Tuesday, August 14, 2007

WSJ vs. NYT: is the Afghan glass half empty or half full?

Immediately below yesterday's interview with Karl Rove on the Op-Ed page, the Wall Street Journal published an article, "The Road to Jalalabad," that also tried to put a positive spin on a Bush administration problem. The author, Ann Marlowe, who has described herself as "more or less a neocon," sets out to counter the criticisms of the administration's record in Afghanistan. She attributes them entirely to partisanship -- her opening target is Hillary Clinton, who, Marlowe claims, has "cynically charged that we are 'losing the fight to al Qaeda and bin Laden' in Afghanistan."

Marlowe had no way to know that only one day before the publication of her article, New York Times reporters David Rohde and David Sanger would publish a comprehensive overview of the Bush administration's myopic parsimony in Afghanistan, drawing from on-the-record interviews with all three post-9/11 US ambassadors to Kabul, President Bush's first special envoy on Afghanistan, a serving three-star army general who commanded all US forces in Afghanistan, and a retired four-star marine general who as Supreme Allied Commander oversaw all NATO operations in the country. (I commented on that article yesterday.)

But I am not writing just to criticize Ann, as I will call her, since we have met in both Kabul and New York. Though it was clear from our first conversation that we did not agree, I respect the work she has done. Ann has been to Afghanistan eight times and contributed some of her own resources to worthwhile projects. She is not just an opinionated ideologue: her article is based on first-hand observations of genuine achievements that deserve more attention and analysis than they receive. By now Ann is a candidate for membership in the Association of People who Know More about Afghanistan than Is Legal in Most States and the District of Columbia, which I claim to have founded in 1992.

Ann's article is useful because a comparison of what she wrote and the New York Times article provides us with a means to discuss that endless question: is the Afghan glass half full or half empty? Is it nothing more than a matter of perspective, partisan or otherwise?

I first remember engaging with this amazingly persistent metaphor at a meeting in Paris in April 2005. This meeting eventuated in an edited volume with the alliterative title The Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East. It is the only volume to which I have every contributed with a blurb by Bill Kristol, though, to be fair, he did not attend the session on Afghanistan, presumably because his priorities, like the administration's, were elsewhere.


This collaboration between the Brookings Institution and the European Union Institute for Security Studies aimed at bridging US-European differences on Israel/Palestine, Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. On each subject the sponsors had paired analysts from the new world and the old to compare and contrast "American" and "European" perspectives and seek to forge a synthesis.

I accepted the invitation to provide an "American" perspective on Afghanistan. My trans-Atlantic foil was Ambassador Michael Schmunk, the former German special envoy on Afghanistan. Schmunk, with whom I had appeared at several previous meetings, gave his presentation, about how much the international community had achieved, and I gave my presentation, about how much the international community had not yet achieved, thereby endangering the sustainability of what it had. As I recall, Michael then summarized our presentations by saying that he thought the glass was half-full, whereas I thought it was half-empty.

I argued that this distinction missed the point. As a simple matter of fact, if a glass is half-full, it is ipso facto also half empty. People seem to make this distinction to defend their efforts against what the Wall Street Journal calls "the naysayers" in its web blurb for Ann's article. But the US, NATO, UN, and many other countries are not in Afghanistan in order to congratulate themselves on their efforts, or to do, as the Journal wrote somewhat peevishly, "as well as anyone has the right to expect." We are in Afghanistan to achieve some vital objectives. If we fail to achieve them, no one will give us an 'A' for effort. Besides, how do we know the glass is half rather than a tenth full -- and how full does it have to be before it contains enough water -- or essential oil, as in this picture of Gulestan Ltd. employees Shafiqullah Azizi And Mathieu Beley (which I took, by the way, in Jalalabad in April 2006)?

But I understand and even sympathize with Ann's frustration and Michael Schmunk's desire to show that Germany's and Europe's engagement had not been for naught. The media focus almost entirely on the military struggle. One modest contract I have had with a media organization describes me as a "terrorism analyst." I tried to have this changed to "regional analyst" or "Afghanistan analyst." But the TV people told me they were interested solely in terrorism, and thus far they have been true to their word.

Ann rightly asserts that Afghanistan is and has long been one of the poorest countries in the world with massive obstacles to economic development and political stability that have nothing to do with the Bush administration (or even the Clinton administration). But from her visit to Kabul and three Eastern provinces (Nangarhar, Laghman, and Khost) she concludes that "the trend lines are up, not down."

What are those trend lines? More flights between Dubai and Kabul on the private carrier Kam Air (though she does not mention that the national carrier, Ariana, is being stripped of its assets by various mafias and is consequently in greater danger of collapse now than it was when it was placed under international sanctions during the Taliban regime); cheaper and geometrically increasing access to mobile telephones (and, she might add, television and the internet); repair and construction of both primary and secondary roads; investments, largely funded by the US, in infrastructure for agricultural marketing; the growth of private banking; the construction of a new university in Khost with funding from the United Arab Emirates; significant funding of development by remittances from migrant workers; the "wholehearted support" for the US of "85-90% of the population," according to a US military officer; the growth of school enrollments; and, she claims, some improvements in security: no "conventional attacks" by Taliban in 2007 and some success in countering "al Qaeda, Taliban and other fighters [who] cross from Pakistan," something she apparently considers to be an unavoidable fact of local geography. She repeats the common conservative trope that Afghanistan (or Baghdad) is no more violent than the US's inner cities (we know who lives there of course). She mentions San Jose, Indianapolis,and Detroit, but it does not occur to her to wonder why parts of the US are apparently almost as violent as Afghanistan. I guess it's just the way those people are.

Like Ann, I wish that more people in the US and Europe knew of these positive trends and real accomplishments. They do not lead me to conclude that Afghanistan is irreversibly on the way to stability and prosperity, but they show what we have to lose by not making a more effective effort. They give me hope that, despite all the mistakes, mismanagement, corruption, and even crimes, the will of the people of Afghanistan is still strong enough that an international partnership with them can succeed.

But that may not happen if current trends continue, especially some that Ann did not mention. Unfortunately these concern fundamental issues that will determine whether Afghanistan and its international supporters can sustain these achievements.

The NYT article identifies the following not so hopeful trends:

Like Osama bin Laden and his deputies, the Taliban had found refuge in Pakistan and regrouped as the American focus wavered. Taliban fighters seeped back over the border, driving up the suicide attacks and roadside bombings by as much as 25 percent this spring, and forcing NATO and American troops into battles to retake previously liberated villages in southern Afghanistan.

. . . Afghanistan’s embattled president, Hamid Karzai, said in Washington last week that security in his country had “definitely deteriorated.” One former national security official called that “a very diplomatic understatement.”

At critical moments in the fight for Afghanistan, the Bush administration diverted scarce intelligence and reconstruction resources to Iraq, including elite C.I.A. teams and Special Forces units involved in the search for terrorists. . . . .

When it came to reconstruction, big goals were announced, big projects identified. Yet in the year Mr. Bush promised a “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan, the country received less assistance per capita than did postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, or even desperately poor Haiti, according to a RAND Corporation study. . . .

