a society’s consensus by force is to wage war against it. But the US and the international community is not in Afghanistan to wage war against the Afghan people. The moment the Afghan people believe that is their goal, we all lose.

One of the leading patrons of trafficking reportedly suggested a way out of this situation. According to one minister, this man, who was at that time governor of a major opium-producing province, suggested that President Karzai negotiate with the major traffickers. He reportedly told the president that he knew who the major traffickers in his province were – not surprising, as they were his business partners. The government could not touch them, as they were too powerful, but these people were not against the government on principle. They might well be interested in discussing a transition to a different economy. Such a transition might provide amnesty for past trafficking while allowing traffickers to invest their money in legal enterprises plus forfeiting some assets to public purposes. The ulama (learned clergy) could be consulted about appropriate forms of restitution.

At present, there is no structure set up to help the major entrepreneurs and power holders in the opiate business in Afghanistan to transition out of the trade. On the contrary, when entrepreneurs grown rich from the trade seek help from aid organizations in creating licit enterprises, they are turned away, told that national laws forbid cooperation or negotiation with drug traffickers. In Helmand, the provincial director of one ministry walked into the USAID-funded Alternative Livelihoods Program compound with $800,000 in cash, offering to share the costs for setting up a wheat mill. USAID overruled local program staff who wanted to accept the offer, on the grounds that it would have constituted negotiation with a trafficker or money laundering. USAID contracts prohibit working with anyone with narcotics history or connections, but the house rented by its major Alternative Livelihoods contractor in Lashkargah was owned by a major drug trafficker, which ensured the staff’s security. Rules could be bent to solve the problems of U.S. contractors, but not those of Afghanistan.

The international community recognizes that after decades of armed conflict in one of the poorest countries of the world, it is not possible to administer justice for all the wrongs that were committed in the past. The process of establishing peace and stability foregoes such justice and seeks, at best, “transitional justice.” Transitional justice may enable a society to confront its past truthfully, perhaps punish a few and make amends with most, while laying the foundation for a system of government and justice that will prevent reversion to armed conflict. Such transitional justice, which has hardly even started in Afghanistan, is difficult enough to administer.

It is no less unrealistic to expect that Afghanistan, whose economy and polity depend more on narcotics than any other state, can move from an illicit to a licit economy without an acknowledged transition, not only for farmers, but also for elites that have sustained their power through the profits of trafficking. Every foreign diplomat in Afghanistan regularly meets people associated with both war crimes and drug trafficking. Those few who have tried to avoid doing so have found it more or less impossible. The only guarantees of clean hands in the past several decades are absence from the country or powerlessness.

A condition for successful negotiations is some leverage. Interdiction aimed at the high end of the value chain plus political measures against traffickers well connected to the state are essential. The government and international community should seek to avoid perverse outcomes by seeking some measure of reparations from those who have accumulated wealth in the trade, such making contributions to the capitalization of rural development banks or micro-credit institutions. Enabling them to bring their funds into the open by investing in financial institutions as well as other programs that produce social good would offer some degree of compensation to those in the society who did not benefit from the drug trade.

There is no more a law enforcement solution to Afghanistan’s narco-polity than there is a military solution to the insurgency. Well-targeted sanctions and enforcement are needed as part of counter-narcotics, just as well targeted military actions are needed as part of counter-insurgency. But a counter-insurgency strategy that targets uncontrolled areas where insurgents hide among the population while providing safe haven to the insurgents’ leaders and financiers would be similar to . . . Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban. A counter-narcotics policy that replicates that model will achieve similar results.

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Anidjar: "Columbia at its Best"

Columbia at its Best

by Gil Anidjar


On June 18, 2007, Columbia University President Lee Bollinger informed his “fellow members of the Columbia Community” that the university had just taken an important step, the completion of a formal application, bringing it closer to its planned expansion into Manhattanville in West Harlem. As official statements on the Columbia website have it, the expansion seeks to combine the fulfillment of Columbia’s role as a global university, and its place among a number of “the nation’s universities.”

This expansion, along with Columbia’s much publicized and repeated appearance in the media over a number of years now, perhaps provides an occasion to reflect on the relationship between the principles of education, which guide or should guide an institution of higher learning, and the political commitments of that institution. After all, much of the conversation surrounding universities these days – and Columbia foremost among them – is precisely with regards to this question: what is the nature of the connection between education and politics? This is a local as well as global question, one that is of national and international significance. And though it may have something to do with the much touted notion of “freedom,” we will see that it is hardly about “freedom of speech.”

The Local

Not that they are many, or that they have been able to gather much force, but there are those who oppose the expansion of the university. This, it will be granted, has little to do with freedom of speech; it has to do with a power differential. Insofar as the university intervenes in the environment of the neighborhood – for good or for ill – it is acting politically. It is exercising power. The university is not simply enjoying its right to freedom, much less exercising freedom of speech. As an established and highly recognized institution, it has a freedom which its opponents do not have, namely, the freedom to gather its extensive forces, negotiate with the New York City Council and other political bodies. It wields its legal, financial and political power – forgive me, its freedom – in order to reach its stated goal of expansion. To be on the receiving end of this deployed power means to confront an asymmetry that cannot be denied. It is an experience in powerlessness. The political lesson – for it is a lesson that comes from an institution of higher learning – should be clear. Columbia is a political actor and its actions have political effects as well as a political message (one could argue that this constitutes an ethical message as well): don’t get caught being the little guy. So much for the residents and businesses of Manhattanville.

The Global

One could here find grounds for an analogy when it comes to the “global” university: the role it plays, the actions it takes and the statements it delivers, in international politics. In fact, Columbia and its spokespersons (first and foremost its president, who can only speak the words of the institution, checked and approved by its lawyers and other authorizing forces, those who give the president his legitimacy as chief executive officer) have been quite outspoken about marking the global footprint of the institution: the international dimension of its faculty and student body is one instance, international collaboration of a scientific and financial nature is another. It is this footprint that constitutes one of the main reasons for a still larger campus in the city of New York.

The analogy between the local and the global is thus much more than a mere analogy. Turning our attention to a third dimension of Columbia’s political activities will in fact reveal the difficulty of fully distinguishing local from global in terms of political significance and effects. The word in vogue to signify this lack of distinction is, if I am not mistaken, “glocal.”

The Glocal

Now, it is important to remark that Columbia University has made perfectly clear that it is by no means a democratic institution (its decisions may be made in consultation, but there is no democratic commitment, nor a democratic obligation on these decisions or on any other matter pertaining to the university). Of course, we might want to recall once again that it is an educational institution. And it is indeed. But the meaning of that assertion must be related to an additional fact. The university is also a private corporation run by a board of trustees, most of whom have long and impressive affiliations with the corporate world (lawyers, bankers and business executives), with the political world (most often the federal government, but also state government) and with the medical world (doctors and nurses). The distinction between these three “worlds,” as can be gathered from the biographical data for each of the trustees, is not a categorical or hermetic one. And it should be noted that the two primary functions of an institution of higher learning, namely research and education, are not overwhelmingly represented. Of course, the other, if less important, governing body (namely, the Senate of the university) does have faculty and student representation. But what about freedom of speech?

Insofar as the chief executive officer of the university, designated by the trustees, speaks, he does so with the voice of the university, and justifiably so. This is why it is important to recognize that, despite statements to the contrary, an individual occupying an official (or simply, institutional) position is less exercising freedom of speech than enjoying both the privilege and the responsibility bestowed upon him by the institution of which he is the voice. In contrast to the speech of private individuals, here it is only the power invested in the institutional person (not the private individual) that authorizes and enables his capacity to speak. President Bollinger’s communications over the years must therefore be taken as statements of the university that have little to do with personal convictions or overstepping of boundaries (whatever these might be). They do not testify to personal opinions or to his right to freedom of expression (and let me add that insofar as they are posted on the university’s website, accessible and publicized as such, they receive additional material force from the university per se). When President Bollinger speaks, it is the university that speaks (even if dissenting voices might express themselves, might have the freedom – rather than the power and official, authorizing seal – to do so).

On the glocal scene, then, what has Columbia been saying? It has issued statements of compassion at national and international disasters (Katrina, the 2004 Tsunami) and disseminated news about its activities, particularly those of Jeffrey Sachs’ Earth Institute in the fight against poverty and disease. What the university has emphatically not done is express political judgments, taken explicit political action for or against any side involved in a conflict, against or on behalf of any partisan activity or expression of opinion in such conflicts.

But for one exception.

Western Asia.

From the outset, the new administration (Bollinger’s inaugural speech is dated October 3rd, 2002) had made clear that it was pursuing a policy of explicitness when it comes to Western Asia, whether on the divestment campaign (November 7, 2002), his statements on academic freedom (and accusations of political harassment and anti-Semitism made against Middle East studies faculty, March 29 2003, October 22, 27 and December 8, 2004; March 23, 31 and April 11, 2005), on the decision not to invite Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (September 21, 2006), on the detainment of Iranian-American scholars (May 31, 2007), on the British Teachers Union’s proposal to discuss a boycott of Israeli academics (June 12, 2007), and more recently on the President of Iran.

Although it can be granted that a number of these statements have a local dimension, it is also the case that they have had Western Asia in their proximate background. It is simply a fact that no other region of the world has attracted the explicit, political attention of the university in its public statements. It should moreover be noted that words like “obscene,” “offensive,” “heinous,” “odious,” and “repugnant” (to mention but a few) have not been used in other contexts. It is in this peculiar context in fact that the university, deploying its commitment to global issues, has publicly claimed: “This is America at its best” (September 19, 2007), or, in a more elaborate version: “The kind of freedom that will be on display at Columbia has always been and remains today our nation’s most potent weapon against repressive regimes everywhere in the world. This is the power and example of America at its best” (September 24, 2007). What is freedom then? As I was suggesting earlier and as is explicitly argued here, it is a weapon and a power. It is asymmetric. It is the differential capacity to exercise one’s power and to extend one’s pedagogical light to those who do not enjoy the same privilege, the same institutional authorization, the same power (whether they are guests, heads of states increasingly targeted for war, or individual faculty members like Joseph Massad or Nadia Abu el-Haj) To be on the receiving end is hardly an exercise in freedom. It is an exercise in powerlessness.

But it does teach us something. On the question of what should be the connection between education and politics (local and global), this must be the answer. Freedom – for the institution (or the country?) that wields it – is the exercise of political power and self-righteous pedagogy. This is, this must be, Columbia at its best.

And don’t get caught being the little guy.


Gil Anidjar is Associate Professor in the Department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures at Columbia University. All the information mentioned here was gathered exclusively from the Columbia University, and most particularly from this site(accessed September 26, 2007). Read more on this article...

The Bhutto Complex

I have led an unusual life. I have buried a father killed at age 50 and two brothers killed in the prime of their lives. I raised my children as a single mother when my husband was arrested and held for eight years without a conviction -- a hostage to my political career. I made my choice when the mantle of political leadership was thrust upon my shoulders after my father's murder. I did not shrink from responsibility then, and I will not shrink from it now.

- When I Return to Pakistan, September 20, 2007

Why do you think that the U.S. seems to have a harder time with women at the highest level of power than other countries?

In a country like Pakistan or India, when a charismatic leader dies, people are not sure that the traditions he symbolized will continue—there’s a lot of illiteracy and there isn’t the same access to information. So they tend to transfer allegiance from a male leader to a female descendant, in the hope that his policies will be continued. But in Westernized societies, it’s a little different, because people have greater education and greater access to information—they don’t have the same need to be sure of the message of the leader.

- Nurturer-in-Chief: Advice for Hillary Clinton from the former prime minister of Pakistan, October 1, 2007.


On April 4th, 1979, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the overthrown Prime Minister of Pakistan and the father of Benazir Bhutto, was hanged by the State of Pakistan under the military dictator Zia ul Haq.

Zulfiqar Bhutto was an incredibly charismatic and popular leader [known for his fiery presence at the U.N. as Pakistan's Foreign Minister] but he was filled with contradictions. He was an intellectual who came from landed elite. He was schooled in the best of places and was bourgeoisie yet claimed to speak for the people with socialist convictions. He rose to prominence not from the mass politics but from the inner halls of bureaucratic power under the dictator General Ayub. When he became the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in 1963, he wanted Pakistan on the forefront of Islamic countries and South Asia instead he stoked the fires in Kashmir. He hated the military but all of his best friends were military men. He was the most trusted man Ayub had but, in 1969, his own political ambition led him to create the political party [PPP - Pakistan's People Party] and, subsequently, topple Ayub. He instituted industrial and land reform but the only beneficiaries were landlords and industrialists. He gave speech after speech on the terrors of landholding exploiters of the people but he remained a landholder and courted the landed elite as his base. He promised 18 acres of land to each peasant and they got, well, nothing. From 1972 to 1977, he shaped Pakistan in his fractured image. More than anything, it was his death which came to symbolize the end of civil power in Pakistan.

Zulfiqar Bhutto was a popular PM. Perhaps, the most popular figure in the history of the nation. After his execution and Zia's long tenure of military dictatorship, Benazir Bhutto emerged as the hope of millions and the spearhead for democracy. The day she returned to Pakistan for the first time in 1986, those millions turned out to welcome her. The cult of personality that had built up around her father, herself, her brothers, her uncles, grew larger and larger but her tenure was just as maddenigly contradictory as her fathers. She courted the Islamists as much as she let the Army dictate her government. She tried to be the voice of feminism and modernity yet failed to do anything substantial for the rights of women and minority in her nation.

Benazir Bhutto is reportedly working on a deal that will bring her to power in Pakistan in companionship with Pervez Musharraf. Read more on this article...

Bush-Cheney Threaten U.S. Security: Where's the Accountability?

I know that I am supposed to be writing here as a "highly respected," "wonky, moderate, and thoroughly analytical" scholar, not just another partisan blogger. But sometimes it's hard to make the distinction.

Last June 29, I was in Ohrid, Macedonia for a conference of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which brought together delegations from all members of NATO and the Partnership for Peace to discuss current issues, including the NATO mission in Afghanistan. (Left- Hekmat Karzai, Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies in Kabul, poses with me in front of the ancient Greco-Roman Theater in Ohrid). After the closing plenary, a U.S. NATO official came over to offer some friendly advice. I was losing credibility in international meetings, he suggested, because my (see adjectives above) expertise on Afghanistan was being colored by my domestic political agenda. I thanked him for his constructive criticism and began to consider whether he might be right. After all, the administration had changed many (though hardly all) of the policies I had been criticizing since 2001. Couldn't I take yes for an answer?

When I got back to the hotel, I found an e-mail from Juan Cole inviting me to join this group blog, which he was just setting up. Before answering, I glanced over at Informed Comment, to see what Juan was writing about. I found this:

Bush said in a speech on Thursday that he hopes Iraq will be like Israel, a democracy that faces terrorist violence but manages to retain its democratic character:

' In Israel, Bush said, "terrorists have taken innocent human life for years in suicide attacks. The difference is that Israel is a functioning democracy and it's not prevented from carrying out its responsibilities. And that's a good indicator of success that we're looking for in Iraq." '

These words may be the stupidest ones ever uttered by a US president. Given their likely impact on the US war effort in the Middle East, they are downright criminal.

Juan noted that telling Middle Easterners that the U.S. wants Iraq to be just like Israel was not an effective way to build regional support for our effort. He archived this story under the tag, "Monumental stupidity."

I answered Juan, gladly accepting the invitation, and added a note telling him about the NATO official's comment. I concluded:

I thought maybe he was right. Then I went back to the hotel and read your post from today. I think my domestic political agenda is the result of my knowledge of the rest of the world.

In this spirit, I would like to draw readers' attention to the following bizarre fact: The Bush-Cheney administration still enjoys some vestige of credibility when claiming that its policies defend the national security of the United States, and the Democratic Party presidential candidates and Congressional Leadership sometimes seem afraid of challenging the administration too directly for fear of being seen as soft on terrorism.

