Tuesday, August 28, 2007

Points on Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan: A Critique and a Proposal (Updated)















In the first and second installments of this series (August 24 and 25), I took the release of the new “U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan” as the occasion to analyze the US approach. On August 27, the United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released its Afghan Opium Survey 2007 at a press conference in Kabul. The press release sounded the alarm at the record production this year. The report led with two major findings:

UNODC's 2007 Annual Opium Survey showed the area under opium cultivation rose to 193,000 hectares from 165,000 in 2006. The total opium harvest will be 8,200 tonnes, up from 6,100 tonnes last year. The amount of Afghan land used for growing opium is now larger than the combined total under coca cultivation in Latin America - Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. No other country has produced narcotics on such a deadly scale since China in the 19 th century.

In the centre and north of Afghanistan, where the government has increased its authority and presence, opium cultivation is diminishing. The number of opium-free provinces more than doubled from six to thirteen, while in the province of Balkh opium cultivation collapsed from 7,200 hectares last year to zero. However, the opposite trend was seen in southern Afghanistan. Some 80 percent of opium poppies were grown in a handful of provinces along the border with Pakistan, where instability is greatest. In the volatile province of Helmand, where the Taliban insurgency is concentrated, opium cultivation rose 48 percent to 102,770 hectares.
The report and press release repeat the misconception in the U.S. Strategy that provinces with little or no poppy cultivation are "opium-free." Elites in "opium-free" provinces continue to profit handsomely from drug trafficking. The UNODC report is a welcome complement to the U.S. Strategy in that it speaks frankly though mildly of the inadequacy of alternative livelihood programs and of development for those who do not grow poppy. The report accurately links poppy cultivation (though not drug trafficking) to insecurity. Like the U.S. Strategy, it calls for the full integration of counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics measures, especially in Helmand province, which has become "the world's biggest source of illicit drugs, surpassing the output of entire countries."

Some colleagues asked for my ideas on how to respond to what UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa called a "grim" but "not yet hopeless" situation. I drafted a brief (though probably not brief enough) memo giving my critique of current policy and making some prescriptions. This memo is not part of the series of four installments I am posting on Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan. The first was entitled "Defining the Problem" and the second analyzed "The Value Chain, the Corruption Chain." A third essay will discuss sanctions against narcotics production and trafficking (eradication and interdiction), and the final will discuss incentives (alternative livelihoods) and strategic sequencing. This post is a summary of the overall policy conclusions I have reached. The four longer installments will provide the analysis on which I base the conclusions below.

The Situation, the Problem, the Tools, the Goal
  • According to UNODC estimates, cultivators receive only about 20% of the revenue from narcotics, and the drug money that really harms Afghanistan is the money that passes between trafficker/processors on the one side, and power holders on the other, including Taliban, Afghan government officials, and local/tribal leaders.
  • These links are just as strong in northern Afghanistan as in southern Afghanistan. Drug trafficking moves north across so-called opium-free provinces as well as south. Afghanistan has an integrated drug market. Security provided by the Afghan government and international forces makes cultivation more difficult in some areas and enables farmers to earn a living through other activities, but it does not restrict drug trafficking, which flourishes equally everywhere. Helmand province (which produces nearly half the opium in the world) and its neighbors are not a drug-producing enclave unconnected to opium-free provinces. They are now the main source of raw material for the country’s largest industry, which is national in scope. Enhanced eradication of the poppy crop in Helmand without adequate other measures will raise the farm-gate price of opium and create incentives for cultivation to migrate. Suppression of cultivation in Nangarhar in the East in 2004-2005 led to the increase of cultivation in northern Afghanistan.
  • Both globally and within Afghanistan, narcotics cultivation is the result of, not the cause, of insecurity. Costa emphasized the link between insecurity and narcotics production in releasing the Afghanistan Opium Assessment. The essential need for counter-narcotics policy is “a state that works” according to Colombian Deputy Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo. Therefore, as always, the core problem is security.
  • The core tools of counter-narcotics policy are crop eradication, interdiction (which is much more complex than arresting traffickers), and development (alternative livelihoods). All are necessary in a coordinated counter-narcotics policy, but they need not be simultaneous. A list of tools is not a strategy. They have to be sequenced to achieve the right outcome. It is not true, as U.S. government spokesmen routinely state, that all counter-narcotics successes combined all three simultaneously. In Thailand the government invested in development for ten years before introducing eradication. Since the people had confidence in the alternatives by then, they accepted eradication of what little cultivation was left.
Strategy
  • The correct strategy for Afghanistan is to invest in development (not only rural) in all provinces, especially in the first instance in those areas that are not cultivating. Both US and UNODC spokesmen cite the figure that “only” 14 percent of the Afghan population is directly involved with poppy cultivation, but this grossly underestimates the economic dependence of the population on the drug economy, as most of the revenue comes from trafficking, processing, and protecting, not cultivation.
  • Simultaneously there must be a greatly enhanced interdiction effort. Interdiction does not mean only or even primarily seizing containers of narcotics from traffickers. It is above all political and must start at the top, with the removal of high officials benefiting from the trade. This means high officials and political leaders who receive contributions or bribes from traffickers even if they have no direct contact with trafficking. This problem has to be handled politically, as it is not possible to cope with a problem of this dimension mainly through law enforcement. The key is removing people from positions or sending them out of the country, not getting legal cases strong enough to try them in the US, which, though useful as a complement to the political effort, will take far too long.
  • The concept of integrating counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency by using some international military forces to assist in interdiction, including the destruction of heroin labs, is welcome and overdue. But the international forces must take extreme care during such actions not to cause civilian casualties, which have already become a serious issue in the country.
  • The proposal to enhance eradication immediately, especially in Helmand, is extremely dangerous for Afghanistan. It is likely to have the following results:
  1. The cultivators of Helmand, who do not believe that they currently have secure access to alternative livelihoods (no matter how much money has left Washington, D.C. with that alleged purpose), will resist the eradication by mobilizing their tribes and calling for help from anti-government elements. The fact that the average cultivator in Helmand may be somewhat better off than the average cultivator in some provinces without opium cultivation is irrelevant. The security situation in Helmand has prevented effective delivery of development aid, no matter how much money has been spent.
  2. The Taliban will be able to consolidate their hold on districts where enhanced eradication takes place, as the government and international forces will not be able to drive them out by military means against the opposition of the population without extensive civilian casualties.
  3. As a result, the government and international aid will not be able to enter those areas to engage in development programs or to collect intelligence for interdiction, and counter-narcotics will be reduced to eradication, i.e. an attack on the rural population. Security will deteriorate. The Taliban will gain much more stable control of base areas that are also narcotics producing areas, similar to what the FARC has in Colombia. As in Colombia, some of these base areas may cross borders, but with far worse effects in this case.
  4. As security deteriorates, NATO casualties will increase, especially British and Canadian casualties in Helmand and Qandahar. The U.K. has already stated its unwillingness to sacrifice its soldiers for a U.S. policy it believes is unwise. Both the NATO commitment to Afghanistan and NATO itself as an alliance would come under severe stress.
  5. If the eradication effort is successful in its own terms, then the farm-gate price of opium will rise throughout the country and beyond. The market is integrated,not segmented. Since people in Balkh and elsewhere in Northern Afghanistan also do not feel secure in their alternative livelihoods, and since, as UNODC noted, the delivery of aid to these areas has been insufficient and very slow, cultivation will return to Balkh, Ghor, and other areas where it has declined. Cultivation and trafficking will also move into the tribal areas of Pakistan and Baluchistan, where the money from these activities will strengthen the Pakistani Taliban and provide resources to thwart the democratization and stabilization of the country. Opium poppy cultivation, which has already started in Diwaniya province south of Baghdad, will spread to other areas of Iraq, and trafficking and processing will start to take off.
  6. As the government and NATO are distracted by a strengthened Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan,, they will have fewer resources for interdiction and will be less willing to take the political risk of confronting corrupt power holders in the government. Hence eradication will displace other counter-narcotics tools and the government will lose control of more territory.
  • An alternative is as follows:
  1. Launch a public information campaign stating that the purpose of counter-narcotics is not to attack but to enhance the livelihoods of the people of Afghanistan. Afghans cannot build a stable future on the basis of a criminal enterprise that is against Islam. But they also cannot build a stable future on empty stomachs. Therefore we must work together with the 98 percent of Afghan poppy cultivators (see UNODC report) who say that they are willing to abandon poppy cultivation if they can count on earning at least half as much from legal crops. Eradication is for the other 2 percent. But first the rural population has to have confidence in the alternative.
  2. Ask for voluntary restraint in planting while actually delivering (not just announcing or funding or launching) much larger alternative livelihood programs. These programs must go first of all to provinces that are not planting poppy or that are reducing it. Otherwise there will be perverse incentives. Second, they should go to poppy producing provinces.
  3. Alternative livelihood programs must provide all the services currently provided to farmers by drug traffickers: futures contracts, guaranteed marketing, financing, and technical assistance (extension services). Micro-finance must be made easily available so that poor farmers and regions can avail themselves of new opportunities. In the last year or two such programs have finally started, but it will take several years before they start to yield returns and people have confidence in them. Fruit trees, for instance, have to mature for several years before they give a yield. People will not stop planting poppy when they have planted fruit seedlings but have as yet no fruits or market access. Alternative livelihoods are available when Afghans believe they can rely on them, not when U.S. officials assert that money intended for alternative livelihood programs has left the U.S. Treasury.
  4. Delivering alternative livelihood programs without forcible eradication will make it easier for the government and international forces to gain access to areas from which the population has thus far excluded them.
  5. Simultaneously, the government, NATO, and Coalition should undertake enhanced interdiction efforts, as envisaged in the U.S. strategy. These should start with political measures at the top, consisting of removing high officials who receive narcotics money, even if their operational involvement with narcotics is distant. Intelligence assets should be directed to obtain this information. NATO and the Coalition should provide military support to attacks on smuggling convoys and heroin laboratories, with due regard for avoiding civilian casualties. The Ministry of the Interior must be reorganized (not just reformed) from top to bottom (in that order). As currently envisaged, precursor interdiction must be enhanced.
  6. According to analyses by both the World Bank and UNODC, interdiction efforts will lower the farm-gate price of opium, sending the right price signals to farmers and making alternatives more viable. It will reinforce containment of cultivation.
  7. There will be a period of transition for both farmers and traffickers. Just as we do not arrest everyone who committed a human rights violation in the past 30 years, we need measures for reconciliation and reintegration of both cultivators and traffickers who are willing to support the government, move out of their illicit occupations, and join the development process. Alternative livelihoods are not just for cultivators. Traders and traffickers have valuable experience in marketing cash crops and providing services to farmers. Those not affiliated ideologically or organizationally to the armed opposition should be retrained to link other agro-based export industries to the countryside.
  8. The major traffickers have residences outside of Afghanistan and should be arrested or made extremely unwelcome in those countries where they reside. As recommended by UNODC, UN Member States should "take full advantage of Security Council resolution 1735 by adding the names of a dozen drug traffickers to the United Nations Al Qaida/Taliban list in order to seize their assets, ban their travel and facilitate their extradition."
  9. We need a program to manage the transition. There is no comprehensive solution through legalizing the crop or buying back all of it. There may be a possibility to use a limited and strictly controlled buy back in areas that reduce production sustainably for 2-3 years as a transitional measure. Any buy-back must be accompanied by compensatory rewards for non-poppy growing areas. Anyone benefiting from a buy-back who then engages in cultivation should be subject to eradication.
Summary
  • Introducing enhanced eradication simultaneously with interdiction and alternative livelihood efforts will lead to a decrease in security and strengthen anti-government forces, while rendering interdiction and alternative livelihoods more difficult. The political purpose of counter-narcotics is to win the support of most of those involved with the drug economy by providing them with better security and links to markets than have drug traffickers, corrupt officials, and the Taliban. This does not require replacing every dollar, as the quality of licit income is much better. But it cannot mean trying to push Afghan farmers who are now used to commercial agriculture back to subsistence farming. It requires linking farmers to licit markets and agro-based industries.
  • The state in Afghanistan can be built only by using the limited force available in a highly targeted and economical way against hard core opponents, while greatly expanding the incentives (where international actors should have a decisive advantage) to win people over to the side of the government and its international supporters. Done the wrong way, counter-narcotics could do to this effort what land reform did to the communists; a good idea gone bad destroyed any hope of popular support. Counter-narcotics done properly is exactly what Afghans have been asking for: removing criminal power holders and bringing security and development.
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Monday, August 27, 2007