In September 2005, NATO defense ministers gathered in Berlin to complete plans for NATO troops to take over security in Afghanistan’s volatile south. It was the most ambitious “out of area” operations in NATO history, and across Europe, leaders worried about getting support from their countries. Then, American military officials dropped a bombshell.

The Pentagon, they said, was considering withdrawing up to 3,000 troops from Afghanistan, roughly 20 percent of total American forces. . . .

Three months after announcing the proposed troop withdrawal, the White House Office of Management and Budget cut aid to Afghanistan by a third. . . . American assistance to Afghanistan dropped by 38 percent, from $4.3 billion in fiscal 2005 to $3.1 billion in fiscal 2006, according to a study by the Congressional Research Service. . . .

In the spring of 2006, the Taliban carried out their largest offensive since 2001, attacking British, Canadian and Dutch troops in southern Afghanistan.

Hundreds of Taliban swarmed into the south, setting up checkpoints, assassinating officials and burning schools. Suicide bombings quintupled to 136. Roadside bombings doubled. All told, 191 American and NATO troops died in 2006, a 20 percent increase over the 2005 toll. For the first time, it became nearly as dangerous, statistically, to serve as an American in Afghanistan as in Iraq. . . .

Among some current and former officials, a consensus is emerging that a more consistent, forceful American effort could have helped to keep the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leadership from regrouping.


The Times article does not even deal with narcotics. According to a UN report released in June, Afghanistan's opium production continued to soar in 2007, accounting for 90 percent of the world's supply. Helmand Province alone produced more than Myanmar, the world's second largest producer.

All the flights to Dubai and mobile phones in the world will not defeat the growing insurgency, stabilize the tribal areas of Pakistan where the Taliban and al-Qaida are based, and sustain a government undermined by rampant drug-fueled corruption. International observers agree that stabilizing Afghanistan will require foreign troops for years if not decades, but Afghans will not tolerate the current toll of civilian casualties for years let alone decades, especially when they realize, as reported by Mark Benjamin in Salon.com, that the number results in part from the US counter-terrorism forces using looser rules of engagement than NATO. The Afghan government will never be able to pay for even the current size Afghan National Army, and under current threat conditions it would need a far larger and better equipped one to provide security. The only alternative is to reduce the level of external threat, but destabilization in Pakistan and a US confrontation with Iran could have the opposite effect. Overall, the summary conclusion I presented in Paris in April 2005 now seems a little too rosy:
Since the overthrow of the Taliban by the US-led coalition and the inauguration of the interim authority based on the UN-mediated Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001, Afghanistan has progressed substantially toward stability. Not all trends are positive, however. Afghanistan has become more dependent on narcotics production and trafficking than any country in the world. It remains one of the world’s most impoverished and conflict-prone states, where only a substantial international presence prevents a return to war. The modest results reflect the modest resources that donor and troop-contributing states have invested in it (Figure 1). Afghans and those supporting their efforts have many achievements to their credit, but declarations of success are premature.

Since then the return to war has occurred. The Afghan glass may be half full, a tenth full, or near to overflowing. But it is standing on a very rickety table in an earthquake prone area. It will not matter how full the glass is if the table collapses or one of the region's unstable tectonic plates suddenly shifts. Read more on this article...

Taliban Claims To Capture Mizani District From Afghan Police

The USG Open Source Center translates an article from a jihadi website:

"Taliban Claims To Capture Mizani District From Afghan Police Control 3 Aug
Jihadist Websites -- OSC Summary
Monday, August 13, 2007

Terrorism: Taliban Claims To Capture Mizani District 3 Aug On 4 August, a jihadist website posted a statement issued by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-Taliban, in which the group claimed responsibility for capturing the Mizani District in Zabul Province as a part of the "Dhu al-Faqar" operations. The statement was attributed to Al-Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-Taliban.

A translation of parts of the statement follows:

"The Taliban, as part of the Dhu al-Faqar Operations, capture Mizani District of Zabul Province.

"Al-Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf -- 3 August 2007.

"Yesterday, the mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate (of Afghanistan-Taliban) launched the new series of military operations that are named "Dhu-al-Faqar" against the infidels and hypocrites in Zabul Province. In addition, within this framework, the mujahidin carried out an attack using heavy and light weapons that targeted Mizani District of Zabul Province today, Friday 3 August 2007. This led to the escape of the traitor policemen from to this attack, while their building in the Mizani District was burned completely. In addition, the mujahidin seized large quantities of weapons and ammunition. By the grace of God, the district and its surrounding security checkpoints still are under the complete control and management of the mujahidin.

"Information: the spokesmen of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-Taliban; Qari Muhammad Yusuf Ahmadi for the southwestern and the northwestern areas of the country; and Dhabihallah (mujahid) for the southeastern and the northeastern areas of the country.

"God is the greatest and honor belongs to Allah and his messenger and to the believers.

"The Information Front of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-Taliban" "
Read more on this article...

Pakistan: Parliamentary Secretary Accuses US of Terrorism

The USG Open Source Center paraphrases a report in the conservative Urdu daily Nava-i Vaqt on remarks of the Pakistani parliament's chief staffer for defense issues.

"Pakistan: Parliamentary Secretary Asks Government To Expose 'Real' Face of US
Report by Staff Reporter: "United States Itself is an International Terrorist: Parliamentary Secretary for Defense"
Nawa-e Waqt
Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Islamabad: The parliamentary secretary for defense, retired Maj Tanvir Hussain Syed, has said that the United States is itself an international terrorist. In order to hide its own blatant aggression, it is describing the victims (of its atrocities) as terrorists.

While talking to the Nawa-e Waqt, he rejected the US objections to his speech in the National Assembly. He said that the Pakistan Government and people have to make a resolve to expose the real face of the US policies. He said that his speech in the National Assembly was very independent. However, the US attitude has always been very irresponsible at the international as well as regional level. The United States has always betrayed Pakistan. If the Americans are right, they should respond to the following questions: How much is the annual budget of the CIA and against which countries and for conspiracies against which particular religion, 80 percent of this budget is being used? The United States should tell whether defenders of ones homeland are terrorists or those who attack them?

Neither the Iraqi mujahidin nor the Taliban in Afghanistan, but the United States had attacked these two countries and had unleashed a reign of terror and aggression on their people. He said that the United States, intoxicated by its military might, was digging a ditch for its own people by invoking aggression. The United States has enslaved the UN for the sake of its vested interests. If the United States is a sworn flag-bearer of principles, why plebiscite has not been held for the poor Kashmiris until to date. The entire history of the United States is witness to its utterly irresponsible attitude. The United States embraces every country, which subjugates the Muslims. Israel and India are the obvious examples in this connection.

(Description of Source: Rawalpindi Nawa-e Waqt in Urdu -- Privately owned, widely read, conservative Islamic daily, with circulation around 125,000. Harshly critical of the US and India.)" Read more on this article...

