Sunday, September 16, 2007

The Road to Hell in Paved with ? Intentions

No Agreement of Principles between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will be presented to the fall 2007 “Peace Conference,” Olmert informed the ministers of his party today. Instead a joint declaration of intentions is to be expected. His statement comes on the eve of Condoleeza Rice’s visit to check up on the local progress for the conference; in effect, preempting the visit. The fall conference is now likely to end up on the ever growing heap of Middle Eastern peace plans.

It is now obvious just how much the Hamas putsch in Gaza and the formation of two competing Palestinian governments had weakened not only Hamas but also Abbas. Hamas had excluded itself, and is now not party to any political process; Gaza now is a site of mostly humanitarian concerns. But Abbas also does not have the authority and power to get Olmert to drop Israel's habitual recalcitrance to agree to final status conditions. Olmert is interested only in normalizing relations with the Ramallah government, and “normalization” has meant the preservation of the political status quo and continued Israeli colonization. Obviously such status quo is not tenable. Maybe it is time to rephrase the statement attributed to Samuel Johnson, and say “The Road to Hell is Paved with Bad Intentions.” Read more on this article...

Washington Accuses and Threatens, Tehran Reacts

Threat and accusations against Iran have been so common that for long-standing Iran observers like me it is a bit difficult to get all riled up over them. But even according to Iran standards, this has been an intense couple of weeks. The Petraeus/ Crocker show was full of references to the “unhelpful” and even “malign” role played by Iran in Iraq, and, presumably running out of other reasons that sound convincing, the need to contain Iran seems to have emerged as the major (and latest) reason for the continued American presence in Iraq. In the words of George Bush, “Iran would benefit from the chaos and would be encouraged in its efforts to gain nuclear weapons and dominate the region.”

Stories abound too that the Bush administration is seriously considering military strikes against Iran; stories I might add that, according to the New York Times report by Helen Cooper, “the Bush administration officials have pointedly not tried to stem.” Even an Israeli air strike in Syria last week led to speculation that Israel, in alliance with the United States, was really trying to send a message to Iran that it could strike Iranian nuclear facilities if it chose to, leading George Perkovich of the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to say, “If I were the Iranians, what I’d be freaked out about is that the other Arab states didn’t protest. The Arab world non-reaction is a signal to Iran that Arabs aren’t happy with Iran’s power and influence, so if the Israelis want to go and intimidate and violate the airspace of another Arab state that’s an ally of Iran, the other Arab states aren’t going to do anything.”

Freaking out may be what George Perkovich and many others would like the Iranian leadership to be doing in the hope that the fear of a military attack will convince them to back down on the nuclear issue. But a reading of the Iranian press suggests anything but freaking out. In fact, I have found it quite interesting that various leaders in Iran have not only publicly reacted to what is going on in Washington swiftly but also, despite clear disagreements on a variety of other issues, rather calmly and in unison.

The gist of the message coming out of Iran is the following:

1. Iran is making serious efforts to resolve its issues with the international community and, more importantly, if it is allowed with the US.

2. Regarding the nuclear issue, this means an agreement to resolve the outstanding issues regarding Iran’s past activities and, upon their resolution through an IAEA-directed process, to maintain a sufficiently intrusive and IAEA-acceptable inspection regime allowing the IAEA to continue to verify that no nuclear material has been diverted to a weapons program.

3. Regarding Iraq, this means offer of help to improve the security situation, in addition to the continuous economic and political support Iran has given every government of Iraq since the American invasion. According to Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiatior, "Iran does not want a speedy withdrawal of the Amercian forces. They have to devise a time table with Nuri al-Maliki's government. No matter what Iraq is an occupied country and this is a heavy burden for the people of Iraq and the United States must figure out a way to resolve this issue and we are ready for any help."

4. But Iran is making these efforts, and sending all sorts of messages regarding the need to talk and reach a compromise on a variety of issues that concern both countries, understanding very well that the Bush administration may be in no mood for talks or compromise as it tries to find a scapegoat for its failures in the Middle East. Again, in the words of Ali Larijani, "Iran is an important county with which [the Americans] can have constructive interaction. In my view, because of the problems they are faced with in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan, the Americans are suffering from strategic incoherence.”

5. The awareness of this “strategic incoherence” or perhaps worries about the actions of what the former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says may be a “wounded tiger,” has also meant that Iran is preparing itself for the possibility of direct military attacks by the United States. In the words of the new head of IRGC, Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, “The enemies have intensified the tune of threats but they should know that… Sepah, in addition to high capability in military dimensions, has informational superiority over the enemies and high missile capabilities which are of great defensive help… Asymmetrical warfare is a kind of war that we utilized during the sacred defense since during the imposed war there were great inequalities between us and the enemy. But the inequality was not to the extent that we can call the battles of sacred defense asymmetrical war. But since the material and technological capabilities of [the current] enemy is higher relative to us, we need to move in the direction of appropriate policies and defensive approaches, the example of which is asymmetrical war. An objective example of this type of war can be seen in the 33-day Lebanon war.”

In short, from the Iranian perspective the issue at hand seems to be how to capitalize on the American foreign policy disaster in Iraq in ways that would lead to the American acceptance of the Islamic Republic "as is" and also a a significant and worthy player in the region while simultaneously pursuing policies that would best neutralize the possibility of American attack and increased pressures against Iran.

Just to give a flavor of the Iranian mindset, this is what Ali Larijani said on September 6:

The current conditions are very sensitive. We have to assess these conditions correctly and know their point of focus. The current conditions are valued as much by us as the victory of the Americans for global management and unilateralism is valued by them.

Speaking to the Assembly of Experts, this is what Larijani said on September 4,

In the past two months both the framework for the resolution of issues with the Agency has been devised and, with the initiative of a European country, a preliminary plan for political understanding in the nuclear negotiations was prepared. Under these conditions Iran has shown its goodwill for the resolution of the nuclear issue and the realization of the commitment of the opposing party means paving the way for the natural progression of the dossier in the Agency. This message needs a hearing ear. If America wants a dialogue of the deaf, a non-hearing status is [something that] all can achieve.

It is noteworthy that references to “deaf/non-hearing” or “irrational” Americans are now commonly used by Iranian officials. On August 31st, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said,

Their behavior has become childish. They are unable to solve any of the problems of the Middle East because the have a wrong point of view. Wait for a few months and under pressure the government of Iraq will also face failure. I guess then they will say that we want to dismiss the people of Iraq! Anyone who wants to give them advice, [is seen] as wanting to push them further into quagmire. I am surprised why they do not understand….. Is there no reason in their government? Are their advisors self-interested or ignorant?

On September 9, Larijani gives further clues about the extent to which Tehran feels it has extended its hand in trying to find a resolution to the problem:

Iran has taken a positive step based on good will. …The nuclear discussion regarding Iran over which they maneuvered a lot was that Iran had problems in the past which it did not clarify and secondly that the speed with which Iran was pursuing enrichment did not allow for inspections. [With the new understanding with Solana] we have resolved both of these problems… I previously told Solana and ElBaradei that we will take a positive step and in return you have to clarify the atmosphere. It is not supposed to be [a situation in which] one smiles and the other frowns… This is a test for us. We have taken an important step and if the behavior of the other side is not appropriate we will behave in a different way.