Potential Designation of Sepah-e Pasdaran as a Terrorist Organization: Reactions from Tehran

I did not comment earlier about the reported designation of Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami (translated as the Islamic Revolution’s Guard Corps or sometimes even more carelessly as Revolutionary Guard Corps while the word sepah means army and the correct translation is the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution) mostly because over the past five years of closely monitoring the fate of Iran’s nuclear dossier, I have become skeptical of newspaper leaks, plants or commentary that hint at the possibility of eventual military action (either by the United States or Israel) against Iran right around the time or in the midst of negotiations among permanent Security Council members and Germany (P5+1) about the extension of sanctions against Iran.

This time around the story made headlines in both the New York Times and Washington Post as Iran was about to begin the third round of negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over an “action plan” and timetable for Iran to address the remaining “unresolved questions” over its nuclear program (that agreement, the text of which was revealed today and can be found here, has already been announced as inadequate by the US even before its content was known).

The United States is also pushing for a third set of economic sanctions through the UN Security Council and as far as I can tell even the smallest hint of US military action (and the potential terrorist designation of the national army of another country is certainly a hint) has become a very useful tool not only in the process of persuading countries freaked out about yet another Middle East war that sanctions are the way to go but also in framing the Iran policy discussions domestically in the US.

Once military action becomes a possibility, then most of the energy is spent discussing why this is a terrible option while the issue at hand, which is really whether or not sanctions are good policy options, are not adequately reflected upon. In an either/or frame, sanctions or what is sometimes, I guess, euphemistically called “coercive diplomacy” in fact become the “good option” upon which a consensus can be reached. Ultimately the fundamental premise of the Bush Administration that Tehran needs to be dealt with through coercion, unless Iran agrees to US pre-conditions, and the implications of the sanctions policy for Iranian politics and Iranian people and whether sanctions will fulfill the stated objectives are rarely discussed.

The US has been sanctioning Iran in significant ways since the first term of the Clinton Administration and hopefully in a later post I will talk about how sanctions have strengthened non-transparent networks of economic middlemen in Iran whose lucrative activities during the Saddam era sanctions against Iraq (yes Iraq) as well as close ties to various state institutions have enriched them enough to influence Iranian politics in significant ways, particularly since Iran’s borders with neighboring countries (now all American allies) are so porous.

But here I want to talk specifically about the impact of the recent news about the placing of Sepah on the terrorist list on Iranian politics. In the words of David Ignatius of Washington Post, through this designation, which he suggests is part of a new post-Iraq strategy, the Bush administration hopes to “squeeze the guard and all of the businesses it owns -- banks, trading companies, tech companies that are part of the nuclear program -- and seek to divide President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, himself a product of the guard, from Iran's less fanatical majority."

A close look at the reaction from Tehran, however, clearly encapsulates how such moves push the whole array of political forces to the right of the political spectrum and in fact strengthen precisely the same forces that the publicized policy presumably intends to weaken. This, I think, is the story of American foreign policy vis-à-vis Tehran; a story that very few people in the Bush Administration or the US Congress (which since 1990s has done everything possible to outdo the executive branch in this sanctions game) are willing to confront.

Now let’s see what happened in Tehran once the news hit the headlines. The government did not respond officially. In fact, only a Foreign Ministry official who wished to remain anonymous (yes the Iran has them too!), characterized the publicity as part and parcel of the “psychological war” in which the US has engaged in the past couple of years in order to intimidate Iran.