Sunday, August 12, 2007

New York Times on Failure in Afghanistan

In today's New York Times, reporters David Rohde and David Sanger published a retrospective overview of how the Bush administration has failed in Afghanistan. While the article contains no revelations to those following the issue closely, some parts of the account have not appeared in print in such a prominent place before. The article provides a comprehensive overview of how, in the words of the NYT's headline, "The 'Good War' Went Bad."

The record of misjudgments is as familiar as it is complete: believing that the quick collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 constituted a resounding "victory"; a refusal to enlarge the international security presence to secure the country; a failure to follow up on boastful talking points about a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan with any strategic planning, coordinated leadership, adequate funding, or effective implementation; neglect and denial for years of the Pakistan military's permissive (at best) attitude toward the Taliban leadership; and, like a shiny silk thread of failure woven through the entire fabric, the constant diversion of military, political, intelligence, economic, and leadership resources to Iraq. As news reporters, the authors decline to make the obvious observation: more attention and resources from this administration meant a more comprehensive and disastrous failure in Iraq than in Afghanistan.

The article neglects one important aspect of the Afghan effort -- the involvement of the United Nations, which the reporters do not even mention. Yet one of the major reasons for the limited successes in Afghanistan was precisely that, because of the low priority the administration assigned to it, it agreed to a recommendation from the State Department to empower the UN to take the lead in helping Afghans assemble a political transition. The UN organized and chaired the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn that designed the transition, and it oversaw the Loya Jirgas (Grand Councils), constitutional process, elections, and adoption of the Afghanistan Compact, the successor to the Bonn Agreement, which the administration has unsuccessfully tried to copy in Iraq. It was the success of these UN political efforts as much as anything else that enabled the Bush administration to camouflage its strategic failure for so long. (Note: I have a personal bias in that I was involved in these UN efforts as an occasional adviser or consultant).

The article also catalogues the efforts of both military and diplomatic professionals and some political appointees (notably Zalmay Khalilzad) to change these policies. The willingness of all former US ambassadors and several former US and NATO military commanders to go on the record in the New York Times in criticism of the administration's policies indicates how general is now the recognition that US policies were wrong, both in allocating global priorities and in planning for Afghanistan.

What the article does not analyze is the strategic and ideological doctrines of the administration, and in particular its radical misunderstanding of the threat from al-Qaeda and the challenges in Afghanistan, that led to these policy failures. The administration has tried as usual to shift blame to others, by claiming that the non-US "lead nations" in security sector reform performed inadequately and that NATO troop contributors have placed too many limitations on their troops. While these charges contain elements of truth, they ignore that the flawed "lead-donor" system resulted from the Bush administration's ideologically motivated refusal in 2002 either to lead or authorize others (such as the UN) to lead a well-coordinated and resourced state-building effort.

Complaints about NATO troop contributors ignore the political reality that allies are reluctant to sacrifice their soldier's lives to a conflict greatly exacerbated by Washington's own mistakes. This same dynamic is being played out again as the administration pushes for a disastrous policy of accelerated poppy eradication, and allies whose troops may die in the resulting resistance push back.

In future posts I will analyze the failure of the US and other international actors to define goals and hence to design a strategy for Afghanistan. The failure to define what we are trying to accomplish or to analyze what it would require to accomplish it results in politically motivated talking points on "success" that consist mostly of lists of genuine but unsustainable achievements. This strategic failure, which, alas, goes far beyond the upper reaches of the Bush administration, has led to policies being enacted piecemeal on drugs, Pakistan, Iran, reconstruction/development, and the Taliban. I will analyze the concept of "success" in Afghanistan (is the glass half full or half empty, or what?) and each of these particular subjects in subsequent posts. Read more on this article...

Saturday, August 11, 2007

Getting Pakistan Right - An UnPublished Op-Ed

Below is an op-ed that I recently wrote. I decided to put it here, after reading Benazir Bhutto's comments in the WSJ.

-----
The American flag is burning again in Pakistan. Angry masses are protesting the recent remarks made by Democratic Presidential hopeful Senator Barack Obama to deploy US soldiers on Pakistani territories and to take unilateral action based on intelligence inside Pakistan. Senator Obama’s comments echo growing consensus among policy makers about Pakistan’s commitment to fighting Al-Qa’eda and the need to demand “results” from Pakistan.

Conventional wisdom maintains that Pakistan is teetering on the brink of extremism and that the authoritarian regime of Pervez Musharraf is our only hope of preventing a nuclear-capable militant Islamic state from emerging in South Asia. This is the understanding with which the Bush Administration has proceeded since 2001. The difference now is that we are moving towards a unilateral approach.

This conventional wisdom was wrong before and is dangerously wrong now. It ignores the significant contributions made by Pakistan in capturing or killing the majority of Al-Qa’eda leadership. It also ignores the salient facts that Pakistan has time and again rejected traditionalist Islamic parties within its political spectrum - who have never managed to garner more than a few percentage of electoral votes - and that a robust consensus exists in Pakistan against militancy and extremism in Islam. Last month, we saw protests across Pakistan against the radicalization of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid mosque. Unilateral actions, or the mere threat of it, can destabilize not only the US-Pakistan strategic alliance but derail the tentative steps Pakistan has recently taken towards democracy.

On July 20th, 2007, a pivotal decision in Pakistan’s civil and political history came from its Supreme Court. It reinstated Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry who had been summarily dismissed by Pervez Musharraf on March 9th, 2007, almost certainly because Chaudhry had authorized investigations into the “disappearances” of civilians at the hands of military intelligence branch of the Army. Subsequently, the Court ordered the release of many political prisoners – most notably the opposition leader Javed Hashmi who was jailed in 2003 for criticizing Pervez Musharraf.

This triumph of independent judicial oversight and civil society over military power came only after thousands of lawyers, civil officers and professionals led the march into the streets in support of Chaudhry. Soon enough, thousands became hundreds of thousands and the cause of Chaudhry became a cause for democracy across Pakistan. The news media withstood state violence and censorship and refused to shut down their coverage.

These are encouraging signs of democracy that we need to explicitly support. Longtime observers of Pakistan’s history will remember that in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, we provided material and political support to the erstwhile Islamist dictator General Zia ul Haq, as part of the Cold War raging in Afghanistan against Soviet forces. But, we Americans abandoned Pakistan throughout the 1990s -- which crippled the democratic and civilian governments and strengthened militarization and Talibanization in the region. We must not repeat this history. Our current support for the dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf, and threats of military deployment or sanctions is, thus, exactly the wrong strategy both for our long-term global interests and for the people of Pakistan.

Our anxiety and mistrust for our most valuable ally in the global war on terrorism comes from the same fear and incomprehension with which we perceive the broader Muslim world. Our news coverage, after all, shows us little besides faces contorted into masks of rage, mosques turned into fortresses of hate, and the aftermath of yet another bomb blast. Our support for “democratization” will remain nominal until we learn to look beyond the dictates of conventional wisdom and the confines of a pre-destined clash of civilizations. We must know, understand, trust and dialogue with the global community of Muslims

Instead of reducing this sprawling, diverse, multi-denominational and multi-cultural nation to nothing more than a caricature of its madrasas and tribal chieftans, US policy must explicitly support immediate and full democracy in Pakistan. As we continue to insist on a flat, binary world of those with us or against us; as we continue to distrust those masses populating the streets of Pakistan; as we continue to believe that the only outcome to an election in Pakistan will be power for the extremists, we ignore the birth of a real and pure movement for democracy – and we ignore it at our peril.