Then, regarding the possibility of a third sanctions resolution and military action, Larijani goes on to say,

Rationally we have to take into account all possibilities…..If the Americans welcome military confrontation then this will be the last nail on the coffin of neoconservatives. This is not a region from which they can reap attractive takeaways… [Increased military threats] are nothing new and in the past few years they have their highs and lows. The situation in Iraq has shaped conditions for them in such a way they are forced to talk this way in order to save face. These dreadful roars are more like a flight trumpet than a call for action. We cannot prevent anyone from speaking. We do not consider such an action rational but if they did it we will give commensurate response. Their act will be harmful for the whole region.

The message that the current Iranian leadership seems to be giving the United States is that, having tried and failed to use other countries as buffer to resolve the nuclear issue and counter the American antagonism towards the existence of the Islamic republic, they are now using the direct and I think a much riskier strategy of looking “eye to eye.”

By attempting to decouple the issue of enrichment and outstanding issues and agreeing to work on the latter with the IAEA, Iran is also signaling that it is able and willing to devise strategies intended to limit the damage the United States can cause.

Ironically, the case for what I think should be considered a “moderated” hard-line position was best made on September 7th by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, now the head of both Expediency Council and Council of Experts and a man who is perhaps the best symbol of Islamic Iran’s determination to survive and thrive under the most difficult of circumstances: I say ironically because Hashemi Rafsanjani is often described as the leader of the moderate/pragmatic wing of Iran’s foreign policy establishment:

The nuclear issue is still a very important issue. This oppressive dossier through which resolutions have been issued at the Agency and Security Council against the aggrieved Iran is still very important… Recently the Agency – of course if it really has good will – has begun an appropriate move … of course even in this act it is not yet clear what they are after. It is not acceptable by the United States, France, and many other Western country and they say ElBaradei should not have done this and we should go the route of Security Council. I tell them, do not repeat your mistakes so much. …Learn from the acts you committed in the world after September 11…They invaded a few countries in the name of the idea of axis of evil and in the name of terrorism….and in their minds surrounded Iran. Of course it became clear that they are not capable of taking care of countries such as Afghanistan and began to rely on NATO, of course giving a bad name to NATO too… The plan for the Greater Middle East has failed. The besieging of Iran has had the opposite result and today the United States is besieged, asking help from us… From this tribune I warn those sitting in the White House and members of Congress and tell them to let go of in your heads this way of confronting Islam, Muslims and Islamic revolutionary forces. If there is a way, it is only the path of talks which God willing is still open. Of course we ourselves should also give attention and when we are faced with a wounded tiger we have to be vigilant and face this big issue of the region and the world with reason, vigilance, and poise.

Hashemi Rafsanjani’s words, given on the occasion of his election as the head of the Assembly of Experts, seems to be a signal that the Iranian leadership has mustered the political will to offer yet another compromise; a compromise that can be build on what Iran considers to be certain shared regional interests with the United States but must allow Iran to come out of the confrontation with the US in ways that are acceptable within the broad outlines of Iran’s contentious politics.

But, watching its messages and hints go “unheard” by the “deaf,” the Iranian leadership is rational enough to realize that those terms may not be acceptable to the Bush administration; hence the Iranian messages that preparation have been under way for the kind of fight it feels it might have to fight but certainly prefers not to. Read more on this article...

Friday, September 14, 2007

Haleh Esfandiari Speaks to Gwen Ifill on the NewsHour

Haleh Esfandiari, the director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, was released after 105 days in Evin Prison (known as "Evin University," because of the large number of intellectuals who have graduated). She spoke last night to Gwen Ifill of the NewsHour. Watch the video or read the transcript here.

On why she was arrested:

To this day, I really don't know why I was arrested. But having talked to these -- having been interrogated for almost eight months by people from the ministry of intelligence, I can explain what they believe in.

They believe that the United States is now entangled in Iraq and elsewhere. Therefore, it will not contemplate a military attack on Iran, but it is planning a Velvet Revolution. And the instruments for this Velvet Revolution, like the Ukraine or Georgia, are American and European foundations and think-tanks. And I think they thought that the Wilson Center was also involved in this program.

On her treatment:
I was treated in prison with utmost respect. And I think the reason was that I always kept a barrier between myself and the interrogator. And I was always very polite to them. And they were, as a result, very polite to me.
On contact with other prisoners:
I knew that Mr. [Kian] Tajbakhsh, who is still -- both are still in prison -- was there, because one day the interrogator was carrying five, six English books. And as my eyes lit up, and I said, "Oh, English books." I said, "Who's are they?" And he said, "These belong to Mr. Tajbakhsh." And I said, "Could you ask him whether I can borrow some from him?"

So then, at night, one of the female guards -- because, in the women's ward or quarter, we had female guards -- she brought me two books, and this was the beginning of borrowing books from Mr. Tajbakhsh. And on one occasion, I sent him some fruit with the permission of the prison authorities.
On why she was released:
I think my release came mainly because the President of the Wilson Center, Lee Hamilton, wrote a letter to the [Supreme] Leader [Ayatollah Khamene'i]. And I have not seen the text of the letter because it was confidential. And the Leader reacted to the letter positively and probably ordered my release.
Read more on this article...

Thursday, September 13, 2007

Iran War "Rollout" Roils Blogosphere

Since my original post passing on an unverified but troubling report that Vice-President Cheney's office had asked neo-conservative institutions for help creating political support for an attack on Iran, this nugget has been batting around the internet like any good conspiracy theory.

I'm not a fan of conspiracy theories. Anyone who works on Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan has to reject a dozen a day just to keep in shape. But if you don't want to be constantly surprised, you also have to learn from the Red Queen and "believe six impossible things before breakfast." With experience you get better at keeping the balance right.

Conspiracy theories are easy targets for deflation, since, almost by definition, they lack evidence to support them. Sure enough, right-wing writers (I won't say "conservative," since I have a hard time imagining Edmund Burke or Michael Oakeshott going down this road) have rolled out an attack on this report. I may illustrate the common pattern of these attacks by reference to Eli Lake's September 10 column in the New York Sun. The argument (omitting a few flagrant misrepresentations of what I wrote, which are just distractions) is pretty simple:
  1. It's typical left-wing conspiracy theory to imagine that Cheney's office would instruct neo-conservatives to campaign for war with Iran.
  2. Neo-conservatives are campaigning for war with Iran because they sincerely support such a war, not because anyone told them to do it.
  3. They're right to support such a war, because the Iranian mad-mullah regime is already at war with the U.S. and is making nuclear bombs right now in order to destroy Israel, the U.S., and the entire global order.
Somehow I don't find this line of argument reassuring.

Another warning I have received is not to rely on Alex Debat, whom I have never met or spoken to. (Update: the Weekly Standard just asked me if Debat was my source.) Reports are now circulating that he is a fabulist. I have no idea if he is or not. I cited an article in the Sunday Times of London in which he is quoted by the reporter as providing a detailed description of U.S. preparations for war with Iran.