The conservative organizations and newspapers did respond but they did so with either a yawn or their usual bombast and ridicule about American failures in Iraq and how these failures leave the US no other options but to find scapegoats. In an August 23rd editorial entitled “Paper Presence,” this is how Kayhan, Tehran’s most important hard-line daily reacted to the news:

If the news is correct, it is another sign that the Americans neither have sufficient intelligence for the correct understanding of their problems in the Middle East nor do they have much wisdom for addressing them. The excuse, they say, is that Sepah is helping Hezbollah, Hamas and [Islamic] Jihad and other similar groups…. The US imagines that these groups have modeled their fighting after Sepah and further claims that Sepah trains or arms them; claims that are repeated for years without an ounce of evidence ever presented to support them…. It is understandable that it is difficult for Israel and the United States – and the shame associate with it even harder – to accept and for the world to believe that with all their claims and pride they have been humiliated in front a few hundred Kalashnikov carrying youth. This is why in their own minds they have found a solution … by enlarging their adversary they want to belittle their own defeat or at least find an excuse for it. But let us say that the Jihadi groups in the Middle East region were created by Sepah and are now under its protection – which they are not and America knows this truth better than anyone else, is the solution to take a torn piece of paper and write on it that Sepah is terrorist? Will this solve the American problem?... The Americans imagine that the solution to the strategic defeat that has beleaguered them in the Middle East is paper play and issuing of declarations and resolutions. Sepah, if we accept America’s ridiculous claims, has taken America to the point of desperation on the boiling sands of Iraq, expansive plains of Lebanon, and swarming cities of Palestine. If there is a response to Sepah, then it must be given there. Apparently, however, there is no response and members of Sepah, by traversing time and place, are in a position that the US must await a new wonder from them at any given moment…

But ridiculing the significance of the US decision, if it happens, does not prevent hard-line or conservative forces from using the proposed terrorist designation in their attacks against domestic opponents. Suggesting that the idea of placing Sepah on the terrorist list can be associated with a few members of the Iranian exile community in the United States with past links to the reformists, Baztab, a website associated with Mohsen Rezaie, the former commander of Sepah, in an August 21st piece subtitled “A Test for the Patriotism of the Reformists” demands:

Now that the hard-line American circles are pretending that in confronting Sepah-e Pasdaran they have the reformists on their side, time has arrived for well-known leaders of that array of groups to defeat this plan through a clear statement of their position… Time has arrived for organizations such as Association of Combatant Clerics, The National Confidence Party, Servants of Construction, Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution and Participation Front and figures such as Khatami, Karrubi, Mir Hossein Mussavi, Mohtashamipour, Karbashchi and others, who despite critical positions regarding certain issues have also shown their support for their territorial integrity of the country to enter the fray and prevent any kind of western pretensions on behalf of the reformists.

And the call has not gone unheeded. Almost every reformist organization has since come out with a written statement in support of Sepah, echoing what Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s former reformist president, said in an interview with ISNA (Iranian Students News Agency) against the potential move:

If the hard-line war mongers in the United States do not know, I am sure the wise and just of that country know that Sepah has risen from the main beliefs and longings of a nation, is one of the main pillars of national authority and security, is the protector of the nation’s rights, values of the revolution, and territorial integrity, and form the spiritual point of view has a special place among the people of Iran. No nation can accept being subjected to aggression or even insult against the backbone of its authority and security and guardian of its territorial integrity, honor, and independence.

Khatami goes to hope that “illogical extremists” will be prevented from steering American foreign policy and calls on the “wise” in both countries to prevent another crisis, while posing a question about which people will benefit from the leakage of such a news in the midst of US-Iran discussions of and Iran’s attempts to respond to the unresolved technical questions regarding its nuclear program.

To be sure, Khatami’s interview along with written statements issued by political groups such as the National Confidence Party, Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution and Participation Front all include an implicit and at times even explicit criticism of hard-line posturing against the United States and lack of prudence on the part of the Iranian government in its dealings with the United States. But make no mistake, the mere reporting on the possibility of terrorism designation of Sepah has had a rallying effect on the significant players of the Islamic republic and once again has made it easier for had-line forces in Iran to make the case that conciliatory moves towards the United States (either in relation to Iraq or more significantly in relation to Iran’s nuclear file) are of no use since US policy objectives in Iran are not behavior change but regime change. Read more on this article...

Saturday, August 25, 2007

Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan II: The Value Chain, The Corruption Chain

In the first installment of this series, I took the release of the new “U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan” as the occasion to analyze some flaws in the US approach.

As I noted there, in these posts I will confine myself to considering strategies within the framework of the current international prohibitionist regime for narcotics, including opium and its derivatives. In a recent Washington Post article, Misha Glenny shows how the "War on Drugs" is damaging our security. The next few years of drug policy in Afghanistan, however, will conform to that regime, which I take as a given here.

In the first installment, "Defining the Problem," I argued that the U.S. Strategy defined the problem posed by drugs in Afghanistan correctly, as "drug money" that “weakens key institutions and strengthens the Taliban.” Furthermore, the drug money that harms our goals in Afghanistan comes from the 80 percent of the value of opiates in Afghanistan that, according to UNODC estimates, goes to traffickers and protectors (left -- opium bazaar in Qandahar), not the 20 percent or less that goes to farmers, whose support the government needs. A counter-narcotics strategy that serves our security goals would win over the farmers and many others involved in the industry, while we and the Afghan government help them adjust to the shock of being subject to international rules, while isolating the few who wish to use illicit revenue to fund insurgency and terrorism. Instead, the administration has adopted the Afghan equivalent of "shock treatment" in the former USSR: a "War on Drugs" approach, as if it is trying to end drug addiction in the West by attacking Afghan farmers.

The comparison to post-Communist shock treatment may seem strange. But what has happened to Afghanistan is not just drugs and terrorism: for the first time in history, the Afghan peasantry has started producing a cash crop for the international market. The peasantries of other countries faced this challenge under colonialism, when they produced (or lost their land to plantations that produced) rubber, tea, coffee, indigo, sugar, cotton, tobacco, and many other products. Caffeine, nicotine, and alcohol (in the form of rum) all came to the consumers of the developed world through the same kind of transformation that is now bringing them cannabis, opiates, and cocaine, except that the latter are now considered to be illegal. Just as sudden integration with the international finance and product markets required a shocking readjustment in the former Communist countries, the move from an illicit form of export mono-culture to a licit economy requires an immense upheaval in Afghanistan. Both transitions can destroy the economic security of millions and provoke the type of backlash we now see in Russia, but with even more dangerous consequences in Afghanistan, given the presence of al-Qaida. Avoiding this backlash should dictate the pace that crop eradication plays in counter-narcotics strategy.

In no case have countries undergone a transition from an economy based on cash crop exports back to subsistence farming. Alternative livelihood programs have to follow in the footsteps of the drug traffickers, linking Afghan farmers to the market, but with licit crops that, alas, cannot profit from Afghanistan's comparative advantage in producing illegality, but that might be able to profits from international interest through a "Made in Afghanistan" brand. This is what Gulestan is trying to do. Given the significant capacity for production, marketing, and finance that the opiate economy has developed in Afghanistan, we need to transform rather than destroy much of this capacity, a goal that should inform our approach to the 80 percent of the value of opiates produced by processing and trading.

Designing a strategy that focuses on the part of the opiate economy that destabilizes the region and undermines the rule of law requires an analysis of the value chain in the opiate industry through which the raw material is produced, refined (below) , and marketed, adding illicit value at each step. This analysis both suggests how to intervene (through eradication and interdiction) in a way that does the most to stop the flow of illicit drug money; it also suggests how alternative livelihood programs can create value chains for licit products.

I am told that the classified version of the U.S. Strategy includes a discussion of money laundering and high-level corruption. No doubt some of the information, especially about specific individuals, is very sensitive. But there is nothing secret or sensitive about the general process of heroin refining,financing, trafficking, and protection. We have already seen the result of focusing efforts at the bottom of the value chain: when the Taliban suppressed cultivation while permitting trafficking in 2000-2001, the returns shifted upward in the value chain, as farmers lost their crop while traffickers profited from a ten-fold price increase, while lowered the unit cost of smuggling. Except for an increase in expected bribes, the cost of smuggling a kilogram of opium that costs $600 is the same as the cost of smuggling a kilogram of opium that costs $60.

Defenders of the policy make the seemingly obvious (but completely wrong) point that eradication of poppy decreases the quantity of drugs and therefore the money from drugs. They seem unaware of something that intervenes as drugs are converted into money: PRICES. And when an intervention (crop eradication, bad weather) lowers the quantity supplied, prices go up (see chart above to see the price effect of the Taliban ban).

The value chain includes many different prices: raw opium at the farm gate; raw opium at the bazaar; processed morphine or heroin leaving the laboratory (which requires the import of precursor chemicals not made in Afghanistan; heroin and raw opium at the border and across the border, as they are transferred to international traffickers. Prices increases geometrically as one ascends the value chain, accounting in part for the increasing share of opiate profits going to traffickers (see below, based on UNODC data).