As a wonky, moderate, highly respected, and thoroughly analytical scholar, I do not express myself in simplistic partisan formulae. But politicians do. That's their job. If I were a politician, for instance, I might say something like this:

The Bush-Cheney administration has surrendered much of Afghanistan to the Taliban and much of Pakistan to al-Qaida. They have turned most of Iraq over to Iran, creating the very danger over which they now threaten another disastrous war; they have strained the U.S. Armed Forces to the point of exhaustion, turned the Defense Department over to private contractors, the Justice Department over to the Republican National Committee, and the national debt over to foreign creditors, while leading a party whose single most basic belief is supposed to be that individuals must take personal responsibility for their actions. And they dare to lecture us on national security?

Allow me to illustrate these (slight) overstatements with a few current reports.

On Afghanistan, I have already commented on recent analyses of how the Bush-Cheney adminstration fecklessly under-invested in Afghanistan, assuring that the weak government of Hamid Karzai would lack the resources needed to establish itself throughout the country. Since the recent New York Times report was based on interviews with most of the U.S.'s former ambassadors and military commanders in Afghanistan, I won't bother to re-argue the point here. Especially since a former CIA counter-terrorism official (who led the team that captured Abu Zubayda) and a former State Department official (now working for Kissinger Associates, not MoveOn.org) observe in Sunday's LA Times:

Afghanistan -- former Taliban stronghold, Al Qaeda haven and warlord-cum-heroin-smuggler finishing school -- feels more and more like Sept. 10, 2001, than a victory in the U.S. war on terrorism.

The country is, plain and simple, a mess. Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies have quietly regained territory, rendering wide swaths of the country off-limits to U.S. and Afghan forces, international aid workers and even journalists. Violent attacks against Western interests are routine. Even Kabul, which the White House has held up as a postcard for what is possible in Afghanistan, has become so dangerous that foreign embassies are in states of lockdown, diplomats do not leave their offices, and venturing beyond security perimeters requires daylight-only travel, armored vehicles, Kevlar and armed escorts.

For more of the same, see Jim Rupert's report from the remote province of Nuristan in the northeast. Of course the administration has changed so much of its original policy on Afghanistan that its claims to have done the right thing there are in their last throes, supported by only a few dead-enders such as the delusional Donald Rumsfeld.

Pakistan? Here's another article from Sunday's L. A. Times:

Political turmoil and a spate of brazen attacks by Taliban fighters are forcing Pakistan's president to scale back his government's pursuit of Al Qaeda, according to U.S. intelligence officials who fear that the terrorist network will be able to accelerate its efforts to rebuild and plot new attacks.

The development threatens a pillar of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, which has depended on Pakistan to play a lead role in keeping Al Qaeda under pressure to reduce its ability to coordinate strikes.

It just gets better from there; you should read the whole article. As I noted previously, the legitimacy of the government is collapsing in Pakistan, the result of a fully predictable (and predicted) political crisis that has been gathering steam for over a year. How did the Bush administration respond? By announcing in January that Ambassador Ryan Crocker would be transferred from Islamabad to Baghdad and then by not replacing him until July. And by fully supporting General Musharraf's contempt for rule of law and democracy until he had provoked much of Pakistan's middle class to take to the streets against him.

Ambassador Crocker now has the demanding task of trying to nudge the Iranian backed Iraqi Shi'a factions that the U.S. installed in power to reconcile with the Sunni Ba'athi factions that the U.S. removed from power (but whose willingness to take arms and money from the U.S. is now cited as the main indicator of U.S. success). And good luck to him.

Meanwhile, back at the war on those who attacked us on 9/11 (not Iraqi Shi'a militias, Iran, or Ba'athists, as far as I know): according to the National Intelligence Estimate on "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland," which was prepared while the ambassador's residence in Islamabad was vacant:

Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.

In the past few weeks, a reinvigorated Bin Laden has released both a video aimed at asserting his leadership of the global struggle against U.S. dominance, promising that "Islam" would solve the crises of imperialism, high taxes, and sub-prime mortgages, and an audio tape aimed at al-Qa'ida's most strategic target market, the population of Pakistan, where Bin Laden and his senior advisors are now safely ensconced. In the audio tape Bin Laden fulsomely praises the "tribes of Waziristan" and several Pakistani Taliban leaders, while omitting support for any Afghan group. This indicates where his real sanctuary in the region lies.

Iraq and Iran? I cede to Juan Cole, Scott Horton, and numerous others the thankless labor of documenting the administration's crimes and blunders in Iraq, a task I would compare to trying to convince a skeptical audience that water is wet. But since the administration (now abetted by CBS's 60 Minutes) is furiously accusing Iran of support for Shi'a militias in Iraq, it seems appropriate to recall a few basic facts about the situation in Iraq, helpfully laid out by Peter Galbraith in the New York Review of Books. Peter first visited Iraqi Kurdistan in, I think, 1989. He was one of the first outsiders to document the atrocities of Operation Anfal, at a time that the first Bush administration was giving Saddam a pass on killing Kurds, as long as he stood against Iran. At that time Peter was a senior staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Since then he has been Ambassador to Croatia and held a senior U.N. post in East Timor. I last saw Peter in Heathrow airport just before Thanksgiving last year, when we crossed paths as he returned from Iraq and I from Afghanistan.

An Afghan friend once remarked that Americans, unlike Afghans, seemed to require "memory facilitation," which Peter's article helpfully provides:

Iraqi forces [in the south] are dominated by the Badr Organization, a militia founded, trained, armed, and financed by Iran. When US forces ousted Saddam's regime from the south in early April 2003, the Badr Organization infiltrated from Iran to fill the void left by the Bush administration's failure to plan for security and governance in post-invasion Iraq.

In the months that followed, the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) appointed Badr Organization leaders to key positions in Iraq's American-created army and police. At the same time, L. Paul Bremer's CPA appointed party officials from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to be governors and serve on governorate councils throughout southern Iraq. SCIRI, recently renamed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), was founded at the Ayatollah Khomeini's direction in Tehran in 1982. The Badr Organization is the militia associated with SCIRI.

In the January 2005 elections, SCIRI became the most important component of Iraq's ruling Shiite coalition. In exchange for not taking the prime minister's slot, SCIRI won the right to name key ministers, including the minister of the interior. From that ministry, SCIRI placed Badr militiamen throughout Iraq's national police.

In short, George W. Bush had from the first facilitated the very event he warned would be a disastrous consequence of a US withdrawal from Iraq: the takeover of a large part of the country by an Iranian-backed militia.

Peter notes, as seems obvious but is ignored by most discussion in the U.S., that the Bush administration's stupendous blunders in Iraq have handed Iran a "far-reaching" "strategic victory." He illustrates his claim that "the scale of the American miscalculation is striking" with one of the by-now familiar astoundingly wrong quotations from the administration's strategic thinkers, in this case Paul Wolfowitz confidently asserting that a Shi'a-led Iraq will undermine Iran.

On the exhaustion and depletion of the U.S. Army, see this, this, and many other stories, including the recent ones explaining how the post-"surge" troop reduction is required regardless of "success" in order to keep the Army from collapsing. Scott Horton at Harpers provides complete coverage (and original investigation) of both the privatization of the U.S. Defense Department and the transformation of the Justice Department into a branch of the RNC. On the financing of the debt caused by the combination of tax cuts and uncontrolled spending on everything but social services for those who really need them, see this table of foreign holders of U.S. Treasury Securities.

Accountability, anyone? Read more on this article...

A Hamas Truce?

An exchange of signals, including indirect contacts, between Israel and Hamas this past week offer an opportunity to examine both the balance of forces and each side’s current aspirations.

On September 16th, 2007, Hamas spokesman Taher al Nunu suggested that Hamas will implement the truce with Israel as part of the (no longer existing) unity government’s decisions. The rationale given for the (belated) truce was the desire to improve conditions during the month of Ramadan. Maybe the successful rocket attack on an Israeli military base outside Gaza in which about 60 soldiers, were wounded - most lightly, provided a ‘high note’ before a new course. The next day, Matan Vilnai, Israel’s Deputy Minister of Defense, (who was head of Southern Command when the IDF pulled out of the Strip in 1994) suggested that if Hamas stopped rocket fire against Israel for one to two weeks, than Israel should study the possibility of a truce with Hamas. Hamas called on Islamic Jihad to stop firing rockets, though it seems only in the area of the border crossings between Gaza and Israel.

Then, yesterday Hamas leaked to Reuters that Ghazi Hamad, the Hamas’s spokesman, contacted Vilnai through an intermediary. Hamas offered a truce in return for Israel’s agreement to open the crossings between Gaza and Egypt and Gaza and Israel. The Israeli government not only rejected the proposal, but on September 19th declared Gaza an “enemy entity,” a legal designation that it could use to further limit supplies to Gaza.

Though Hamas is adamant on not recognizing Israel’s right to exist, it expressed in the past a willingness to negotiate with it over practical issues such as trade and traffic. The new initiative, however, is different: it would involve negotiations over the resistance to Israel, that is over security issues. Such willingness seems to signal a sense of weariness and point to chinks in Hamas’ armor in the wake of the June putsch and Gaza’s subsequent isolation.

The Israeli rejection of the truce indicates that the crude home made Qassam rockets from Gaza are viewed at this stage mostly as an irritant. The Israel government is utilizing the Hamas takeover to keep the crossing into Egypt closed, since it is worried about weapons smuggling from Egypt which would arm Hamas with the kinds of long range rocket launchers that Hizballah used so successfully in the 2006 Lebanon War. Further, the Israel government feels emboldened in its attempts to choke Gaza by the tacit support of Egypt and Abbas himself. Read more on this article...

Bin Laden Slams Musharraf

The USG Open Source Center comments on and translates an audiotape of Usama Bin Laden condemning Pakistani Gen. Pervez Musharraf as an apostate for his crackdown on the Red Mosque in June.


Bin Ladin Calls For 'Armed Rebellion' Against Pakistani President . . .
Jihadist Websites -- OSC Summary
Friday, September 21, 2007

Terrorism: Bin Ladin Calls for 'Armed Rebellion' Against Pakistani President in Video Statement On 20 September, a jihadist website posted a message entitled, "Remove the Apostate, Al-Sahab Production Presents 'A Call for Jihad' by the Lion, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin," which included several links to a 23-minute 36-second message from the leader of Al-Qa'ida Organization Usama Bin Ladin. The video, which contained still pictures of Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a number of Pakistani and Afghani jihad leaders, contained a message from Bin Ladin in which he praised a number of Pakistani clerics, including Abd-al-Aziz Ghazi who was killed in the attacks on the Red Mosque, and urged the Pakistanis to rise against President Pervez Musharraf. In the message, Bin Ladin explained that Musharraf's decision to attack the Red Mosque last July proved his submissiveness to the US, which in turn makes his removal obligatory. . .

A description of the video follows:

The video begins with the recitation of a Koranic verse and the following caption: "Come to Jihad - A Speech to the People of Pakistan, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin (May Allah protect him), September 2007/Ramadan 1428."

The rest of the video contains Bin Ladin's message, accompanied by an old picture of his as well as the images of four jihad leaders that appear in the four corners of the screen, including that of Abd-al-Aziz Ghazi, who was killed in the Red Mosque attacks in Pakistan. Throughout the video, various still images and excerpts from previously processed old videos of Bin Ladin and Al-Zawahiri are displayed.

The full text of Bin Ladin's message as transcribed from the English subtitles follows:

"All praise is due to Allah. We praise Him and seek His aid and forgiveness, and we seek refuge in Allah from the evil in ourselves and from our bad deeds. He whom Allah guides cannot be led astray, and he who is led astray cannot be guided. I bear witness that there is no God other than Allah alone, without partners, and I bear witness that Muhammad is His slave and Messenger. As for what comes after: To my Muslim brothers in Pakistan: Peace be upon you and the mercy of Allah and His blessings. Allah, the Most High says, 'O Prophet, strive hard against the disbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be harsh against them. Their abode is Hell and an evil destination it is' (9:73) (Koranic verse; Al-Tawbah 9:73). And the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, says, 'There is no one who abandons a Muslim in a place where his honor is violated and his sanctity is infringed upon except that Allah, the Most High abandons him in a place in which he would like His aid, and there is no one who aids a Muslim in a place where his honor is violated and his sanctity is infringed upon except that Allah aids him in a place in which he would like His aid' (Narrated by Ahmad) (Hadith). Pervez's invasion of Lal Masjid in the city of Islam, Islamabad, is a sad event, like the crime of the Hindus in their invasion and destruction of the Babari Masjid. And this event has crucial and critical connotations, most important of which are: First, this event demonstrated Musharraf's insistence on continuing his loyalty, submissiveness and aid to America against the Muslims, and this is one of the ten nullifiers of Islam, as the people of knowledge have determined, and makes armed rebellion against him and removing him obligatory.

"Allah, the Most High, says, 'O you who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: they are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them. Verily Allah guides not a people unjust' (5:51) (Koranic verse; Al-Ma'idah 5:51). And His statement, 'And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them,' means that he is of them in Kufr (unbelief), as the people of Tafseer (explanation) have said. This ruling was the one given and confirmed by Mufti Nizammuddin Shamzai, may Allah have mercy on him, in his famous Fatwa following the raids on New York, and among the things which he said: 'If any ruler of an Islamic state provides aid to an infidel state in its aggression against the Islamic states, it is the legal obligation of the Muslims to remove him from power and consider him to be legally a traitor to Islam and Muslims.' People of Islam in Pakistan: Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, may Allah have mercy on him, discharged a great duty which was upon him, and declared the word of truth and didn't care about the anger of the creation. He endangered himself and his wealth and made clear the ruling of Allah regarding Pervez: that he is a traitor to Islam and Muslims and must be removed.

This Fatwa enraged Pervez and enraged his masters in America, and it is my opinion that the murder of the Mufti - may Allah have mercy on him - was at their hands. And Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai died without having replaced the word of truth with falsehood, in contrast to what many of the 'Ulama of vice do. And the obligation on us remains, and we have been extremely late in carrying it out, six years having passed, so we should make up for lost time. May Allah forgive me as well as you.

"Second, the government's showing of Maulana Abd al-Aziz Ghazi in women's clothing in the media is clear evidence of the extent of the great hostility, hatred and contempt held by Pervez and his government towards Islam and its sincere 'Ulama, and that is greater Kufr which takes one out of Islam. Allah, the Most High, says, 'And if you question them, they will most surely say, "We were only talking idly and jesting." Say, Was it Allah and His Signs and His Messenger which you were mocking? Make no excuses. You have certainly disbelieved after believing. If we forgive a party from among you, a party We shall punish, for they are criminals' (9:65-66) (Koranic verses; Al-Tawbah 9:65-66). And read, if you wish, the Tafseer of Ibn Katheer - may Allah have mercy on him - regarding this Ayat.

"Third, in such events, the people are tested and the friends of the Most Merciful are separated from the friends of Satan. The 'Ulama who are from the friends of the Most Merciful declare the truth, and if they are unable or are weak, they observe silence and don't help falsehood with their words or actions. As for the friends of Satan, they are led by Pakistani military intelligence to speak falsehood and help its people. Some of them deem it obligatory to unite with Pervez and his army, while others deem as Haraam martyrdom-seeking fedayee operations against the soldiers of the Taghut (idol-king), while still others assail the Mujahideen, slandering and defaming them. And this is the way of the Munafiqeen (Hypocrites). Allah, the Most High, says, 'They are stingy (in helping) you. And when danger comes, you see them looking towards you, their eyes rolling like one fainting as death approaches. But when the fear has passed away, they assail you with sharp tongues, being stingy will good deeds. Those have never believed, so Allah has rendered their works null and void. And that is easy for Allah' (33:19) (Koranic verse; Al-Ahzab 33:19). So everyone who refrained from helping the Imam Maulana Abd al-Rashid Ghazi is from the sitters, whereas those who attacked him to help Pervez claiming that Islam isn't established through fighting and calling fighting in the path of Allah 'terrorism' - in the context of invective - and saying that the way is through peaceful demonstrations and democratic methods are from those who have gone astray and followed the path of the Munafiqeen. Nearly two decades ago, the soil of Pakistan saw and was watered by the blood of a great Imam of the Imams of Islam - i.e. the Mujahid champion Imam Abdullah Azzam, may Allah have mercy on him - and today, we have seen another great Imam, not at the level of Pakistan alone, but at the level of the entire Islamic Ummah: i.e. the Imam Maulana Abd al-Rashid Ghazi - may Allah have mercy on him.