We have to practice what we preach. Our weapons against extremism are democracy, civil society, a free press and the rule of law, not support for military dictators.
------------------

Also, please see WSJ's Reversal of Fortune
Pakistan's once--and future?--prime minister on her imminent return home
in which Bhutto discusses Barack Obama's recent comments as well as the threat of extremism in Pakistan. Her prescription is clear-eyed:
The remedy to all this, says Ms. Bhutto, is democracy, plain and simple. She does not believe that Pakistani society has become more illiberal in its political outlook, despite the almost metastatic growth of radical madrassas (religious schools) in recent years. On the contrary, she argues that the increasing--and increasingly unrestrained--power of militants to compel or kill ordinary people to get what they want has created a huge backlash, one that could make itself felt at the ballot box if people are given the chance to vote their consciences.
Read more on this article...

Pashtun Nationalist Leader Calls on Afghan Taleban to Renounce Violence

The USG Open Source Center translates the comments of Pashtun politician Mahmud Khan Achakzai on security in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pashtun nationalist leader calls on Afghan Taleban to renounce violence
Pajhwok Afghan News (Internet Version-WWW)
Friday, August 10, 2007
Document Type: OSC Transcribed Text

Pashtun nationalist leader calls on Afghan Taleban to renounce violence

Text of report in English by Afghan independent Pajhwok news agency website


Kabul, 10 August: A veteran Pashtun nationalist leader from Baluchistan (in Pakistan) has reminded the United States and the international fraternity of their responsibility to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan before they walk away from it.

There was absolutely no justification for Washington and its allies to leave the Central Asian country in state of devastation in the wake of the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) chief told the four-day regional peace jerga here on Friday (10 August) .

In his typically blunt style, Mahmud Khan Achakzai remarked the US being the sole superpower would not lose sight of its responsibility this time around if it was really determined to rid the long-suffering country of terrorists and miscreants.

The seasoned politician touched a raw nerve while asking jerga president and (Pakistan) Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao to request President Gen Pervez Musharraf to swing into action to drench the fires raging in Pakistan. If remedial steps were not initiated immediately, he warned, the whole region would be engulfed by the devouring flames of strife.

Pakistan's tribal areas, where political agents were armed with sweeping powers, were in the throes of trouble never seen before. He particularly cited the perturbing situation in Khyber Agency, Hangu, Waziristan and elsewhere in a country run by intelligence agencies. All of us know what these agencies have been doing, he added.
Pashtuns or Afghans had historically been a peace-loving and tolerant nation that never resorted to terrorism for achieving their goals, claimed Achakzai, who challenged historians to find a single instance linking the community to acts of brainless violence. But their land had been the scene of a war that knew no bounds and inflicted untold suffering on them, he regretted.

From the epoch-making reign of Ahmad Shah Baba to this day, he maintained, Pashtuns had been living by a code of life that set store by peace and co-existence and abominated beheading elders, abducting women and killing innocent civilians.

He urged reclusive Taleban supremo Mullah Mohammad Omar to shun violence if he desired peace and prosperity in his country. The fugitive ought to take his cue from Pakistan's opposition leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who contested elections to get that position.

At the outset of the proceedings on day two of the jerga, Achakzai's party colleague Abdorrahim Mandokhel referred to deadly militant attacks in Charsadda, Swat, Waziristan, Lakki Marwat, Kohat, Bajaur and Mohmand Agency, where the security situation was on a nose-dive.

Mandokhel, tending to ridicule Pakistan-Afghan recriminations over terrorist sanctuaries, wondered where the killers - with an obscurantist agenda - came from. Should the neighbours continue to temporize in their fight against the rebels, he warned, both would slide further into chaos.

He deplored an ongoing wave of kidnappings and decapitations by a band of hard-liners intent upon imposing their credo on noted tribal elders and law-abiding citizens. Who had allowed the miscreants to kill people on the amorphous charge of spying, set alight schools, take over mosques and brazenly humiliate individuals in a self-styled drive against vice.

If the Taleban were interested in a political struggle to realize their objectives, the PkMAP leader suggested, they should renounce violence and register as a political party in accordance with Afghanistan's constitution. Let it be clear, he reasoned, the fighters could not attain their goals through terrorist activities.

Another Pakistani delegate, Jamil Hasan Bangash hailed the grand tribal gathering as a positive beginning that should continue as long as the twin menace of terrorism and extremism was not banished from both the countries. The thrust of his speech was that the jerga must be empowered to take independent decisions on the common woes of the two peoples.

Minister of State for Education Anisa Zeb Tahirkheli recalled the firm support and cooperation Pakistan extended to Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. Through all thick and thin, she continued, her country stood by the Afghans in a show of good neighbourliness.

Nawab Aurangzeb Jogezai from the Baluchistan Province believed the distinction between the jihad against the erstwhile Soviet Union in the 80s and the war on terror today had become blurred. Pakistan's stability was directly depended on peace in Afghanistan, he opined. The two, therefore, should jointly explore ways of forging friendly relations, forgetting past differences.

(Description of Source: Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News (Internet Version-WWW) in English -- Pajhwok Afghan News, established in April 2004, provides daily news and features in Pashto, Dari, English and Urdu. Self-described as "independent," it often reports on security matters and the Taliban activities. It claims to be staffed, managed, and led entirely by Afghans. According to the site, it receives financial support from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).)

Read more on this article...

Thursday, August 9, 2007

Bush Warns Maliki, Corrects his Nuclear Gaffe and Acknowledges that the US is Trying to Deny the Iranian People Their Rightful Place in the World

In his pre-vacation news conference George Bush warned Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki against relying on Iran. Responding to a question regarding Maliki's trip to Iran (he visited both Tehran and Mashad; the latter city to meet with Ayatollah Khamenei) and his comments about Tehran's work in "providing security and fighting terrorism in Iraq,"Bush said, “If the signal is that Iran is constructive, I will have to have a heart to heart with my friend, the prime minister, because I don't believe they are constructive.”

“My message to him is, when we catch you playing a non-constructive role, there will be a price to pay," Bush said in remarks which had to be corrected immediately after the news conference by the US National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe who said the "price to pay" remark by Bush was directed at Iran.

Obviously flustered by the back to up back support Iran has received from two key American allies, Hamid Karzai and Nuri al-Maliki, Bush corrected his previous charge about Iran’s proclaimed intentions to acquire nuclear weapons but insisted on identifying Iran as very “troubling nation.” He also revealed that America’s Iran policy is designed to squeeze the people of Iran economically:

… should the American people be concerned about Iran. Yea we ought to be very concerned about Iran. They are a destabilizing influence. They are a government that's declared policy is very troubling obviously when they have announced, when Ahmadinejad has announced the destruction of Israel as part of his foreign policy. That’s something obviously we cannot live with.