At each stage of the value chain, different power-holders take shares of the profit to provide various services, including the service of not killing you (the well-known "make him an offer he can't refuse," which in Afghanistan, I am told, can take the form of "take this $1,000 or I'll kill you in a particularly painful way.") In villages the farmers contribute a share to the mosque (sometimes conceptualized as the Islamic tax, ushr), which is used to pay the mullah and for local public expenditures such as teachers' salaries, medical care, or irrigation. The small traders who come to the village have to pay the police (or Taliban) whom they pass on the road, who pass a share up to their superiors. The police chief of the district may have paid a large bribe to the Ministry of the Interior in Kabul to be appointed to a poppy producing district; he may have also paid a member of parliament or an influential person to introduce him to the right official in Kabul. These officials may also have paid bribes (or, at this level, "political contributions" that are no longer recognizable as deriving from narcotics) to obtain a position where they can make so much money.

Running a heroin laboratory requires payments to whoever controls the territory -- in most cases a local strongman plus the government or the Taliban. Importing precursors requires bribing border guards (perhaps on both sides of the border) or paying an armed group for a covert escort. Smuggling the opium, morphine, or heroin out of Afghanistan requires access to an airfield (heroin seized at Kabul International Airport, right) or border crossing (controlled by the border police and Ariana Airlines, both of whose employees are reported to make significant income from drug trafficking), the escort of armed groups (Taliban, tribes, commanders), or expensive specialists in packaging such as those who seal heroin inside empty almond shells or condoms. The bureaucratic, military, political, or social superiors of those directly involved in facilitating trafficking claim a right to shares of the resulting tribute, though the higher the money moves, the less evident is its connection to the flowers that the foreigners like to photograph.

Different counter-narcotics tools intervene at different points of the value chain and thus affect prices, quantity, and the distribution of profits differently. The strategy that lowers the physical supply of drugs the most is not the strategy that most effectively stops drug money from funding corruption and insurgency. Nor is it the strategy that improves security or creates stabilizing political alliances. In the next installment, I will discuss eradication and interdiction in the light of this analysis.


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Friday, August 24, 2007

Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan (First Installment): Defining the Problem

The U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement released a new “U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan” this month. The strategy calls for added efforts in all pillars of the Counter-Narcotics effort in Afghanistan, but its most salient change from the past is its proposal for more forceful and extensive eradication of opium poppy crops. The Strategy calls for “non-negotiated” eradication, ostensibly in order to avoid the manipulation of eradication by local elites to exempt their own crops and focus eradication on their rivals or the powerless. While the Strategy states that no means of eradication will be used without the approval of the Government of Afghanistan, it contains many examples of thinly veiled pressure on the Government of Afghanistan to authorize the spraying of herbicides both from the ground and from the air.

Implementation of this strategy will lead to a rapid deterioration of security at least in the south of the country and the further weakening of the Afghan government. Afghans will conclude (if they have not so concluded already) that the U.S. does not consider Afghanistan to be sovereign and that the foreigners are in Afghanistan to pursue their own agenda, not to help Afghanistan. Significant portions of the countryside that have been neutral or pro-government will move toward the Taliban. The farmers will respond to the greater risk imposed by eradication not by stopping poppy cultivation but by preventing the government and international community from entering their areas. By and large, they will succeed, especially as US resources, credibility, and alliances continue to be drained by the disastrous war in Iraq.

Currently, the Taliban-led insurgency does not have stable and exclusive control of any significant territory and population in Afghanistan, as does the FARC in Colombia. Areas subject to aerial spraying for crop eradication, however, are likely to come under much more stable Taliban control. The government and its international supporters will be unable to enter such areas to provide development assistance or to engage in interdiction. Hence the more that aggressive eradication and aerial spraying are introduced before Afghans believe they have secure alternative livelihoods, the more the counter-narcotics policy will be reduced to eradication by military means, amounting to a war on the livelihood of the part of the Afghan rural population most vulnerable to Taliban influence.

Implementation of this strategy will also undermine attempts to stabilize the tribal areas of Pakistan and Baluchistan, by providing incentives for drug traffickers to move their operations into those areas just as Pakistan is undergoing a political crisis with unpredictable results.

The continuing escalation of tension between the U.S. and Iran will also promote the success of drug trafficking, as does the lack of U.S.-Iranian cooperation on counter-narcotics, the policy area where they have the clearest common interest. If the administration attacks Iran, as many observers are predicting, Iran will respond in such a way as to make much of Afghanistan ungovernable, including regions that the US government seems to think are under the stable control of the government. Counter-narcotics and many other policies will become impossible to implement. Iran's current activities in Afghanistan are both preparing for such an eventuality and signaling what it can do. As I will discuss in subsequent posts, the administration can have a confrontation with Iran or some success in Afghanistan, but not both.

I have read only the unclassified version of the Strategy. I am told that the classified version includes some of the elements that are missing in the open version, in particular on money laundering and high-level corruption. Those with the needed access can decide whether those sections meet some of the objections in my critique.

In a short series of posts, I will suggest why I find the proposed strategy so dangerous to international strategic goals in Afghanistan. In these posts I will confine myself to considering strategies within the framework of the current prohibitionist international regime for narcotics, including opium and its derivatives. I have argued elsewhere (including in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), that
The international drug control regime, which criminalizes narcotics, does not reduce drug use, but it does produce huge profits for criminals and the armed groups and corrupt officials who protect them. Our drug policy grants huge subsidies to our enemies.
Over the next few years, at least, we will be working within that regime, which I take as a given here.

This first post deals with defining the problem and understanding the situation.

Overall goals:

The overriding goal of the U.S. and allies in Afghanistan is stabilizing the government and the region to (1) assure that al-Qaida cannot re-establish its bases in Afghanistan and (2) destroy al-Qaida’s current sanctuary in some of Pakistan’s tribal agencies. There are (and were long before 9/11) moral, humanitarian, and altruistic reasons to try to heal the wounds of Afghanistan and provide its people with a better life, but those reasons did not inspire the intervention that has been taking place since October 2001. The strategic goal is related to the ethical ones, however: the only long-term way to secure the region is to strengthen the state institutions and economies of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to the point that they can enforce norms of the international system with the consent of the people throughout their territories.

Among the many reasons that the US, UN, NATO, and dozens of donors and troop contributors are NOT in Afghanistan is to stop drug addiction in Europe or the U.S. Mounting a major state building effort in Afghanistan would hardly be the appropriate means to attain that goal. This does not mean that Donald Rumsfeld’s original policy of turning a blind eye to drug trafficking by counter-terrorism allies was right. That view of counter-narcotics was based on the same myopic vision that saw counter-terrorism solely as a "kill and capture" mission, whereas it can succeed only if it establishes the basis for effective security and policing. Policing and law enforcement, unlike military action, require the consent of the bulk of the population. That is why efforts to eliminate narcotics in a badly governed or ungoverned state tend to drift into a military mode (war on drugs). I will explain that when I discuss interdiction.

So what is the problem posed by the narcotics economy? The narcotics sector consists of economic activities whose profit (or rent) derives from illegality. The final price of narcotics is determined mainly by the cost of smuggling and distributing an illegal product rather than by conventional costs of production. Afghanistan’s principal comparative advantage is not in poppy cultivation but in the production of illegality. It is cheaper to engage in illegal activity in Afghanistan than almost anywhere else in the world. Iraq is catching up, however. Having first followed Afghanistan's lead in becoming a major haven for transnational terrorism, Iraq is now starting to produce opium poppies.

Thus Afghanistan's drug economy expanded when the state broke down after 1992. It consolidated itself and expanded further under the Taliban, because the Islamic Emirate was a peculiar type of state: internally it strictly enforced its own laws and brought security to trade routes and rural areas, at least in the Pashtun zones. But the government was not recognized internationally and did not recognize international law. Narcotics was profitable because it was illegal beyond the borders of Afghanistan, but it could expand securely within Afghanistan because of the security and administrative control of their regime. It consequently produced only modest revenues inside Afghanistan, compared to today.

Since the Taliban never treated drug trafficking as a crime, and forbade poppy cultivation for only one year, the drug trade provided little or no opportunities for corruption within Afghanistan. This changed only during the year that the Taliban banned poppy cultivation (2000-2001), though they never banned trafficking. The Taliban ban, by criminalizing part of the opium economy, made the narcotics economy far more profitable –prices rose ten-fold. Though prices have declined since then, they have never returned to the competitive levels of the period when the entire drug economy was de facto legal inside Afghanistan.