"He, his brothers, his students and female students of Jami'ah Hafsa demanded the application of the Shari'ah of Islam, as the reason for our creation is that we worship Allah the Most High through His religion, al-Islam, and they were killed because of this great objective. Allah, the Most High, says, 'And I have not created jinn and men but that they may worship Me' (51:56) (Koranic verse; Al-Zariyyat 51:56).

"They sacrificed the great thing they owned: they sacrificed themselves for their religion. I ask Allah to accept them among the martyrs. They were killed treacherously and treasonously at the hands of the apostate infidel Pervez and his aides. The purpose of the army - or so they say - is to protect the Muslims against the Kuffaar, but now we see the armies becoming tools and weapons in the hands of the Kuffaar against the Muslims. Pervez threw away the cause of Kashmir and restrained those fighting to liberate it, in accordance with the wishes of the Hindus and Nazarenes. Then he opened his bases and airports to America for invading the Muslims in Afghanistan, and as you've seen before, the army attacked the people of Swat who also demanded the rule of Shari'ah, and attacked the people of Waziristan, in addition to betraying and extraditing hundreds of Arab Mujahideen from the grandsons of the Sahabah (Companions), with whom Allah was pleased, to the head of Kufr, America. So Pervez, his ministers, his soldiers and those who help him are all accomplices in the spilling the blood of those of the Muslims who have been killed. He who helps him knowingly and willingly is an infidel like him, and as for he who helps him knowingly and under compulsion, his compulsion isn't legally valid, as the soul of the one forced to kill isn't better than the soul of the one killed, and the Messenger of Allah - peace and blessings of Allah be upon him - said, 'Were all the inhabitants of the heavens and earth to participate in the spilling of a believer's blood, Allah - the Great and Glorious - would throw them into the Fire' (Hadith).

"So I tell the soldiers who perform the Salaat (prayer) in the military organs: you must resign from your jobs and enter anew into Islam and disassociate yourself from Pervez and his Shirk (polytheism).

"Some of the Munafiqeen among the 'Ulama of vice and others may say that Islam orders us to stay together and the people to unite with the army and government to stand in the face of the enemies and avoid Fitnah (strife).

"I say: the one who says this is creating lies about Allah. The government and the army have become enemies of the Ummah, after becoming a weapon in the hands of the Kuffaar against the Muslims. And they refuse to rule by the religion of Islam in all of life's affairs, like politics, economy, social life and other matters. Allah has ordered these and their like to be fought, not to be united with and hung onto, as those hypocrites claim. Allah, the Most High, says, 'And fight them until there is no Fitnah (polytheism), and religion is wholly for Allah' (8:39) (Koranic verse: Al-Anfal 8:39).

"So if some of the religion is for Allah and some of it is for other than Allah, fighting is obligatory to make the religion entirely for Allah, the Most High. By the grace of Allah, the Most High, we preformed Jihad with the Afghan Mujahideen against the Russians, and the Afghan army was a weapon in their hands against us. They would pray and fast, but despite that, the senior 'Ulama of the Islamic world, including the 'Ulama of Pakistan, ruled that they are to be fought. And after the exit of the Russians, the 'Ulama of Pakistan also supported Taliban against the Northern Alliance, although they also pray and fast. So is there any difference between Pervez and his soldiers and Ahmad Shah Massoud, Rabbani and Sayyaf and their soldiers? There is no difference at all. All of them have pledged to the Crusaders to fight true Islam and its people, and those who say it is forbidden to fight Pervez and his soldiers and exclude him from the general ruling have an illness in their hearts: they prefer this life to the next. Allah, the Most High, says, 'Are your unbelievers better than those or have you an immunity (from punishment) in the sacred books?' (54:43) (Koranic verse; Al-Qamar 54:43)

"I tell Pervez and his army: your betrayal of your nation and people has been exposed, and the people are no longer fooled by your showing off militarily by launching some missiles after every disaster and massacre you commit against the populace, as has occurred repeatedly in the border regions, or after the biggest massacre in Lal Masjid most recently. How is the nation benefited by these weapons and tests of yours? The same goes for the nuclear bomb itself. When the American foreign minister Powell came to you, you cowered, bowed and submitted to him like a lowly slave, and you permitted the American Crusader forces to use the air, soil and water of Pakistan, the country of Islam, to kill the people of Islam in Afghanistan, then in Waziristan. So woe to you and away with you.

"'Against the peoples attacking lions, and against the enemy rabbits and ostriches?' (Poetry)

"And your going to Makkah and performing the Tawaaf (circling) of the Ka'aba won't benefit you when combined with Kufr and combating of Islam and its people. Were it to benefit anyone in combination with Kufr, it would have benefited Abu Lahab, the uncle of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him.

"Then someone might say that armed rebellion against Pervez will lead to the spilling of blood. But I say: were the order to fight the apostate ruler from the people, like 'Amr and Zyad, then it would be permissible for minds and opinions to intervene and discuss what they should do or not do. However, as you know, the order to fight the apostate ruler is an order in the Shari'ah of Allah, and it is not permissible for the Muslim to make his opinion a rival to the order of Allah and order of His Messenger, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him. Allah, the Most High, says, 'And it is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, to exercise their own choice in the matter concerning them. And whoso disobeys Allah and His Messenger goes manifestly astray' (33:36) (Koranic verse; Al-Ahzab 33:36).

"So when the capability is there, it is obligatory to rebel against the apostate ruler, as is the case now. And the one who believes that the strength required to rebel has not yet been completed must complete it and take up arms against Pervez and his army without procrastination. Pervez and most of the Muslim's rulers jumped to power and usurped it and ruled us by other than what Allah sent down by force of arms, and the situation will not return to normal through elections, demonstrations and shouting. So beware of the polytheistic elections and futile actions, for iron is only dented by iron, and it is through fighting in Allah's path and exhorting of the believers that the might of the Kuffar is restrained. Allah, the Most High, said, 'So fight in Allah's Cause - you are held responsible only for yourself - and rouse the believers. It may be that Allah will restrain the might of the unbelievers. And Allah is strongest in might and strongest in punishment' (4:84) (Koranic verse; Al-Nisa 4:84).

"Fighting in Allah's path is an act of worship, and it is based on sacrifice of selves. Muslim blood is spilled and poured out to protect the religion, which only reached us after his (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) cuspid tooth was broken, his head cut open and his noble face bloodied, and after the blood of the best of people, like Hamza, Mus'ab, Zaid and Ja'afar (with whom Allah was pleased), was poured out. This is the path, so follow it. The people have forgotten the path of victory. They think it comes easily or without blood running. Where is the Jihad of the Messenger of Allah? (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him)

"So to sum up: It is obligatory on the Muslims in Pakistan to carry out Jihad and fighting to remove Pervez, his government, his army and those who help him. And it is obligatory on them to pledge allegiance to an Amir of the Believers who observes the rule of Shari'ah rather than Pervez's polytheistic positive-law constitution. And the Muslims will not be successful in liberating themselves from slavery to Pervez and to his polytheistic laws until they are successful in liberating themselves from many of the leaders and 'Ulama falsely affiliated with Islam, who are in fact the first line of defense for Pervez and his government and army. You have seen with your own eyes the stances they took previously, when, rather than moving to break the siege placed on the Muslims of Afghanistan, they moved to break the siege placed on the bases and airports which Pervez gave to America and from which the planes were taking off to pound us in Tora Bora, Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Nangarhar and other places. And for your information, Pervez only dared invade Lal Masjid and Jami'ah Hafsa after he was satisfied that most of the 'Ulama and leaders of the Jama'ats (groups) had renounced the Jihad which Allah the Most High legislated to enforce the truth and whose banner was tied by the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), and replaced it with polytheistic democratic solutions and with peaceful demonstrations and bogus threats to absorb the anger of the masses. Pervez had tested them before, when he broke the back of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, after which they came to him voluntarily and of their own accord to participate in the polytheistic parliament, as if nothing had happened.

"So O people of Islam in Pakistan: the truth is greater than everyone, and if truth is not greater than everyone and if we don't apply the Hudood (punishments) to both the nobleman and weak, that is the road to ruin, as the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) informed, 'Those before you were ruined because when the nobleman among them stole, they would let him go, but when the weak one among them stole, they would execute on him the Hadd (punishment). And by He in whose Hand is my soul, were Fatima, daughter of Muhammad, to steal, I would cut off her hand' (Agreed upon) (Hadith).

"O youth of Islam in Pakistan: the Pen is writing what is for you and what is against you, and it won't benefit you to make excuses by saying that many of your 'Ulama and leaders have allied themselves to the infidel rulers and that the rest have failed to speak the truth and declare it out of fear of the ruling Taghuts (idols), except those on whom Allah has had mercy, and these are either in prison or on the run. This huge disaster - i.e. the marching of the 'Ulama of vice in line with the apostate ruler and their currying favor with him and attacking of the sincere Mujahid 'Ulama - isn't peculiar to Pakistan, but rather, is a disaster covering the entire Islamic Ummah. And there is no power nor might except with Allah.

"So O people of Islam in Pakistan: every one of you will come alone to Allah, the Most High, and be held accountable for his own actions, so discharge your duty. The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) has said, 'The smart one is he who subdues his self and works for what comes after death, and the feeble one is he who lets his self chase after his desires and (then) hopes from Allah' (Hadith). And be aware that if Jihad becomes an individual obligation, as is the case today, there are only two ways with no third: either Jihad, which is the way of the Messenger, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, and those who believed with him, or sitting, which is the way of the disobedient ones and Munafiqeen. So make your choice. Allah, the Most High, says, ' They prefer to be the womenfolk who remain behind at home, so their hearts are sealed so they understand not. But the Messenger and those who believe with him strive (in the cause of Allah) with their wealth and their persons, and it is they who shall have good things, and it is they who shall prosper ' (9:87-88) (Koranic verses; Al-Tawbah 9:87-88). And we in al-Qaida Organization call on Allah to witness that we will retaliate for the blood of Maulana Abd al-Rashid Ghazi and those with him against Musharraf and those who help him, and for all the pure and innocent blood, foremost of which is the blood of the champions of Islam in Waziristan both north and south - among them the two noble leaders, Nek (Taqi) Muhammad and Abdullah Mahsud. May Allah have mercy on them all.

"The tribes of Waziristan have made a great stand in the face of international Kufr - America, its allies and its agents - and the major states have been unable to make the stands they have made. They have been made resolute in this stance by their Iman (faith) in Allah, the Most High, and their Tawakkul (reliance) on Him, and they have withstood huge sacrifices of souls and wealth. We ask Allah to compensate them well. And the Muslims shall not forget these magnificent stances, and the blood of the 'Ulama of Islam and leaders of the Muslims and their offspring will not be spilled in vain or neglected as long as there remains in us a pulsing vein or a blinking eye. We ask Allah to help us to fulfill that.

"O Allah, our Lord, accept those of our brothers and sisters who have been killed among the martyrs and heal the wounded; O Allah, make their graves spacious for them, and take care of their families and raise their grades in 'Illiyeen (Heaven); O Allah, Pervez, his ministers, his 'Ulama and his soldiers have been hostile to your friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur and Lal Masjid: O Allah, break their backs, split them up and destroy their unity; O Allah, afflict them with the loss of their dear ones as they have afflicted us with the loss of our dear ones; O Allah, we seek refuge in You from their evilness and we place You at their throats; O Allah, make their plotting their destruction; O Allah, suffice for us against them with whatever You wish; O Allah, destroy them, for they cannot escape You; O Allah, count them, kill them, and leave not even one of them; O Allah, our Lord, give us in this world goodness and in the last goodness, and protect us from the torment of Fire; O Allah, send prayers and peace on our Prophet Muhammad and on all his family and Companions."

Read more on this article...

Kian is Free!

At midnight tonight (September 19) Tehran time, Kian Tajbakhsh was released from Evin Prison on bail and is at home with is wife Bahar, who is expecting their first child in a few weeks.

Robin Wright has more at the Washington Post. Read more on this article...

Afghans React to Iranian Warning

As I noted on September 16, Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran) Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that Iran has prepared a "crushing" (literally "teeth-breaking") response against the weak points of those who had occupied Afghanistan and Iraq.

Today members of Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga (lower house of the National Assembly) addressed this statement. Dr. Abdul Kabir Ranjbar, representative of Kabul and head of the Democratic Party of Afghanistan, is reported to have stated that attacking U.S. interests in Afghanistan from abroad would be a violation of the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and a breach of international law. Several other deputies made similar statements, though I do not yet have the texts. I would welcome help from anyone who can get them.

So far I have found no comment from the National Front, a group in the Afghan National Assembly that has received some assistance from Iran. The Afghan government and the Iranian embassy in Kabul declined to comment. The Ambassador of Iran to Afghanistan, Muhammad Reza Bahrami, was removed from his post by Tehran soon after General Jafari's statement. Bahrami has represented Iran in Afghanistan in various capacities for twenty-three years.

Update: I received from Kabul the text in English of a Tolo TV broadcast on this subject:

Text of report by Afghan independent Tolo TV on 18 September 2007

[Presenter] Iran has warned that it will target US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq if America attacks Iran.

[Passage omitted: comments by a senior commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps]

[Correspondent] A number of MPs describe as irresponsible the recent remarks by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, saying that it is an excuse for Iran to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and help the Afghan armed insurgents.

[Kabir Ranjbar, MP from Kabul Province] [The military forces of] any other country present in Afghanistan act in line with the constitution and other laws of Afghanistan. Attacking those [foreign] forces means invading Afghan soil. I do not consider this an attack on the Americans. From the legal point of view, it is an absolute violation of inter-governmental relations, and of good neighbourly values and principles with Iran.

[Ahmad Shah Khan Achakzai, MP from Kandahar Province, in Pashto] Relations between Iran and America have been bad for a long time. I believe this is only an excuse by the Iranians.

[Jamil Karzai, MP from Kandahar Province, in Pashto] First, if we take a look back, relations between Iran and America have not been good for the past 15 to 20 years, since the establishment of the Islamic government in Iran. They are not on good terms. The president of Afghanistan has offered to mediate between the two countries, if possible.

[Correspondent] America has stressed diplomatic ways of addressing the Iranian nuclear problem, but has not ruled out the possibility of resorting to military options. We tried to contact the Afghan Foreign Ministry and the Iranian embassy in Kabul for their comments on the issue, but they were not available for comments.

Further update from the comments: On September 19, Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait Ali Jannati stated that "in case of any military attack on Iran, the country will target all U.S. military bases used for Washington's attack." He called such an attack "unlikely," and added:

Iran only attacks those military bases used for launching military assault against it. Tehran believes that the countries of the region would never let the U.S. use their soil to attack Iran.

This appears to mean that, if the U.S. uses bases in Iraq or Afghanistan to attack Iran, Iran will retaliate against U.S. bases in those countries, but that otherwise it will respond in other ways. Read more on this article...

The Road to Hell in Paved with ? Intentions

No Agreement of Principles between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will be presented to the fall 2007 “Peace Conference,” Olmert informed the ministers of his party today. Instead a joint declaration of intentions is to be expected. His statement comes on the eve of Condoleeza Rice’s visit to check up on the local progress for the conference; in effect, preempting the visit. The fall conference is now likely to end up on the ever growing heap of Middle Eastern peace plans.

It is now obvious just how much the Hamas putsch in Gaza and the formation of two competing Palestinian governments had weakened not only Hamas but also Abbas. Hamas had excluded itself, and is now not party to any political process; Gaza now is a site of mostly humanitarian concerns. But Abbas also does not have the authority and power to get Olmert to drop Israel's habitual recalcitrance to agree to final status conditions. Olmert is interested only in normalizing relations with the Ramallah government, and “normalization” has meant the preservation of the political status quo and continued Israeli colonization. Obviously such status quo is not tenable. Maybe it is time to rephrase the statement attributed to Samuel Johnson, and say “The Road to Hell is Paved with Bad Intentions.” Read more on this article...