They have expressed their desire to be able to enrich uranium which we believe is a step toward having a nuclear weapons program. That in itself coupled with their stated foreign policy is very dangerous for world stability They are funders of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is intent upon you know battling forces of moderation. And so it is a very troubling nation right now.

Iran can do better. The government is isolating its people. The government has caused America and other nations, rational nations, to say we will work together to do everything we can to deny you economic opportunity because of the decisions you are making.

My message to the Iranian people is that you can do better than this current government. You don’t have to be isolated. You don’t have to be in a position where you can’t realize your full economic potential, and the United States of America will continue to work with our friends and allies in the Security Council and elsewhere to put you in a position, to deny you your rightful place in the world, not because of our intention but because of your government’s intention.

So the bottom line, it seems, is that the Bush administration's now publicly acknowledged policy is to hold the people of Iran hostage economically ("to deny you your rightful place in the world" and "to deny you economic opportunity") because of their government. Note that Bush's direct message to the Iranian people does not end with the misdeeds of the Iranian government that can be changed. His words are that “you can do better than this current government.” And what if the Iranian people cannot? Well, they obviously have to pay for their misfortune.

Just imagine what the Iranian government and its Ministry of Intelligence which just a couple of days ago warned Iranian citizens about the multiple ways the American government is trying to cause political and economic instability and insecurity in Iran will do with these words. Read more on this article...

Wednesday, August 8, 2007

Emergency in Pakistan

There are reports coming out of Pakistan that Pervez Musharraf is declaring Emergency in, at least, parts of the country.

This is a serious setback to the nascent movement for democracy in Pakistan.

Senator Obama's recent comments seem to have played a significant role in giving the embattled Army leader a way out.

update: At the moment, Musharraf is not going ahead with it. Read more on this article...

Pakistan Editorialists Respond to Obama, Tancredo

The USG Open Source Center translates Pakistan Editorials Responding to Barack Obama and Tom Tancredo

'Urdu Press Roundup on 'Hostile' Statements by US Presidential Candidates
Pakistan -- OSC Summary
Monday, August 6, 2007

The following is a roundup of excerpts from editorials on the strongly-worded statements by the US presidential hopefuls belonging to both the Republican and Democratic parties on strikes inside Pakistan and against Muslims' holy cities, published in the 4 August 2007 editions of six Urdu dailies:


Nawa-e Waqt Editorial Says American Leadership Against Islamic World, Pakistan

Discussing the statement of ruling Republican presidential hopeful Tom Tancredo on whether the United States should attack the holy cities of the Muslims, Mecca and Medina, the editorial remarks: "Earlier, the presidential hopeful of the Democratic Party, Barack Obama had demonstrated his audacity by saying that he would order strikes on Pakistan to hunt down Usama Bin Laden. Expressing its formal reaction, our Foreign Office termed the statements of both the presidential hopefuls as madness. On the other hand, the US presidential candidates are not only making threats to promote their enmity against Islam but are also setting their future targets. Pakistan and the holiest places of Muslims are foremost amongst their targets."


Khabrain Editorial Finds Statements of US Presidential Hopefuls Reflective of Their Mindset, Intensions

Rejecting the claims made by the US administration and presidential hopefuls about possible nuclear attacks on the US by the Muslim world, the editorial states: "If the US presidential hopefuls talk about attacking the Muslims' holy cities of Mecca and Medina and an announcement is made about destroying the hideouts of terrorists inside Pakistan, it should not be considered as boasting by unhinged people. Rather, we should prepare ourselves to counter it (the threat). A session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) should immediately be convened to chalk out a joint strategy. On the other hand, those making such threats should consider whether they will be able to maintain peace in the world by playing with the sentiments of Muslims."


Jasarat Editorial Urges Muslim Rulers To Rise to Occasion

Terming the statements of the US presidential hopefuls as horrible for the Muslim world, the editorial says: "The entire Western world would have raised hue and cry if such a statement had been made by some important figure in the Muslim world. However, the presidential candidate of the ruling Republican Party is attacking the very soul of Muslims, and there is no one to check his tongue. The situation poses a challenge for the entire Muslim world. The tragedy of the Muslim world is that its people are fully awake, but their rulers are in deep slumber. Rather, they are being used in different places as tools by the West to work against their own religion, history, ideology, community, and nation."


Islam Editorial Asks Muslim World To Register Protest With US in Effective Way

Lamenting the hostile statements of the future US leadership towards the Islamic world and Pakistan, the editorial suggests: "The Islamic world should cut off all sorts of ties and end cooperation with the US as a mark of protest. They should compel the United States to stop negative propaganda and military actions against Muslims at once and withdraw their forces from all occupied Muslim lands without any delay so that Muslims in these countries can decide their own future."


Pakistan Editorial Alleges US Pursuing Policy of Clash of Civilizations

Calling on the Muslim leaders to realize the situation and join heads to find a solution to the challenges, the editorial states: "Having their faith in a clash of civilizations, the US rulers have been subjecting the Muslims to their atrocities. The sentiments of Muslims have been hurt due to the tirade against the Muslims' holy cities. The Muslim community will have to rise to the occasion. The OIC is duty-bound to tell the United States and the West of the unanimous stance of the Muslim community in this regard."


Jinnah Editorial Sees Statement Reflective of US Designs Against Muslims

Highlighting that the statements by the US presidential hopefuls from both parties are not just by chance, the editorial comments: "In the wake of the statement of Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama about striking Al-Qa'ida hideouts inside Pakistan, the Republican presidential candidate Tom Tancredo has used the same, silly language. He said that the only way out to save the United States from nuclear attacks is that the holy places of Muslims should be targeted. While speaking during his election campaign, he said that a if nuclear attack is launched against the United States, Mecca and Medina should be bombed. He said that the US should make this decision at the earliest. Perhaps we do not know what the US designs are. President Bush never talked about a crusade; it came out due to a slip of the tongue. In like manner, Tom Tancredo has expressed his evil, inner self." ' Read more on this article...

Tuesday, August 7, 2007

Afghanistan, Iraq and the Bush Administration’s Incoherent Iran Policy

Two events in the past couple of days have once again highlighted the incoherence that characterizes the Bush Administration’s policy vis-à-vis Iran: Hamid Karzai’s visit to the US and his CNN comment regarding Iran’s helpful role in Afghanistan and the third US-Iran round of talks about Iraq’s security.

Let me begin with Karzai’s comments and Bush’s response. Here are excerpts of Bush’s exchange with a reporter:

Q: President Karzai said yesterday that he believed Iran was playing a helpful role in Afghanistan. Was he able to convince you, in your meetings that that was the case, or do you still have concerns about Iran's role?

BUSH: … it's up to Iran to prove to the world that they're a stabilizing force as opposed to destabilizing force.

After all, this is a government that has proclaimed its desire to build a nuclear weapon. This is a government that's in defiance of international accord, a government that seems to be willing to thumb its nose at the international community, and at the same time a government that denies its people a rightful place in the world and denies its people the ability to realize their full potential.