The current government, however, is committed to (in the words of the preamble to the Constitution of 2004/1382) “restoring Afghanistan to its rightful place in the international community.” Hence, unlike the Taliban Emirate, the government cannot tax, regulate, or settle disputes arising from the main economic activity in the country. Instead the constitution provides:
The state shall prevent all types of terrorist activities, the production and consumption of intoxicants (musakkirat), and the production and smuggling of narcotics.

While I cannot prove it with survey data, my informal observations lead me to conclude that the social consensus in Afghanistan is that poppy cultivation and drug trafficking are wrong, but that they are inevitable and excusable (at least cultivation and small trading are) until economic alternatives develop. (I will discuss the view of the ulama in a subsequent post on interdiction and law enforcement.)

Narco-economy: the tax base for insecurity

The participants in the narcotics economy must govern this economic sector (about a third of the economy, at least half of the cash economy) through activities that are “illegal,” but that are hidden mainly from foreigners rather than other Afghans. The Afghan police and administration, political leaders, and the anti-government insurgents all offer protection services to poppy growers and drug traffickers. Competition for this lucrative role motivates much of the violence in the country. The U.S. Strategy probably overstates the relative importance of the Taliban and al-Qaida in protecting the trade and understates the degree to which the narco-economy is controlled by officials and political leaders in the Afghan government. Portraying the drug economy as primarily supporting terrorism, however, does make militaristic approaches to it seem more acceptable.

Hence the narcotics economy corrupts and weakens the government, undermines stable economic development, and funds terrorism and insurgency. It also promotes dishonesty between Afghans and foreign officials, since the former cannot tell the latter what they really think. Political insurgents, whether national or transnational, predatory officials, and illegal businessmen have a common interest in preventing consolidation of the government or rule of law. The rents from illegality provide them with the resources to undermine security, though, like the Taliban, they also use these resources to provide the local security that the drug economy needs. From the point of view of Afghan poppy cultivators, eradicators provide insecurity, and leaders (whether in the government or Taliban) who can keep eradicators out provide security. Hence poorly designed and implemented counter-narcotics policies drive many disparate forces together, though most are not ideologically committed to transnational terrorism.

On pages 13-14, the US Strategy (“Defining the Problem”) correctly diagnoses the problem as “drug money,” which “weakens key institutions and strengthens the Taliban.” But this diagnosis has consequences that the Strategy does not draw. A strategy to lessen the flow of drug money into corruption and insurgency is not identical to a strategy to reduce the quantity of addictive substances produced and exported. Once the US Strategy accurately diagnoses the problem as “drug money,” it then reverts to a nearly exclusive focus on drugs themselves, and not even on heroin, which produces much more drug money, but on poppy cultivation, which accounts for at most 20 percent of the drug economy in Afghanistan but has become the photogenic Paris Hilton of Afghan narcotics policy. This analytical flaw is the root cause of most of what I believe is wrong with this strategy.

The focus on flowers rather than drug money has led to a false comparison between northern and southern Afghanistan. U.S. officials now imply that political elites in northern Afghanistan are engaging in successful counter-narcotics, while the southern drug economy expands. This depiction has obvious ethnic implications, to the point that one government (not the U.S.) asked me to comment on whether different ethnic groups have different cultural attitudes toward opium.
The basis for these generalizations is that poppy cultivation spread into Afghanistan mainly through the Pashtun areas and that in the last year poppy cultivation has decreased in the mainly northern provinces (see the UNODC Rapid Assessment Survey map). The main reason that the drug economy expanded the most in the Pashtun areas is that traffickers shifted the cultivation to Afghanistan from Pakistan when Islamabad started to suppress it in the 1980s, and the government collapsed in Afghanistan. As a trans-border people, Pashtuns are well-organized for smuggling, whether of opium, weapons, or spare parts for trucks.

But most importantly, the map shows only the flowers. The U.S. Strategy nowhere claims, discusses, or even mentions whether “drug money” has decreased in northern Afghanistan. It has not. Balkh may be poppy-free, but its center, Mazar-i Sharif, is awash in drug money. The commanders who control Northern Afghanistan today are playing the same shell game that the Taliban did in 2000-2001. Some have suppressed cultivation (in Ghor and Bamiyan cultivation is hardly worthwhile anyway, the yields are so poor) but none have moved against trafficking. Most of them continue to profit from it, if only through what in the U.S. we would call "political contributions."

Some of the same officials who today get credit for counter-narcotics efforts are generally believed to have become millionaires directly or indirectly from drug trafficking. Recently the nephew and right-hand man of the chief of the border police in a province colored a hopeful green in the map above was caught driving a car full of heroin north through Kabul. Why? Because there is still plenty of trafficking going through the North, and trafficking, not cultivation, is where the money is. An Afghan friend (and official of the Afghan government) told me that when he was in Bamyan recently, the north-south road by the lake at Band-i Amir was crowded like a highway with trucks taking the opium and heroin of Helmand northwards. (This is the same road that the mujahidin used to transport arms from Pakistan to northern Afghanistan in the 1980s.) The same traffic goes through Ghor, to the west. The arms traffic goes in the other direction, as northern commanders sell their Iranian weapons to dealers who re-sell them to the Taliban.

The commanders have learned that we pay no attention to the money but only to bright colored flowers. And what both government officials and politically connected people tell me is, the pressure for photogenic progress comes from Congress. Every year it wants easily depicted metrics, and flowers provide it. Perhaps someone from the legislative branch would like to comment on this.

In the next installment, we will look beyond the flowers to analyze the implications of the neglected opiate value chain for counter-narcotics policy. Read more on this article...

Thursday, August 23, 2007

Winds of Change

The Supreme Court decisions continue to change the landscape of Pakistan's history and politics. Since Chief Justice Chaudhry Iftikhar's reinstatement on July 20th, 2007 [see Justice's Turn], the Supreme Court has released various political prisoners, most notably Javed Hashmi.

Today, the Supreme Court has ruled that Nawaz Sharif, the deposed Prime Minister, can return from exile to Pakistan.

Nawaz Sharif, you may recall, was the Prime Minister whose administration fell to Pervez Musharraf's military coup in 1999. Since then, he has been living in Saudi Arabia and London - forced, he says, to agree to a 10 year long exile by Musharraf's regime. A similar exile was arranged with Benazir Bhutto. The reason these leaders agreed to the exile may have to do with the myriad anti-corruption cases launched against their persons and administration by Musharraf's government [some are highly merited - and are currently active in the courts].

Benazir Bhutto has recently met with Musharraf and been in discussions to return to Pakistan as well. She gave some details of those "power-sharing" arrangements but this decision by the Supreme Court will undoubtedly complicate, if not make moot, such discussions.

Both exiled ex-PMs Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif want to be back in Pakistan by October and running for re-re-re-election in December. Hopefully.

What does it all mean? In terms of internal politics of Pakistan, this is tremendous news for the resurgent democratic movement in Pakistan. The full participation of the many political parties - including the Bhuttos and Sharifs - will guarantee that Pakistan start recovering from the despotic military regime. However, that is easier said than done. The military, under Musharraf, has become the largest land-owning, asset-controlling entity in Pakistan with ex- and current military officials serving across the civil and social landscape. How can that military be coaxed "back into the barracks"? It is quite probable that there are forces within the military eager to curtail their political vulnerabilities. The popular image of the military in Pakistani society has underwent tremendous change in recent years - from a highly valued and respected institution (the only "corruption-free" one) to a hegemonic and undesirable presence. I could argue that the military's own interests lie in withdrawing from the political realm and re-burnishing its image and standing. Of course, the defense budget remains the highest expenditure in the country and no successive civil government will change that. By and large, the military cannot lose by "giving democracy back" to the country. That was, after all, what Musharraf claimed when he took control.

In terms of oft-mentioned "Talibanization" of Pakistan and the wider conflict with extremism, the answers are less apparent at the moment. Some certainties do exist: any civil government will continue to fully cooperate with the US efforts. In fact, the efforts in Waziristan would be strengthened by the participation of Baluchistani leaders at the Federal level [Baluchistan has always been a Federal/State controversy]. The elections will not result in any rise-to-power of Mullah Omar in Islamabad. And a democratic Pakistan will surely be a far valuable ally within the Muslim world. The uncertainties largely hinge on the nature of the elections - the participation of various groups and their freedoms to do so. It will also be a chaotic period which can make Pakistan vulnerable to further attacks and incursions.