A tall tale? Maybe. Or maybe Debat got an advance look at this 80-page study by Dr. Dan Plesch and Martin Butcher of the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. They summarize their principal findings:
The study concludes that the US has made military preparations to destroy Iran’s WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and economic infrastructure within days if not hours of President George W. Bush giving the order. The US is not publicising the scale of these preparations to deter Iran, tending to make confrontation more likely. The US retains the option of avoiding war, but using its forces as part of an overall strategy of shaping Iran’s actions.

• Any attack is likely to be on a massive multi-front scale but avoiding a ground invasion. Attacks focused on WMD facilities would leave Iran too many retaliatory options, leave President Bush open to the charge of using too little force and leave the regime intact.

• US bombers and long range missiles are ready today to destroy 10,000 targets in Iran in a few hours.

• US ground, air and marine forces already in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan can devastate Iranian forces, the regime and the state at short notice.

• Some form of low level US and possibly UK military action as well as armed popular resistance appear underway inside the Iranian provinces or ethnic areas of the Azeri, Balujistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Iran was unable to prevent sabotage of its offshore-to-shore crude oil pipelines in 2005.
In case this turns out to be accurate, Iran has prepared to respond. Tehran Times reports:
Commander of the IRGC, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari here on Tuesday said that any attack against Iran would spark a crushing response from the country.

Iran has boosted its defense capabilities based on the weak points of the enemies, which occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, General Jafari said on Tuesday.

The newly appointed commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) warned that the IRGC is more than ready to defend Iran's against all security, political, cultural, and social threats.

Such preparations make a "provocation," which Reuel Marc Gerecht of AEI thinks is the most likely cause of war, more likely. In any case, General David Petraeus has told Congress that Iran has already launched such provocations. The National Review helpfully summarized them in order to savage Ambassador Ryan Crocker for supporting an “Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” Appeasement! Here is Petraeus' bill of particulars:

We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq.

Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence.

In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from al Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists.

In the past six months we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps’ Qods Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.

The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that … success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces[.]

[O]n a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater concern.

[Our] assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including … exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.

The weblog of Foreign Policy magazine originally adhered to the prescribed role of "moderates" in the rollout script by explaining "Why you should discount all the bomb Iran talk." Of course the administration was just engaging in coercive diplomacy over Iran's nuclear program in order to stiffen the backs of the Europeans. Clever negotiating tactic!

But this item from Fox News gave them second thoughts:

Political and military officers, as well as weapons of mass destruction specialists at the State Department, are now advising Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the diplomatic approach favored by Burns has failed and the administration must actively prepare for military intervention of some kind. Among those advising Rice along these lines are John Rood, the assistant secretary for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; and a number of Mideast experts, including Ambassador James Jeffrey, deputy White House national security adviser under Stephen Hadley and formerly the principal deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs.

Consequently, according to a well-placed Bush administration source, "everyone in town" is now participating in a broad discussion about the costs and benefits of military action against Iran, with the likely timeframe for any such course of action being over the next eight to 10 months, after the presidential primaries have probably been decided, but well before the November 2008 elections.

The discussions are now focused on two basic options: less invasive scenarios under which the U.S. might blockade Iranian imports of gasoline or exports of oil, actions generally thought to exact too high a cost on the Iranian people but not enough on the regime in Tehran; and full-scale aerial bombardment.

This could not be discounted as the ravings of the liberal blogosphere (even if Rupert Murdoch did give a fundraiser for Hillary Clinton). So today Foreign Policy warns:

Next thing you know, you'll start hearing folks at AEI saying that Iran was responsible for 9/11. Wait a minute, that's already happening, as Peter Beinart pointed out in Sunday's New York Times. "It's the 2007 equivalent of the claims made in 2002 and 2003 about Iraq," Beinart noted. "The years between 9/11 and the Iraq war gave rise to a cottage industry ... charging that Saddam Hussein was the hidden mastermind behind a decade of jihadist terror. While refuted by the 9/11 Commission and mainstream terror experts, these claims had a political effect."

Looks like it's time to stop the epidemic of denial that has the foreign-policy community convinced that an attack on Iran is out of the question. Before it's too late.

I once wrote a book about early warning and conflict prevention. There are two kinds of errors in early warning (as in statistical inference): believing something that ain't so and disbelieving something that is. You have to weigh the likelihood and the cost of each kind of error. That's the calculus behind Vice-President Cheney's One Percent Doctrine: the risk of not acting on a warning of nuclear terrorism is so great, that you have to treat a one percent possibility as a certainty.

I set the bar a bit higher than one percent. But in view of the record of this administration, including what its leaders and supporters have said themselves, the cost of not acting on these warnings is too great. The cost of acting (for me anyway) is being attacked by the New York Sun and the National Review and being supported by a few conspiracy theorists. I can live with it.

Update: In his speech yesterday in Clinton, Iowa, Senator Barack Obama said:
We hear eerie echoes of the run-up to the war in Iraq in the way that the President and Vice President talk about Iran. They conflate Iran and al Qaeda. They issue veiled threats. They suggest that the time for diplomacy and pressure is running out when we haven't even tried direct diplomacy. Well George Bush and Dick Cheney must hear - loud and clear - from the American people and the Congress: you don't have our support, and you don't have our authorization for another war.
Let's hear from other candidates and members of Congress. Read more on this article...

Tuesday, September 11, 2007

The IAEA Board of Governors Meet to Talk about Iran Again

The 35-member IAEA Board of Governors are meeting in Vienna this week and the agenda in all likelihood will be dominated by Iran again. Mohammad ElBaradei, the Agency’s Director General, is asking the Board, despite American objections, to give the IAEA time to implement the work plan the Agency has negotiated with Iran. ElBaradei’s hope is for the Security Council to take a "timeout'' from sanctions and for Iran to pause its uranium enrichment to avert a crisis over the country's nuclear program.

But Iran has already stated that it will not accept a suspension under any conditions and will halt its newly agreed upon cooperative work plan with the Agency if new sanctions are pursued at the Security Council. Hence, the Board, but more significantly the P5+1 (Permanent Security Council members plus Germany) which have been pursuing Security Council sanctions in order to pressure Iran to halt its enrichment program, is faced with the difficult choice of deciding whether to give the IAEA more room to maneuver regarding the inspection of Iran’s nuclear program. This means a suspension of the attempt to tighten the sanctions noose without a concomitant and publicly announced suspension of uranium enrichment by Tehran. There have been suggestions that Iran has effectively and perhaps intentionally slowed its program (a suggestion that was immediately denied by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but not Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani). But I am pretty sure that the chances of an official suspension is almost nil.

I am pasting below the Iran relevant parts of the Director General’s statement to the Board, acknowledging the Agency's ability "to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material," resolution of a number of outstanding issues along with the Iran’s continued defiance of Security Council demand to suspend enrichment and the Agency’s inability to verify certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program. It is in the hope of verifying these aspects that the work plan was negotiated with Iran.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The report before you provides an update on the implementation of Agency safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report makes four main points.