So I believe that it's in the interests of all of us that we have an Iran that tries to stabilize, not destabilize; an Iran that gives up its weapons ambitions. And therefore we're working to that end.

The president knows best about what's taking place in his country. And, of course, I'm willing to listen.

But from my perspective, the burden of proof is on the Iranian government to show us that they're a positive force.

And I must tell you that this current leadership there is a -- is a big disappointment to the people of Iran.

I mean, the people of Iran could be doing a lot better than they are today. But because of the actions of this government, this country is isolated.

And we will continue to work to isolate it. Because they're not a force for good, as far as we can see. They are a destabilizing influence, wherever they are now.

The president will talk to you about Afghanistan. But I would be very cautious about whether or not the Iranian influence there in Afghanistan is a positive force. And, therefore, it's going to be up to them to prove to us and prove to the government that they are.

Now I understand that George Bush’s spoken words cannot be considered a good marker for either coherence or eloquence. Nevertheless, his response is an astounding statement about how convoluted his thinking about Iran continues to be.

First of all, true to form, he begins with an outright misstatement (more accurately, a lie). The statement, “after all, this is a government that has proclaimed its desire to build a nuclear weapon,” is an obvious untruth that like so many other untruths will probably not be challenged by the mainstream media, but through which George Bush hopes to etch in the American mind (or his own mind?!) the proven or “proclaimed” aspirations of the Iranian leadership for acquiring the bomb.

This is while the Iranian government has never articulated such a desire and in fact has repeatedly claimed, genuinely or disingenuously, the opposite. The Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons (as distinct from the pursuit of the capability to build nuclear weapons), as of today, remains a charge and assertion. The issue at hand, repeatedly described through intense European negotiations with Iran, concerns Iran’s enrichment-related programs and the fact that those programs will eventually give Iran the technological “capability” to build nuclear weapons even if Iran denies the desire to build the bomb. The point has always been that “they” cannot be trusted with the technology and not the proclaimed desire to build the bomb.

That Bush conveniently leaves out this fact, and proclaims Iran’s intention to build nuclear weapons, is not particularly surprising or revealing. Similar leaps in assertion were at work in connecting 9/11 to Saddam Hussein and in endowing Iraq with WMD. What is revealing is how the presumed Iranian aspirations for nuclear weapons are then mixed up with Iran’s other sins, including the denial of the people of Iran “to their rightful place in the world.”

In a mechanical and highly ideological fashion all of Iran’s sins are laid out to explain why Bush does not accept Karzai’s assertion that Iran is playing a helpful role in Afghanistan. Casting doubts on the words of “our man in Kabul” (and note that Karzai is no Nuri al-Maliki and no ambiguities surround the fact that he is America’s best man to run Afghanistan; no Shi’i connections can be made and he has no history of exile in Iran), Bush says, “it's up to Iran to prove to the world that they're a stabilizing force as opposed to destabilizing force,” disingenuously giving the impression that such a proof is possible for a government that is assumed to be “not a force for good.”

In the most revealing part of his answer, Bush immediately follows the sentence that blames the Iranian government for the isolation of Iran with the contradictory statement that the US “will continue to work to isolate it. Because they're not a force for good, as far as we can see. They are a destabilizing influence, wherever they are now.”

If this is not one of the clearest statements about the inability of the Bush administration to see things as they are perceived on the ground (by American allies such as Karzai), and substituting preconceived notions of good versus evil for coherent policy, I don’t know what is.

The United States and Iran have many common interests in the Middle East and adjacent areas that include some sort of stability and order in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity (an interest Iran shares with Turkey and Syria and not necessarily with other countries in the region). It is true that Tehran does not see itself obliged to help the United States in getting a handle over the mess the latter has created in Iraq and increasingly so in Afghanistan. But this is not out of the desire to bring about instability in either of the two neighboring countries, with which it shares long and conceivably insecure borders. Iran’s approach to Iraq is more due to the sheer rationality of not rushing to help (or even causing a little bit of trouble for) a superpower that identifies Iran as “not a force for good.”

This situation can be altered with a change in American foreign policy, away from reliance on pressure (and connected economic bribes if Iran gives in to political and strategic pressures) and towards an acceptance of Iran as a worthy regional player with which one can engage in serious and meaningful negotiations on a whole host of issues. But, clearly, the language used by George Bush does not reflect a desire or willingness to bring about that kind of a change. In Bush’s world, Iran ought to help improve the security situation in Iraq or Afghanistan because the US demands it; even then it is the US that will decide whether Iran has met the expectations and not on the ground realities or what the governments of Iraq or Afghanistan think or say. Furthermore, all this should be done without the US feeling any need to change or even temporarily suspend its overall hostile frame of its policies towards Iran.

Realities on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, are slowly revealing the incoherence (or impracticality) of Bush’s policies. Karzai talks about Iran’s helpful role in Afghanistan and acts accordingly while al-Maliki’s government in Iraq pleas for the continuation of US-Iran security talks before al-Maliki himself (along with his foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari) takes off for Iran in a few days for the government of Iraq’s own security talks with Iran.

It is within this context that Iran’s moves to agree with the talks with the US over Iraq must be understood. Iran is not naïve enough to think that the Bush Administration has changed its overall strategy regarding Iran. In fact, the Iranian leadership is acutely aware of the American strategy of initiating talks in the arena in which it is in most trouble (i.e., Iraq), while at the same time maintaining the language and policies of imposing as much political and economic pressure as it can muster on Iran in other areas.

Still the belief on the part of most significant players inside Iran about a unified and stable Iraq being the key to regional stability has led to a decision to engage in talks with the United States over Iraq’s security. These talks, the third of which occurred on August 6th (including ambassadorial and expert levels talks as part of a security subcommittee), are not negotiations but attempts to create an understanding about the nature of the Iran-US conflict as it is being played out in Iraq. This time around both sides considered the talks as useful, serious, and to be continued, with Iran calling for “a change in the broad policies and approach of the US in Iraq.”

From Iran's point of view, rightly or wrongly, the United States has no other choice but to eventually engage in negotiations with Iran due to historical, geographic, strategic exigencies as well as mutual interests in the region. Banking on this confidence, the Iranian leadership no longer considers talks with the US as taboo and in fact is ready to participate in multiple venues for discussions with the US even if the overall frame of hostile US policies continues. This is a significant and often neglected change in Iranian foreign policy, sanctioned by Ayatollah Khamenei. It is based on the argument that these venues of engagement will ultimately reveal the incoherence of a policy based on the notion of Iran being “not a force for good” as well allow Iran to pursue its interests in the region.

Approached in this manner, Iranian and American interests in Iraq and Afghanistan are not perceived to be necessarily in opposition and if the US can solve its problems in these two countries in ways that would allow an “honorable” exit, this is seen to be to Iran’s interest. In the words of Sadeq Kharrazi, Iran’s former ambassador to France, Iran understands that “in leaving Iraq the Americans need to save face because their humiliation may not be constructive, making the situation in the Middle East even worse than already is and forcing them to react angrily.”