However, the bottom line is that Pakistan needs full and immediate US support through the next six months. UN should take an interest in insuring fair elections. And the subsequent government should be cultivated and nourished throughout the full term. Read more on this article...

Wednesday, August 22, 2007

Taiwan: Economic Development in Central Asia

The USG Open Source Center summarizes Taiwanese reports on the economies and politics of Central Asia in the context of projects of the US Agency for International Development and Chinese, Russian and American geopolitical competition in the region.

Highlights: Development in Central Asia
Taiwan - OSC Summary
Tuesday, August 21, 2007

Special Report on Developments in Central Asia

According to a Chung-kuo Shih-pao report of 6 August 2007 by Chang Hui-ying entitled " Taiwan's Foreign Aid Comparatively Too Politically-Oriented," the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has a wide range of aid programs, including coaching high school students to start businesses; improving the quality of justice by introducing the recording of trials; training media to conduct investigative reporting; and assisting in policy design. In 1992, USAID provided nearly NT$1.5 billion in aid to Central Asia. In 2000, it helped some women in Tajikistan file a lawsuit over a land dispute, and the women got their land back this year. If there was any ideology involved, it was a belief in the value of democracy, liberty, and equal human rights. This is not only so for the governmental aid-provider but also for the non-government organizations (NGOs). They refused to serve special political interests and be used as a political tool, which might just be what Taiwan's foreign aid program needs.

According to a Chung-kuo Shih-pao report of 6 August 2007 by Chang Hui-ying entitled " US-Russia-China Wrestle for Energy," Central Asia, since its independence, has been the battleground for the United States, Russia, and China for several runs. The first took place from 1991 to 2001 when the US got involved in Central Asia after the dissolution of the USSR and provided economic aid to secure gas and oil sources, to expand NATO and to propagate the ideas of democracy and human rights. The second took place from the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 to 2005 when anti-terrorism was the top priority for the United States which built eight military bases in the region. The third took place from 2005 until now when revolution shocked the Central Asian leaders who asked the US bases and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to get out of Central Asia. China and Russia have collaborated in the containment of the United States by means of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The three big states are all after energy. In the competition, the United States and the European Union apparently were defeated by Russia, which has reached agreements with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the renovation and construction of oil pipelines. Culturally and sentimentally, Central Asia felt closer to Russia, which has also been the main trading partner with Central Asia. People in Central Asia do not like the United States and were unhappy about China because of the influx of cheap goods made in China and illegal Chinese workers. Central Asia has retained a degree of autonomy and balance in terms of foreign policy. At the end of the day, national interests remained the most important.

According to a Chung-kuo Shih-pao report of 8 August 2007 by Chang Hui-ying and Chen Yi-shan entitled "' Switzerland of East' Has Democracy But Is Poor," Kyrgyzstan, often called the "Switzerland of the East," has been the most democratized of the five countries in Central Asia, which unfortunately has not brought about economic prosperity. Its economy has been seriously affected by the "Tulip Revolution" in 2005. Although Kyrgyzstan opened up to US military bases and was the first in Central Asia to join the WTO, former president Akayev had to resort to the old route of totalitarian rule for more effective government. Weak government and unstable political leadership impeded the opening-up policy from being carried through. In the World Bank evaluation, Kyrgyzstan ranked 90th in terms of the degree of easiness to engage in trade, and cross-border trade ranked 173rd, leading to the serious problems of smuggling, lack of investment in infrastructure construction, and reduced attraction to foreign investors. Poverty has been Kyrgyzstan's greatest problem since its independence. Poverty also led to the drug problem and terrorism in the southern part of the country that neighbors Afghanistan. However, Ken McNamara, deputy director of USAID in Kyrgyzstan, was optimistic about development there. In his view, Fergana can become an agricultural strip like California and even the breadbasket of Central Asia.

According to a Chung-kuo Shih-pao report on 8 August 2007 by Chen Yi-shan entitled " Four Girls' Dream of Entrepreneurship," BIG consulting firm of Kyrgyzstan is a success case of USAID's Entrepreneurship Project; it was able to stand on its own feet after the project stopped financial aid this year. The female founders of the firm were representatives of the new generation elite of Kyrgyzstan. One of the founders benefited from the USAID project and was an exchange student in the United States for one year. Another founder studied law in Singapore. The international experience and connections, along with the assistance of USAID, helped BIG land clients, such as the European Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and foreign businesses. The girls had high hopes for Kyrgyzstan. In their view, the greatest advantage of Kyrgyzstan is its educated, peace-loving, and hard-working people.

According to a Chung-kuo Shih-pao report of 9 August 2007 by Chen Yi-shan and Chang Hui-ying entitled " Big Brother All Over Gold, Cotton-Producing Country," Uzbekistan is a totalitarian state without freedom of press or speech, free and fair elections and a political opposition. The government has controlled the people through a tightly knit social network. People have learned not to talk about politics in public. Since independence, Karimov conducted some economic reform toward a market economy without a political opening-up. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-e Tahrir gave the government a good excuse for iron rule. After independence, Uzbekistan first allied with the United States and accepted US bases and economic aid. However, after the Andijan riot in 2005, it turned toward Russia. Uzbekistan's economy relied too much on raw materials, such as cotton, gold and natural gas. Gold has earned the country foreign exchange. Yet, cotton production has declined. A businessman from Switzerland said the government did not really care about the people's livelihood and infrastructure. Uzbekistan ranked 22nd in Foreign Policy 's failed state index in 2007, the worst in Central Asia.

Read more on this article...

Monday, August 20, 2007

Return from Herat: Wherein One Pessoptimist Meets Another


A visitor just left my office: Homa Sorouri, an Afghan woman from Herat who is studying international relations as a Fulbright Scholar at the New School University. She just returned from her first visit home in over a year.
Homa told me she was tired of the American (and other non-Afghan) students at her university asking her whether she was optimistic or pessimistic or if the glass is half full or half empty. She missed my Pessoptimist blogs because she had no internet access in Herat. When I showed them to her, she proclaimed that she too was a pessoptimist.
Here's what she told me. She was shocked at how the situation had deteriorated in Herat. Her parents would not let her leave the house, because it was so unsafe. This had nothing to do with the Taliban or al-Qaida. Her father told her that a man had been murdered in a nearby house. Her brother told her about a robbery. There are three main rumors about the causes of crime: (1) the followers of ousted governor Ismail Khan (the former commander who is now Minister of Energy and Water in Kabul), who burned the UN office (right) in September 2004 when their chief was removed, are staging crimes to show that Herat is not secure without Ismail Khan; (2) because the justice system is so corrupt and there is no rule of law, personal and family disputes frequently escalate into violence; and
(3) the police, who have become part of the same criminal network as drug traffickers and smugglers (oil smugglers at Islam Qala on the right), are responsible for most of the crime. These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.


Her father and all of her brothers and sisters are employed, mostly making decent salaries working for international organizations, but they know so many people who are in deep economic difficulties. Her brothers and sisters have made up a list -- apparently a rather long list -- of people they know personally who are in desperate straits. Next to each person's name is a percentage -- that is the percentage of the family's resources those people are given. Every month when their salary arrives, the brothers and sisters pool a portion of their money and give it to their mother, who distributes it to these needy people.

But the most shocking thing was her encounter with a neighbor. This woman, she told me, was beautiful! She was so young and so beautiful, and she had two daughters who were also so beautiful.
When Homa saw them on the street in the past, she felt happy. This woman came to visit to ask Homa what she should do. Homa was shocked at how this woman looked. She said she wanted to commit suicide. Her husband had become a heroin addict and had sold one daughter to pay for his drugs. I asked Homa what this meant. The daughter was 13 or 14 years old and very pretty, so the father married her to a rich man for a high brideprice. Now this educated young girl who grew up in Iran is more or less imprisoned in an extended family compound in a rural district of Herat in a "terrible situation." The mother had to work in order to earn money not only to support her family but also to pay for her husband's drug addiction -- but she was afraid to leave the house, because her husband might sell the other daughter as well. Homa's neighbor saw no way out but suicide, which many reports indicate is increasing in Afghan urban areas.


You decide: are you optimistic or pessimistic? Is the glass half full or half empty?


(All photos from Herat Province, Afghanistan, December 2004, by Barnett R. Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada)


Read more on this article...