First, the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has continued to provide the access and reporting needed to enable Agency verification in this regard.

Second, Iran has provided the Agency with additional information and access needed to resolve a number of long outstanding issues. In particular, Agency questions regarding past plutonium experiments in Iran have been satisfactorily answered, and this issue has been resolved. Questions about the presence and origin of high enriched uranium particles at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility have also been resolved.

Third, contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, calling on Iran to take certain confidence building measures, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, and is continuing with the construction and operation of the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. Iran is also continuing with its construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak. This is regrettable.

Fourth, despite repeated requests by the Board and the Security Council to Iran, the Agency has so far been unable to verify certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran´s nuclear programme. It was this situation that triggered a crisis of confidence about the nature of Iran´s nuclear programme, which led to a series of actions by the UN Security Council. However, during a meeting I had with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Dr. Larijani, it was agreed that Iran would work with the Agency to develop a work plan for resolving all outstanding verification issues. A copy of the resulting work plan between Iran and the Secretariat is attached to my report.

This is the first time that Iran has agreed on a plan to address all outstanding issues, with a defined timeline, and is therefore an important step in the right direction. Naturally, the key to gauging Iran´s commitment will be its willingness to implement this work plan fully and in a timely manner. This would require active cooperation by Iran and its undertaking of all the transparency measures needed to reconstruct the history of its nuclear programme - measures that are provided for in the additional protocol and beyond, and which include access to locations, documents and individuals, as well as answers to all questions the Agency may need to ask in order to reach a technical conclusion on a particular issue. Resolving all outstanding verification issues in the next two to three months, after a long deadlock, would go a long way towards building the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran´s past nuclear programme.

But equally important, Iran obviously needs to continue to build confidence in the scope and nature of its current nuclear programme, including renewed access by the Agency to information relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research. To that end, and given the special history of Iran´s nuclear programme, it would be indispensable for Iran to ratify and bring into force its additional protocol, as called for by the Security Council and the Board. This would enable the Agency to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material but, equally important, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

Finally, I continue to hope that conditions will be created soon to make it possible for the resumption of negotiations between Iran and all relevant parties. I still believe it is only through negotiations that a durable solution could be achieved - a solution that provides the international community with the required level of assurance and enables Iran to exercise its rights under the NPT. To this end I repeat that a "double time-out" of all enrichment related activities and of sanctions could provide a breathing space for negotiations to be resumed. The earlier we move from confrontation and distrust to dialogue and confidence building, the better for Iran and for the international community.

Read more on this article...

Kian Tajbakhsh: "I do expect to be released soon."

The BBC and several other sources report that "journalists on a tour of Evin Prison were given a surprise meeting with Mr. Tajbakhsh." According to this report Kian said:
"I do expect to be released soon. Exactly when, I do not know. . . .The conditions in prison are fine. I'm in a solitary cell, I have a television and a table. I have a private bathroom. . . .I have weekly visits from my wife."

Mr Tajkbakhsh then revealed that he had not yet been charged by Iranian judicial authorities, despite them claiming otherwise in March.

"There have been no formal charges with the case right now, my case is under investigation," he said.

"Of course, I've been told why I am being held but I prefer not to discuss issues with the case right now."

The academic insisted he was not guilty and said the interview on Iranian television had not been a confession.

Let's hope that Kian is back with his wife, family, and friends soon. Read more on this article...

Collapse of Legitimacy in Pakistan? Negotiations in Afghanistan?

The illegal deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia combined with signs of internal weakness in the military, could be a dangerous turning point. Ahmed Rashid, writing in the Telegraph, draws a link between the two. The U.S. (or the West), he writes, is desperate to broker a "loveless marriage" between General Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto:
So that the general can combat the terrorists and the lady play democracy. This, they hope, can keep the crumbling edifice of military rule going for a few more years or at least until Osama bin Laden is winkled out of his home in the tribal regions of North and South Waziristan.
But he goes on:
That is where the whole plan falls apart because in a country like Pakistan, a failing state hovering over the abyss, there are too many loose ends to tie up.
What are these loose ends? None other than every principle of legitimacy of the state in Pakistan. Sharif is (hypocritically) challenging whatever shred of democratic legitimacy the General may concoct with Washington's support by sabotaging the plan for a negotiated transition ignoring his party. Musharraf was forced into this confrontation when a mass mobilization of the legal profession in support of the chief justice exposed the vacuum of legality on which the military regime stood; only a 2 am telephone call from Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stopped Musharraf from destroying the pretense of legality by declaring martial law.

Pakistani generals thought they were prepared for this: after destroying any other source of legitimacy, they have always argued that only the army kept Pakistan together. It used "the mullahs" against the "politicians," and it had both under firm control. But now, writes Rashid:

There is the crumbling morale in the army. Two weeks ago US and Nato forces in Afghanistan were shocked to discover that 300 Pakistani soldiers - their erstwhile partners in the war on terrorism - had surrendered to the Taliban in Waziristan without firing a shot.

Soldiers in the badlands controlled by the Taliban and al-Qa'eda are deserting or refusing to open fire. The White House is panic-stricken. That is because Gen Musharraf in his hubris has utterly failed to convince Pakistanis or the army that Pakistan has to fight not America's war, but its own war against ever-expanding extremism.

So the Pakistani state is one by one shedding its legal-constitutional, Islamic, democratic, and national legitimacy.

And this happened in the state where (1) Usama bin Laden is currently living, having reconstituted the core structures of al-Qaida; (2) the military has nuclear weapons and recently tested a missile delivery system; and (3) President Bush removed Ambassador Ryan Crocker in November to send him to Iraq, the "central front in the War on Terror," leaving the US ambassadorship vacant during most of this crisis.

The violence continues in Afghanistan, of course, despite the same type of statistically induced optimism as in Iraq on the part of US military commanders. The new British government, however, having conducted its review of Iraq and Afghanistan policy, decided to pull out of Basra and reportedly has
told Washington that in Afghanistan, we are "winning the battles but losing the war.” Apparently the glass is half empty and getting emptier.

But a small item deserves to be watched: according to AFP a "senior Taliban spokesman" told their correspondent, "For the sake of national interests ... we are fully ready for talks with the government." This follows by one day yet another public offer of negotiations from President Hamid Karzai.

This could be another soon-to-be-denied random report. But it occurs in a context where Karzai has repeatedly offered such negotiations with no apparent hindrance from Washington.

At the August Afghan-Pakistan Peace Jirga in Kabul, the participants decided to constitute a smaller jirga of 50 (25 from each country) to "engage in "dialogue for peace and reconciliation with opposition." This jirga took place in part thanks to U.S. engagement, and senior officials have privately said they fully support this initiative. In Pakistan, Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, the leader of Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam, the Deobandi party that is more or less the godfather of the Taliban, offered cautious support to the process. Fazlur Rahman had boycotted the Jirga on the grounds that the Taliban were not represented there, but he did not rule out joining the process in the future.