Washington Accuses and Threatens, Tehran Reacts

Threat and accusations against Iran have been so common that for long-standing Iran observers like me it is a bit difficult to get all riled up over them. But even according to Iran standards, this has been an intense couple of weeks. The Petraeus/ Crocker show was full of references to the “unhelpful” and even “malign” role played by Iran in Iraq, and, presumably running out of other reasons that sound convincing, the need to contain Iran seems to have emerged as the major (and latest) reason for the continued American presence in Iraq. In the words of George Bush, “Iran would benefit from the chaos and would be encouraged in its efforts to gain nuclear weapons and dominate the region.”

Stories abound too that the Bush administration is seriously considering military strikes against Iran; stories I might add that, according to the New York Times report by Helen Cooper, “the Bush administration officials have pointedly not tried to stem.” Even an Israeli air strike in Syria last week led to speculation that Israel, in alliance with the United States, was really trying to send a message to Iran that it could strike Iranian nuclear facilities if it chose to, leading George Perkovich of the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to say, “If I were the Iranians, what I’d be freaked out about is that the other Arab states didn’t protest. The Arab world non-reaction is a signal to Iran that Arabs aren’t happy with Iran’s power and influence, so if the Israelis want to go and intimidate and violate the airspace of another Arab state that’s an ally of Iran, the other Arab states aren’t going to do anything.”

Freaking out may be what George Perkovich and many others would like the Iranian leadership to be doing in the hope that the fear of a military attack will convince them to back down on the nuclear issue. But a reading of the Iranian press suggests anything but freaking out. In fact, I have found it quite interesting that various leaders in Iran have not only publicly reacted to what is going on in Washington swiftly but also, despite clear disagreements on a variety of other issues, rather calmly and in unison.

The gist of the message coming out of Iran is the following:

1. Iran is making serious efforts to resolve its issues with the international community and, more importantly, if it is allowed with the US.

2. Regarding the nuclear issue, this means an agreement to resolve the outstanding issues regarding Iran’s past activities and, upon their resolution through an IAEA-directed process, to maintain a sufficiently intrusive and IAEA-acceptable inspection regime allowing the IAEA to continue to verify that no nuclear material has been diverted to a weapons program.

3. Regarding Iraq, this means offer of help to improve the security situation, in addition to the continuous economic and political support Iran has given every government of Iraq since the American invasion. According to Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiatior, "Iran does not want a speedy withdrawal of the Amercian forces. They have to devise a time table with Nuri al-Maliki's government. No matter what Iraq is an occupied country and this is a heavy burden for the people of Iraq and the United States must figure out a way to resolve this issue and we are ready for any help."

4. But Iran is making these efforts, and sending all sorts of messages regarding the need to talk and reach a compromise on a variety of issues that concern both countries, understanding very well that the Bush administration may be in no mood for talks or compromise as it tries to find a scapegoat for its failures in the Middle East. Again, in the words of Ali Larijani, "Iran is an important county with which [the Americans] can have constructive interaction. In my view, because of the problems they are faced with in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan, the Americans are suffering from strategic incoherence.”

5. The awareness of this “strategic incoherence” or perhaps worries about the actions of what the former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says may be a “wounded tiger,” has also meant that Iran is preparing itself for the possibility of direct military attacks by the United States. In the words of the new head of IRGC, Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, “The enemies have intensified the tune of threats but they should know that… Sepah, in addition to high capability in military dimensions, has informational superiority over the enemies and high missile capabilities which are of great defensive help… Asymmetrical warfare is a kind of war that we utilized during the sacred defense since during the imposed war there were great inequalities between us and the enemy. But the inequality was not to the extent that we can call the battles of sacred defense asymmetrical war. But since the material and technological capabilities of [the current] enemy is higher relative to us, we need to move in the direction of appropriate policies and defensive approaches, the example of which is asymmetrical war. An objective example of this type of war can be seen in the 33-day Lebanon war.”

In short, from the Iranian perspective the issue at hand seems to be how to capitalize on the American foreign policy disaster in Iraq in ways that would lead to the American acceptance of the Islamic Republic "as is" and also a a significant and worthy player in the region while simultaneously pursuing policies that would best neutralize the possibility of American attack and increased pressures against Iran.

Just to give a flavor of the Iranian mindset, this is what Ali Larijani said on September 6:

The current conditions are very sensitive. We have to assess these conditions correctly and know their point of focus. The current conditions are valued as much by us as the victory of the Americans for global management and unilateralism is valued by them.

Speaking to the Assembly of Experts, this is what Larijani said on September 4,

In the past two months both the framework for the resolution of issues with the Agency has been devised and, with the initiative of a European country, a preliminary plan for political understanding in the nuclear negotiations was prepared. Under these conditions Iran has shown its goodwill for the resolution of the nuclear issue and the realization of the commitment of the opposing party means paving the way for the natural progression of the dossier in the Agency. This message needs a hearing ear. If America wants a dialogue of the deaf, a non-hearing status is [something that] all can achieve.

It is noteworthy that references to “deaf/non-hearing” or “irrational” Americans are now commonly used by Iranian officials. On August 31st, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said,

Their behavior has become childish. They are unable to solve any of the problems of the Middle East because the have a wrong point of view. Wait for a few months and under pressure the government of Iraq will also face failure. I guess then they will say that we want to dismiss the people of Iraq! Anyone who wants to give them advice, [is seen] as wanting to push them further into quagmire. I am surprised why they do not understand….. Is there no reason in their government? Are their advisors self-interested or ignorant?

On September 9, Larijani gives further clues about the extent to which Tehran feels it has extended its hand in trying to find a resolution to the problem:

Iran has taken a positive step based on good will. …The nuclear discussion regarding Iran over which they maneuvered a lot was that Iran had problems in the past which it did not clarify and secondly that the speed with which Iran was pursuing enrichment did not allow for inspections. [With the new understanding with Solana] we have resolved both of these problems… I previously told Solana and ElBaradei that we will take a positive step and in return you have to clarify the atmosphere. It is not supposed to be [a situation in which] one smiles and the other frowns… This is a test for us. We have taken an important step and if the behavior of the other side is not appropriate we will behave in a different way.

Then, regarding the possibility of a third sanctions resolution and military action, Larijani goes on to say,

Rationally we have to take into account all possibilities…..If the Americans welcome military confrontation then this will be the last nail on the coffin of neoconservatives. This is not a region from which they can reap attractive takeaways… [Increased military threats] are nothing new and in the past few years they have their highs and lows. The situation in Iraq has shaped conditions for them in such a way they are forced to talk this way in order to save face. These dreadful roars are more like a flight trumpet than a call for action. We cannot prevent anyone from speaking. We do not consider such an action rational but if they did it we will give commensurate response. Their act will be harmful for the whole region.

The message that the current Iranian leadership seems to be giving the United States is that, having tried and failed to use other countries as buffer to resolve the nuclear issue and counter the American antagonism towards the existence of the Islamic republic, they are now using the direct and I think a much riskier strategy of looking “eye to eye.”

By attempting to decouple the issue of enrichment and outstanding issues and agreeing to work on the latter with the IAEA, Iran is also signaling that it is able and willing to devise strategies intended to limit the damage the United States can cause.

Ironically, the case for what I think should be considered a “moderated” hard-line position was best made on September 7th by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, now the head of both Expediency Council and Council of Experts and a man who is perhaps the best symbol of Islamic Iran’s determination to survive and thrive under the most difficult of circumstances: I say ironically because Hashemi Rafsanjani is often described as the leader of the moderate/pragmatic wing of Iran’s foreign policy establishment:

The nuclear issue is still a very important issue. This oppressive dossier through which resolutions have been issued at the Agency and Security Council against the aggrieved Iran is still very important… Recently the Agency – of course if it really has good will – has begun an appropriate move … of course even in this act it is not yet clear what they are after. It is not acceptable by the United States, France, and many other Western country and they say ElBaradei should not have done this and we should go the route of Security Council. I tell them, do not repeat your mistakes so much. …Learn from the acts you committed in the world after September 11…They invaded a few countries in the name of the idea of axis of evil and in the name of terrorism….and in their minds surrounded Iran. Of course it became clear that they are not capable of taking care of countries such as Afghanistan and began to rely on NATO, of course giving a bad name to NATO too… The plan for the Greater Middle East has failed. The besieging of Iran has had the opposite result and today the United States is besieged, asking help from us… From this tribune I warn those sitting in the White House and members of Congress and tell them to let go of in your heads this way of confronting Islam, Muslims and Islamic revolutionary forces. If there is a way, it is only the path of talks which God willing is still open. Of course we ourselves should also give attention and when we are faced with a wounded tiger we have to be vigilant and face this big issue of the region and the world with reason, vigilance, and poise.

Hashemi Rafsanjani’s words, given on the occasion of his election as the head of the Assembly of Experts, seems to be a signal that the Iranian leadership has mustered the political will to offer yet another compromise; a compromise that can be build on what Iran considers to be certain shared regional interests with the United States but must allow Iran to come out of the confrontation with the US in ways that are acceptable within the broad outlines of Iran’s contentious politics.

But, watching its messages and hints go “unheard” by the “deaf,” the Iranian leadership is rational enough to realize that those terms may not be acceptable to the Bush administration; hence the Iranian messages that preparation have been under way for the kind of fight it feels it might have to fight but certainly prefers not to. Read more on this article...

Haleh Esfandiari Speaks to Gwen Ifill on the NewsHour

Haleh Esfandiari, the director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, was released after 105 days in Evin Prison (known as "Evin University," because of the large number of intellectuals who have graduated). She spoke last night to Gwen Ifill of the NewsHour. Watch the video or read the transcript here.

On why she was arrested:

To this day, I really don't know why I was arrested. But having talked to these -- having been interrogated for almost eight months by people from the ministry of intelligence, I can explain what they believe in.

They believe that the United States is now entangled in Iraq and elsewhere. Therefore, it will not contemplate a military attack on Iran, but it is planning a Velvet Revolution. And the instruments for this Velvet Revolution, like the Ukraine or Georgia, are American and European foundations and think-tanks. And I think they thought that the Wilson Center was also involved in this program.

On her treatment:

I was treated in prison with utmost respect. And I think the reason was that I always kept a barrier between myself and the interrogator. And I was always very polite to them. And they were, as a result, very polite to me.

On contact with other prisoners:

I knew that Mr. [Kian] Tajbakhsh, who is still -- both are still in prison -- was there, because one day the interrogator was carrying five, six English books. And as my eyes lit up, and I said, "Oh, English books." I said, "Who's are they?" And he said, "These belong to Mr. Tajbakhsh." And I said, "Could you ask him whether I can borrow some from him?"

So then, at night, one of the female guards -- because, in the women's ward or quarter, we had female guards -- she brought me two books, and this was the beginning of borrowing books from Mr. Tajbakhsh. And on one occasion, I sent him some fruit with the permission of the prison authorities.

On why she was released:

I think my release came mainly because the President of the Wilson Center, Lee Hamilton, wrote a letter to the [Supreme] Leader [Ayatollah Khamene'i]. And I have not seen the text of the letter because it was confidential. And the Leader reacted to the letter positively and probably ordered my release.

Read more on this article...

Iran War "Rollout" Roils Blogosphere

Since my original post passing on an unverified but troubling report that Vice-President Cheney's office had asked neo-conservative institutions for help creating political support for an attack on Iran, this nugget has been batting around the internet like any good conspiracy theory.

I'm not a fan of conspiracy theories. Anyone who works on Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan has to reject a dozen a day just to keep in shape. But if you don't want to be constantly surprised, you also have to learn from the Red Queen and "believe six impossible things before breakfast." With experience you get better at keeping the balance right.

Conspiracy theories are easy targets for deflation, since, almost by definition, they lack evidence to support them. Sure enough, right-wing writers (I won't say "conservative," since I have a hard time imagining Edmund Burke or Michael Oakeshott going down this road) have rolled out an attack on this report. I may illustrate the common pattern of these attacks by reference to Eli Lake's September 10 column in the New York Sun. The argument (omitting a few flagrant misrepresentations of what I wrote, which are just distractions) is pretty simple:

1. It's typical left-wing conspiracy theory to imagine that Cheney's office would instruct neo-conservatives to campaign for war with Iran.
2. Neo-conservatives are campaigning for war with Iran because they sincerely support such a war, not because anyone told them to do it.
3. They're right to support such a war, because the Iranian mad-mullah regime is already at war with the U.S. and is making nuclear bombs right now in order to destroy Israel, the U.S., and the entire global order.

Somehow I don't find this line of argument reassuring.

Another warning I have received is not to rely on Alex Debat, whom I have never met or spoken to. (Update: the Weekly Standard just asked me if Debat was my source.) Reports are now circulating that he is a fabulist. I have no idea if he is or not. I cited an article in the Sunday Times of London in which he is quoted by the reporter as providing a detailed description of U.S. preparations for war with Iran.

A tall tale? Maybe. Or maybe Debat got an advance look at this 80-page study by Dr. Dan Plesch and Martin Butcher of the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. They summarize their principal findings:

The study concludes that the US has made military preparations to destroy Iran’s WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and economic infrastructure within days if not hours of President George W. Bush giving the order. The US is not publicising the scale of these preparations to deter Iran, tending to make confrontation more likely. The US retains the option of avoiding war, but using its forces as part of an overall strategy of shaping Iran’s actions.

• Any attack is likely to be on a massive multi-front scale but avoiding a ground invasion. Attacks focused on WMD facilities would leave Iran too many retaliatory options, leave President Bush open to the charge of using too little force and leave the regime intact.

• US bombers and long range missiles are ready today to destroy 10,000 targets in Iran in a few hours.

• US ground, air and marine forces already in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan can devastate Iranian forces, the regime and the state at short notice.

• Some form of low level US and possibly UK military action as well as armed popular resistance appear underway inside the Iranian provinces or ethnic areas of the Azeri, Balujistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Iran was unable to prevent sabotage of its offshore-to-shore crude oil pipelines in 2005.

In case this turns out to be accurate, Iran has prepared to respond. Tehran Times reports:

Commander of the IRGC, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari here on Tuesday said that any attack against Iran would spark a crushing response from the country.

Iran has boosted its defense capabilities based on the weak points of the enemies, which occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, General Jafari said on Tuesday.

The newly appointed commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) warned that the IRGC is more than ready to defend Iran's against all security, political, cultural, and social threats.

Such preparations make a "provocation," which Reuel Marc Gerecht of AEI thinks is the most likely cause of war, more likely. In any case, General David Petraeus has told Congress that Iran has already launched such provocations. The National Review helpfully summarized them in order to savage Ambassador Ryan Crocker for supporting an “Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” Appeasement! Here is Petraeus' bill of particulars:

We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq.

Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence.

In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from al Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists.

In the past six months we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps’ Qods Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.

The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that … success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces[.]

[O]n a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater concern.

[Our] assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including … exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.

The weblog of Foreign Policy magazine originally adhered to the prescribed role of "moderates" in the rollout script by explaining "Why you should discount all the bomb Iran talk." Of course the administration was just engaging in coercive diplomacy over Iran's nuclear program in order to stiffen the backs of the Europeans. Clever negotiating tactic!

But this item from Fox News gave them second thoughts:

Political and military officers, as well as weapons of mass destruction specialists at the State Department, are now advising Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the diplomatic approach favored by Burns has failed and the administration must actively prepare for military intervention of some kind. Among those advising Rice along these lines are John Rood, the assistant secretary for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; and a number of Mideast experts, including Ambassador James Jeffrey, deputy White House national security adviser under Stephen Hadley and formerly the principal deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs.

Consequently, according to a well-placed Bush administration source, "everyone in town" is now participating in a broad discussion about the costs and benefits of military action against Iran, with the likely timeframe for any such course of action being over the next eight to 10 months, after the presidential primaries have probably been decided, but well before the November 2008 elections.

