Sunday, July 29, 2007

Improving America's Security Act of 2007

The Pakistani press, and the authorities are quite chagrined at some languages but more concerned about the requirements imposed by the just passed Improving America's Security Act of 2007.

The section relevant to Pakistan from H. R. 1
SEC. 1442. PAKISTAN.

(a) Findings-
Congress finds the following:
(1) Since September 11, 2001, the Government of Pakistan has been an important partner in helping the United States remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and combating international terrorism in the frontier provinces of Pakistan.
(2) There remain a number of critical issues that threaten to disrupt the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, undermine international security, and destabilize Pakistan, including--
(A) curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology;
(B) combating poverty and corruption;
(C) building effective government institutions, especially secular public schools;
(D) promoting democracy and the rule of law, particularly at the national level;
(E) addressing the continued presence of Taliban and other violent extremist forces throughout the country;
(F) maintaining the authority of the Government of Pakistan in all parts of its national territory;
(G) securing the borders of Pakistan to prevent the movement of militants and terrorists into other countries and territories; and
(H) effectively dealing with Islamic extremism.


(b) Statements of Policy- The following shall be the policies of the United States:
(1) To work with the Government of Pakistan to combat international terrorism, especially in the frontier provinces of Pakistan, and to end the use of Pakistan as a safe haven for forces associated with the Taliban.
(2) To establish a long-term strategic partnership with the Government of Pakistan to address the issues described in subparagraphs (A) through (H) of subsection (a)(2).
(3) To dramatically increase funding for programs of the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State that assist the Government of Pakistan in addressing such issues, if the Government of Pakistan demonstrates a commitment to building a moderate, democratic state, including significant steps towards free and fair parliamentary elections in 2007.
(4) To work with the international community to secure additional financial and political support to effectively implement the policies set forth in this subsection and help to resolve the dispute between the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India over the disputed territory of Kashmir.


(c) Strategy Relating to Pakistan-
(1) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT ON STRATEGY- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified form if necessary, that describes the long-term strategy of the United States to engage with the Government of Pakistan to address the issues described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection (a)(2) and carry out the policies described in subsection (b) in order accomplish the goal of building a moderate, democratic Pakistan.
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED- In this subsection the term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.


(d) Limitation on United States Security Assistance to Pakistan-
(1) LIMITATION-
(A) IN GENERAL- For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, United States assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) or section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) may not be provided to, and a license for any item controlled under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may not be approved for, Pakistan until 15 days after the date on which President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Pakistan is making all possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control, including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman and in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
(B) FORM- The certification required by subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(2) WAIVER- The President may waive the limitation on assistance under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national security interest of the United States to do so.
(3) SUNSET- The limitation on assistance under paragraph (1) shall cease to be effective beginning on the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Taliban, or any related successor organization, has ceased to exist as an organization capable of conducting military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in Afghanistan from Pakistan.
(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED- In this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.


(e) Nuclear Proliferation-
(1) FINDING- Congress finds that Pakistan's maintenance of a network for the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies would be inconsistent with Pakistan being considered an ally of the United States.
(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that the national security interest of the United States will best be served if the United States develops and implements a long-term strategy to improve the United States relationship with Pakistan and works with the Government of Pakistan to stop nuclear proliferation.


(f) Authorization of Appropriations-
(1) IN GENERAL- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for providing assistance for Pakistan for fiscal year 2008--
(A) for `Development Assistance', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 103, 105, and 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151a, 2151c, and 2151d,);
(B) for the `Child Survival and Health Programs Fund', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b);
(C) for the `Economic Support Fund', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.);
(D) for `International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.);
(E) for `Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs', such sums as may be necessary;
(F) for `International Military Education and Training', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.); and
(G) for `Foreign Military Financing Program', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
(2) OTHER FUNDS- Amounts authorized to be appropriated under this subsection are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.