Taleban and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The USG Open Source Center translates an article about the Taliban resurgence and their attempt to ingratiate themselves with the Shanghai Cooperation Council (Russians, Chinese and Central Asians).


Afghan paper says Taleban trying to represent themselves in a new shape
Cheragh (Light)
Sunday, August 19, 2007
[OSC]

Afghan paper says Taleban trying to represent themselves in a new shape

Text of editorial in Dari, "Post-war Taleban, taking the initiative of foreign policy", published by independent Afghan newspaper Cheragh on 18 August
During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting on Thursday (16 Aug) in Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the Taleban, besides sending an open letter to heads of the states participating at the SCO meeting on behalf of their leadership council, asked the SCO to focus its attention on a number of issues over which this group (Taleban) was accused of violations, both in the past and now.

In this letter, the Taleban not only wanted the SCO to refrain from viewing the purpose of their fight through the eyes of the Americas, which is negative and "unrealistic", they also wanted the organization to reconsider its views on the Taleban because, according to the content of the letter, the Taleban are no longer terrorists and are not after interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. The letter also says the Taleban are not against the national interests and territorial integrity of any countries but respect them.
The Taleban spokesman says Afghanistan has been occupied by the USA and therefore waging war is their indisputable right.

With their precise diplomatic demands in this letter and their word games, the Taleban are showing that their isolation during their reign in Afghanistan taught them a lesson. Therefore, taking into consideration this lesson, the Taleban are trying not to repeat the provocative slogans undoubtedly planned by the countries opposing the presence of the mojahedin in Afghanistan and the ones who wanted to gain a foothold in Central Asia. Also, after reorganizing their fighting groups and challenging the Afghan and NATO security forces, the Taleban are trying to join in politics and in taking advantage of the weakness of the4 Afghan government's foreign policy in adopting a clear and practical strategy, the Taleban are trying to take huge advantage in the future.

Of course, this change in the Taleban mentality and the initiative in their psychological war show the presence of an active diplomatic body of the neighbouring country that wants to give the Taleban a new face as if the Taleban can respect and observe the regulations and international standards and to present them to the world, especially the SCO member countries. The SCO was set up out of fear of the expansion of the ideology of Talebanization to the newly-independent Central Asian countries. The other aim of this letter was to give an assurance that the Taleban can reach an understanding and are ready to have mutual cooperation with this organization.
Therefore, before the Taleban can take the initiative, the government of Afghanistan and the countries which support it should reconsider all their assessments. They should respect the demands of the people and neighbouring countries that Afghans should ensure the country's peace and security.

(Description of Source: Kabul Cheragh (Light) in Dari -- Eight-page independent daily, publishes political, social and cultural articles; critical of the transitional government) Read more on this article...

Friday, August 17, 2007

Pan-Arab Talk Shows on Libya, Arms Deals, Jordan: OSC

These are the portions of the USG Open Source Center roundup of Arab satellite channels' talk shows during the past week that concern subjects other than Iraq. Covered are the United Nations and its legitimacy, an interview with the son of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhdhafi, Western arms sales to the Middle east, the Lebanese political crisis, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic theology. For the Iraq portions, see Informed Comment.

Weekly Roundup of Pan-Arab TVs Talk Shows 5-11 Aug Corrected version; replacing text; changing Subject Qatar -- OSC Summary Thursday, August 16, 2007 . . .


Al-Jazirah at 1905 GMT on 7 August carries a new episode of its weekly talk show "The Opposite Direction" moderated by Faysal al-Qasim. The topic of discussion is the United Nations Security Council and the international legitimacy. To discuss this topic, Al-Jazirah hosts in the studio Faysal Jallul writer and researcher, and Akram al-Bunni, writer and human rights activist.

Writer Akram al-Bunni

Commenting on an opinion poll posted on Al-Jazirah Net which showed that 95 percent of participants do not believe that there is international legitimacy; Jallul says that the poll results speak for themselves, adding that the majority of people in the Arab world, Latin America, and Africa currently have no trust in the "so-called international legitimacy."

For his part, Al-Bunni argues that people in other parts of the world believe in international legitimacy as it helped bring an end to their problems. He says that the Arabs' failure to believe in the presence of international legitimacy is mainly attributed to the Arab-Israeli conflict. . .

At 1905 GMT on 8 August Al-Jazirah carries a new episode of its "Without Borders" talk show, moderated by Layla al-Shaykhali. Today's episode hosts Sayf-al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and director of the Al-Qadhafi Institute for Development.

Al-Qadhafi starts by talking about the Bulgarian nurses issue, saying that his institute was asked by the families of the AIDS children and by the Bulgarian and Libyan governments to intervene in the matter, and maintains that Libya and the families received the best possible deal from the matter as a result of competition between European countries. He says it was the Europeans who controlled the negotiations and offered Libya millions of dollars in addition to a partnership with the European Union and massive aide, and accuses Europe and the United States of blackmailing Libya. He provides background information and details on the Bulgarian nurses' case, and expresses his belief of the nurses' innocence, noting explains that the nurses remained in custody because there were varying theories on the AIDS infections and because the Libyan judiciary was intentionally given false information. He praises Qatar's role in resolving the issue and speaks of a Qatari-French-EU arrangement, but notes that Libya only cares for the end results and is not concerned with details. He defends his exposure of French and British arms deals related to the nurses case, saying that the case was the key to defensive, economic, and political issues of concern to Libya. . .

At 1905 GMT on 10 August Al-Jazirah carries a new episode of its weekly program " More Than One Opinion" moderated by Malik al-Turayki.

The topic of discussion is the question of why do Egypt and the Arab Gulf states continue to buy weapons and spend tens of billions of dollars to buy weapons from the United States instead of investing the money in economic development.

The guests of the program are Lieutenant General Salah Salim, strategic analyst in Cairo; Brian Katulis, researcher at the Center for American Progress in Washington; and Iranian political analyst Ali Nuri Zada in the studio.

Salim says the open objective of the arms deals is to realize a strategic balance between Iran and the Arab Gulf states and deter the Iranian interference in the region. He says the real reason for these deals is to attach the major Arab countries to the US strategy before a US attack on Iran.

Katulis expresses belief that there is no clear US policy on Iraq, and says that the Bush administration seems not to know what it is doing and rules out the econ omic considerations in the arms deals. Zada says the different viewpoints within the US Administration is something new. He says Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE have always been the clients of US weapons. He expresses belief that the economic factor was not the motive behind the arms deals. . .

Al-Jazirah at 1905 GMT on 11 August carries a new episode of its weekly program "Open Dialogue" presented by Ghassan Bin-Jiddu. The program hosts General Michel Awn, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, in Beirut, to discuss the political situation in Lebanon, the recent by-elections, the role of the church in Lebanon, the possibility of running in the presidential elections, relations with Hizballah, and other issues.

Asked about the recent by-elections in Al-Matn, Awn says it was "a very difficult battle" for his trend, adding that the US Administration threatened to freeze the assets of any Person who wished to support his party. He goes on to say that the some institutions and clergymen in Lebanon worked against his party during the recent by-elections, and that his opponents used the blood of martyr Pierre al-Jumayyil for propaganda purposes during the recent by-elections. Awn also criticize s the use of money by his opponents to buy votes, and the use of media outlets and intimidation against his trend. He goes on to say that Amin al-Jumayyil, who is a leader of a political party and a former president, should quit political life after losing the by-elections in his constituency.

On the US Administration's interference in the recent by-elections in Al-Matn and whether it plays a role in the Lebanese internal conflicts, Awn says that there is "excessive support" by the US Administrations for Siniora's government, and not Lebanon's government. He adds that the Lebanese Constitution, and not the US Administration, decides whether the Lebanese Government is legitimate or not. He goes on to say that the US Administration supports some Christian sides against him because of "his understanding with Hizballah." He says that he is ready to help the United States achieve its interests, but adds that "the US policy threatens our existence.

"On a possible initiative by the Vatican, Awn says that the Vatican closely watches developments in Lebanon, adding that Lebanese politicians should abide by the apostolic nuncio's "spiritual guidance". . .

At 1908 GMT on 9 August Al-Arabiyah carries a new episode of its weekly program "In Plain Arabic" presented by Giselle Khuri. The program hosts Samir Ja'ja, chairman of the Lebanese Forces' Executive Committee leader of the Lebanese Forces Army, to discuss the current political situation in Lebanon following the results of the by-elections and the upcoming presidential elections.