Fazlur Rahman has outlined what a settlement would look like. Last November in Peshawar, Ahmed Rashid and I heard him address a "Pakhtun Peace Jirga" organized by the Pashtun Nationalist Awami National Party. Fazlur Rahman, whose party had participated in Pakistani elections and has at times been an electoral ally of the PPP, said he "could not deny to others what I claim for myself." Just as JUI participated in elections in Pakistan, the Taliban could do so in Afghanistan, but not while they were labeled "terrorists" and foreign troops occupied the country.

That is the first and principal (though not sole) obstacle to negotiations: are the Taliban the organization that harbored the terrorists of 9/11, who therefore must, in President Bush's words, "share their destiny?" Or are they an Afghan armed opposition group that has not yet joined the peace process that started with the Bonn Agreement? Will returning Taliban be reintegrated or sent to Guantanamo?

If quoted correctly, the Taliban spokesman offered an interesting hint: he spoke of "national interests." This is not a term commonly employed by Bin Laden and Zawahari. There have been many signs, especially since the invasion of Iraq, that the Taliban have become radicalized and moved toward a global Islamism foreign to their origins. But Taliban ground commanders, like the mujahidin commanders of the 1980s (in some cases their fathers or uncles) sometimes make local deals for local reasons. President Karzai's spokesman, Humayun Hamidzada, responded to the report with the standard formula, that
"government's doors are open to anyone who agrees to obey the constitution and other laws of the country to join peace."

The status of those Taliban leaders branded by the U.S. as harborers of al-Qaida and listed by the UN Security Council as terrorists subject to sanctions could pose an obstacle, as well as the question of foreign troops. But the internal ethnic cleavage and the regional situation will also complicate matters. Domestically, the former Northern Alliance leaders by and large have opposed any hint of dialogue with the Taliban. Significant sectors of the northern population retains memories of conquest and massacre by the Taliban. But their former political leader, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, reportedly stated last week at a seminar in Peshawar that "Taliban should be given representation in the sub-jirga formed in line with the declaration of the joint Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga last month."

Regional resistance may be harder to overcome. Russia refuses to countenance the removal from the sanctions list even of the current Governor of Uruzgan Province, a former Taliban commander who has collaborated well with a Dutch NATO contingent and made the province more secure. Even as the U.S. has escalated claims that Iran is aiding the Taliban, Iranian diplomats privately warn the U.S. against making a political deal with the Taliban.

Such a deal could constitute a rough Afghan equivalent of U.S. policy in Anbar Province, Iraq. In 2001-2002, the U.S. cooperated with Iran to use the Northern Alliance to occupy the ground vacated by the Taliban and to bolster the authority of the new Afghan administration. While the Northern Alliance's ties to Iran are weaker and more purely pragmatic than those of Iraq's Shi'a leaders, Iran and the U.S. both see them as potential (though unreliable) Iranian assets in Afghanistan. Whether or not the U.S. has
in view such a strategic shift toward "moderate" Taliban (I have no direct evidence of it), Iran will surely suspect that it does and react accordingly. In the context of rising tensions with the U.S. over Iraq and Tehran's nuclear program, such political changes could link the two wars even more closely, mostly (as usual) to the detriment of the aspirations of Afghans for a semblance of a normal life after decades of war.

It is worth exploring indications that those currently fighting the Afghan government, NATO, and US in Afghanistan are willing to adopt a national political agenda that could, in principle, be a subject of negotiation. But if Bin Laden's support base among Taliban in the tribal territories of Pakistan continues to grow, and if the Pakistani state continues to disintegrate, the incentives for maximalist positions will grow as well. If tensions between the U.S. and Iran escalate, the result may be reconfigured war rather than peace. And if the U.S. presses on with aggressive opium poppy eradication in southern Afghanistan, efforts at consolidating government authority in the vulnerable areas bordering what Rashid calls Pakistan's "badlands" may collapse.
Read more on this article...

Monday, September 10, 2007

Swing States: Jazz Diplomacy along the Silk Road

In the Christian Science Monitor, Moises Velazquez-Manoff brings us a report on "Jazz Ambassadors" in Central Asia.

Buried in this feature is a policy proposal from yours truly:
The US touts tolerance and diversity along the Silk Road, says Barnett Rubin, director of studies at New York University's Center on International Cooperation. But its primary interests in the region, he says, are access to military bases for the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns to counter Russian influence and eventually tapping abundant oil and natural gas resources. "If anyone tells you that the US has an interest in democracy in Central Asia, don't believe them," Dr. Rubin says.

"Cultural exchange is no substitute for an effective foreign policy," he adds. "Patting a kid on the head is no substitute for having a policy in the Middle East that Arabs can support."

Dour as he sounds, Rubin has only good things to say about sending jazz abroad. Future presidential candidates should nominate "a secretary of swing," he half jokes. "Swinging is a very important [political] philosophy. You make something beautiful by cooperating, without anyone telling you what to do."

I doubt this administration can make good use of jazz: if they cared about jazz, they would fix New Orleans. But jazz can do something more for the U.S. than showcase diversity. It's a model for international relations in a world out of balance. Swinging is not only cooperating, it's driving forward by staying off the beat. Since September 11, we have been hitting the beat just where UBL knows where to find us. When Dizzy Gillespie ran for president in 1963-1964, he had an important lesson: just listen to his campaign song, Vote Dizzy. He keeps you guessing where he's coming down, but he always gets there in the end.

In a rare show of transparency, Dizzy announced his major appointments in advance: Duke Ellington as Secretary of State, the recently departed Max Roach as Secretary of War (when told that the post was now called "Defense," Dizzy whispered, "Don't nobody tell Max" -- later he decided to abolish the Department of War -"Because we're not having any"), and, most inspired, Miles Davis as Director of Central Intelligence. Miles knew how to end a war. When John Coltrane asked him how to end a solo, he replied, "Take the horn out of your mouth." And with Miles at the CIA, there would have been no slam dunks. He would have sent daily briefer Thelonius Monk to give the President the facts the way he gave us the notes: Straight, No Chaser.

Update: Joe Zawinul has died. My wife Susan and I saw him lead the Zawinul Syndicate at a concert in Provence last July. Talk about jazz ambassadors: he was a jazz UN. This 75-year old Austrian who played with Cannonball Adderley and Miles Davis performed with electrifying musicians from Brazil, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, and the Congo. Mercy, mercy, mercy. Read more on this article...

Sunday, September 9, 2007

Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan: A Study by UNAMA

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued a 140-page study today entitled Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007). September 9, the day chosen to issue the report, is a national holiday in Afghanistan, the anniversary of the assassination of Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud by al-Qa'ida operatives, which was the first known suicide attack in the history of the Afghan conflicts. Massoud was the charismatic field commander of Northern Afghanistan's resistance to both the Soviet Union and the Taliban, and his assassination was an integral part of the preparation for September 11. Al-Qaida's goal was to annihilate the most effective potential rallying point for a strike back against al-Qaida and the Taliban. This attack was carried out by European citizens of North African Arab origin, not by Afghans, but since that time some attacks have also been carried out by Afghans.