There was a time in Iran, during the reformist era of Mohammad Khatami, when the Iranian leadership thought that Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan and the negotiations over the nuclear issue would eventually open the path for a broader framework within which matters of contention between the two countries could be resolved. The Bush Administration's rejection of reformist overtures and the fiasco in Iraq set the stage for the rise of a hard-line foreign policy in Iran.

In time, however, the on the ground realities of Iraq and Afghanistan will force the US to sit down with Iran and acknowledge it as a regional player that shares many of US concerns in the region. Too bad that the beginnings of such an acknowledgment has come in a round about, almost underhanded, fashion and at a time when Iran’s foreign policy establishment is run by hardliners. One could say that hardliners in Iran could have asked for no more: an on the ground US foreign policy that is beginning to acknowledge Iran’s importance in the region, combined with an overall foreign policy frame of economic and political pressures that allow hardliners in Iran to attack domestic opponents with impunity using the pretext of American hostility. Read more on this article...

Poor Helmand Security Situation Explained: Interview

The USG Open Source Center translates an interview with a female member of parliament for Afghanistan's troubled Helmand Province, Nasima Niazi in which she explains the security problems there from a local point of view. Helmand is a major center of the Taliban resurgence and produces much of Afghanistan's poppy crop, which is turned by dealers into heroin.


"Afghan MP highlights causes of Helmand insecurity
Cheragh (Light)
Monday, August 6, 2007
Document Type: OSC Translated Text

Afghan MP highlights causes of Helmand insecurity

Text of interview by Shirin Aqa Jalali with Nasima Niazi, MP from Helmand Province, entitled "Security can be ensured in Helmand when attention is paid to people's voice" published by independent Afghan newspaper Cheragh on 5 August.

Helmand is one of Afghanistan's restive provinces with the highest level of Taleban influence. The insecurity in Helmand has different factors. The fact that Helmand borders Pakistan, the high level of poppy cultivation, the lack of attention to people's demands, and the air raids on civilians are all factors that have changed the normal situation to an emergency one in that province.

To further discuss the causes of insecurity in Helmand, we have an interview with Nasima Niazi, MP from Helmand.

(Cheragh) Please tell us about the security situation in Helmand Province.

(Nasima Niazi) Helmand is one of the restive provinces of Afghanistan. People live in fear of terror and abduction in the capital of that province. The majority of districts are in the hands of the insurgents. There is not 100 per cent rule of law in the four districts under government control. An emergency situation rules over the districts.

(Cheragh) How effective are the activities of the Afghan and foreign security forces against the Taleban?

(Nasima Niazi) Unfortunately the Afghan and foreign troops have so far had no coordination in their activities. The lack of coordination and accurate intelligence has caused civilian casualties in air raids in that province. This has created a gap between the people and the government. The lack of attention to people's demands, branding the people as Al-Qa'idah and Taleban members, and the unjust detention of innocent people are other factors behind the gap between the people and the government.

(Cheragh) Why have the Taleban chosen Helmand as the centre of their operations? Do they enjoy a high level of influence in Helmand and why? There are other provinces bordering Pakistan, but there is less Taleban influence in those provinces.

(Nasima Niazi) Helmand has a strategic location from the geographical point of view. It borders Pakistan. On the other hand, Helmand is one of the biggest provinces of Afghanistan with vast plains and highland areas. The Taleban have chosen this area as their best haven. The Taleban presence in the province is not because of a lack of government attention or lack of military operations, but the public dissatisfaction has caused the Taleban presence in the province.

(Cheragh) Why do the Taleban use the people of Helmand as human shields? Can the people not prevent this, and leave the area if their life is in danger?

(Nasima Niazi) The people cannot stop the Taleban in their areas. Secondly, Helmand is a province with a high population. A number of residents of the province earlier migrated to Lashkargah City due to air raids, but the government paid no attention to them. The other big problem is that Iran and Pakistan are also expelling Afghan refugees. The people have also invested their lives in these districts to a great extent. They therefore have to stay in the province.

(Cheragh) Do the people of Helmand not have any problems with the presence of the Taleban in their province?

(Nasima Niazi) The people have problems with the Taleban presence, and that is why they have stood against the Taleban. The government never supported them. Hundreds of the people were killed. All media sources might know about this.

(Cheragh) UN reports say Helmand produces 50 per cent of the world's opium. What measures has the government taken so far to eradicate poppy fields?

(Nasima Niazi) The lack of government rule in Helmand and the untimely counter-narcotics efforts have increased poppy cultivation instead of preventing it. The Taleban tell the people to cultivate poppy, and that they will protect their fields. Because the people have no other employment opportunities in factories, and no other sources of income, they have no other option but to cultivate poppy. Eradication campaigns usually occur when it is the harvest time.

(Cheragh) In spite of the fact that there is no security in Helmand Province, more than 200m dollars have been allocated for reconstruction and development projects in that province. How would it be possible to implement development projects when there is no security?

(Nasima Niazi) Yes, in addition to other projects, there is the Kajaki project. We still do not have the right situation for that project, but a big amount of money has been allocated for that.

We had good opportunities to work on the project in the past years, but they spent the money on other projects. Reconstruction projects would not be useful unless there is security in the province.

(Cheragh) As a public representative, what suggestions and plans have you given to the government to help improve the situation in Helmand? If you have given your plans and suggestions to the government, how far do you think the government has put the plans into practice?

(Nasima Niazi) We, all the MPs of Helmand Province have had separate meetings with the president, the ministers of defence and interior, and head of the National Security Department, to discuss the security situation in Helmand. We shared our thoughts and plans with the officials. Helmand Province would undoubtedly be in a better situation had they implemented those plans.

We suggested that the local residents of Helmand should be appointed to local government posts because they were all aware of the situation in that province and are familiar with the area. Unfortunately, this did not happen. There are circles that do not want Helmand to become secure. Paying attention to people's suggestions is the only way of improving security in Helmand. Attention should be paid to those in favour of peace in Helmand.

In addition, strengthening of the national army and police, coordination between (Afghan and foreign) forces, and finally using the experience of the people of Helmand can ensure peace in that province. Only 30 policemen could ensure security in Helmand today if they were from that province. We should not label the people with incorrect names. (Local) personalities should be respected. All these points can, in general, be helpful in addressing the problem.

(Description of Source: Kabul Cheragh (Light) in Dari -- Eight-page independent daily, publishes political, social and cultural articles; critical of the transitional government)" Read more on this article...

Monday, August 6, 2007

First reflections on the August 5 by-elections in Lebanon

Muhammad al-Amin Itani won handily in Beirut in a by-election to fill the seat of Walid Eido, who was assassinated in June. Eido was a member of the March 14 alliance, which holds a slim majority of parliamentary seats. Itani's victory was anticipated. The voters in his Beirut district are strongly supportive of Fouad Siniora's government, and many are followers of the Moustaqbal--or Future--movement associated with the late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.