(g) Extension of Waivers-
(1) AMENDMENTS- The Act entitled `An Act to authorize the President to exercise waivers of foreign assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan through September 30, 2003, and for other purposes', approved October 27, 2001 (Public Law 107-57; 115 Stat. 403), is amended--
(A) in section 1(b)--
(i) in the heading, to read as follows:
`(b) Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008- '; and
(ii) in paragraph (1), by striking `any provision' and all that follows through `that prohibits' and inserting `any provision of the foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal year 2007 or 2008 (or any other appropriations Act) that prohibits';
(B) in section 3(2), by striking `Such provision' and all that follows through `as are' and inserting `Such provision of the annual foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal years 2002 through 2008 (or any other appropriations Act) as are'; and
(C) in section 6, by striking `the provisions' and all that follows and inserting `the provisions of this Act shall terminate on October 1, 2008.'.
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by paragraph (1) take effect on October 1, 2006.
(3) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that determinations to provide extensions of waivers of foreign assistance prohibitions with respect to Pakistan pursuant to Public Law 107-57 for fiscal years after the fiscal years specified in the amendments made by paragraph (1) to Public Law 107-57 should be informed by the pace of democratic reform, extension of the rule of law, and the conduct of the parliamentary elections currently scheduled for 2007 in Pakistan.

3 comments:

eurofrank said...

The discussion of Pakistan and Afghanistan's relationship to SCO and CSTO is of great interest and puts the background to the manouvering in context.


The Great Game (Round 23)



The SCO summit therefore poses challenges for the US from various angles. The coming together of the CSTO and the SCO is a double setback to US regional policies. Both are entities that are anathema to the United States' geopolitical interests. The US strove to stifle these two organizations in their infancy, but instead now sees them gather new strength.

The US game plan projecting NATO into the Central Asian region runs into a formidable obstacle. The US dilemma is acute. Unless NATO expands into Central Asia, there can be no full "encirclement" of either Russia or China. It is senseless if NATO remains stuck in the southern Caucasus.

Indeed, NATO's credibility is at stake, too. As things stand, NATO's "transformation" isn't progressing smoothly. Afghanistan has become a lump in NATO's throat. NATO can't spit it out, nor can it swallow. It is disfiguring NATO. No amount of propaganda can hide the reality that Afghan people increasingly view NATO as an occupation force. Apart from insufficient troop strength, NATO commanders are in desperate need of intelligence.

The United States' "pull" within NATO is also in decline. This week, Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema openly called for the cessation of all US military operations in Afghanistan, except strictly under NATO command. The change of leadership in France, Germany and Britain doesn't seem to work quite the way Washington expected.

Therefore, Washington will do its utmost to ward off the SCO's "encroachment" on to Afghan turf. Washington will count on Karzai to smother the SCO's overtures. The US predicament will be that on the face of it, the SCO initiative on Afghanistan cannot be questioned. Karzai would also look rather foolish if he were to spurn an offer of help from the SCO. After all, the SCO has a legitimate interest in effectively stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, since the stability of the Central Asian region is linked to it in many respects.

On the other hand, Washington's grip over the Kabul setup will incrementally weaken once Afghanistan develops an "SCO connection". Washington should be extremely wary, since Afghans are adept at playing their optimal role in the "Great Game". Most important, the US will increasingly find itself under compulsion to perform as a team player, which suits neither its geostrategy nor its standing as the sole superpower.

In all this, Pakistan remains an unpredictable player, given the fluidity of its internal situation, even though Islamabad is keen to work closely with the SCO and China. Most of the supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan pass through Pakistan. It will be quite an irony if a situation develops where the US ends up doing all the fighting in Afghanistan, while the SCO gains in public adulation among the Afghan people and in the wider region as a "nation-builder".

Least of all, Washington knows that the SCO's involvement in the Afghan problem ultimately means Russia will be making a big re-entry into the Hindu Kush, apart from foiling the United States' grand design to steer NATO as a global security organization with global partners. Curiously, on July 17, Tajikistan announced that an agreement had been concluded providing for the deployment of Russian combat aircraft on the Ayni Air Base outside Dushanbe. Indications are that in the first instance Russia will deploy Su-25 jets and Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters. The Russian deployment will be within the CSTO framework. Moscow just about stumped the United States' last lingering hope of gaining a toehold in Tajikistan.

All this pales into insignificance for Washington if the SCO summit favorably views Iran's admission as a full member. There is only an outside chance at the moment that the SCO will want to wade deep into the fierce crosscurrents in the Persian Gulf region. But Washington will be nervously watching.

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