The authors of the report interviewed over two dozen would-be or failed suicide bombers. They find that most are poor and uneducated, some are children, and many did not fully understand the consequences of their actions. An increasing number are Afghans, though the majority appear to be foreigners. The tribal territories of Pakistan remain an important base of support and recruitment for suicide bombers, but the Afghan dimension is growing. Only 11 percent of Afghans surveyed state that suicide bombing can sometimes be used to defend Islam.

The report documents the effects of these bombings on the communities they attack as well as on the communities from which the bombers are recruited and recommends a set of actions to prevent them. Read more on this article...

Crossover Dreams: UBL Rebrands al-Qa'ida in (anti-) Global Market Share Grab

Most of the discussion of Bin Laden's recent video seems to me to have missed the point. Bin Laden is no longer just seeking to lead Muslims in a jihad against "Crusaders and Zionists"; he is proclaiming to the whole world that the genuine revolutionary alternative to imperialism, capitalism, global warming, genocide, high taxes, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, moral decay, confused sex roles, the decline of the family, commercialism, and whatever else ails us is Islam. In this sense Bin Laden is indeed seeking to don the mantle of the last century's false prophets.

One of the clearest indicators is the social origin of new recruits to al-Qa'ida. As Olivier Roy writes in his forthcoming Le Croissant et le Chaos:
La carte de recrutement d’al-Qaida ne correspond pas à celle des conflits du Moyen-Orient, car on y trouve surtout des jeunes musulmans européens de seconde génération et des convertis, mais ni Palestiniens, ni Afghans et fort peu de gens venus du Moyen-Orient.
The map of the origin of al-Qaida recruits does not match the map of Middle East conflicts. The recruits consist predominantly of second-generation European young Muslims and converts, not Palestinians or Afghans, and very few people coming from the Middle East.

This quote comes from an electronic file dated in July, but it perfectly matches the profile of those arrested in Germany last week: the sons of Turkish guest workers and a German convert.

Just what are these "converts" converting to? They are not converting to anything that most Muslims would recognize as Islam. They do not integrate into the religion and culture of Islamic civilization and then gradually develop political views that correspond to their new milieu. On the contrary: they are radicalized opponents of the global order who find that al-Qa'ida has become the most genuine anti-globalization revolutionary organization. "Conversion" is just part of the initiation ritual.

Former Pakistani ISI director Hamid Gul made the same point in a UPI interview on September 28, 2001. Elaborating on his thesis that the World Trade Center was bombed by the Israeli secret services who warned the Jews to stay away (I must have forgotten to check my email that day), Gul told Arnaud de Borchgrave:
The world needs a post-modern state system. Right now, the nation-state and round the clock satellite TV lead people to imitate America's way of life. Which is mathematically impossible. You have 4 percent of the world's population consuming 32 percent of the world's resources. The creator through Prophet Mohammed said equal distribution. Capitalism is the negation of the creator's will. It leads to imperialism and unilateralism. [We will have] a global village under divine order, or we will have global bloodshed until good triumphs over evil.
Bin Laden is more sophisticated. He must have found it frustrating for years that his epigones denied him credit for 9/11, in the apparent belief that only Jews were clever enough to pull off such an operation. He now says to Americans who do not understand "why they hate us":
This innocence of yours is like my innocence of the blood of your sons on the 11th - were I to claim such a thing. But it is impossible for me to humour any of you in the arrogance and indifference you show for the lives of humans outside America, or for me to humour your leaders in their lying, as the entire world knows they have the lion's share of that.
In his latest speech he even abandons the usual anti-Semitic claims that "Zionists" control the government and press in the U.S. in favor of the populist trope that the government serves capital, which wants oil. Ahmadinejad denies the Holocaust. Bin Laden acknowledges the Holocaust and blames it on Western Civilization. Bin Laden even poses, amazingly, as the heir of the tolerance of classical Islam, the last time that Islam posed a global alternative:
The holocaust of the Jews was carried out by your brethren in the middle of Europe, but had it been closer to our countries, most of the Jews would have been saved by taking refuge with us. And my proof for that is in what your brothers, the Spanish, did when they set up the horrible courts of the Inquisition to try Muslims and Jews, when the Jews only found safe shelter by taking refuge in our countries. And that is why the Jewish community in Morocco today is one of the largest communities in the world. They are alive with us and we have not incinerated them.
It is ironic to say the least that Bin Laden claims credit for the policies of Muslim rulers that his predecessors, the Salafis of the day (the Muwahhidin, known in Spain as Almohade), considered to be apostates.

Bin Laden's message has little or no appeal to Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, or elsewhere engaged in their national struggles for identity, legitimacy, or power. He engages, as Roy writes, "les migrants, les réfugiés, la seconde génération, les nouvelles classes sociales, ou bien . . .les tribus en mutation sociale." (He attracts "migrants, the second generation, new social classes, or tribes undergoing social change.")

I made a similar point about Bin Laden's relation to globalization and the nation-state system in a previous post.

This movement can pose a serious threat because of its global capacity for violence. But the more we link that threat to the numerous political struggles of Muslims around the world, the more we provide Bin Laden with talking points for his next video. Stay tuned. Read more on this article...

A new Declaration of Principles?

The focus of political debate in Israel between now and November will be the planned Peace Conference. Two approaches seem to be shaping up.

One is expressed by the Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, who argues that no withdrawal from the West Bank should take place until Israel has developed an anti-rocket system to prevent the recurrence, this time from the West Bank, of the Hizbollah-type rocketing of Israeli cities and other targets during the 2006 War in Lebanon.

The other is represented by Olmert’s deputy and confidant, Vice Premier Haim Ramon. Two respected correspondents of Yediot Achronot wrote on September 6, 2007, that Ramon met with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayad to work on a statement of principles for the conference. The journalists alleged that the position Ramon put forth included offering the Palestinians an Israeli withdrawal from nearly the entire West Bank, including the Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem, as part of a final peace deal. According to the report's account of Ramon's offer, the border between Israel and the future Palestinian state will roughly follow the route of Israel's West Bank security wall. This would leave the major Israeli settlement blocs that comprise between 3 and 8 percent of the West Bank in Israel's hands. In return, Israel will cede the same amount of land inside Israel to the Palestinians to make up for the annexed territory. Such an offer would be an improvement on Barak’s 2000 offer which included only partial territorial compensation. In addition, he alleged to have offered a land corridor between the West Bank and Gaza, a long-standing Palestinian demand.

The Yediot Achoronot article explained the relationship between Olmert and Ramon in this fashion: Olmert is aware of and approves of Ramon's negotiating activities. If Ramon is successful in reaching an accord, Olmert will publicly adopt the results, and if they fail, Olmert will portray them as Ramon’s personal effort. If this is indeed the case, Ramon is playing the same role Beilin did in his talks with Abu Mazen (Abbas) in 1995. That agreement was never given an official hearing as it was concluded shortly before Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995. At the same time, its principles served as the core of the 2000 Camp David Two talks between Barak and Arafat.