The discussions are now focused on two basic options: less invasive scenarios under which the U.S. might blockade Iranian imports of gasoline or exports of oil, actions generally thought to exact too high a cost on the Iranian people but not enough on the regime in Tehran; and full-scale aerial bombardment.

This could not be discounted as the ravings of the liberal blogosphere (even if Rupert Murdoch did give a fundraiser for Hillary Clinton). So today Foreign Policy warns:

Next thing you know, you'll start hearing folks at AEI saying that Iran was responsible for 9/11. Wait a minute, that's already happening, as Peter Beinart pointed out in Sunday's New York Times. "It's the 2007 equivalent of the claims made in 2002 and 2003 about Iraq," Beinart noted. "The years between 9/11 and the Iraq war gave rise to a cottage industry ... charging that Saddam Hussein was the hidden mastermind behind a decade of jihadist terror. While refuted by the 9/11 Commission and mainstream terror experts, these claims had a political effect."

Looks like it's time to stop the epidemic of denial that has the foreign-policy community convinced that an attack on Iran is out of the question. Before it's too late.

I once wrote a book about early warning and conflict prevention. There are two kinds of errors in early warning (as in statistical inference): believing something that ain't so and disbelieving something that is. You have to weigh the likelihood and the cost of each kind of error. That's the calculus behind Vice-President Cheney's One Percent Doctrine: the risk of not acting on a warning of nuclear terrorism is so great, that you have to treat a one percent possibility as a certainty.

I set the bar a bit higher than one percent. But in view of the record of this administration, including what its leaders and supporters have said themselves, the cost of not acting on these warnings is too great. The cost of acting (for me anyway) is being attacked by the New York Sun and the National Review and being supported by a few conspiracy theorists. I can live with it.

Update: In his speech yesterday in Clinton, Iowa, Senator Barack Obama said:

We hear eerie echoes of the run-up to the war in Iraq in the way that the President and Vice President talk about Iran. They conflate Iran and al Qaeda. They issue veiled threats. They suggest that the time for diplomacy and pressure is running out when we haven't even tried direct diplomacy. Well George Bush and Dick Cheney must hear - loud and clear - from the American people and the Congress: you don't have our support, and you don't have our authorization for another war.

Let's hear from other candidates and members of Congress. Read more on this article...

The IAEA Board of Governors Meet to Talk about Iran Again

The 35-member IAEA Board of Governors are meeting in Vienna this week and the agenda in all likelihood will be dominated by Iran again. Mohammad ElBaradei, the Agency’s Director General, is asking the Board, despite American objections, to give the IAEA time to implement the work plan the Agency has negotiated with Iran. ElBaradei’s hope is for the Security Council to take a "timeout'' from sanctions and for Iran to pause its uranium enrichment to avert a crisis over the country's nuclear program.

But Iran has already stated that it will not accept a suspension under any conditions and will halt its newly agreed upon cooperative work plan with the Agency if new sanctions are pursued at the Security Council. Hence, the Board, but more significantly the P5+1 (Permanent Security Council members plus Germany) which have been pursuing Security Council sanctions in order to pressure Iran to halt its enrichment program, is faced with the difficult choice of deciding whether to give the IAEA more room to maneuver regarding the inspection of Iran’s nuclear program. This means a suspension of the attempt to tighten the sanctions noose without a concomitant and publicly announced suspension of uranium enrichment by Tehran. There have been suggestions that Iran has effectively and perhaps intentionally slowed its program (a suggestion that was immediately denied by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but not Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani). But I am pretty sure that the chances of an official suspension is almost nil.

I am pasting below the Iran relevant parts of the Director General’s statement to the Board, acknowledging the Agency's ability "to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material," resolution of a number of outstanding issues along with the Iran’s continued defiance of Security Council demand to suspend enrichment and the Agency’s inability to verify certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program. It is in the hope of verifying these aspects that the work plan was negotiated with Iran.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The report before you provides an update on the implementation of Agency safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report makes four main points.

First, the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has continued to provide the access and reporting needed to enable Agency verification in this regard.

Second, Iran has provided the Agency with additional information and access needed to resolve a number of long outstanding issues. In particular, Agency questions regarding past plutonium experiments in Iran have been satisfactorily answered, and this issue has been resolved. Questions about the presence and origin of high enriched uranium particles at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility have also been resolved.

Third, contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, calling on Iran to take certain confidence building measures, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, and is continuing with the construction and operation of the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. Iran is also continuing with its construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak. This is regrettable.

Fourth, despite repeated requests by the Board and the Security Council to Iran, the Agency has so far been unable to verify certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran´s nuclear programme. It was this situation that triggered a crisis of confidence about the nature of Iran´s nuclear programme, which led to a series of actions by the UN Security Council. However, during a meeting I had with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Dr. Larijani, it was agreed that Iran would work with the Agency to develop a work plan for resolving all outstanding verification issues. A copy of the resulting work plan between Iran and the Secretariat is attached to my report.

This is the first time that Iran has agreed on a plan to address all outstanding issues, with a defined timeline, and is therefore an important step in the right direction. Naturally, the key to gauging Iran´s commitment will be its willingness to implement this work plan fully and in a timely manner. This would require active cooperation by Iran and its undertaking of all the transparency measures needed to reconstruct the history of its nuclear programme - measures that are provided for in the additional protocol and beyond, and which include access to locations, documents and individuals, as well as answers to all questions the Agency may need to ask in order to reach a technical conclusion on a particular issue. Resolving all outstanding verification issues in the next two to three months, after a long deadlock, would go a long way towards building the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran´s past nuclear programme.

But equally important, Iran obviously needs to continue to build confidence in the scope and nature of its current nuclear programme, including renewed access by the Agency to information relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research. To that end, and given the special history of Iran´s nuclear programme, it would be indispensable for Iran to ratify and bring into force its additional protocol, as called for by the Security Council and the Board. This would enable the Agency to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material but, equally important, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

Finally, I continue to hope that conditions will be created soon to make it possible for the resumption of negotiations between Iran and all relevant parties. I still believe it is only through negotiations that a durable solution could be achieved - a solution that provides the international community with the required level of assurance and enables Iran to exercise its rights under the NPT. To this end I repeat that a "double time-out" of all enrichment related activities and of sanctions could provide a breathing space for negotiations to be resumed. The earlier we move from confrontation and distrust to dialogue and confidence building, the better for Iran and for the international community.

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Kian Tajbakhsh: "I do expect to be released soon."

The BBC and several other sources report that "journalists on a tour of Evin Prison were given a surprise meeting with Mr. Tajbakhsh." According to this report Kian said:

"I do expect to be released soon. Exactly when, I do not know. . . .The conditions in prison are fine. I'm in a solitary cell, I have a television and a table. I have a private bathroom. . . .I have weekly visits from my wife."

Mr Tajkbakhsh then revealed that he had not yet been charged by Iranian judicial authorities, despite them claiming otherwise in March.

"There have been no formal charges with the case right now, my case is under investigation," he said.

"Of course, I've been told why I am being held but I prefer not to discuss issues with the case right now."

The academic insisted he was not guilty and said the interview on Iranian television had not been a confession.

Let's hope that Kian is back with his wife, family, and friends soon. Read more on this article...

Collapse of Legitimacy in Pakistan? Negotiations in Afghanistan?

The illegal deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia combined with signs of internal weakness in the military, could be a dangerous turning point. Ahmed Rashid, writing in the Telegraph, draws a link between the two. The U.S. (or the West), he writes, is desperate to broker a "loveless marriage" between General Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto:

So that the general can combat the terrorists and the lady play democracy. This, they hope, can keep the crumbling edifice of military rule going for a few more years or at least until Osama bin Laden is winkled out of his home in the tribal regions of North and South Waziristan.

But he goes on:

That is where the whole plan falls apart because in a country like Pakistan, a failing state hovering over the abyss, there are too many loose ends to tie up.

What are these loose ends? None other than every principle of legitimacy of the state in Pakistan. Sharif is (hypocritically) challenging whatever shred of democratic legitimacy the General may concoct with Washington's support by sabotaging the plan for a negotiated transition ignoring his party. Musharraf was forced into this confrontation when a mass mobilization of the legal profession in support of the chief justice exposed the vacuum of legality on which the military regime stood; only a 2 am telephone call from Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stopped Musharraf from destroying the pretense of legality by declaring martial law.

Pakistani generals thought they were prepared for this: after destroying any other source of legitimacy, they have always argued that only the army kept Pakistan together. It used "the mullahs" against the "politicians," and it had both under firm control. But now, writes Rashid:

There is the crumbling morale in the army. Two weeks ago US and Nato forces in Afghanistan were shocked to discover that 300 Pakistani soldiers - their erstwhile partners in the war on terrorism - had surrendered to the Taliban in Waziristan without firing a shot.

Soldiers in the badlands controlled by the Taliban and al-Qa'eda are deserting or refusing to open fire. The White House is panic-stricken. That is because Gen Musharraf in his hubris has utterly failed to convince Pakistanis or the army that Pakistan has to fight not America's war, but its own war against ever-expanding extremism.

So the Pakistani state is one by one shedding its legal-constitutional, Islamic, democratic, and national legitimacy.

And this happened in the state where (1) Usama bin Laden is currently living, having reconstituted the core structures of al-Qaida; (2) the military has nuclear weapons and recently tested a missile delivery system; and (3) President Bush removed Ambassador Ryan Crocker in November to send him to Iraq, the "central front in the War on Terror," leaving the US ambassadorship vacant during most of this crisis.

The violence continues in Afghanistan, of course, despite the same type of statistically induced optimism as in Iraq on the part of US military commanders. The new British government, however, having conducted its review of Iraq and Afghanistan policy, decided to pull out of Basra and reportedly has told Washington that in Afghanistan, we are "winning the battles but losing the war.” Apparently the glass is half empty and getting emptier.

But a small item deserves to be watched: according to AFP a "senior Taliban spokesman" told their correspondent, "For the sake of national interests ... we are fully ready for talks with the government." This follows by one day yet another public offer of negotiations from President Hamid Karzai.

This could be another soon-to-be-denied random report. But it occurs in a context where Karzai has repeatedly offered such negotiations with no apparent hindrance from Washington.

At the August Afghan-Pakistan Peace Jirga in Kabul, the participants decided to constitute a smaller jirga of 50 (25 from each country) to "engage in "dialogue for peace and reconciliation with opposition." This jirga took place in part thanks to U.S. engagement, and senior officials have privately said they fully support this initiative. In Pakistan, Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, the leader of Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam, the Deobandi party that is more or less the godfather of the Taliban, offered cautious support to the process. Fazlur Rahman had boycotted the Jirga on the grounds that the Taliban were not represented there, but he did not rule out joining the process in the future.

Fazlur Rahman has outlined what a settlement would look like. Last November in Peshawar, Ahmed Rashid and I heard him address a "Pakhtun Peace Jirga" organized by the Pashtun Nationalist Awami National Party. Fazlur Rahman, whose party had participated in Pakistani elections and has at times been an electoral ally of the PPP, said he "could not deny to others what I claim for myself." Just as JUI participated in elections in Pakistan, the Taliban could do so in Afghanistan, but not while they were labeled "terrorists" and foreign troops occupied the country.

That is the first and principal (though not sole) obstacle to negotiations: are the Taliban the organization that harbored the terrorists of 9/11, who therefore must, in President Bush's words, "share their destiny?" Or are they an Afghan armed opposition group that has not yet joined the peace process that started with the Bonn Agreement? Will returning Taliban be reintegrated or sent to Guantanamo?

If quoted correctly, the Taliban spokesman offered an interesting hint: he spoke of "national interests." This is not a term commonly employed by Bin Laden and Zawahari. There have been many signs, especially since the invasion of Iraq, that the Taliban have become radicalized and moved toward a global Islamism foreign to their origins. But Taliban ground commanders, like the mujahidin commanders of the 1980s (in some cases their fathers or uncles) sometimes make local deals for local reasons. President Karzai's spokesman, Humayun Hamidzada, responded to the report with the standard formula, that "government's doors are open to anyone who agrees to obey the constitution and other laws of the country to join peace."

The status of those Taliban leaders branded by the U.S. as harborers of al-Qaida and listed by the UN Security Council as terrorists subject to sanctions could pose an obstacle, as well as the question of foreign troops. But the internal ethnic cleavage and the regional situation will also complicate matters. Domestically, the former Northern Alliance leaders by and large have opposed any hint of dialogue with the Taliban. Significant sectors of the northern population retains memories of conquest and massacre by the Taliban. But their former political leader, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, reportedly stated last week at a seminar in Peshawar that "Taliban should be given representation in the sub-jirga formed in line with the declaration of the joint Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga last month."

Regional resistance may be harder to overcome. Russia refuses to countenance the removal from the sanctions list even of the current Governor of Uruzgan Province, a former Taliban commander who has collaborated well with a Dutch NATO contingent and made the province more secure. Even as the U.S. has escalated claims that Iran is aiding the Taliban, Iranian diplomats privately warn the U.S. against making a political deal with the Taliban.

Such a deal could constitute a rough Afghan equivalent of U.S. policy in Anbar Province, Iraq. In 2001-2002, the U.S. cooperated with Iran to use the Northern Alliance to occupy the ground vacated by the Taliban and to bolster the authority of the new Afghan administration. While the Northern Alliance's ties to Iran are weaker and more purely pragmatic than those of Iraq's Shi'a leaders, Iran and the U.S. both see them as potential (though unreliable) Iranian assets in Afghanistan. Whether or not the U.S. has in view such a strategic shift toward "moderate" Taliban (I have no direct evidence of it), Iran will surely suspect that it does and react accordingly. In the context of rising tensions with the U.S. over Iraq and Tehran's nuclear program, such political changes could link the two wars even more closely, mostly (as usual) to the detriment of the aspirations of Afghans for a semblance of a normal life after decades of war.

It is worth exploring indications that those currently fighting the Afghan government, NATO, and US in Afghanistan are willing to adopt a national political agenda that could, in principle, be a subject of negotiation. But if Bin Laden's support base among Taliban in the tribal territories of Pakistan continues to grow, and if the Pakistani state continues to disintegrate, the incentives for maximalist positions will grow as well. If tensions between the U.S. and Iran escalate, the result may be reconfigured war rather than peace. And if the U.S. presses on with aggressive opium poppy eradication in southern Afghanistan, efforts at consolidating government authority in the vulnerable areas bordering what Rashid calls Pakistan's "badlands" may collapse.
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Swing States: Jazz Diplomacy along the Silk Road

In the Christian Science Monitor, Moises Velazquez-Manoff brings us a report on "Jazz Ambassadors" in Central Asia.

Buried in this feature is a policy proposal from yours truly:

The US touts tolerance and diversity along the Silk Road, says Barnett Rubin, director of studies at New York University's Center on International Cooperation. But its primary interests in the region, he says, are access to military bases for the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns to counter Russian influence and eventually tapping abundant oil and natural gas resources. "If anyone tells you that the US has an interest in democracy in Central Asia, don't believe them," Dr. Rubin says.

"Cultural exchange is no substitute for an effective foreign policy," he adds. "Patting a kid on the head is no substitute for having a policy in the Middle East that Arabs can support."

Dour as he sounds, Rubin has only good things to say about sending jazz abroad. Future presidential candidates should nominate "a secretary of swing," he half jokes. "Swinging is a very important [political] philosophy. You make something beautiful by cooperating, without anyone telling you what to do."

I doubt this administration can make good use of jazz: if they cared about jazz, they would fix New Orleans. But jazz can do something more for the U.S. than showcase diversity. It's a model for international relations in a world out of balance. Swinging is not only cooperating, it's driving forward by staying off the beat. Since September 11, we have been hitting the beat just where UBL knows where to find us. When Dizzy Gillespie ran for president in 1963-1964, he had an important lesson: just listen to his campaign song, Vote Dizzy. He keeps you guessing where he's coming down, but he always gets there in the end.