Asked about the reason for having security forces around his home, Ja'ja says that he is "threatened" and might be targeted just like those who were targeted in the past.Asked why he was not killed in jail if he is really targeted, Ja'ja says that had he been killed in jail, it would have been a very clear crime.

Asked about the possibility for running for the post of president in the upcoming presidential elections, Ja'ja says that he will not run for the post of president of the republic. Asked about the 14 March candidate for the presidential elections, Ja'ja says that he thinks that the candidate for the post of president will be announced at the last minute. He adds that it is not necessary to have a certain candidate at present.

Commenting on the fact that Patriarch Sfayr does not prefer to have any former military persons, such as General Awn or General Michel Sulayman-- run for the post of president, Ja'ja says that that he feels that Patriarch Sfayr does not support introducing any amendments to the constitution or having "ex-gen e rals" run for the post of president.

Asked whether Christians will agree on a candidate, Ja'ja says that he supports this idea because Christians are divided between General Awn and Christians from the 14 March forces.

Answering a question, Ja'ja says that President Lahhud, whose term will end on 23 November 2007, does not have the right or the authority to appoint or suggest any person to succeed him in accordance with Article 62 of the Lebanese Constitution. . .

At 1830 GMT on 10 August Al-Arabiyah carries a new episode of its weekly program " Point of Order" presented by Hasan Mu'awwad. The program hosts Salim al-Falahat, controller general of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group in Jordan, to speak about the MB's withdrawal from the municipal elections in Jordan.

MB Controller General Salim al-Falahat

Asked whether the recent withdrawal from the municipal elections six hours after the beginning of voting was legal, Al-Falahat says that the decision to withdraw from the elections was taken based on the 'huge rigging" that took place in the voting centers. He adds that the withdrawal was not a premeditated decision but was taken following developments in the field. He goes on to say that "rigging is illegal" ands that citizens have the right to participate or not in the elections. Asked why the movement withdrew from the elections six hours after the start of voting although they noticed violations before the day of the elections, Al-Falahat says: "We are realistic and realize to what extent we have integrity and democracy in the third world countries.

"Answering a question, Al-Falahat denies reports that four members from the Islamic Action Front (IAF) did not withdraw from the elections and won. Asked about the MB's relations with HAMAS, Al-Falahat also answers questions on relations with HAMAS, Gaza incidents, and other issues. . .

At 1905 on 5 August Al-Jazirah carries a new episode of its weekly talk show "Life and Religion" moderated today by Uthman Uthman. The episode hosts Dr Fathi Malkawi, executive director of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, for a discussion on individual perceptions of the world from political and religious standpoints and the dangers posed by radical archaic perceptions of the world as one consisting of good and evil. Malkawi explains that one's perception of the world is but a response to questions about the creator, his existence, his creations, and the nature of his creations, particularly humans and the meaning of life, and says that this applies to philosophy and extends to a person's perception of their place in the world and their relation to their surroundings. Malkawi goes on to explain how individuals perceptions are formed and the factors contributing to those perceptions, and speaks about the differences in perceptions, be they secular or religious, and the perception that the world consists of Muslims and infidels, explaining that it is not a perception of the world, but is a jurisprudence-based diagnosis of the circumstances experienced by a particular society at a particular period of time. Read more on this article...

Thursday, August 16, 2007

Breakthrough on Korean Hostage Issue in Afghanistan?
China Role called Crucial

The USG Open Source Center translates a broadcast of GEO television, the privately owned Pakistani satellite channel, regarding a possible breakthrough on the crisis provoked when Taliban took South Koreans hostage. For video on this issue, see the previous post on the release of two hostages.

"Pakistan: Kamran Khan Program
-- 'Breakthrough' on Korean Hostage Issue Seen . . .
Geo News TV Thursday, August 16, 2007
Document Type: OSC

[Discussion between Nazir Leghari, editor of Urdu newspaper Awam, and senior Pakistani journalist Kamran Khan in studio in Karachi on Korean hostages issue--live; taken from regularly scheduled "Today with Kamran Khan" program; words within double slant lines are in English.]

(Kamran Khan) Reports have been received that the Taliban have decided to release those 19 Korean hostages who were abducted about a month ago on 19 July in Ghazni province (of Afghanistan). In all 23 Koreans, majority of whom were women, were abducted. They were //aid workers// and//Christian missionaries// and had gone to Afghanistan for aid work. Reports say that the Taliban are now ready to release most of them. Two of the 23 hostages were killed by the Taliban and two others were released a few days ago. The row is the most important topic in Afghanistan at present. Afghan President Hamid Karzai and America are under direct pressure of South Korea, which is asking America to take steps to get its citizens released and accept the Taliban's demands. The reports received now say that there has been a//breakthrough// on the issue.

We have with us in studio Nazir Leghari, editor of (Urdu) newspaper Awam, who will give us the news of a //breakthrough//.

Nazir, what development has taken place, which we are describing as a //breakthrough// and which could, perhaps, lead to a solution of the issue.

(Leghari) The //breakthrough// according to the reports is that China has contacted the Taliban. One thing that emerged during the Pakistan-Afghanistan jirga (council of tribal leaders) was that both sides have agreed to create conditions for a //dialogue// with the Taliban and in this connection the jirga also constituted a 50-member delegation, which will hold//dialogue// with the Taliban. The occasion provided an opportunity to China to//enter// into the overall picture. China is an important country of the region and all these developments are taking place next door to it. China shares a long border with Afghanistan and some of its provinces are very close to Afghanistan. Then there are //regional issues//. So, China cannot keep itself too much out from the issues of these countries. The Taliban are also a victim of//isolation// as no country or a major organization is with it. So, this was the overall picture. So, now the Chinese contacts with the Taliban in itself is a major development for them. Pakistan and Afghanistan now accept that there should be a dialogue with the Taliban and that they should be brought into the political process and in //governance// if possible. The Taliban have to be brought on the path of dialogue. The Chinese entry at this juncture is very important. Reports are being received that the Taliban decided yesterday to release a woman hostage and they even wanted to implement the decision. But reports later came that the woman has said that until her other women colleagues are not released, she does not want to be released. So, it was then decided to release about 5 women and the Taliban Shura (consultative council) agreed to the decision.

(Khan) Does the Taliban's latest position on the hostages indicate that they will give up their demands?

(Leghari) I do no think so. There are two situations--to accept the demands, which appear to be likely, or not to accept. On various occasions an //underhand deal// is negotiated, which is not reported. Afterwards when it is known that so and so Taliban leaders have been released, they were actually released as a result of a //deal//. And, there still are such leaders in the Taliban leadership who were first captured, but were later released.

(Khan) You are saying that it may not appear at present, but there will be a //quid pro quo//, meaning something that will be done (for release of hostages), but it will not be clearly visible.

(Leghari) This could be possible, but it may also not happen. The Taliban can also make a //goodwill// gesture and since China has joined, so it should be given a better //position// to enable it to enter into the overall situation and join a major dialogue process.

(Khan) So, please tell us whether you think that in the present //ground// situation the issue is very close to a solution and the remaining 19 Koreans, including 15 women, will be released peacefully?

(Leghari) Yes, I guess that the Taliban will release the hostages. I understand it will happen and some reports are coming that the Taliban leadership is mentally prepared to do so and China can play an important role through its contacts with the Taliban. Negotiations took place today, but it was not announced when the negotiations will be resumed. The negotiations between the Taliban and the Koreans had been deadlocked in a way, but at the same time reports say that these negotiations were deliberately deadlocked after the Chinese contacts because it would be better if conditions for release are created as a result of the Chinese contacts.

(Khan(Thank you very much. Nazir Leghari, editor of newspaper Awam, was giving us the details. The reports are coming in that a//breakthrough// has taken place and there is a hope for the release of 19 Koreans, who are still being kept as hostages by the Taliban. For the first time, China's role has emerged in this Afghanistan's important issue and problem. China is trying that the issue is settled peacefully.

(Description of Source: Karachi Geo News TV in Urdu -- 24-hour satellite news TV channel owned by Pakistan's Jang publishing group, broadcast from Dubayy. Known for providing quick and detailed reports of events. Programs include some Indian shows and dramas which the group claims are aimed at promoting people-to-people contact and friendly relations with India.) " Read more on this article...

No celebrations in Seoul as two hostages are freed

From Eurovision via YouTube:

Read more on this article...