It is much too soon to take the report on Ramon’s negotiations at face value but there is growing tension within the ranks of Kadima, Olmert’s Party, as November nears. At the same time, Yediot Achronot reports today (September 9, 2007), that in view of Olmert’s efforts there is a growing willingness on the part of the Labor Party to stay in the coalition government with Kadima. Yossi Beilin, Haim Oron, and “Peace Now” leaders to the left of Labor are also seeking ways to strengthen his public standing and to advance the negotiations.

Gershon Shafir Read more on this article...

The Double Defeat of the Neo-Conservatives: A New Book by Olivier Roy

This week U.S. bookstores (and the American Enterprise Institute) launch the latest phantasmagorias of Michael Ledeen and Norman Podhoretz (mildly dissected by The New Republic's Peter Beinart in the New York Times Book Review). Anglophone readers will have to wait, unfortunately, to read Olivier Roy's Le Croissant et le Chaos, in French bookstores September 12. I have just received an electronic copy from the author and can only hope that it is translated soon.

I haven't finished this 200-page essay yet, so I will just translate an excerpt from the review in Le Monde under the title, "The Double Defeat of the Neo-Conservatives."
The neo-conservatives imposed a comprehensive (totalizing) response to a supposedly totalitarian threat, whereas what was required was implementation of policies adapted to each situation and conflict.

Olivier Roy reaffirms the conviction he has upheld for years: "The vision of a Muslim world unified under the banner of Islam mounting an offensive against the West makes no sense," no less than that of a new "Islamo-fascist" totalitarianism, which has supposedly replaced the totalitarianisms of the 20th century.
This review does not do justice to the subtlety and clarity of Roy's analysis. He shows how the implementation of a policy based on a false image of middle eastern societies self-destructs irretrievably once fantasy meets reality. An example from today's news is the latest "success" in Iraq: arming Saddamist Sunni militias aganist Salafi jihadists (and Shi'a militias) in the name of the civic equality of all citizens of Iraq.

Let's hope this book is available in English soon. Read more on this article...

Thursday, September 6, 2007

Update on Iran War Rollout

At UPI's "Outside View" feature, David Isenberg of the British American Security Information Council and the Cato Institute provides a summary of the campaign for war with Iran so far. He missed the Newsweek article by AEI fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht about why war is inevitable, the Washington Post's shameless reprise yesterday of its 2003 attack on Mohamed El-Baradei of the IAEA, the Anti-Defamation League's opening of its No Nuclear Iran campaign, and William Kristol's call for attacks on "Terrorist Training Camps" in Iran.

Update: The New Yorker used to have a capsule review of Night at the Opera which said, "The Marx Brothers do to Il Trovatore what ought to be done to Il Trovatore." See Salon, where Glenn Greewald does to Fred Hiatt and Michael Ledeen what ought to be done to Fred Hiatt and Michael Ledeen.

Update II: Interviewed by Spencer Ackerman of TPMMuckraker, Reuel Marc Gerecht of AEI good naturedly denies that he or AEI received any instructions from the Office of the Vice President to beat the drums for war with Iran. He even says something nice about me. Let's hope that he is right and my source is mistaken. For the record: I did not accuse "hardliners in Dick Cheney's office of giving right-leaning think tanks in Washington 'instructions' to start a drumbeat for war with Iran," as Ackerman writes. I passed on a credible report to that effect, explicitly saying I could not verify it, in order to draw attention to something I consider very dangerous. Let's see if empirical evidence confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis.
Read more on this article...

Wednesday, September 5, 2007

Theses on Policy toward Iran

As I and many others have noted, there are increasing signs that the administration has decided or has nearly decided to launch an air and sea attack on Iran, which will include but not be limited to all installations connected to the country’s nuclear program. All military equipment is in place for such an attack (three carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf). As I wrote in a recent blog, there are credible reports of a concerted campaign to build public support for such an attack. The aim is said to be to get support in polls up to about 35-40%, but the most important goal is to intimidate the Democrats in Congress, in particular through AIPAC and allied groups, so that they will not use either the power of the purse or Congress’ war powers to impede the attack. The administration is counting on Democrats saying they don’t want to “tie the president’s hands” as he deals with this mortal threat to the U.S. and Israel. The Anti-Defamation League announced today a campaign with the theme "No Nuclear Iran."

Under the Cheney-Addington interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, there is no need for any Congressional consent to such an action by the President. In any case, the Authorization for the Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001, suffices, as it authorizes the use of such force against any terrorists or states harboring terrorists. There is no requirement that the President certify or Congress approve any such designation. The argument would be strengthened, however, if the administration formally designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran) or its elite unit, the Qods (Jerusalem) Force, as a terrorist organization, a proposal that has been floated in the press. In that case the Iranian state would be officially designated as harboring terrorists.

The rationale for such an act of war is likely to be that it is necessary to prevent a terrorist state from acquiring nuclear weapons. Any hint of Iranian compliance with international demands would interfere with the campaign. Hence part of the PR campaign that has started for the war will consist of attacks on Mohamed El-Baradei and the IAEA, as in 2002-2003 over Iraq, when, of course, the IAEA was proved right and its critics wrong. Such at attack, presumably authored by Fred Hiatt, commenced on the editorial page of the Washington Post today. For some reason, the Post editorial does not mention its similar editorial from January 28, 2003, where it made identical false charges against El-Baradei.

The Bush-Cheney policy on Iran is unlikely to have any outcome but war, not because of the threat of the use of force, but because of its objective: regime change. The President and Vice-President have never echoed the disavowals of this goal by other officials. Their supporters at AEI, the Weekly Standard, and elsewhere, make it clear that the goal of the policy is destroying the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even if this were not true, the government (and not only the government) of Iran believes it is true. In repeated discussions on several continents over the past five years, Iranian officials have told me that the main obstacle to improvement in U.S.-Iran relations is the agenda of regime change – not Israel, not Iraq, nothing else. No amount of pressure or threats will force the Iranian government to negotiate its own destruction. Therefore as long as regime change is the goal, or appears to be the goal, Iran has no credible incentives to comply with any demands. Threats are useless. Sanctions are useless. In any case, sanctions will strengthen and enrich the regime, as they almost always do.

The Bush administration discarded an opportunity to expand cooperation with the government of President Muhammad Khatami after the U.S. and Iran collaborated to remove the Taliban regime and establish the Government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. I witnessed that cooperation as a member of the UN team at the Bonn conference. The Bush administration threw that chance away, declaring Iran a member of the Axis of Evil. It did so under President Khatami, who never denied the Holocaust or said that the Israeli regime, like the Soviet Union, was destined to disappear from the pages of time (which is what Ahmadinejad actually said, not that Israel should be wiped off the map). Therefore Iran does not believe that there is any genuine link between the extremist statements of President Ahmadinejad and U.S. policy, as the Bush administration had exactly the same policy toward the Government of President Khatami. Ahmadinejad has indeed called Israel the “bearer of Satan,” the equivalent in Persian of calling a country a member of the “axis of evil.” There is a fearful symmetry of demonization.