In a rare show of transparency, Dizzy announced his major appointments in advance: Duke Ellington as Secretary of State, the recently departed Max Roach as Secretary of War (when told that the post was now called "Defense," Dizzy whispered, "Don't nobody tell Max" -- later he decided to abolish the Department of War -"Because we're not having any"), and, most inspired, Miles Davis as Director of Central Intelligence. Miles knew how to end a war. When John Coltrane asked him how to end a solo, he replied, "Take the horn out of your mouth." And with Miles at the CIA, there would have been no slam dunks. He would have sent daily briefer Thelonius Monk to give the President the facts the way he gave us the notes: Straight, No Chaser.

Update: Joe Zawinul has died. My wife Susan and I saw him lead the Zawinul Syndicate at a concert in Provence last July. Talk about jazz ambassadors: he was a jazz UN. This 75-year old Austrian who played with Cannonball Adderley and Miles Davis performed with electrifying musicians from Brazil, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, and the Congo. Mercy, mercy, mercy. Read more on this article...

Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan: A Study by UNAMA

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued a 140-page study today entitled Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007). September 9, the day chosen to issue the report, is a national holiday in Afghanistan, the anniversary of the assassination of Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud by al-Qa'ida operatives, which was the first known suicide attack in the history of the Afghan conflicts. Massoud was the charismatic field commander of Northern Afghanistan's resistance to both the Soviet Union and the Taliban, and his assassination was an integral part of the preparation for September 11. Al-Qaida's goal was to annihilate the most effective potential rallying point for a strike back against al-Qaida and the Taliban. This attack was carried out by European citizens of North African Arab origin, not by Afghans, but since that time some attacks have also been carried out by Afghans.

The authors of the report interviewed over two dozen would-be or failed suicide bombers. They find that most are poor and uneducated, some are children, and many did not fully understand the consequences of their actions. An increasing number are Afghans, though the majority appear to be foreigners. The tribal territories of Pakistan remain an important base of support and recruitment for suicide bombers, but the Afghan dimension is growing. Only 11 percent of Afghans surveyed state that suicide bombing can sometimes be used to defend Islam.

The report documents the effects of these bombings on the communities they attack as well as on the communities from which the bombers are recruited and recommends a set of actions to prevent them. Read more on this article...

Crossover Dreams: UBL Rebrands al-Qa'ida in (anti-) Global Market Share Grab

Most of the discussion of Bin Laden's recent video seems to me to have missed the point. Bin Laden is no longer just seeking to lead Muslims in a jihad against "Crusaders and Zionists"; he is proclaiming to the whole world that the genuine revolutionary alternative to imperialism, capitalism, global warming, genocide, high taxes, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, moral decay, confused sex roles, the decline of the family, commercialism, and whatever else ails us is Islam. In this sense Bin Laden is indeed seeking to don the mantle of the last century's false prophets.

One of the clearest indicators is the social origin of new recruits to al-Qa'ida. As Olivier Roy writes in his forthcoming Le Croissant et le Chaos:

La carte de recrutement d’al-Qaida ne correspond pas à celle des conflits du Moyen-Orient, car on y trouve surtout des jeunes musulmans européens de seconde génération et des convertis, mais ni Palestiniens, ni Afghans et fort peu de gens venus du Moyen-Orient.

The map of the origin of al-Qaida recruits does not match the map of Middle East conflicts. The recruits consist predominantly of second-generation European young Muslims and converts, not Palestinians or Afghans, and very few people coming from the Middle East.

This quote comes from an electronic file dated in July, but it perfectly matches the profile of those arrested in Germany last week: the sons of Turkish guest workers and a German convert.

Just what are these "converts" converting to? They are not converting to anything that most Muslims would recognize as Islam. They do not integrate into the religion and culture of Islamic civilization and then gradually develop political views that correspond to their new milieu. On the contrary: they are radicalized opponents of the global order who find that al-Qa'ida has become the most genuine anti-globalization revolutionary organization. "Conversion" is just part of the initiation ritual.

Former Pakistani ISI director Hamid Gul made the same point in a UPI interview on September 28, 2001. Elaborating on his thesis that the World Trade Center was bombed by the Israeli secret services who warned the Jews to stay away (I must have forgotten to check my email that day), Gul told Arnaud de Borchgrave:

The world needs a post-modern state system. Right now, the nation-state and round the clock satellite TV lead people to imitate America's way of life. Which is mathematically impossible. You have 4 percent of the world's population consuming 32 percent of the world's resources. The creator through Prophet Mohammed said equal distribution. Capitalism is the negation of the creator's will. It leads to imperialism and unilateralism. [We will have] a global village under divine order, or we will have global bloodshed until good triumphs over evil.

Bin Laden is more sophisticated. He must have found it frustrating for years that his epigones denied him credit for 9/11, in the apparent belief that only Jews were clever enough to pull off such an operation. He now says to Americans who do not understand "why they hate us":

This innocence of yours is like my innocence of the blood of your sons on the 11th - were I to claim such a thing. But it is impossible for me to humour any of you in the arrogance and indifference you show for the lives of humans outside America, or for me to humour your leaders in their lying, as the entire world knows they have the lion's share of that.

In his latest speech he even abandons the usual anti-Semitic claims that "Zionists" control the government and press in the U.S. in favor of the populist trope that the government serves capital, which wants oil. Ahmadinejad denies the Holocaust. Bin Laden acknowledges the Holocaust and blames it on Western Civilization. Bin Laden even poses, amazingly, as the heir of the tolerance of classical Islam, the last time that Islam posed a global alternative:

The holocaust of the Jews was carried out by your brethren in the middle of Europe, but had it been closer to our countries, most of the Jews would have been saved by taking refuge with us. And my proof for that is in what your brothers, the Spanish, did when they set up the horrible courts of the Inquisition to try Muslims and Jews, when the Jews only found safe shelter by taking refuge in our countries. And that is why the Jewish community in Morocco today is one of the largest communities in the world. They are alive with us and we have not incinerated them.

It is ironic to say the least that Bin Laden claims credit for the policies of Muslim rulers that his predecessors, the Salafis of the day (the Muwahhidin, known in Spain as Almohade), considered to be apostates.

Bin Laden's message has little or no appeal to Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, or elsewhere engaged in their national struggles for identity, legitimacy, or power. He engages, as Roy writes, "les migrants, les réfugiés, la seconde génération, les nouvelles classes sociales, ou bien . . .les tribus en mutation sociale." (He attracts "migrants, the second generation, new social classes, or tribes undergoing social change.")

I made a similar point about Bin Laden's relation to globalization and the nation-state system in a previous post.

This movement can pose a serious threat because of its global capacity for violence. But the more we link that threat to the numerous political struggles of Muslims around the world, the more we provide Bin Laden with talking points for his next video. Stay tuned. Read more on this article...

A new Declaration of Principles?

The focus of political debate in Israel between now and November will be the planned Peace Conference. Two approaches seem to be shaping up.

One is expressed by the Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, who argues that no withdrawal from the West Bank should take place until Israel has developed an anti-rocket system to prevent the recurrence, this time from the West Bank, of the Hizbollah-type rocketing of Israeli cities and other targets during the 2006 War in Lebanon.

The other is represented by Olmert’s deputy and confidant, Vice Premier Haim Ramon. Two respected correspondents of Yediot Achronot wrote on September 6, 2007, that Ramon met with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayad to work on a statement of principles for the conference. The journalists alleged that the position Ramon put forth included offering the Palestinians an Israeli withdrawal from nearly the entire West Bank, including the Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem, as part of a final peace deal. According to the report's account of Ramon's offer, the border between Israel and the future Palestinian state will roughly follow the route of Israel's West Bank security wall. This would leave the major Israeli settlement blocs that comprise between 3 and 8 percent of the West Bank in Israel's hands. In return, Israel will cede the same amount of land inside Israel to the Palestinians to make up for the annexed territory. Such an offer would be an improvement on Barak’s 2000 offer which included only partial territorial compensation. In addition, he alleged to have offered a land corridor between the West Bank and Gaza, a long-standing Palestinian demand.

The Yediot Achoronot article explained the relationship between Olmert and Ramon in this fashion: Olmert is aware of and approves of Ramon's negotiating activities. If Ramon is successful in reaching an accord, Olmert will publicly adopt the results, and if they fail, Olmert will portray them as Ramon’s personal effort. If this is indeed the case, Ramon is playing the same role Beilin did in his talks with Abu Mazen (Abbas) in 1995. That agreement was never given an official hearing as it was concluded shortly before Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995. At the same time, its principles served as the core of the 2000 Camp David Two talks between Barak and Arafat.

It is much too soon to take the report on Ramon’s negotiations at face value but there is growing tension within the ranks of Kadima, Olmert’s Party, as November nears. At the same time, Yediot Achronot reports today (September 9, 2007), that in view of Olmert’s efforts there is a growing willingness on the part of the Labor Party to stay in the coalition government with Kadima. Yossi Beilin, Haim Oron, and “Peace Now” leaders to the left of Labor are also seeking ways to strengthen his public standing and to advance the negotiations.

Gershon Shafir Read more on this article...

The Double Defeat of the Neo-Conservatives: A New Book by Olivier Roy

This week U.S. bookstores (and the American Enterprise Institute) launch the latest phantasmagorias of Michael Ledeen and Norman Podhoretz (mildly dissected by The New Republic's Peter Beinart in the New York Times Book Review). Anglophone readers will have to wait, unfortunately, to read Olivier Roy's Le Croissant et le Chaos, in French bookstores September 12. I have just received an electronic copy from the author and can only hope that it is translated soon.

I haven't finished this 200-page essay yet, so I will just translate an excerpt from the review in Le Monde under the title, "The Double Defeat of the Neo-Conservatives."

The neo-conservatives imposed a comprehensive (totalizing) response to a supposedly totalitarian threat, whereas what was required was implementation of policies adapted to each situation and conflict.

Olivier Roy reaffirms the conviction he has upheld for years: "The vision of a Muslim world unified under the banner of Islam mounting an offensive against the West makes no sense," no less than that of a new "Islamo-fascist" totalitarianism, which has supposedly replaced the totalitarianisms of the 20th century.

This review does not do justice to the subtlety and clarity of Roy's analysis. He shows how the implementation of a policy based on a false image of middle eastern societies self-destructs irretrievably once fantasy meets reality. An example from today's news is the latest "success" in Iraq: arming Saddamist Sunni militias aganist Salafi jihadists (and Shi'a militias) in the name of the civic equality of all citizens of Iraq.

Let's hope this book is available in English soon. Read more on this article...

Update on Iran War Rollout

At UPI's "Outside View" feature, David Isenberg of the British American Security Information Council and the Cato Institute provides a summary of the campaign for war with Iran so far. He missed the Newsweek article by AEI fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht about why war is inevitable, the Washington Post's shameless reprise yesterday of its 2003 attack on Mohamed El-Baradei of the IAEA, the Anti-Defamation League's opening of its No Nuclear Iran campaign, and William Kristol's call for attacks on "Terrorist Training Camps" in Iran.

Update: The New Yorker used to have a capsule review of Night at the Opera which said, "The Marx Brothers do to Il Trovatore what ought to be done to Il Trovatore." See Salon, where Glenn Greewald does to Fred Hiatt and Michael Ledeen what ought to be done to Fred Hiatt and Michael Ledeen.

Update II: Interviewed by Spencer Ackerman of TPMMuckraker, Reuel Marc Gerecht of AEI good naturedly denies that he or AEI received any instructions from the Office of the Vice President to beat the drums for war with Iran. He even says something nice about me. Let's hope that he is right and my source is mistaken. For the record: I did not accuse "hardliners in Dick Cheney's office of giving right-leaning think tanks in Washington 'instructions' to start a drumbeat for war with Iran," as Ackerman writes. I passed on a credible report to that effect, explicitly saying I could not verify it, in order to draw attention to something I consider very dangerous. Let's see if empirical evidence confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis.
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Theses on Policy toward Iran

As I and many others have noted, there are increasing signs that the administration has decided or has nearly decided to launch an air and sea attack on Iran, which will include but not be limited to all installations connected to the country’s nuclear program. All military equipment is in place for such an attack (three carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf). As I wrote in a recent blog, there are credible reports of a concerted campaign to build public support for such an attack. The aim is said to be to get support in polls up to about 35-40%, but the most important goal is to intimidate the Democrats in Congress, in particular through AIPAC and allied groups, so that they will not use either the power of the purse or Congress’ war powers to impede the attack. The administration is counting on Democrats saying they don’t want to “tie the president’s hands” as he deals with this mortal threat to the U.S. and Israel. The Anti-Defamation League announced today a campaign with the theme "No Nuclear Iran."

Under the Cheney-Addington interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, there is no need for any Congressional consent to such an action by the President. In any case, the Authorization for the Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001, suffices, as it authorizes the use of such force against any terrorists or states harboring terrorists. There is no requirement that the President certify or Congress approve any such designation. The argument would be strengthened, however, if the administration formally designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran) or its elite unit, the Qods (Jerusalem) Force, as a terrorist organization, a proposal that has been floated in the press. In that case the Iranian state would be officially designated as harboring terrorists.

The rationale for such an act of war is likely to be that it is necessary to prevent a terrorist state from acquiring nuclear weapons. Any hint of Iranian compliance with international demands would interfere with the campaign. Hence part of the PR campaign that has started for the war will consist of attacks on Mohamed El-Baradei and the IAEA, as in 2002-2003 over Iraq, when, of course, the IAEA was proved right and its critics wrong. Such at attack, presumably authored by Fred Hiatt, commenced on the editorial page of the Washington Post today. For some reason, the Post editorial does not mention its similar editorial from January 28, 2003, where it made identical false charges against El-Baradei.

The Bush-Cheney policy on Iran is unlikely to have any outcome but war, not because of the threat of the use of force, but because of its objective: regime change. The President and Vice-President have never echoed the disavowals of this goal by other officials. Their supporters at AEI, the Weekly Standard, and elsewhere, make it clear that the goal of the policy is destroying the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even if this were not true, the government (and not only the government) of Iran believes it is true. In repeated discussions on several continents over the past five years, Iranian officials have told me that the main obstacle to improvement in U.S.-Iran relations is the agenda of regime change – not Israel, not Iraq, nothing else. No amount of pressure or threats will force the Iranian government to negotiate its own destruction. Therefore as long as regime change is the goal, or appears to be the goal, Iran has no credible incentives to comply with any demands. Threats are useless. Sanctions are useless. In any case, sanctions will strengthen and enrich the regime, as they almost always do.

The Bush administration discarded an opportunity to expand cooperation with the government of President Muhammad Khatami after the U.S. and Iran collaborated to remove the Taliban regime and establish the Government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. I witnessed that cooperation as a member of the UN team at the Bonn conference. The Bush administration threw that chance away, declaring Iran a member of the Axis of Evil. It did so under President Khatami, who never denied the Holocaust or said that the Israeli regime, like the Soviet Union, was destined to disappear from the pages of time (which is what Ahmadinejad actually said, not that Israel should be wiped off the map). Therefore Iran does not believe that there is any genuine link between the extremist statements of President Ahmadinejad and U.S. policy, as the Bush administration had exactly the same policy toward the Government of President Khatami. Ahmadinejad has indeed called Israel the “bearer of Satan,” the equivalent in Persian of calling a country a member of the “axis of evil.” There is a fearful symmetry of demonization.

The advocates of war claim that the Iranian regime is a monolithic, revolutionary regime whose aim is destruction of world order and in particular the U.S. and Israel. The argument is identical to that of Cold Warriors who argued that the USSR was a monolithic revolutionary regime with exactly the same aims. Because the regime is “evil” and monolithic, negotiations are impossible (see AEI fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht’s article in the current Newsweek). Internal change or reform is also impossible. There are no Iranian moderates or realists with whom one can work for change, just as there were no moderate or reform communists in the USSR. These same people argued that everything Gorbachev did was part of a plot to trick the West and strengthen Soviet Communism. They now make the same arguments about Iran.