The real contest was in the Metn, the Christian heartland and the home base of the Gemayel family. In that race the contest was between Amin Gemayel (Jumayyil) and Camille Khoury, who is associated with the Free Patriotic Movement of General Michel Aoun. Amin Gemayel, of course, was President of Lebanon (1982-88). He is also the father of Pierre Gemayel, who was killed last November in a gangland-style killing. When he was assassinated, Pierre was the Minister of Industry in the Siniora government.

A victory the former President Gemayel would have been an important symbolic victory by the March 14 coalition and the Siniora government. U.S. policymakers were betting that the former president would win the by-election. The hope will be unrequited. In a close election, with a turnout of less than fifty percent, the victory in the Metn went to Camille Khoury and the Aounists.

Although the U.S.-supported government in Beirut holds a slim majority in the parliament, it does not enjoy the same level of support among the Lebanese public. As I have argued in various publications, and in a variety of interviews and presentations over the past year, the opposition enjoys broader support than the U. S.-supported government.

Aoun's blood foe is Samir Geagea, who heads the Lebanese Forces, which greeted the Camille Khoury victory with the headline (in Arabic): "Congratulations to Bashar al-Asad for the victory of Aoun...." Aoun’s adversaries see him as a Syrian wedge back' into Lebanon, much like the U S. does. No doubt. Syria is happy with the result in the Metn, but it is self-deceiving to imagine that Aoun's continuing support stems merely from his (now) cordial relationship with Syria.

The general sustains his following among Lebanese Christians because many of them are disgusted by the political system, and its endemic corruption, favoritism and inefficiency. They also share the general's scathing critique of the Siniora government. Whatever one's feelings about Aoun, and I have longstanding misgivings about the general and his judgment, there is no denying that he has sustained durable popular support in Lebanon. While his alliance with Hezbollah--which precedes last summer's war--has lost him some supporters, there is a structural coherence to the opposition alliance. Indeed, were general elections held now in Lebanon, the opposition would probably capture a majority of parliamentary seats.

I hope the U.S. Secretary of State will understand the importance of what has happened in the Metn by-election. Despite hearty U.S. support, the popular support of the Siniora government is far thinner than official rhetoric in Washington suggests. Taking into account defections and the August 5th election result, the government commands only a slim majority in the parliament.

This should suggest that it is now urgent to end the stalemate that has trapped Lebanon since Aoun and Hezbollah launched demonstrations to topple the government. They faded, but they have succeeded in immobilizing the government, and the economy for eight months

Meantime, as the continuing bloody battles in northern Lebanon illustrate, the political stalemate has not frozen the ability of extremist affiliates of al-Qaeda to set up housekeeping in parts of Lebanon. Nearly 130 Lebanese soldiers have died in the course of more than two months of tough combat in and around the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in the north (recall that the population of Lebanon is only four million, so the toll of military dead is immense).

It is crucial that the political stalemate end so the Lebanese government may turn its attention to the formidable dangers that confront Lebanon. The Bush administration has tended to view Lebanon in very black and while terms, as though our allies in the Siniora government were the "good guys" while Aoun, Hezbollah and a variant of other groups were the "bad guys Sorry, but it is just not that simple.

A Lebanese presidential election looms. Emile Lahoud. extended in office by Syrian diktat in 2004, is scheduled to leave office in November. The parliament is scheduled to convene to elect a president on September 25. A quorum of two-thirds is necessary for the election to proceed. A simple majority vote is necessary an to elect a president, once a quorum has assembled.

What is needed now is a dialogue between government and opposition. The U S needs to stop blocking that dialogue. Otherwise, if the presidential election fails, we have a small hint in the Metn election of how Lebanon may split.

Fostering instability in Lebanon is not something the U.S. should wish to do right now.

Augustus Richard Norton, Boston University Read more on this article...

Taleban Deny Pakistan Complicity;
Say Losing Patience with Korean Gov't

The USG Open Source Center translates two press reports from a fundamentalist newspaper in Peshawar in which the Taleban deny the allegation of an Afghan official that Pakistani forces are helping hold the South Korean hostages; and in which they warn they are losing patience with the S. Korean government's response to their demands with regard to their hostages.

Afghan Taleban spokesman denies Pakistanis among those holding Koreans
Afghan Islamic Press
Sunday, August 5, 2007

Afghan Taleban spokesman denies Pakistanis among those holding Koreans

Text of report by private Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press news agency

Kandahar, 5 August: The Taleban have denied a statement by the governor of Ghazni. . . Taleban spokesman Qari Yusof Ahmadi gave Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) a call from an unknown location this afternoon and dismissed the statement by Ghazni Governor Merajodin Patan, who said that the South Korean hostages are now under the control of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).

He said: "The governor has plenty of good equipment. If someone was really interpreting his words into Urdu, why did he not record the conversation? If he has recorded the conversation, let him reveal it."
He added: "Merajodin Patan went to Ghazni Province full of hope, but it is now 20 days since people were taken hostage in his province and he cannot do anything about it. Therefore, he is now levelling various accusations and wants to hide his failure by words. Patan himself had said that the Americans had not allowed him to exchange the prisoners."

Qari Yusof said: "There are no Taleban from Pakistan or other country with us. They all are Afghans."

When he was asked with emphasis whether there are Pakistani Taleban with them or not, he answered: "No. The Pakistani Taleban are not free to come here. They have plenty to do in Pakistan."

It should be mentioned that the governor of Ghazni Province had said in an interview with an international media outlet that the Korean hostages are now under the control of Pakistani Taleban and ISI. As a proof of his allegation, the governor had said that when he was talking to a Taleban member by phone, the Taleban member was translating his words into Urdu for other Taleban.

(Description of Source: Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto -- Peshawar-based agency, staffed by Afghans. The agency used to have good contacts with Taliban leadership; however, since the fall of the Taliban regime, it now describes itself as independent and self-financing).

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Taleban losing patience with South Korean government - spokesman
Afghan Islamic Press
Sunday, August 5, 2007

Taleban losing patience with South Korean government - spokesman

Kandahar, 5 August: The Taleban regard South Korea's efforts for freeing the hostages as imperfect.

Taleban spokesman Qari Yusof Ahmadi gave Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) a call from an unknown location at noon and said regarding the S Korean hostages: "The South Korean government contacted us by phone again today. We are frequently told that South Korea is making efforts to convince the Americans to free the Taleban prisoners and the UN to offer the guarantee."

Qari Yusof added: "We do not consider the efforts of the S Korean government as adequate. Their efforts are defective because they have not yet officially requested the UN to offer the guarantee."
He warned: "The Taleban are now feeling hopeless about the efforts of the S Korean government. We will start killing the hostages when we become completely impatient."

When he was asked how many more days they could wait, he answered: "If we had become totally hopeless about the efforts of the South Korean government today, we could have started killing them."

(Description of Source: Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto -- Peshawar-based agency, staffed by Afghans. The agency used to have good contacts with Taliban leadership; however, since the fall of the Taliban regime, it now describes itself as independent and self-financing)

Read more on this article...

Sunday, August 5, 2007

Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan Air Strikes?

VOA reports that Afghanistan officials are alleging that Thursday's US air strikes against a Taliban position killed large numbers of civilians.

Aljazeera English television news has more on this issue of alleged civilian casualties:

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