The advocates of war claim that the Iranian regime is a monolithic, revolutionary regime whose aim is destruction of world order and in particular the U.S. and Israel. The argument is identical to that of Cold Warriors who argued that the USSR was a monolithic revolutionary regime with exactly the same aims. Because the regime is “evil” and monolithic, negotiations are impossible (see AEI fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht’s article in the current Newsweek). Internal change or reform is also impossible. There are no Iranian moderates or realists with whom one can work for change, just as there were no moderate or reform communists in the USSR. These same people argued that everything Gorbachev did was part of a plot to trick the West and strengthen Soviet Communism. They now make the same arguments about Iran.

In part thanks to them, we are now dealing not with the Iranian Gorbachev, but with the Iranian Putin, who is rather worse than the original. Nonetheless, the Iranian power structure still includes people with a range of views, from conservative realist to reformist, with whom it is possible to engage, if an agenda of regime change did not sabotage any efforts on their part. I meet with such people regularly. Certainly the Iranian democratic opposition has made clear its opposition to forcible regime change.

There is an alternative to war, but it has to start with an end to regime change as a policy goal. There are then a number of areas, such as counter-narcotics in Afghanistan and the territorial integrity of Iraq, where the U.S. and Iran have clearly complementary interests and could start a dialogue. I will not attempt to sketch a road map here, and it will be difficult to move far as long as the current administrations are in power in both countries.

The alternative of war will have terrible effects including:

  • No support for the U.S. from any country but Israel (though Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may not be too unhappy) and the demolition of whatever still remains of the U.S.’s international standing except as a warmaking power; that reputation will also quickly dissipate as this war, too, fails to achieve its objectives.
  • Rapid deterioration of security in (at least) Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; note that much of the support for Benazir Bhutto, whom the U.S. hopes will help shepherd a political transition in Pakistan, comes from Pakistani Shi’a, who will turn violently anti-American in the event of an attack on Iran; northern Afghanistan is also under the de facto control of groups supported by Iran against the Taliban; the government of Iraq in Baghdad will oppose an attack on Iran, but our new friends in Anbar province, whom President Bush visited on Labor Day and who fought Iran for Saddam Hussein, will support it and maybe even volunteer to fight.
  • Gasoline prices may reach $7/gallon within a week and probably go higher rapidly, especially if Iran makes even partially successful attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Either there will be a movement of national solidarity against invasion in Iran from across the entire Iranian political spectrum, or (less likely) Iran will collapse into some kind of civil disorder, with nuclear materials littered about.
  • Hizbullah and Hamas will unleash missile attacks and perhaps suicide bombings on Israel, and Israel will respond harshly in Lebanon and Gaza (at least).
  • Such an attack will also have other unpredictable consequences, which I will therefore not try to predict.

What course of action do I suggest?

The immediate goal for Democratic presidential candidates and the Democrats (and sensible Republicans) in Congress should be to use the power of the legislative branch to prevent the administration from launching a war. I can think of two possible ways to do this:

  • Pass an Act of Congress stating that the 2001 AUMF does not authorize a preemptive strike against Iran (or a strike in response to an alleged provocation – recall Tonkin Gulf). In this case, Congress would claim that war with Iran requires new authorization.
  • Cut off funding for any war with Iran not specifically authorized by Congress in accordance with the law after September 30, when spending starts out of next year’s budget. Presumably they won’t be able to start the war by then and rely on the “support the troops” argument.

In coordination with this immediate response, responsible leaders in both parties should articulate an alternative policy toward Iran starting with the same principle as the Helsinki Accords of 1975 – no regime change. The same political groups that want war with Iran today opposed the Helsinki Accords of 1975 because they recognized the Soviet control of Eastern Europe. But these Accords were instrumental in bringing about the collapse of the USSR and rise of independent forces in Central and Eastern Europe.

Under different leaders, the U.S. could start work on such a détente today. It will take years and it cannot advance much while Bush-Cheney and Ahmadinejad are in power. But we should not let them destroy such opportunities for the future.

Read more on this article...

Tuesday, September 4, 2007

Rough translation of BBC Persian Service on Kian Tajbakhsh

The translation below is a quick effort by a non-professional volunteer, Azadeh Ensha, whom I would like to thank. As soon as an authoritative version is available I will post it or a link.

Article follows:

15:51 GMT Tuesday 4 September 2007

Kian Tajbakhsh will be freed

Kian Tajbakhsh, a social science researcher, who was accused of undermining national security and spying and who was arrested in Iran will be freed on bail.

State television of Iran quoted Hassan Hadad, prosecutor for the national security court in Tehran, reported that the investigation of the special court into Mr. Tajbakhsh is ongoing, and that after completion of the investigation, he will be released on bail.

Mr. Tajbakhsh, a social science researcher and a consultant to the American Organization called Open Society, which is related to George Soros Foundation, was arrested about four months ago and accused of activities and propaganda for spying and espionage for foreign powers.

A few days after news of his arrest was made public in the Washington Post on 29 May, Alireza Jamshidi, a spokesman for the Judiciary in Iran, confirmed his arrest in a press conference in Tehran.

The spokesman for the Judiciary said about Mr. Tajbakhsh, "This Iranian national is temporarily arrested because he is accused of having activities against the security of the country and he was active in propaganda and spying for foreigners."

Mr. Tajbakhsh is 45-years-old. From 2004, he was working with the plans of International Bank for Iran and he was an active consultant for some of the Iranian governmental organizations. His expertise is public health and urban problems.

A while back, Iranian television program under the title of "In The Name of Democracy" broadcast that Mr. Tajbakhsh, Haleh Esfandiari and Ramin Jahabegloo explained their activities separately.

In this program, Mr. Tajbakhsh said he was working for the Soros Foundation in three different issues concerning Iran. One was open programs, the other was culture and organization making and the third was a long term program to introduce the point of view of the Open Society Institute to Iran.

Owing to his expertise in urban development, said that he was giving Soros Foundation ideas in the area of social and cultural changes in Iran, he tried to connect people of the foundation with people from Iranian institutions and also to organize plans that were not necessarily in his line of expertise.

The Soros Foundation is an institute which is close to the Democratic party in America and Kian Tajbakhsh in part of his talk on television said "that the reason that the American government gave permission to Soros Foundation to have activities and projects in Iran means they have a united approach to Iranian affairs in spite of their differences between Soros Foundation and the Republican party of Mr. Bush."

Haleh Esfandiari, the other Iranian-American researcher, who was arrested at about the same time as Mr. Tajbakhsh on similar accusations, was freed on the 30th of Mordad and left Iran on Monday, the 3rd of September. Also, it's been reported that the passport of Parnaz Azima, the Farda Radio broadcaster who was also forbidden to leave Iran for activities against the regime, received her passport back. Shirin Ebadi, one of the attorneys for Ms. Azima, said to BBC Persian that the justice government last night agreed to return the passport of Azima. Mrs. Ebadi said that her client, who up to now was forbidden to leave Iran, is planning to leave Iran, but will return for her trial. Read more on this article...