In part thanks to them, we are now dealing not with the Iranian Gorbachev, but with the Iranian Putin, who is rather worse than the original. Nonetheless, the Iranian power structure still includes people with a range of views, from conservative realist to reformist, with whom it is possible to engage, if an agenda of regime change did not sabotage any efforts on their part. I meet with such people regularly. Certainly the Iranian democratic opposition has made clear its opposition to forcible regime change.

There is an alternative to war, but it has to start with an end to regime change as a policy goal. There are then a number of areas, such as counter-narcotics in Afghanistan and the territorial integrity of Iraq, where the U.S. and Iran have clearly complementary interests and could start a dialogue. I will not attempt to sketch a road map here, and it will be difficult to move far as long as the current administrations are in power in both countries.

The alternative of war will have terrible effects including:

• No support for the U.S. from any country but Israel (though Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may not be too unhappy) and the demolition of whatever still remains of the U.S.’s international standing except as a warmaking power; that reputation will also quickly dissipate as this war, too, fails to achieve its objectives.
  
• Rapid deterioration of security in (at least) Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; note that much of the support for Benazir Bhutto, whom the U.S. hopes will help shepherd a political transition in Pakistan, comes from Pakistani Shi’a, who will turn violently anti-American in the event of an attack on Iran; northern Afghanistan is also under the de facto control of groups supported by Iran against the Taliban; the government of Iraq in Baghdad will oppose an attack on Iran, but our new friends in Anbar province, whom President Bush visited on Labor Day and who fought Iran for Saddam Hussein, will support it and maybe even volunteer to fight.
• Gasoline prices may reach $7/gallon within a week and probably go higher rapidly, especially if Iran makes even partially successful attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz.
• Either there will be a movement of national solidarity against invasion in Iran from across the entire Iranian political spectrum, or (less likely) Iran will collapse into some kind of civil disorder, with nuclear materials littered about.
• Hizbullah and Hamas will unleash missile attacks and perhaps suicide bombings on Israel, and Israel will respond harshly in Lebanon and Gaza (at least).
• Such an attack will also have other unpredictable consequences, which I will therefore not try to predict.

What course of action do I suggest?

The immediate goal for Democratic presidential candidates and the Democrats (and sensible Republicans) in Congress should be to use the power of the legislative branch to prevent the administration from launching a war. I can think of two possible ways to do this:

• Pass an Act of Congress stating that the 2001 AUMF does not authorize a preemptive strike against Iran (or a strike in response to an alleged provocation – recall Tonkin Gulf). In this case, Congress would claim that war with Iran requires new authorization.
• Cut off funding for any war with Iran not specifically authorized by Congress in accordance with the law after September 30, when spending starts out of next year’s budget. Presumably they won’t be able to start the war by then and rely on the “support the troops” argument.

In coordination with this immediate response, responsible leaders in both parties should articulate an alternative policy toward Iran starting with the same principle as the Helsinki Accords of 1975 – no regime change. The same political groups that want war with Iran today opposed the Helsinki Accords of 1975 because they recognized the Soviet control of Eastern Europe. But these Accords were instrumental in bringing about the collapse of the USSR and rise of independent forces in Central and Eastern Europe.

Under different leaders, the U.S. could start work on such a détente today. It will take years and it cannot advance much while Bush-Cheney and Ahmadinejad are in power. But we should not let them destroy such opportunities for the future.

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Rough translation of BBC Persian Service on Kian Tajbakhsh

The translation below is a quick effort by a non-professional volunteer, Azadeh Ensha, whom I would like to thank. As soon as an authoritative version is available I will post it or a link.

Article follows:

15:51 GMT Tuesday 4 September 2007

Kian Tajbakhsh will be freed

Kian Tajbakhsh, a social science researcher, who was accused of undermining national security and spying and who was arrested in Iran will be freed on bail.

State television of Iran quoted Hassan Hadad, prosecutor for the national security court in Tehran, reported that the investigation of the special court into Mr. Tajbakhsh is ongoing, and that after completion of the investigation, he will be released on bail.

Mr. Tajbakhsh, a social science researcher and a consultant to the American Organization called Open Society, which is related to George Soros Foundation, was arrested about four months ago and accused of activities and propaganda for spying and espionage for foreign powers.

A few days after news of his arrest was made public in the Washington Post on 29 May, Alireza Jamshidi, a spokesman for the Judiciary in Iran, confirmed his arrest in a press conference in Tehran.

The spokesman for the Judiciary said about Mr. Tajbakhsh, "This Iranian national is temporarily arrested because he is accused of having activities against the security of the country and he was active in propaganda and spying for foreigners."

Mr. Tajbakhsh is 45-years-old. From 2004, he was working with the plans of International Bank for Iran and he was an active consultant for some of the Iranian governmental organizations. His expertise is public health and urban problems.

A while back, Iranian television program under the title of "In The Name of Democracy" broadcast that Mr. Tajbakhsh, Haleh Esfandiari and Ramin Jahabegloo explained their activities separately.

In this program, Mr. Tajbakhsh said he was working for the Soros Foundation in three different issues concerning Iran. One was open programs, the other was culture and organization making and the third was a long term program to introduce the point of view of the Open Society Institute to Iran.

Owing to his expertise in urban development, said that he was giving Soros Foundation ideas in the area of social and cultural changes in Iran, he tried to connect people of the foundation with people from Iranian institutions and also to organize plans that were not necessarily in his line of expertise.

The Soros Foundation is an institute which is close to the Democratic party in America and Kian Tajbakhsh in part of his talk on television said "that the reason that the American government gave permission to Soros Foundation to have activities and projects in Iran means they have a united approach to Iranian affairs in spite of their differences between Soros Foundation and the Republican party of Mr. Bush."

Haleh Esfandiari, the other Iranian-American researcher, who was arrested at about the same time as Mr. Tajbakhsh on similar accusations, was freed on the 30th of Mordad and left Iran on Monday, the 3rd of September. Also, it's been reported that the passport of Parnaz Azima, the Farda Radio broadcaster who was also forbidden to leave Iran for activities against the regime, received her passport back. Shirin Ebadi, one of the attorneys for Ms. Azima, said to BBC Persian that the justice government last night agreed to return the passport of Azima. Mrs. Ebadi said that her client, who up to now was forbidden to leave Iran, is planning to leave Iran, but will return for her trial. Read more on this article...

Kian Tajbakhsh Released, Parnaz Azima issued passport?

I am getting e-mail reports from Kabul and Washington that Kian Tajbakhsh has been released on bail from Evin Prison, and that Parnaz Azima has been issued a passport and will soon leave Iran. I will post again if there is any confirmation.

Update: RFE/RL confirms the news about Azima.

Further Update: BBC Persian Service reports that the spokesman of the national security court stated on Iran state television that the investigation of Kian's the case is continuing (dar juryan ast), but that he will be released on bail when the investigation is concluded. As far as I can see there is no date given. Read more on this article...

Iran War Rollout Starts: Link to Iraq Troop Reductions?

Since my original post on a report of a post-Labor Day rollout of a propaganda barrage for war with Iran, the report has been picked up by quite a few bloggers who usually preface my name with some honorific such as "respectable," "highly respected,""Serious," "well-connected," etc. I think the point they are trying to get across is that I am not a total lunatic. I don't like being in the position of publishing reports with inadequate evidence, but the stakes are too high, so I will risk losing those adjectives. Here's something else:

I posted the first blog on Wednesday, August 29. On the morning of Thursday, August 30, someone who is a professional in handling information called me to recount a conversation from the previous Thursday or Friday (August 23 or 24). In this conversation, someone whose proximity to knowledge of such things is so great that I cannot identify him in any other way, told my interlocutor that President Bush would be inclined to accept suggestions for withdrawing some troops from Iraq and moving as many as possible into more secure bases, as a safeguard against reprisals in the event of a U.S. attack on Iran.

In today's reports from Iraq (see for example the New York Times and the Washington Post) President Bush is quoted as saying, "If the kind of success we are now seeing here continues it will be possible to maintain the same level of security with fewer American forces." The president made a point of visiting and lauding the progress in predominantly Sunni Anbar province, where the U.S. would be more secure from reprisals by Shi'a militias sympathetic to Iran. Anyone who follows political thinking in the Middle East will realize that throughout the region this will be interpreted as confirming a shift in U.S. strategy toward allying with Sunnis to encircle Iran. The British withdrawal from Basra is also said have been accelerated to avoid reprisals on their highly exposed position there.

Meanwhile, the war rollout started on Labor Day with a Newsweek article by Reuel Marc Gerecht of the American Enterprise Institute stating that "War may come, but not because negotiations break down. The likely trigger is an Iranian provocation." He concludes:

Washington can try to exercise soft power—through sanctions, resolutions, diplomatic isolation and rougher rhetoric. But the Islamic Republic, especially its radical president and praetorian guard, are accomplished practitioners of hard power. They are unlikely to be overwhelmed by moderate tactics. Instead, they seem set to continue killing Americans in Iraq, waiting to see if and when the United States gives up and run for the exits.

Of course the government of Iraq, dominated by Shi'a groups with close ties to Iran, would oppose an attack on Iran. But it turns out that the central government in Baghdad is now irrelevant to success in Iraq! According to David Brooks in the New York Times, "the key Iraqi figures are not in the center but in the provinces and the tribes. Peace will come to the center last, not to the center first. Stability will come not through some grand reconciliation but through the agglomeration of order, tribe by tribe and street by street." The Wall Street Journal reports (from the news side) that:

The new policy is a profound shift away from the Bush administration's original goal of building a multisectarian democracy in the heart of the Middle East. Instead, the new strategy seems likely to lead to an Iraq with a very weak central government and largely self-governing and homogenous regions. Over the long term the goal is to connect these local leaders to the central government by making them dependent on Baghdad for funds. To qualify for U.S. assistance, local groups must pledge loyalty to the central government, though many Sunni leaders who are working with the U.S. complain the Shiite dominated government is illegitimate.

So when the central government in Baghdad opposes a U.S. attack on Iran, the administration can still announce success, because of support in Anbar, at the grassroots, where it really counts. If this war happens, we can count on journalists and "experts" traveling to Ramadi on Pentagon-escorted tours to report on Iraqi popular support for the attack on Iran and widespread opposition to the position taken by the "illegitimate," pro-Iranian government in Baghdad.

Let's see if we start hearing of very grave Iranian provocations.

Final note: from a Cheney-Addington legal point of view, it does not matter if the entire Sepah-e Pasdaran (Revolutionarly Guards) or only the Qods Force is declared a terrorist organization. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001 authorized the use of military force by the President not only against terrorist organizations but against anyone harboring them. So if the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei refuses to hand over the commander of the Qods Force to U.S. custody, there will be a legal casus belli. Read more on this article...

Hashemi Rafsanjani Is Back!

In an important development, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s former president and the current head of the Expediency Council won in a secret ballot to become the third chair in the history of Iran’s Assembly of Experts for the Leadership (Majles-e Khobrgran Rahbari). This Assembly is currently a body of 86 scholars of Islamic law (mujtahedeen). According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran it is tasked with selecting (Article 107 and 111) and dismissing (Article 111) of the supreme leader (rahbar) in case of the inability to perform constitutional duties or determination that from the beginning certain qualifications were not met. Additional responsibilities include the supervision of rahbar’s activities, and promulgation of laws regarding the activities of the Assembly itself.

Hashemi Rafsanjani had received the highest number of votes in the city of Tehran in the December 2006 election for the Assembly but had continued to serve as deputy chair under Ayatollah Ali Meshkini. Meshkini’s death at the end of June opened the floodgate of discussions about who will eventually chair this elected assembly. Speculations abound that there would be a showdown between Hashemi Rafsanjani and the avid supporter of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi.

In reality, however, given Hashemi Rafsanjani’s impressive showing in the December election (he received almost 50 percent more votes in Tehran than the second vote getter) and Mesbah Yazdi’s comparatively poor showing there was really never a match. There was agreement among most Iranian political pundits that if Hashemi Rafsanjani chose to run he would win. The question was whether he would be willing to go for it knowing that his candidacy would spark vitriolic attacks against him and his family in hard-line newspapers and websites.

Well, Hashemi Rafsanjani chose to run, and the hard-line circles went after him with full force in the weeks prior to the closed three-day meeting that began today, even accusing him of lying in his memoir about Ayatollah Khomieni entertaining the possibility of “retiring” the death to America slogan in mid-1980s. Even more interestingly was the fact that Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi did not even run since he probably knew he would get embarrassingly few votes. Instead in a strange move on the part of hardliners, Ayatollah Ali Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, decided to run, completely ignoring the conflict of interest that is involved in the head of the Guardian Council, the body that vets the candidates for the Assembly of Experts, running for the leadership of a body whose membership it vets!

The vote was 41 to 33 with 11 abstentions and 1 spoiled ballot. The number of votes received by Hashemi Rafsanjani was lower than the 69 votes he had received earlier in his election as the deputy chair and is certainly a reflection of how divided or contested the Iranian political system is, even among the clerics. But his expected election, despite lower numbers, was still significant precisely because the hardliners had tried so hard to push him out, even going so far as claiming that some of his supporters and friends were going to run against him.

His election is also significant in so far as it should yet again remind everyone that the Iranian system is truly a contested one, admittedly contested among a limited number of people and groups but nevertheless a contested one. Reports of political demise of individuals or political groups should rarely be taken seriously. What should be taken seriously is the competition that exists among relevant political players, making the political game in Iran intense, uncertain in terms of outcome, and open to political comebacks.

Finally his election should also be a reminder about the utter strangeness of the Iranian political system. Hashemi Rafsanjani is now the head of both the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts. He is appointed to the former position by Ayatollah Khamenei but as the elected head of the Assembly of Expert he is constitutionally empowered to begin the process of dismissing Ayatollah Khamenei if the latter is deemed unfit to be the leader!! Read more on this article...

A Change of Guard in Tehran

On September 1st, Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei announced a change in the leadership of Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami (IRGC). Brigadier (now Major) General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari was given a new star and appointed as sepah’s new commander while Yahya Rahim Safavi who had led sepah for the past 10 years became the leader’s military advisor, occupying a newly created and probably ceremonial position.

Given the recent news about the possibility of the United States placing sepah on the list of terrorist groups, the move led to speculations about it being a reaction to American pressures. Chances are, however, that it had very little to do with the possible designation, the news for which, from what I now understand, was in any case inaccurate as the contemplated designation was apparently regarding the Qods force, a part of sepah that is said to be engaged in operations in Iraq.

Indeed, in response to direct questions in this regard both commanders in separate news conferences suggested that the decision for change was made about two months ago. Safavi went as far as to say that Ayatollah Khamenei simply does not like anyone serving at any position for more than 10 years. The move nevertheless reveals a couple of interesting points about the role of military in Iranian politics which is usually overlooked.

First and foremost is the tight civilian control that exists over the military in Iran. In the past couple of years, since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election, there has been a lot of loose talk about the increasing importance of the military in Iranian politics. The reality is that sepah (as well as the regular military) as an institution remains under the constitutionally sanctioned tight reign of the leader’s office. And for years Ayatollah Khamenei has taken that job very seriously, rotating leaders and demanding institutional changes depending on perceived needs and circumstances.

This is nothing new. Iran simply does not have a historical tradition of military prominence in the way for instance Turkey has had. This does not mean that since the inception of modern military in the 20th century, various civilian leaders of Iran, particularly when under pressure, have not used the military arm to “take care of the country’s problems,” by bringing “discipline” to the country or building its roads and pipelines. As Masoud Behnoud, one of Iran’s most astute journalists now living in exile, points out in his Persian blog, even during the Shah’s reign many of the tasks seen as too difficult for public institutions or the private sector were handled and managed by the military. As such, under the current circumstances of sanctions and international pressures, Behnoud I think is right to say that it is not the institutional or internal urge by sepah to grab power that has increased its role in Iranian politics and economy but circumstances. Once circumstances change, so will sepah’s role.

In his press conference Aziz Jafari, the new commander of sepah, was totally unapologetic about this predicament. He acknowledged sepah’s economic role in various construction projects, welcomed them, and in fact defended them as part of sepah’s mission, not to make profit, but to build the country. He identified sepah as a “precautionary force at the service of the commander in chief in order to rush to the help of other organizations wherever help is necessary.”

The second point that the new appointment reveals is about the individuals that have come to constitute the core of sepah’s leadership and the role they are playing in contemporary Iran. It is important to understand that sepah is different from Iran’s regular army in so far as it came into being during the revolution as a people’s army. It is constitutionally expected to “guard the revolution and its achievements,” (unlike the regular military which is given the task of “guarding the independence, territorial integrity, and political order of the Islamic Republic), and found its character during the war with Iraq, a war in which Iran was clearly out-resourced and had to rely on tactical innovations to counter Iraq’s technological superiority.

Many of the men who joined this people’s army to fight in the war and ended up being its commanders were very bright university students in their early twenties. Many of them died, some survived but left sepah during or immediately after the war to turn into politicians, diplomats or bureaucrats (of reformist, centrist, or hard-line kinds), and some remained to make sepah a more professional institution with various branches. These men who stayed on are now in their late forties or early fifties and as individuals see themselves as capable leaders who, precisely because of the experience they gained during the war and afterwards, can influence the direction of the country, in the same way, I would say, ex-IDF generals have seen themselves in relation to Israeli politics.

A number of them, like Mohmmad Baqer Qalibaf (the current mayor of Tehran who has presidential aspirations) and Mohsen Rezaie (the secretary of the Expediency Council, also with presidential aspirations) eventually left their military posts and are making their marks as politicians. Other high ranking officers like Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr and Alireza Afshar are now powerful hard-line bureaucrats in the Interior Ministry (which is in charge of internal security as well as conduct of elections).

Others like Aziz Jafari, who is from the province of Yazd and reportedly a good friend of another Yazdi, the former president Mohmmad Khatami, continue to serve in sepah but are playing a critical role in the transformation of the institution itself. A closer look at Jafari’s biography reveals why it is in the continued commitment of people like him, a man reported to be very genial and well liked within sepah, that one must locate the strength of the Islamic Republic.

He was a student at the very prestigious and difficult to get into architecture school at the University of Tehran during the revolution. According to his official bio he was instrumental in the establishment of the Islamic association at his school, was a representative of his school to the university wide association, and “was active in the takeover” of the American embassy. As such, he must have been friends with many others involved in the event who later became prominent reformist leaders (e.g., Mohsen Mirdamadi who is currently the secretary general of the reformist Islamic Iran's Participation Party) or journalists (e.g., Abbas Abdi). He went to war as a member of the basij militia, immediately joined sepah, and “out of the necessities of the war” soon ended up in command positions. After the war he managed to finish both his architecture degree as well as go through the military leadership training programs. Later he became the commander of sepah’s ground forces. It was as the commander of sepah’s ground forces in 1999 that he signed, along with several other sepah commanders, a threatening letter to his friend and the then President Khatami expressing concern about student riots and the latter’s inability to maintain order.

But the job that qualified him for the current leadership of sepah came in 2005 when Ayatollah Khamenei appointed him to be in charge of setting up sepah’s Strategic Center, a center tasked with drawing up a new command structure and military strategy, preparing the country for the changing regional environment and the kind of foreign military confrontation it may have to face.

In his news conference with the Iranian press, Jafari was very blunt about his task. Pointing out that the threats to Iran have changed, he identified sepah’s role as one of deterrence and defense. He also identified it as a “learning organization” that because of its popular roots and organic ties to the population is very flexible in the kind of asymmetrical war – “similar to the one Hezbollah fought against Israel” - Iran needs to be prepared for just in case it is attacked.

His response to a question regarding the recent American threats against Iran was equally blunt:

The enemies have intensified the tune of threats but they should know that an organization such as sepah that is revolutionary and popular cannot be destroyed and they must show more deliberation in their threats…. The presence of the enemy in the region is causing problems for them and every path they take ends in an impasse. I suggest that they end their presence and interact with Islam and countries of the region form afar. This will surely be to their benefit and I suggest that they leave the region as soon as possible.

The appointment of Aziz Jafari seems to be yet another signal that the Iranian leadership takes the American threat seriously enough to prepare for the kind of fight it feels it might have to fight but undoubtedly prefers not to. Read more on this article...

Haleh Esfandiari allowed to leave Iran: Kian Tajbakhsh, Ali Shakeri still in Evin Prison

Robin Wright of the Washington Post reports that Dr. Haleh Esfandiari, Director of Middle East Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington, D.C., was permitted to leave Tehran this morning. Farida Farhi previously discussed this case here. Esfandiari is to meet her husband, Professor Shaul Bakhash, in Vienna today.

The related cases of other Iranian-U.S. dual nationals (Iran does not recognize dual nationality) have not been resolved. Wright reports:

New York-based social scientist Kian Tajbakhsh and California businessman Ali Shakeri are in solitary confinement in Evin Prison. Both were picked up in the same three-day period in early May when Esfandiari was arrested.

Parnaz Azima, a correspondent for U.S.-funded Radio Farda, is out on bail of more than $600,000. . . .

According to the New York Times on August 23, a judge told Kian Tajbakhsh's wife, Bahar Malek, that he would be released in 10 to 15 days (between September 2 and 7) so that he could spend the last month of his wife's pregnancy with her. But such promises have not been honored in the past.

The Government of Iran created a special section of the Intelligence Ministry to suppress efforts at a "soft revolution" funded by the U.S. At the administration's request, Congress appropriated $75 million for "democratization" efforts in Iran, which Tehran of course sees as a complement to the administration's push for regime change. When the intelligence ministry could not find any programs in Iran actually supported by this money (Iranian spies are apparently unaware of how ineffectively and slowly money for such programs is disbursed), they arrested a number of Iranian-Americans, including Esfandiari and Tajbakhsh, who have been openly and legally carrying out activities in Iran with the knowledge and consent of the government for years.

Whatever may or may not be happening in the confrontation between the Ahmadinejad and Bush governments, these people have nothing to do with it, except that they have been working to promote engagement between the two countries for years. We need such people with us now more than ever. Let's hope that the Iranian government will cease treating these innocent people as hostages to its official relations with the U.S. Read more on this article...

Administration's Iran, drug policies endanger Afghanistan

The Sunday Times of London reports from Washington a story I have not seen in any U.S. media: that "the Pentagon has drawn up plans for massive air strikes against 1,200 targets in Iran, designed to annihilate the Iranians’ military capability in three days." The source of this report was Alexis Debat, director of terrorism and national security at the Nixon Center.
Speaking at a meeting sponsored by the journal National Interest, edited by Irving Kristol, father of Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol Debate stated:

US military planners were not preparing for “pinprick strikes” against Iran’s nuclear facilities. “They’re about taking out the entire Iranian military,” he said.

As in the run-up to the war in Iraq, President Bush is maintaining the fiction that he is "committed for now to the diplomatic route," but many signs indicate that the decision to attack has been taken as irrevocably as the decision to attack Iraq in the fall of 2002.

The legal argument to bypass the U.S. Congress has already been floated. As I noted in my DailyKos post:

The U.S. cannot mount a ground invasion or occupation of Iran, but it might be capable of an air attack and sea embargo. The administration has prepared a legal justification by floating its plan to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization. Since the IRGC is under the command of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the administration, with its usual legal acuity, could claim legal authority for an attack on Iran under Senate Joint Resolution 23 of September 18, 2001,which authorized the use of military force against "those who plan, authorize, commit, or aid terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests -- including those who harbor terrorists."

There has been much speculation about how Iran would respond, mostly in Iraq, Lebanon, or against Israel. I would add that Iran is prepared to respond in Afghanistan as well. For nearly a year Iranian officials dealing with Afghanistan have been been signaling danger. Under the Khatami administration, they told me, Iran's policy was, "If the U.S. attacks Iran, Iran will not react in Afghanistan," because of Iran's overriding interest in keeping the country stable as a bulwark against Taliban and al-Qaida. Under President Ahmadinejad, priorities have changed.

The Iranian government has been preparing for the possible collapse of the much weakened Karzai government. They have been doing so mainly by providing extensive military and political assistance to the former Northern Alliance, the grouping of commanders supported by Iran, Russian, and India that was funded by the U.S. to occupy the territory vacated by Taliban and al-Qaida fleeing U.S. air strikes in the fall of 2001. Iran denies the charges by the U.S. that it is aiding the Taliban, but it may well be doing so despite longstanding enmity because it now gives a higher priority to creating problems for a U.S. that it sees as bent on forcible regime change.

U.S. officials may be deceived by the illusion of stability in northern and western Afghanistan. If those areas are quiet, it is because Northern Alliance leaders, under pressure from both the U.S. and Iran, have placed a premium on keeping the anti-Taliban coalition together and have only intermittently openly opposed the government. A U.S. attack on Iran may change this calculus. While some northern leaders will try to maintain an agenda independent of Iran, which is not popular in Afghanistan, the region could quickly move out of government control, as it did when these same commanders' calculus changed in January 1992.

The U.S. can have a confrontation with Iran or a chance for some success in Afghanistan. It cannot have both.

On Afghanistan, David Rohde of the New York Times continues his excellent analytic series with a report from Southern Afghanistan showing that the Afghan police and administration have been unable to hold much territory retaken from the Taliban by NATO forces. The background to the weakness of the police goes back to the decisions analyzed in Rohde's previous article: the ideological opposition to "nation building," which led Donald Rumsfeld to refuse President Karzai's request for funding the police.

In the L.A. Times, Peter Bergen and Sameer Lalwani report from Uruzgan province, that "U.S. efforts to eradicate Afghanistan's [poppy] crop are empowering the Taliban by sowing seeds of resentment." They echo the conclusions I presented here and in other posts on this blog. They write, "The U.S. government, in short, is deeply committed to an unsuccessful drug policy that helps its enemies."

Finally, where are the Democrats and sensible Republicans? It's time to amend the Authorization for the Use of Military Force to make clear that it does not authorize a pre-emptive war on Iran. Congress should also stop the policy of crop eradication that is driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban while actually increasing the size of the opium economy. Congress should shift the funding allocated for eradication to alternative development. At the moment, according to Bergen and Lalwani, in the new U.S. Strategy for Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan:

The increased funds set aside in the new plan to help farmers find alternative livelihoods -- $50 million to $60 million -- are woefully inadequate and constitute a paltry 6% of American counter-narcotics spending in Afghanistan for 2007. Eradication continues to receive the largest share of the budget.

It is difficult to see how the effort in Afghanistan can survive the Cheney-Bush administration's policies on Iran and narcotics. All who believe, as all Democratic presidential candidates and many Republicans claim, that the effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the core of our strategy against those who attacked us on 9/11, should be doing all they can to halt this course. Read more on this article...

Rollout to War with Iran: An Update

Update: Since I posted the original note on this topic Wednesday night, there have been several developments. Several more well-informed people have called to discuss it -- all of them with confirming information. No one called to say I was wrong.

The original cross-post that I put on DailyKos at 11:26 PM Wednesday night sank off the front page in the wee small hours of the morning, while the whole wide world was fast asleep. On Thursday, however, DailyKos diarist Scientician saw Juan Cole's plug on Informed Comment. He checked me out on the web and determined that I was a "respectable foreign affairs academic" (not always a compliment on DailyKos). That morning he nonetheless posted a diary that made it to the top of the recommended list, finally garnering 561 comments, many of them by people who appear not to be lunatics.

Then on Friday New Yorker contributor George Packer called. After our conversation he wrote about it on his blog Interesting Times:

If there were a threat level on the possibility of war with Iran, it might have just gone up to orange. Barnett Rubin, the highly respected Afghanistan expert at New York University, has written an account of a conversation with a friend who has connections to someone at a neoconservative institution in Washington.

His evaluation: "True? I don’t know. Plausible? Absolutely."

Later he put up a postscript:

Barnett Rubin just called me. His source spoke with a neocon think-tanker who corroborated the story of the propaganda campaign and had this to say about it: “I am a Republican. I am a conservative. But I’m not a raging lunatic. This is lunatic.”

Today, the first day of Magical September (hat-tip to openthread at DailyKos), Scott Horton of Harper's Magazine picked up the story on his No Comment blog, under the title, The New Rollout. Horton summarized my post and Packer's entry and then adds:

And no sooner does this appear in the blogosphere than we see what may be the first bit of ground-preparation for the rollout: Michael Ledeen’s new book, set for release right on schedule a week after Labor Day, and it’s called—get this–Iranian Time Bomb: The Mullah Zealots’ Quest for Destruction. What’s the point in being subtle when you’re trying to run herd on what Nietzsche called the “bovine masses?” Here’s the blurb:

“Michael A. Ledeen has written a knowing book about Iran’s ways. His is a book that lays bare the cruelties of the radical theocracy and its ambitions beyond its borders. After Ledeen’s book, the illusions about Iran should finally be put to rest. A smart and unsentimental work.”

Ledeen, the author of Machiavelli on Modern Leadership, among other classics, is a fluent Italian speaker with curious connections to the Italian state security and the yellowcake uranium caper. No doubt Michael thinks that somewhere out in the ethersphere, Niccolò is smiling. I think that Niccolò was smarter than that: he’s wincing.

Somewhere in the etheral blogosphere, diarist WilyFlorentine is preparing to post a few lessons:

The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him.

One who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived.

Men rise from one ambition to another: first, they seek to secure themselves against attack, and then they attack others.

And finally:

No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the enemy until it is ripe for execution.

Since Ledeen is an expert on Machiavelli, the latter quote might argue that the rollout proves that war talk is a bluff designed to pressure Iran into agreeing to the demands of the European negotiators over nuclear enrichment. But brinkmanship works only when the other side has something to gain by conceding. That might be true if the administration's goal really was to prevent Iran from gaining full control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Rhetoric like President Bush's speech to the American Legion and Ledeen's book, however, only further convince Tehran that nothing short of forcible regime change will satisfy Washington.

Perhaps the war party will answer with another quotation from Chapter 17 of The Prince:

It is much more secure to be feared than to be loved.

In a speech delivered in Macchiavelli's native Florence, "The Danger of Being Hated," Scott Horton provided a fitting answer. He reminded his audience that the original formulation "Let them hate us, so long as they fear us," comes not from Macchiavelli, but from the insane Roman Emperor Caligula. Horton comments:

In chapter 17 of The Prince Machiavelli says that “it is much safer to be feared than loved”–a very shrewd rearrangement of Caligula’s statement. But he doesn’t stop there–he goes on immediately to say that the one of the worst mistakes a prince can ever make is to be hated; for in this way he converts himself to a target. He compounds the risks he personally and his subjects must face.

The balance that Machiavelli commends to us is this: don’t strive to be loved, but at all costs avoid being hated. A modern state need not flinch from being feared, but its position is strongest when it exhibits the values of virtue of which he writes. A state which is seen as virtuous, strong and decisive is best able to assure its security.

But there is one counsel of Macchiavelli's that even those who (unlike me) consider the Islamic Republic of Iran an irreconcilable enemy, ought to remember: that any injury done by the Prince should be so great that the victim is "unable to retaliate." And that is why the public and the press must at least ask the questions posed by Packer:

Does the Administration expect the Iranian regime to fall in the event of an attack? If yes, what will replace it? If no (and it will not), why would the Administration deliberately set about to strengthen the regime’s hold on power? What will the Administration do to protect highly vulnerable American lives and interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world against the Iranian reprisals that will follow? What if Iran strikes against Israel? What will be the strategy when the Iranian nuclear program, damaged but not destroyed, resumes? How will the Administration handle the international alarm and opprobrium that would be an attack’s inevitable fallout?

Writing on the futility of relying solely on force, Machiavelli counseled:

For this reason the best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you

That is why today, more even than when this Republic was founded, we owe “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” Today the U.S. is less loved, less respected, and after the debacle in Iraq, less feared but for its folly, than ever before. And that is the greatest threat to our security. Read more on this article...